States was producing about 91⁄2 per cent of the world's copper production; midway thereof it produced about 14% per cent, and at the end of said 20 years the United States was producing about 27 per cent of the world's copper production. These 20-year rate factors for the United States are practically identical with those stated aforegoing for the combined countries of Chile, Belgian Congo, and Canada during the period 1912-1929.

In the writer's opinion these equivalent percentage factors are not coincidental, but they are equivalent for the reason that they are due to similar copper production forces.

As of about 1869 we find Calumet & Hecla adding its tremendous copper wealth to the Lake Superior copper production, and from 1880 to 1885 we find the copper wealth of Montana and Arizona added to our domestic output. The plant facilities and copper ore reserve factors as of 1885 indicated a continuous increase in the succeeding domestic 20-year world-production rate.

As of 1912 Chile, Belgian Congo, and Canada evidenced to the world that they possessed copper ore deposits of great commercial value. As of 1920 it was well known that the three foregoing countries had developed copper ore reserves of very great value. By 1929 it was well known that the explored Rhodesian extension of the Belgian Congo ore area had added enormous copper values to the other three foreign ore reserves. At the present time it is known the world over that these foreign copper ore reserves exceed many times in world competitive value the developed ore reserves within the United States. Furthermore, the foreign plant facilities of the present and nearing completion, combined with the enormous foreign copper ore reserves already developed, indicate beyond question a continuation of the past 20-year world percentage rate increase.

There are no new ore reserve indications of this day visible within our domestic copper areas that can compare in cost or volume factors with these new foreign reserves. The United States is to-day confronted with the same degree of proportional competition from these foreign ore reserves that the domestic copper reserves of 50 years ago directed against the established copper industries within Chile, Spain, Portugal, Germany, Australia, and South Africa.

As already stated, Chile, Spain, Portugal, Australia, and South Africa, 50 years ago just as to-day, mined copper for export only. Their domestic consuming market was negligible. Consequently, as our low-cost large-volume domestic copper began to penetrate into the world channels of commerce-from behind the effective tariff barrier of 1869-it forthwith displaced the high-cost low-volume copper product from these foreign areas, the result being the virtual destruction of the copper-mining industry within all these foreign copper-producing countries, for the reason that a protective tariff would have been useless in the absence of a sufficient domestic demand for copper to maintain the domestic industry.

We further ascertain that the domestic world percentage rate of about 27 per cent as of 1885 had increased to about 50 per cent about 10 years later. Twenty years later we find the rate had increased to 55 per cent, and during the World War the domestic rate reached its maximum of 60 per cent. It was during this era of maximum percentage that the combined competition of Chile, Belgian Congo, and Canada reversed the percentage rate and forced our high-cost copper to retreat before the ever-swelling offerings of their low-cost product.

It requires no prophetic vision to foresee that the large-volume lowcost copper from these foreign areas will within the near future furnish 50 per cent, and a few years later, 60 per cent and upward of the copper requirements of the world. This foreign copper will secure control of the world's market a great deal faster to-day than did our rich copper product of 50 years ago. It has, in fact, filled the economic channels of foreign lands and already driven our domestic copper product therefrom. It has invaded our home market and brought dire distress to the domestic copper miner dependent on caring for

same.

The domestic copper miner is in a vastly different situation when confronted with foreign copper competition that the miner within the foreign nonconsuming copper countries. The foreign copper miner of 50 years ago, had, or could easily have secured, a tariff as against the foreign product, but none of these copper-producing countries consumed any copper. The placing of a tariff barrier under such circumstances was useless.

However, the domestic copper-consuming market is greater than all the other copper-consuming markets scattered here and there throughout the world. Our citizenship has a per capita copper consumption rate 15 times greater than the foreign rate. The center of this consumption factor lies only about 1,500 miles from the loci of our domestic copper-mining industries. The domestic copper miner in selling his copper ingot to his industrial brother within his own domain is not alone aiding his country in maintaining a vitally essential domestic industry, but our domestic copper miner is dealing with human and economic factors of proven value.

All the domestic copper miner has to do in order to remove the menacing foreign copper competition now enveloping him is to seek refuge behind the tariff barrier he was driven from about 40 years ago. The copper tariff pathway was marked 85 years ago, and in 1869 its way was blazed and maintained for more than two decades, during which time was founded the great copper-mining industries of the West that now produce 90 per cent of our domestic copper.

The copper mining industry of our country was initiated, maintained, and brought to a self-sustaining basis through the medium of adequate tariff protection. It is absurd to contend that the tariff medium that gave and maintained its economic life during its weak and formative period can not forthwith sustain it during its present weakened state. To claim otherwise is to disregard the past history of not alone the domestic copper mining industry, but likewise all of the other protected domestic industries.

There is no need in setting out in detail the productive capacities of Chile, Belgian Congo, Northern Rhodesia, and Canada. There is ample evidence available that Belgian Congo has now installed or about completing an annual output capacity of 600,000,000 pounds of copper. Northern Rhodesia has also completed or will soon provide an annual output capacity of about 600,000,000 pounds of copper. Chile Copper Co. can easily increase its annual output capacity to 700,000,000 pounds of copper. Braden Copper Co. can easily increase its annual capacity to 300,000,000 pounds, and Andes Copper Co. can produce 200,000,000 pounds of copper per year. In addition, it is believed that Canada will soon be able to maintain an annual output of 400,000,000 pounds of copper.

