does not concur in the existence of that power, and was supposed to entertain an opinion, that the previous assent of the States was necessary. Here was an unfortunate conflict of opinion. Here was a case for compromise and mutual concession, if the difference could be reconciled. Congress advanced so far toward a compromise as to allow the States to express their assent or dissent, but then it thought that this should be done within some limited but reasonable time; and it believed, since the bank and its branches were established for the benefit of twenty-six States, if the authorities of any one of them really could not make up their mind within that limited time, either to assent or dissent to the introduction of a branch, that it was not unreasonable, after the lapse of the appointed time, without any positive action, one way or the other, on the part of the State, to proceed as if it had assented. Now, if the power contended for by Congress really exists, it must be admitted that here was a concessiona concession according to which an unconditional power is placed under temporary restrictions-a privilege offered to the States, which was not extended to them by either of the charters of the two former banks of the United States. And I am totally at a loss to comprehend how the president reached the conclusion, that it would have been "far better to say to the States, boldy and frankly, Congress wills, and submission is demanded." Was it better for the States that the power of branching should be exerted without consulting them at all? Was it nothing to afford them an opportunity of saying whether they desired branches or not? How can it be believed, that a clause which qualifies, restricts, and limits the branching power, is more derogatory to the dignity, independence, and sovereignty of the States, than if it inexorably refused to the States any power whatever to deliberate and decide on the introduction of branches? Limited as the time was, and unconditionally as they were required to express themselves, still those States (and that probably would have been the case with the greater number) that chose to announce their assent or dissent, could do so, and get or prevent the introduction of a branch. But the president remarks, that "the State may express, after the most solemn form of legislation, its dissent, which may from time to time thereafter be repeated, in full view of its own interest, which can never be separated from the wise and beneficent operation of this government; and yet Congress may, by virtue of the last proviso, overrule its law, and upon grounds which, to such State, will appear to rest on a constructive necessity and propriety, and nothing more."

Even if the dissent of a State should be overruled, in the manner supposed by the president, how is the condition of that State worse than it would have been if the branching power had been absolutely and unconditionally asserted in the charter? There would have been, at least, the power of dissenting conceded, with a high degree of probability, that if the dissent were expressed, no branch would be introduced.

The last proviso to which the president refers is in these words: "and

provided, nevertheless, that whenever it shall become necessary and proper for carrying into execution any of the powers granted by the Constitution, to establish an office or offices in any of the States whatever, and the establishment thereof shall be directed by law, it shall be the duty of the said directors to establish such office or offices accordingly."

This proviso was intended to reserve a power to Congress to compel the bank to establish branches, if the establishment of them should be necessary to the great purposes of this government, notwithstanding the dissent of a State. If, for example, a State had once unconditionally dissented to the establishment of a branch, and afterward assented, the bank could not have been compelled, without this reservation of power, to establish the branch, however urgent the wants of the treasury might be.

The president, I think, ought to have seen, in the form and language of the proviso, the spirit of conciliation in which it was drawn, as I know. It does not assert the power; it employs the language of the Constitution itself, leaving every one free to interpret that language according to his own sense of the instrument.

Why was it deemed necessary to speak of its being "the language of the master to the vassal," of "this iron rule," that "Congress wills, and submission is demanded ?" What is this whole federal government but a mass of powers abstracted from the sovereignty of the several States, and wielded by an organized government for their common defense and general welfare, according to the grants of the Constitution? These powers are necessarily supreme; the Constitution, the acts of Congress, and treaties being so declared by the express words of the Constitution. Whenever, therefore, this government acts within the powers granted to it by the Constitution, submission and obedience are due from all; from States as well as from persons. And if this present the image of a master and a vassal, of State subjection and congressional domination, it is the Constitution, created or consented to by the States, that ordains these relations. Nor can it be said, in the contingency supposed, that an act of Congress has repealed an act of State legislation. Undoubtedly in case of a conflict between a State constitution or State law, and the Constitution of the United States, or an act of Congress passed in pursuance of it, the State Constitution or State law would yield. But it could not, at least, be formally or technically said, that the State Constitution or law was repealed. Its operation would be suspended or abrogated by the necessary predominance of the paramount authority.

The president seems to have regarded as objectionable that provision in the clause which declares, that a branch being once established, it should not afterward be withdrawn or removed without the previous consent of Congress. That provision was intended to operate both upon the bank and the States. And, considering the changes and fluctuations in public sentiment in some of the States within the last few years, was the security against them to be found in that provision unreasonable? One Legislature

might invite a branch, which the next might attempt, by penal or other legislation, to drive away. We have had such examples heretofore, and I can not think that it was unwise to profit by experience. Besides, an exactly similar provision was contained in the scheme of a bank which was reported by the Secretary of the Treasury, and to which it was understood the president had given his assent. But if I understand this message, that scheme could not have obtained his sanction, if Congress had passed it without any alteration whatever. It authorized what is termed by the president local discount, and he does not believe the Constitution confers upon Congress power to establish a bank having that faculty. He says, indeed, “I regard the bill as asserting for Congress the right to incorporate a United States bank, with power and right to establish offices of discount and deposit in the several States of this Union, with or without their consent; a principle to which I have always heretofore been opposed, and which can never obtain my sanction." I pass with pleasure from this painful theme; deeply regretting that I have been constrained so long to dwell on it.

