tions of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly. You will recall that the second session of the General Assembly in 1947 requested the Interim Committee to make a careful study of this problem of voting procedures and to report with its conclusions. Two sessions of the General Assembly had considered and debated this problem. A majority of the member nations had reached the conclusion that the effectiveness of the Security Council to fulfill its proper function in the United Nations was being jeopardized by the abuse of the veto power by one of the permanent members of the Security Council. There was, however, little agreement on what measures could appropriately be taken to improve the situation. Under the circumstances it was considered desirable that the entire matter be thoroughly studied in a nonpolitical atmosphere with a view to bringing about a better understanding on the part of all concerned as to the political and technical problems involved. It was hoped that such a study would throw more light on the problem with less generation of heat than would be possible in the General Assembly itself. It would also bring to light much more clearly the exact areas of agreement and disagreement among the various member nations.

The results of the study are now before us. Even a superficial perusal of the resolution of the Ad Hoc Committee must disclose that it is not designed to alter fundamentally the unanimity principle as it is embodied in the Charter. A very great majority of the members of the United Nations have expressed the view either explicitly or implicitly that the unanimity principle is and should remain a fundamental principle of the Charter. A majority of the members of the United Nations are opposed to any effort being made at this time to amend the Charter.

On the other hand, there is a large majority of the members of the United Nations who are making an anxious effort to design ways and means of giving life to the unanimity principle and making it work so that the Security Council can carry out its function effectively. The working of this principle requires an effort on the part of all members of the United Nations and particularly the permanent members of the Security Council to reconcile their divergent views on the basis of tolerance and mutual understanding.

The resolution before us sets us on the path toward this objective. It represents a policy of gradual liberalization of the voting procedures of the Security Council through processes of interpretation and application of the principles of the Charter and through agreement of the members of the Security Council. We rely on processes of discussion, definition, regulation, and practice to move us forward toward our objective and not upon revolutionary change. We recommend restraint and self-discipline to member nations in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Charter as an appropriate means of giving life to the unanimity principle and keeping it within proper bounds.

In our view the proposals now before us are most moderate. They are designed to be within the limits of what is practicable under prevailing world conditions. We firmly believe that if the members of the United Nations would cooperate in carrying out the program presented in these proposals we would quickly see substantial improvement in the effectiveness of the Security Council's operations. You will recall that efforts by the Assembly along similar lines in 1946

have resulted in a substantial improvement. I refer to the suggestions made by several members of the Assembly during the debates that abstention of a permanent member of the Security Council should not be considered a veto. That practice was adopted by common consent in the Security Council and has now become a well-accepted Security Council procedure. I believe all of you will agree that the adoption of this practice has substantially added to the effectiveness of the Security Council. A number of important decisions of the Council during the past two years has been approved with one or more of the permanent members abstaining. At least one Security Council decision under chapter VII and one decision recommending a state for membership has been approved with a permanent member abstaining.

Let us now look at this resolution in more detail. The work of the Interim Committee on which the resolution is based revealed the great potentialities which can be progressively realized under the present Charter if there can be general agreement upon a moderate course. By adoption of this resolution, the Assembly would make an important decision to the effect that 34 specified and described decisions of the Security Council are procedural. This effect would principally arise out of the first paragraph-"Recommends to the members of the Security Council that, without prejudice to other decisions which the Security Council may deem procedural, the decisions set forth in the attached Annex be deemed procedural and that the members of the Security Council conduct their business accordingly:"

The principal criteria for placing these 34 items in the category of decisions deemed procedural were

(a) Decisions under procedure provisions of the Charter;

(b) Decisions relating to the internal procedure of the United Nations;

(c) Decisions relating to internal functioning of the Security Council;

(d) Decisions analogous to the foregoing;

(e) Decisions which implement procedural decisions.

In short, the Interim Committee, after a thorough study, concluded that these decisions are procedural in the light of the express language of the Charter, and of sound Charter interpretation.

This first paragraph is concerned with the reversal of a tendency toward an unwarranted extension of the veto to areas where its application was never contemplated by the Charter. Its purpose is, also, to eliminate undisciplined use of the veto contrary to the assumptions and understanding under which the privileged vote was accorded to the permanent members. This first paragraph is simply an interpretation of the Charter according to its letter and spirit. It amounts to saying to the Security Council: "The proper interpretation of the Charter forbids stultification of the Security Council in the cases described." In a word, the effect of this paragraph of the resolution is to keep certain enumerated types of decision in the category of procedural. Its main objective, of course, is to give life to the purposes and principles of the United Nations in accordance with which the Security Council must act in the discharge of its duties.

1 Documents and State Papers, August 1948, p. 340.

This resolution, especially paragraph 1, would be affected by the structural relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council. Article 24 provides:

"In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf."

This general grant of functions and powers, far beyond the specific grants found in chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII, is definitely characterized by the very next paragraph of the Charter:

"In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. .

This is mandatory. Conversely, article 25 provides:

"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."

In the light of the relationship between the Security Council and the General Assembly, by which all members are represented, a recommendation of this nature coming from the General Assembly will no doubt receive particular attention from the members sitting on the Security Council.

This first paragraph does not abridge the unanimity rule of voting. On the contrary, it gives it life-vitality. As I have said, it would make the Security Council efficient with respect to matters in which it is sometimes now stultified. It is proposed at this time because the three years of practice in the Security Council has developed an unforeseen and willful use of the veto based on minority interpretation, contrary to majority decision.

