2. Consequences of such violations, including the procedures to be followed in detecting, establishing, remedying or punishing such violations: (a) Administrative action by the Authority. (1) Special investigations. (2) Revocation or denial of licenses. (3) Other action. (b) Resort to judicial processes and procedures. (c) Reference of serious violations to the Security Council of the United Nations. H. The following additional topics should be provided for in the treaty: 1. Legal capacity and privileges and immunities of the Authority in the territory of each signatory State. 2. Privileges and immunities of officials of the Authority. 3. Accountability of the Authority and its officials, and the scope of, and procedure for, review of their actions. 4. Method of financing the Authority. 5. Procedure for determination of the prices and quotas which the Authority should employ in the sale or lease of atomic energy materials or by-products. 6. Procedure for determination of the compensation to be made by the Authority in acquiring atomic energy supplies and facilities. 7. Measures to insure adequate protection and strategic location of the premises and property of the Authority. 8. Definitions of terms used in the treaty and charter. Note on order in which topics should be considered: Consideration of the charter first would afford an understanding of the functions to be performed by the Authority and would facilitate agreement upon the other provisions of the treaty. 238. UNITED STATES MEMORANDUM NO. 2, DEALING WITH THE FUNCTIONS AND POWERS OF THE PROPOSED ATOMIC DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, JULY 5, 19461 1. A fundamental element of the United States plan for control of atomic energy is an international Atomic Development Authority with the dual functions of: (a) preventing the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes; (b) promoting the peaceful applications of atomic energy and its by-products for the material benefit of the peoples of the world and as a contribution to their science and culture. 2. A few very basic facts afford the opportunity, and determine the pattern, for control of atomic energy. One is that the nuclear chain reaction, essential to the release of atomic energy in any form, requires the presence of uranium alone or in combination with thorium to produce fissionable material. Available knowledge indicates that this requirement is likely to prevail for a considerable time. Another important fact is that all of the initial processes in the production The International Control of Atomic Energy: Growth of a Policy, Department of State Publication 2702, pp. 152-159. of these fissionable materials and certain subsequent ones are identical whether their intended use or purpose is beneficent or dangerous. The conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that the core of any system for control of atomic energy is effective dominion over all uranium and thorium and their fissionable derivatives. The degree of effectiveness of such controls over these fissionable materials is the measure of the success of our undertaking. To be fully effective, such controls must attach firmly to all uranium and thorium from the moment they are produced and must remain in effect so long as they exist in a state or quantity susceptible of dangerous use. Any uranium or thorium in unauthorized hands is a threat to the entire system of control and thus to the maintenance of peace. Since the exploitation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes necessitates operations which are, in the initial stages, identical with those needed to make atomic energy available for destructive purposes, both of these functions (1a and 1b above) should be assigned to the same agency. Furthermore, an international agency with responsibilities for fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy, as well as responsibilities for preventing its misuse, will be more effective, constructive, and workable than if it has merely duties of inspection and policing. The activities of such an agency might even result in establishing beneficial patterns of international co-operation of a new and hopeful kind. In discussing the powers and functions of the Authority, it is helpful to distinguish between operations which are "safe" and those which are "dangerous" from the point of view of mis-application of facilities for the accomplishment of destructive ends. 3. The functions and powers of the Authority will be exercised in a variety of ways and by various means. It is impossible at this time to catalogue completely the exact forms of control which the Authority will need to employ. In general, they fall into the categories of ownership, managerial control, supervision, leasing, licensing, and inspection. The Authority should, of course, be given wide power and discretion as to the particular means or combinations thereof which it deems best adapted to the accomplishment of its functions. 4. Section F of the memorandum submitted to sub-committee No. 1 by the United States Delegation on 2 July 1946, sets forth a partial list of functions and powers of the control agency. The following, arranged in the order of presentation contained in said memorandum, is submitted, in response to the request of our Chairman, by way of explanation and amplification of the operation of these controls: "(a) To obtain and maintain complete and exclusive control or ownership of all uranium, thorium, and other material which may be a source of atomic energy wherever present in potentially dangerous quantities whether in raw material, byproduct, processed, or other form." Initial control, at the source, of the basic materials on which atomic energy depends provides the fundamental basis for protection and facilitates control over all subsequent processing of these materials. Complete control of such basic materials is essential to the successful functioning of the Authority. Uranium is, so far as we now know, the only substance occurring in nature in significant quantities which can maintain a chain reaction. However, thorium in combination with uranium or its derivative plutonium, may well be useful in manufacturing chain-reacting, fissionable material. Therefore, we propose that the Authority be empowered to exercise such measures of control over the mining and processing of both uranium and thorium, as to assure its ownership of all stocks of both of these materials. In so far as exercising actual control over natural deposits of uranium and thorium ores is concerned, the precise pattern of control suitable for various types of deposits of such materials will have to depend on the geological, mining, refining, and economic facts involved in different situations. The Authority, in short, must have such control of mining and concentrating operations as will assure its complete and absolute ownership of all uranium and thorium actually produced. There must be no possibility of diversion from the moment the ore is removed from the ground, and the Authority must set up such actual measures of control as will assure this result. "(b) To conduct continuous investigations and surveys of sources of atomic energy throughout the world, in aid of the proper exercise of the foregoing and the Authority's other functions and powers.' The Authority should have as one of