The foregoing estimated copper output capacities aggregate 2,800,000,000 pounds. This equals about 65 per cent of the world's copper production for 1929, and is 40 per cent greater than our domestic production for that year.

The foreign copper menace, so far as the domestic copper miner is concerned, is not one of the future; it is not alone strangling the domestic industry now, but it began its constrictive machinations some time ago. Relief from this destructive competition must be forthcoming immediately or the industry will suffer an irreparable injury.

CHAPTER XII

DOMESTIC COPPER-ORE RESERVES

The data pertaining to domestic copper-ore reserves has been obtained in most part from Mineral Industry for 1929. The tabulation and summary data were prepared by the writer.

The domestic copper-ore reserve data is herewith submitted in Table 4.

TABLE 4.-Domestic copper-ore reserves, 1929

The only important known domestic copper ore reserves not included in Table 4 are the Anaconda at Butte, Mont., United Verde at Jerome, Ariz., and Copper Range within the Lake Superior District, Mich. To offset these three group reserves, it will be found that certain foreign group ore reserves are not included in Table 5.

From Table 4, we ascertain that the total domestic copper ore reserves equal 1,676,323,985 tons of copper ore, having an average grade value of 1.19 per cent, and contains 39,757,807,234 pounds of copper.

We further ascertained that the loci of 93.2 per cent of the foregoing copper poundage lies about 2,600 rail miles from New York City. We also find that the loci of 6.8 per cent of said copper poundage lies about 1,350 rail miles from New York City. The average rail mile haul to New York City from the loci of all the known domestic copper poundage equals about 2,515 miles.

CHAPTER XIII

FOREIGN COPPER ORE RESERVES

The foreign ore reserve factors were obtained in most part from "Mineral Industry for 1929." The tabulation and summary were prepared by the writer.

The data pertaining to foreign copper ore reserves is herewith submitted in Table 5.

It is believed that the elimination of the Cerro de Pasco, Greene Cananea and Santiago ore reserves will about offset the copper reserves of Butte, Mont.; United Verde; Jerome, Ariz.; and certain Michigan reserves which were not included in the domestic-ore reserve estimate outlined in Table 4.

Table 5 shows that the foreign copper-ore reserves amount to 2,359,773,759 tons of 3.09 per cent copper ore containing 145,770,521,648 pounds of copper.

In order to better understand the areal distribution of the foreign copper-ore reserves, the following summary of Table 5 is submitted.

TABLE 6.-A real summary of foreign-ore reserves shown in Table 5

The consolidated areal group data pertaining to foreign copper ore reserves as set out in Table 6 shows that 99.5 per cent thereof is found within Central Africa, Chile, and Canada; only 0.5 per cent of the total is to be found scattered throughout other foreign areas.

Of the total 99.5 per cent within the aforementioned countries, we note in Table 6 that 43 per cent of the total foreign copper ore reserve is to be found in Central Africa, 47 per cent thereof in Chile and 9.5 per cent within Canada. It will be noted that 90 per cent of the foreign copper poundage is to be found in Central Africa and Chile.

Comparing domestic and foreign copper ore reserves, we note that the foreign reserve contains 3.66 times the amount of copper embraced within the domestic reserve. Furthermore, we note that the ore grade of the foreign copper ore reserve is 2.6 times the grade of the domestic reserve.

We further found that the equivalent rail miles from New York City to the loci of the Central African copper poundage equals about 1,850 miles, this being a composition of 1,250 rail miles from the loci of the copper poundage to Benguela Harbor on the West Coast of Africa, and 580 equivalent rail miles, equals 5,800 nautical miles, from Benguela to New York City.

We further ascertained that the equivalent rail miles from New York City to the loci of the Chilean copper poundage equals about 577 miles, this amount being a composition of 173 rail miles from the loci of the Chilean poundage to tidewater port and 404 equivalent rail miles, or 4,040 nautical miles from said port to New York City.

The rail haul miles from the loci of the Canadian copper ore reserve to New York City equals about 1,150 miles.

It was further ascertained that the equivalent rail-haul miles to New York City from the mean loci of the Chile and Central Africa copper poundage equals about 1,185 miles. The equivalent rail-haul miles to New York City from the mean loci of the Chile, Central Africa, and Canadian copper ore reserves equals about 1,180 miles.

It was stated during the discussion of domestic ore reserves that the distance from the loci thereof to New York City equals about 2,515 miles.

From the foregoing data we find that whereas the Chile, Central Africa, and Canadian copper-ore reserve poundage loci is only 1,180 equivalent rail miles from New York City, the loci of the domesticcopper reserve is 2,515 miles therefrom.

In other words, all this foreign competitive copper poundage can be laid down at New York City at a transportation cost of about 40 per cent of the domestic transportation cost per pound of copper.

Summarizing, we find that the foreign competitive copper poundage is 3.66 times greater than our domestic poundage and can be laid down at New York City at a transportation cost of about 40 per cent of the domestic cost.

CHAPTER XIV

COPPER IMPORTS AND EXPORTS

Copper imports are increasing far more rapidly than copper exports. A situation of this kind can only result in destruction of the domestic copper mining industry, permitting the foreigner to soon control the total vital copper necessities of our country.

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