expansion of our iron-ore resources, but specifically states that with the exception of isolated cases there is nothing to warrant the belief that new important sources of copper ore would be developed within the United States.

The McKinley bill seemingly accorded continued protection to iron at a time when its domestic ore resources were known to be expanding and simultaneously placed copper on the free list when its ore areas were delimited.

The future consumption of large quantities of copper for electrical purposes as of 1890 was clearly indicated, consequently every protective aid should have been maintained and even extended as of that time, in order to increase the domestic copper resources.

It is interesting to note on page 16 of the report submitting the McKinley bill, the following:

They are pleased to ignore the fact that one of the purposes of a protective tariff is to hinder a still larger importation of foreign produce and thus save the market from still greater depression.

Even though there were a domestic overproduction of copper, nevertheless, according to the foregoing doctrine of McKinleyism, protection should have been continued for copper as it was for many domestic industries that had surpluses available for export. The maintenance of effective duty barriers would keep out the peon and pauper produced copper of foreign lands; would have enabled all the domestic copper miners to compete for the trade of our domestic market on an equivalent economic basis.

When the Mills bill, which placed copper in ores and matte on the free list, was under consideration in 1888, we find within reports submitted by William McKinley, minority leader of the Ways and Means Committee, the following:

If the laboring men could have been heard by the committee, they would have told a story of misery during the free-trade era which might have deterred the majority even from inaugurating the policy now proposed.

It seems certain that if William McKinley had heard the tale of misery unfolded by the domestic copper miner as to their sufferings during the free-trade copper era prior to 1869, he and his committee majority might have been deterred in 1890 from inaugurating the destructive copper ore and ingot duty policy embodied in the McKinley bill.

We note that William McKinley in 1888 likewise stated the following:

The foreign market to which the Amercian producer is invited by the majority report is delusory. Our own market is the best. There is no market anywhere comparable with it. Let us first of all possess it; it is ours and we should enjoy it.

It appears that the foregoing was merely a political platitude because the author thereof in sponsoring the McKinley bill practically destroyed the duties on copper in ore and ingot; actually forced the domestic copper miner to share his home market with any foreigner that desired entrance thereto; denied the American copper miner the right to possess that which he was entitled to possess.

The passage of the McKinley bill, October 1, 1890, practically forced the copper miner to again enter the arena of foreign copper competition. This bill ruthlessly took away from the copper miner the protective equities that were accorded him after the historic tariff

struggle of 1869. This act virtually removed the mantle of protection that had wrought an economic miracle in the short space of two decades; destroyed a protective policy that had expanded the annual copper production ten times and cut the price in two.

FIXING RESPONSIBILITY FOR COPPER TARIFF LOSS

The question arises as to the copper tariff attitude of the domestic copper producer during 1888, 1889, and 1890, when the various congressional committees were assembling tariff data, and up to October 1, 1890, the date when the McKinley bill was passed.

It is evident that individuals in control of the domestic copper mining industry, which had produced an average copper value of about $36,000,000 for the years 1888, 1889, and 1890, would not be indifferent as to any or all details effecting their equities.

It certainly is strange, when scanning thousands of pages of testimony taken during these three years, to only encounter the single statement of Mr. John Stanton, a noted copper producer of the Lake Superior district, petitioning for the retention of the copper duties. One would expect to find these pages teeming with defense details. of the copper duty equities comparable with the defense offered and maintained throughout these hearings by the domestic iron ore, lead, and zinc miners in defense of their duty items. Such a defense on the part of the domestic copper miner would have quickly shattered the specious, self-serving pleas of the Canadian Copper Co. crowd, who persistently plead for destruction of the copper ore and matte duties.

It appears after scrutinizing various factors involved that the controllers of the domestic copper mining industry were indifferent as to the continuance of the copper ore and matte duties, due to certain agreements entered into with the French Copper Syndicate beginning with December, 1887. Certain of these agreements were for three years, and so far as Anaconda and certain Lake Superior and Arizona copper producers, controlling about 85 per cent of the domestic production, were concerned, their particular contracts were specially guaranteed, the guarantors being strong and independent banking factors who stood ready to fulfill these contracts, even though the syndicate failed, which it did in March, 1889. It is believed that copper continued to be delivered under said contracts until the end of 1890.

