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228. STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Resolution of the General Assembly, November 21, 1947 1

The General Assembly, in the exercise of its power to make recommendations relating to the powers and functions of any organs of the United Nations (Article 10 of the Charter):

Requests the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, in accordance with paragraph 2 (a) of the resolution of the General Assembly of 13 November 1947, establishing that Committee, to:

1. Consider the problem of voting in the Security Council, taking into account all proposals which have been or may be submitted by Members of the United Nations to the second session of the General Assembly or to the Interim Committee;

2. Consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate to co-operate with the Interim Committee in the study of the problem;

3. Report, with its conclusions, to the third session of the General Assembly, the report to be transmitted to the Secretary-General not later than 15 July 1948, and by the Secretary-General to the Member States and to the General Assembly;

Requests the permanent members of the Security Council to consult with one another on the problem of voting in the Security Council in order to secure agreement among them on measures to ensure the prompt and effective exercise by the Security Council of its functions.

229. THE PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL Resolution by the Interim Committee, January 9, 1948 2

WHEREAS the General Assembly, in its resolution of 21 November 1947, requested the Interim Committee, in accordance with paragraph 2 (a) of the resolution of the General Assembly of 13 November 1947, establishing the Committee, to:

"1. Consider the problem of voting in the Security Council, taking into account all proposals which have been or may be submitted by Members of the United Nations to the second session of the General Assembly or to the Interim Committee;

"2. Consult with any committee which the Security Council may designate to co-operate with the Interim Committee in the study of the problem;

"3. Report, with its conclusions, to the third session of the General Assembly, the report to be transmitted to the Secretary

1 The United States and the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1947, Department of State Publication 3024, International Organization and Conference Series III, 1, p. 163. 2U. N. Document A/AC.18/11, January 12, 1948.

General not later than 15 July 1948, and by the Secretary-General to the Member States and to the General Assembly." THE INTERIM COMMITTEE, to give effect to the request of the General Assembly,

REQUESTS the Members of the United Nations, which desire to submit proposals on the problem of voting in the Security Council, to transmit them to the Secretary-General on or before 15 March 1948;

REQUESTS the Secretary-General to circulate any and all such proposals immediately upon receipt thereof to all Members of the United Nations;

REQUESTS the Chairman of the Interim Committee to bring up for consideration the problem of voting in the Security Council when the Secretary-General shall have ascertained that all Members desiring to do so have submitted proposals, but in any case not later than 15 March 1948.

230. UNITED STATES PROPOSALS ON THE VETO QUESTION, MARCH 10, 1948 1

I. STUDY OF CATEGORIES OF SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS A. The Interim Committee should study the categories of decisions which the Security Council is required to make in carrying out the functions entrusted to it under the Charter and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, and should report to the General Assembly those categories of decisions which in its judgment, in order to ensure the effective exercise by the Security Council of its responsibilities under the Charter, should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members of the Security Council, whether or not such categories are regarded as procedural or non-procedural. (A provisional proposed list of such categories is attached.)

B. The Interim Committee should recommend to the General Assembly:

1. That the General Assembly accept the conclusions of the Interim Committee's report, and

2. That the General Assembly as a first step, recommend to the permanent members of the Security Council that they mutually agree that such voting procedures be followed and that steps be taken to make their agreement effective.

II. CONSULTATIONS AMONG PERMANENT MEMBERS

The Interim Committee should recommend to the General Assembly that, in order to improve the functioning of the Security Council, the General Assembly recommend to the permanent members of the Security Council that wherever feasible consultations should take place among them concerning important decisions to be taken by the Security Council.

1 U. N. Document A/AC.18/41, Mar. 10, 1948.

PROVISIONAL LIST OF CATEGORIES OF SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS WHICH THE UNITED STATES PROPOSES SHOULD BE MADE BY AN AFFIRMATIVE VOTE OF SEVEN MEMBERS, WHETHER OR NOT SUCH CATEGORIES ARE REGARDED AS PROCEDURAL OR NON-PROCEDURAL 1. Decisions with respect to admission of States to membership in the United Nations, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2. 2. Decisions to bring a question relating to the maintenance of international peace and security before the General Assembly pursuant to Article 11, paragraph 2.

3. Decisions to request the recommendation of the General Assembly concerning a matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security being dealt with by the Security Council, pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 1.

4. Decisions to cease dealing with a matter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security pursuant to Article 12, paragraph 2.

5. Decisions with respect to the consent of the Security Council to the notifications made by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2.

6. Decisions with respect to the request directed by the Security Council to the Secretary-General that he convoke a special session of the General Assembly under Article 20.

7. Submission of annual and special reports from the Security Council to the General Assembly pursuant to Article 24, paragraph 3.

8. Decisions of the Security Council as to whether a matter is procedural within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph 2. 9. Determination of the parties to a dispute and the existence of a dispute for the purpose of deciding whether a member of the Security Council shall be required to abstain from voting, pursuant to Article 27, paragraph 3.