Now I shall advance to paragraph 2 of the resolution. It contains a recommendation to the permanent members of the Security Council that they seek agreement among themselves upon what possible decisions of the Security Council they might forbear to exercise their veto when seven affirmative votes are cast in the Council in support of such decisions. In seeking agreement, the permanent members are to give favorable consideration to the list of decisions compiled by the Interim Committee. The theory upon which the Interim Committee prepared this list was that if the permanent members could agree to refrain from using their veto with reference to such decisions, the Security Council would be able to perform its responsibilities more promptly and effectively. The types of decision dealt with here thus differ from those contained in the first recommendation because some of them are unquestionably of substance while as to others there may be differing views upon whether they are substantive or procedural. Indeed, the Interim Committee has indicated clearly that the insertion of decisions in this list was not governed by the criterion of their procedural or nonprocedural character. The most important decisions contained in this list are not procedural, such as, for example, the decision on the admission of a new member and certain pacific settlement matters under chapter VI of the Charter. In this connection, I would recall that the United States is on record as favoring a liberalization of the voting procedure of the Security Council through

elimination by whatever means that may be appropriate of the unanimity requirement with respect to applications for membership and to matters arising under chapter VI of the Charter.

Neither the first nor the second recommendation in the resolution before us violates the spirit of the statement of the four sponsoring powers at San Francisco. During the debate there upon the voting formula, a questionnaire was addressed to the sponsoring powers by the smaller powers. The sponsoring powers thereupon undertook to make a joint interpretation of the voting formula, insofar as such an interpretation of a basic constitutional provision could appropriately be made in advance of its adoption, and in the absence of any practical experience as to the operation of the Organization or of the Security Council. This statement is not a treaty, nor was it intended to be any part of the treaty which is the Charter. By its own words it is characterized as a "statement of their general attitude toward the whole question of unanimity of permanent members in the decisions of the Security Council." It was connected with the act of agreement upon the Charter and is therefore entitled to great weight in that connection. It is nevertheless inferior to the Charter and must be subservient to its principles and purposes. Certainly its natural meaning should not be extended by willful obstruction.

The four-power statement contained an expression of hope that there would not arise matters of great importance upon which a decision would have to be made as to whether a procedural vote would apply. Experience since San Francisco has shown that this optimistic expectation has not been realized, and the first recommendation is based on a recognition of this fact. This recommendation should be of assistance to the Security Council in determining whether or not a question is procedural: The four-power statement made it clear that the enumeration of procedural questions which it contained was not exclusive. Furthermore, it in no way foreclosed advance agreement as to what questions should be considered procedural. It did not say that a question should be considered nonprocedural simply because one of the permanent members so regards it. The four-power statement cannot enjoy a position of supremacy over the Charter.

The four-power statement contained another explicit assumption, which has proved contrary to fact; that the permanent members would not use their privileged vote "willfully to obstruct the operation of the Council." The powers participating in the statement thus recognized that self-restraint upon the part of the permanent members was necessary and to be expected if the Security Council was to function as intended. If this be true it would seem quite proper for the Assembly in light of experience to recommend to the permanent members that if they are unable, after genuine effort, to achieve unanimity among themselves on certain decisions not immediately concerning their vital interests they should agree among themselves not to exercise the veto in those decisions. Such agreement among the permanent members is the objective of the second recommendation. For the reasons I have stated, the four-power statement in the view of my Government constitutes no barrier to such agreement. The parties to that statement are free to explore, as this resolution attempts to do, how better voting procedures can be put into operation.

The third recommendation of the draft resolution suggests to the permanent members a "code of conduct" which they should observe in

connection with their privileged vote. They are to consult together whatever feasible and to exercise their veto only when they consider a question of vital importance, taking into account the interests of the United Nations as a whole, and to state upon what ground they consider this condition to be present.

All permanent members are on record as favoring consultations. We believe that these consultations should take place whenever there is a possibility of obtaining constructive results. These consultations should take place not only with reference to specific matters before the Council; above all, the method of consultation should be applied as one of the means of implementing the recommendations contained in the draft resolution.

This resolution was sponsored by four permanent members and aroused the support of an impressive number of member states. The vote in the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly was yeas 33, nays 6, abstentions 4.

It ought to gain strength in the vote of the General Assembly. Its purpose and natural tendency is to make the United Nations more effective in its vital functions.

232. THE PROBLEM OF VOTING IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL1

Resolution of the General Assembly, April 14, 1949

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of its Interim Committee on the problem of voting in the Security Council, and

Exercising the authority conferred upon it by Article 10 of the Charter to discuss any question within the scope of the Charter or relating to the functions of any organ of the United Nations and to make recommendations to the Members of the United Nations and to the Security Council thereon,

1. Recommends to the members of the Security Council that, without prejudice to any other decisions which the Security Council may deem procedural, the decisions set forth in the attached annex be deemed procedural and that the members of the Security Council conduct their business accordingly;

2. Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council that they seek agreement among themselves upon what possible decisions by the Security Council they might forbear to exercise their veto, when seven affirmative votes have already been cast in the Council, giving favourable consideration to the list of such decisions contained in conclusion 2 of part IV of the report of the Interim Committee;

3. Recommends to the permanent members of the Security Council, in order to avoid impairment of the usefulness and prestige of the Council through excessive use of the veto:

(a) To consult together wherever feasible upon important decisions to be taken by the Security Council;

(b) To consult together wherever feasible before a vote is taken if their unanimity is essential to effective action by the Security Council;

Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part II, 5 April-18 May 1949, p. 7. 98756-50-69