In addition to the foregoing, it appears that several of the leading domestic copper-producing companies, or their controlling stockholders, had become interested in the domestic copper and brass rolling mills, manufacturing and fabricating plants; consequently these controlling agencies were vitally interested in the duties on the manufactured product, and were indifferent as to the duties affecting copper in ores and matte and ingot. The foregoing seems to be the plausible explanation as to why the McKinley bill raised the duty on the manufactured article 29 per cent and lowered the copper miner's ore duty 80 per cent, a duty span of 109 per cent.

It appears that as of 1890 the domestic copper manufacturer was again in control of the tariff policies of the industry. The manufacturer of the eastern tidewater section was again able, after an interval

of 20 years, to maintain inordinate duties on the manufactured article and place the domestic copper miner's ingot practically on the free list.

COPPER STATISTICS, 1890-1894

Discussing the 4-year period, 1891-1894, we find that Michigan produced 35 per cent of the total copper production; that Montana produced 46 per cent, and Arizona 13 per cent thereof. These three States mined 94 per cent of the total domestic copper production for the period. This period definitely witnesseth the passing of Michigan as the leading domestic copper-producing State, an honor she had held since 1850.

CHAPTER VII

1894-1897

The tariff act of August 27, 1894, commonly referred to as the Wilson-Gorman bill, has under Schedule C, and the free list, the following paragraphs pertaining to copper:

PAR. 161. Copper in rolled plates, called braziers' copper, sheets, rods, pipes, and copper bottoms, also sheathing or yellow metal of which copper is the component material of chief value, and not composed wholly or in part of iron ungalvanized, twenty per centum ad valorem.

PAR. 177. Manufactured articles or wares, not specially provided for in this act, composed wholly or in part of any metal, and whether partly or wholly manufactured, thirty-five per centum ad valorem.

FREE LIST

PAR. 451. Copper imported in the form of ores.

PAR. 452. Old copper, fit only for manufacture, clipping from new copper, and all composition metal of which copper is a component material of chief value not specially provided for in this act.

PAR. 453. Copper, regulus, and black or coarse copper, and copper cement. PAR. 454. Copper in plates, bars, ingots, or pigs, and other forms, not manufactured, not specially provided for in this act.

From the foregoing it will be seen that the Wilson-Gorman bill placed copper in ores, regulus, old and ingots, on the free list. It will also be noted that copper in sheets was accorded 20 per cent, and manufactures not specially provided for were placed at 35 per cent. The foregoing bill had at least the economic equality decency of reducing the sheet and manufactured rates of the McKinley bill from 35 and 45 per cent, respectively, to 20 and 35 per cent.

This was the only fair thing to do, inasmuch as the manufacturer's raw material, the copper ingot, was placed on the free list.

The Wilson-Gorman bill, so far as the copper items are concerned, parallels fairly close the rates fixed by the Mills bill of 1888, the exceptions being that in the Mills bill copper in rolled plates carried a rate of 30 per cent instead of 20 per cent; clippings from new copper, 1 cent per pound; composition metal, 2 cents per pound; copper in ingots, 2 cents per pound. From the foregoing it will be seen that the Mills bill was slightly protective to the copper miner, but the WilsonGorman bill removed all protection.

We have to go back prior to 1846 to find a tariff act that placed all the copper miner's product on the free list, such as the WilsonGorman bill did in 1894.

The copper miner anticipated the treatment he received in 1894, for the reason that the political factors in charge of the WilsonGorman bill were nearly identical with those that formulated the Mills bill. The sponsors of the Mills bill in 1888 were known as definitely committed to the policy of placing all so-called raw or crude materials on the free list.

On the other hand, the Allison-McKinley bloc in 1888 were high protectionists, practically in favor of according protection to any and all articles that could be grown, manufactured or mined within the United States. The copper miner in 1890 expected special protective consideration for any and all the items pertaining to his welfare. However, it was this crowd of high protectionists that practically destroyed the copper miner's protective equities in 1890. All the Wilson-Gorman Act did was to remove these useless protective copper rates within the McKinley bill.