10. Decisions concerning the manner of the organization of the Security Council pursuant to Article 28, paragraph 1.

11. Decisions concerning the time and place of its regular and periodic meetings pursuant to Article 28, paragraph 2 and Article 28, paragraph 3.

12. Establishment of subsidiary organs pursuant to Article 29. 13. The election of a President pursuant to Article 30.

14. Adoption of rules of procedure pursuant to Article 30.

15. Decisions to permit the participation of members of the United Nations in the discussion of any question where the Council considers that the interests of the member are specially affected pursuant to Article 31.

16. Decisions to invite a Member State which is not a member of the Security Council or a State not a member of the United Nations which is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Council to participate without vote in the discussion relating to the dispute pursuant to Article 32.

17. Decisions with respect to conditions for the participation of a State which is not a member of the United Nations in the Security Council discussions in accordance with Article 32. 18. Decisions to consider and discuss a matter brought to the attention of the Council.

19. Decisions to call upon the parties to a dispute to settle their dispute by peaceful means of their own choice pursuant to Article 33, paragraph 2.

20. Decisions to investigate a dispute or a situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, pursuant to Article 34.

21. Decisions to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment of a dispute or situation endangering the maintenance of international peace and security, pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 1.

22. Decisions of the Security Council pursuant to Article 36, paragraph 3, to recommend to the parties to a legal dispute that the dispute should be referred by the parties to the International Court of Justice in accordance with provisions of the Statute of the Court.

23. Decisions to make recommendations at the request of all parties to a dispute with a view to its pacific settlement, pursuant to Article 38. 24. Decisions to request assistance from the Economic and Social Council pursuant to Article 65.

25. Reference of a legal question to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion pursuant to Article 96, paragraph 1.

26. Decision to convoke a conference to review the Charter prior to the tenth annual session of the General Assembly pursuant to Article 109, paragraph 1.

27. Decision to convoke a conference to review the Charter subsequent to the tenth annual session of the General Assembly pursuant to Article 109, paragraph 3.

*28. Election of judges of the International Court of Justice pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 1, Article 10, paragraph 1, of the Statute of the Court. (Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Statute). 29. Decisions of the Security Council determining the conditions under which a State which is a party to the present Statute of the International Court of Justice, but which is not a member of the United Nations, may participate in electing the members of the Court pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 3, of the Statute of the Court.

*30. Appointment of conferees in connection with election of judges of the International Court of Justice pursuant to Article 12 of the Statute of the Court. (Article 10, paragraph 2, of the Statute).

31. Determination of the date of election of judges of the International Court of Justice pursuant to Article 14 of the Statute of the Court.

These decisions are made by "an absolute majority of votes in the General Assembly and in the Security Council."

231. THE PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Statement by Warren R. Austin, United States Representative to the United Nations, April 13, 1949 1

1

The General Assembly has before it at this time a resolution relating to the voting procedures of the Security Council approved by the Ad Hoc Political Committee on December 10, 1948, in Paris.

The exercise of the veto power on a number of occasions has seriously undermined the confidence of member states in the ability of the Security Council to maintain international peace and security. The chronic disagreement and deadlock in the United Nations is a matter of deepest concern to all those who wish to see this organization function as it was intended-as an effective instrument to safeguard our common interests in peace and security. The use of the veto and the threat of its use are symptoms of the prevailing disagreement.

All members of the United Nations have assumed definite obligations in the Charter. These obligations constitute the law of the Charter binding upon all nations, large and small. The permanent members of the Security Council cannot, through their special voting position, evade or nullify these obligations. They cannot use their privileged vote granted by the Charter, to defeat the Charter. Under article 2, for example, all members are bound to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. If a permanent member attempts to destroy through force, the political independence of his neighbor contrary to this obligation, the responsibility for the violation cannot be avoided or obscured through the casting of a negative vote when the victim takes the aggression before the Council. The permanent member, through the exercise of the veto, cannot deprive members of the right to defend themselves, nor take away the legal right or moral duty of other members to come to the aid of the victim in defense of the Charter.

The practice of the veto is the very reverse of the unanimity principle in the Security Council. Instead of leading to agreement, it aggravates differences. It provokes ill will and undermines friendly relations among states upon which the peace of the world depends. We must reject the idea that if unanimity fails the will of one, however arbitrary, prevails over the will of many, however reasonable. The unanimity principle cannot work where agreement is offered only on condition that the will of the most intransigent member must prevail.

To insist on the exercise of the veto regardless of its effects on the organized international community and to reject any efforts to regulate its application under the Charter, in the light of experience, is to stand in the way of effective progress by the United Nations.

Looking now to the immediate problem of improving the functioning of the Security Council, we have before us a resolution which was jointly sponsored in the Ad Hoc Political Committee by four of the permanent members of the Security Council-all except the Soviet Union. The resolution incorporates the substance of the recommenda

1 Department of State Bulletin of April 24, 1949, pp. 512-515. Bulletin of January 23, 1949, p. 99.

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