On a former occasion I stated, that in the event of an unfortunate difference of opinion between the legislative and executive departments, the point of difference might be developed, and it would be then seen whether they could be brought to coincide in any measure corresponding with the public hopes and expectations. I regret that the president has not, in this message, favored us with a more clear and explicit exhibition of his views. It is sufficiently manifest that he is decidedly opposed to the establishment of a new bank of the United States formed after the two old models. I think it is fairly to be inferred, that the plan of the Secretary of the Treas ury could not have received his sanction. He is opposed to the passage of the bill which he has returned; but whether he would give his approbation to any bank, and, if any, what sort of a bank, is not absolutely clear. I think it may be collected from the message, with the aid or information derived through other sources, that the president would concur in the establishment of a bank whose operations should be limited to dealing in bills of exchange, to deposits, and to the supply of a circulation, excluding the power of discounting promissory notes. And I understand that some of our friends are now considering the practicability of arranging and passing a bill in conformity with the views of President Tyler. While I regret that I can take no active part in such an experiment, and must reserve to myself the right of determining, whether I can or can not vote for such a bill after I see it in its matured form, I assure my friends that they shall find no obstacle or impediment in me. On the contrary, I say to them, Go on: God speed you in any measure which will serve the country, and preserve or restore harmony and concert between the departments of government. An executive veto of a bank of the United States, after the sad experience of late years, is an event which was not anticipated by the political friends of the president; certainly not by me. But it has come upon us

with tremendous weight, and amid the greatest excitement within and without the metropolis. The question now is, What shall be done? What, under this most embarrassing and unexpected state of things, will our constituents expect of us? What is required by the duty and the dignity of Congress? I repeat, that if, after a careful examination of the executive message, a bank can be devised which will afford any remedy to existing evils, and secure the president's approbation, let the project of such a bank be presented. It shall encounter no opposition, if it should receive no support, from me.

But what further shall we do? Never, since I have enjoyed the honor of participating in the public councils of the nation, a period now of nearly thirty-five years, have I met Congress under more happy or more favorable auspices. Never have I seen a House of Representatives animated by more patriotic dispositions; more united, more determined, more businesslike. Not even that House which declared war in 1812, nor that which, in 1815-16, laid broad and deep foundations of national prosperity, in adequate provisions for a sound currency, by the establishment of a bank of the United States, for the payment of the national debt, and for the protection of American industry. This House has solved the problem of the competency of a large deliberative body to transact the public business. If happily there had existed a concurrence of opinion and cordial co-operation between the different departments of the government, and all the members of the party, we should have carried every measure contemplated at the extra session, which the people had a right to expect from our pledges, and should have been, by this time, at our respective homes.

We are disappointed in one, and an important one, of that series of measures; but shall we therefore despair? Shall we abandon ourselves to unworthy feelings and sentiments? Shall we allow ourselves to be transported by rash and intemperate passions and counsels? Shall we adjourn, and go home in disgust? No! No! No! A higher, nobler, and more patriotic career lies before us. Let us here, at the east end of Pennsylva nia avenue, do our duty, our whole duty, and nothing short of our duty, toward our common country. We have repealed the sub-treasury. We have passed a bankrupt law- -a beneficent measure of substantial and extensive relief. Let us now pass the bill for the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands, the revenue-bill, and the bill for the benefit of the oppressed people of this District. Let us do all, let us do every thing we can for the public good. If we are finally to be disappointed in our hopes of giving to the country a bank, which will once more supply it with a sound currency, still let us go home and tell our constituents, that we did all that we could under actual circumstances; and that, if we did not carry every measure for their relief, it was only because to do so was impossible. If nothing can be done at this extra session, to put upon a more stable and satisfactory basis the currency and exchanges of the country, let us hope that hereafter some way will be found to accomplish that most desirable

object, either by an amendment of the Constitution, limiting and qualifying the enormous executive power, and especially the veto, or by increased majorities in the two Houses of Congress, competent to the passage of wise and salutary laws, the president's objections notwithstanding.

This seems to me to be the course now incumbent upon us to pursue; and by conforming to it, whatever may be the result of laudable endeavors, now in progress or in contemplation in relation to a new attempt to establish a bank, we shall go home bearing no self-reproaches for neglected or abandoned duty.

REJOINDER TO MR. RIVES'S DEFENSE OF MR. TYLER.

MR. RIVES having concluded his remarks, Mr. Clay rose in rejoinder. I have no desire, said he, to prolong this unpleasant discussion; but I must say that I heard with great surprise and regret the closing remark, especially of the honorable gentleman from Virginia, as, indeed, I did many of those which preceded it. That gentleman stands in a peculiar situation. I found him several years ago in the half-way house, where he seems afraid to remain, and from which he is yet unwilling to go. I had thought, after the thorough riddling which the roof of the house had received in the breaking-up of the pet-bank system, he would have fled somewhere else for refuge; but there he still stands, solitary and alone, shivering and pelted by the pitiless storm. The sub-treasury is repealed; the pet-bank system is abandoned; the United States bank bill is vetoed; and now, when there is as complete and perfect a reunion of the purse and the sword in the hands of the executive as ever there was under General Jackson or Mr. Van Buren, the senator is for doing nothing. The senator is for going home, leaving the treasury and the country in their lawless condition! Yet no man has heretofore, more than he has, deplored and deprecated a state of things so utterly unsafe, and repugnant to all just precautions, indicated alike by sound theory and experience in free governments. And the senator talks to us about applying to the wisdom of practical men, in respect to banking, and advises further deliberation! Why, I should suppose that we are at present in the very best situation to act upon the subject. Besides the many painful years we have had for deliberation, we have been near three months almost exclusively engrossed with the very subject itself. We have heard all manner of facts, statements, and arguments in any way connected with it. We understand, it seems to me, all we ever can learn or comprehend about a national bank. And we have, at least, some conception too of what sort of one will be acceptable at the other end of the avenue. Yet now, with a vast majority of the people of the entire country crying out to us for a bank; with the people throughout the whole valley of the Mississippi rising in their majesty, and demand