The tariff hearings held before the Ways and Means Committee of the House, first session, Fifty-third Congress, during the fall of 1893, contains no data pertaining to the domestic copper mining industry or tariff details relating thereto.

CHAPTER VIII

1897-1930

The copper miner's product-namely, copper in ores, regulus, old and ingots, as will be seen in Table 2-has been kept continuously on the free list from the Wilson-Gorman bill of 1894 down to the SmootHawley Act of 1930. In consequence, nothing can be gained, from a copper miner's viewpoint, by discussing in detail the five tariff acts passed since 1894. Each of these five tariff acts monotonously places the copper miner's product on the free list, and with the exception of the Underwood bill accorded most rigid and high protection for the manufactured copper article.

Since the passage of the McKinley bill, October 1, 1890, the value of domestic unprotected copper produced exceeds the combined value of all the highly protected metals-namely, lead, zinc, and aluminum-produced, from 1890 to date.

However, we particularly note the careful and continuous protection accorded lead in ores, from the McKinley bill to the SmootHawley Act. The McKinley Act carried the lead protective rate of 1864, and this rate has been maintained continuously from 1890 to date, except when reduced 50 per cent during the Wilson-Gorman and Underwood tariff periods. Whenever lead in ores has been cut by the low-duty men, the protectionists immediately restored the 1864 rate when they against controlled Congress. The maintenance of this continuous protection for the lead miner's ore product the past 66 years has brought him a fair commodity price for same. Desperate attacks, from 1890 to date have been made by the domestic lead smelting, refining, and manufacturing interests to destroy this 66-year-old protective barrier, but the lead miner, constantly alert, has fought back continuously and ably to maintain the same.

The lead miner through this continuous protection did not have to and would not countenance the encroachments of the manufacturer; the lead miner emphatically insisted on receiving a fair share of the amount paid by the domestic consumer.

It is tragic indeed that the domestic copper miner failed to exercise the same degree of protective determination shown by the lead miner from 1894 to date. The unprotected copper miner has had to accept within his home market whatever price was fixed for copper within the free-trade markets of the world. It is undeniable that if the domestic copper manufacturer during this long period would have been compelled to buy his raw material, the copper ingot, within a protected domestic market, the copper miner would have received a fair commodity price for his product; would have received a part of the increased profit increment that the highly protected manufacturer has exacted and absorbed all these years, and likewise would have insisted on the manufacturer paying a price beyond that received. for the copper ingot.

The domestic copper manufacturer during all the free trade copper years, from 1894 to date, has brought in whatever cheap foreign copper he desired, but, on the other hand, has rigidly prevented importation. of the foreign manufactured article.

The copper miner has had to accept the world free-trade price for his product within a highly protected domestic market when the copper manufacturer received a commodity price for his product.

Such protective discrimination is basically unfair. It is certainly un-American, as evidenced by the past copper tariff history or our country. Through publicizing these discriminatory factors, it appears certain that Congress will again accord economic justice to the copper miner.

CHAPTER IX

COPPER TARIFF STATEMENT

The plea necessity of the domestic copper miner for adequate protection for the product he produces is strange, indeed, when consideration is given to the fact that there is not a single product of economic importance that can be grown, manufactured, or mined within this country that is not now protected.

Within the many thousands of protected items stated in the Smoot-Hawley bill of June 17, 1930, we fail to find mention made of the copper ingot.

Within the thousand protected items listed in the metal schedule of said bill, we find that the copper ingot has been eliminated.

We do, however, find the copper ingot within the free list, midway 'twixt acids and zaffer, neighbored by oriental coir and coral from the southern seas.

The only nonferrous metals and ores within the free list are those of antimony, chromium, cobalt, nickel, and tin, all of which are mined products of foreign lands. Not a dollar's worth of these ores is mined within the United States. They are fittingly placed in the tariff category of exclusively produced foreign products, like rubber, coffee, and tea.

The only other metallic ore of any economic importance whatsoever, outside of the five mentioned aforegoing and copper ore to be found within the free list, is iron ore. We find that iron ore received continuous protection from 1874 to 1913, a period of 39 years. It is undoubtedly permitted to remain within the free list for the reason