its earliest purposes to obtain and maintain complete and accurate information on world supplies of uranium and thorium. Such information as is now available is admittedly inadequate. It must be made complete and accurate and so maintained. Furthermore, the Authority should be empowered to search out new deposits and to expand its knowledge of world supplies of such materials through such surveying and prospecting activities as it may deem necessary. As a result of its own efforts and from information furnished to it by others, the Authority should keep currently informed on the discovery of new deposits. "(c) To acquire, construct, own, and exclusively operate all facilities for the production of U-235, plutonium, and such other fissionable materials as may be specified by the Authority, and to maintain supplies of fissionable materials adequate to fulfill the purposes of the Authority." A primary purpose of the Authority is to prevent illicit use of fissionable materials. It can do this most certainly, most easily, and with least interference with political considerations and industrial operations if it is the sole manufacturer and owner of such materials. Therefore, it should own and operate all primary production facilities for the manufacture of U-235, plutonium, and such other materials as the Authority may determine. As an exception to the foregoing, the Authority may license others to operate facilities which are capable of producing only small quantities of fissionable material and which in the judgment of the Authority do not permit the accumulation of dangerous stockpiles of atomic explosives. The Authority will thus have control of the locations of primary production plants and of any stockpiles of materials. The geographical distribution of such plants and stockpiles should be determined in accordance with principles to be specified in the charter. With the Authority having the sole right to manufacture fissionable materials, any attempt by others to carry on such operations, or to seize the Authority's facilities, whatever the announced intent, would, of itself, constitute a grave violation. Title to all fissionable materials, and final control over their use should remain at all times with the Authority. The Authority should be empowered to use fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, and to lease such materials for use by others under conditions which it deems safe, and subject to such controls as it deems necessary. "(d) To define and determine, in the manner set forth in the charter, any other facilities or activities in the field of atomic energy which would be dangerous unless controlled by the Authority, and to supervise and have complete managerial control of all such activities and facilities." The development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes follows in much of its course a path parallel with the development of atomic weapons. Therefore, it is essential that the Authority have complete control of all operations which might facilitate atomic weapon production. This requires that the Authority also have the power to determine, and adjust from time to time, based on increased knowledge, the dividing line between "safe" and "dangerous" activities as new conditions demand. It is important to emphasize the complicated and varying considerations involved in determining this dividing line. Control of "dangerous" activities should be carried out to the greatest extent possible through direct operation by the Authority. An organization which is actively carrying out an operation is in a much better position to prevent diversion of material than one which merely exercises inspection and policing functions. Furthermore, while the Authority must have full power to conduct such inspection and policing activities as are necessary, the fact that it alone carries on the critical operations will reduce inspection to manageable scope, and render control of atomic energy less burdensome and irritating to nations and their citizens. "(e) To have unhindered access to, and power to control, license, and inspect all other facilities which possess, utilize, or produce materials which are a source of atomic energy, and all other activities which utilize or produce, or are capable of utilizing or producing, atomic energy." As covered under (c) above, the Authority may lease fissionable material exclusively for peaceful purposes under proper safeguards. In all such instances, the Authority should have unhindered access to these installations and such control and opportunity for inspection as it deems necessary to prevent misuse. The Authority may permit others to operate, under such license and control as it deems suitable, research, experimental or other installations which would produce non-dangerous amounts of fissionable materials, provided, however, that the Authority cannot under any circumstances license others to conduct research on the utilization of atomic energy for explosives. "(f) To have the exclusive right of research in the field of atomic explosives." The Authority should have the sole right to conduct research on atomic explosives. Such research is necessary in order to keep the Authority in the forefront of knowledge in this field. This exclusive right of research does not carry with it the right to stockpile atomic weapons. This is a separate matter to be dealt with in the treaty. The above provisions assume that the treaty will include agreements forbidding any nation, its agents, instrumentalities, and citizens from engaging in research in the field of atomic explosives. "(g) To foster and promote the non-dangerous use and wide distribution of atomic energy for beneficial purposes under licenses or other suitable arrangements established by the Authority." While it is a prime purpose of the Authority to prevent national development or use of atomic armament, it is of importance that it foster and promote to the maximum degree scientific research, engineering development, and peaceful utilization of atomic energy for the good of mankind. To this end, the Authority should: 1. conduct scientific research in this field with its own facilities, 2. encourage and assist others to conduct non-dangerous develop- is obviously impossible to foresee at this time what all such uses may be. One of these which has been discussed is the generation of power. In the operation of nuclear reactors for the production of plutonium, heat is produced in considerable quantities. The large reactors now in existence are not designed to operate at high enough temperatures to produce heat energy usable as a source of power. However, it seems possible that reactors for production of fissionable material might be so designed that they would produce usable power as a by-product. Since the Authority will own and operate all reactors producing "dangerous" amounts of fissionable material, it follows that the Authority may itself become a producer of power. Power so produced could be turned over or sold to existing or future power systems for final distribution. This is a very complex problem. It would have to be done in accordance with principles contained in the charter and in conjunction with the geographical distribution of plants referred to in (c) above. The Authority may also be empowered to lease to others dilute or so-called "denatured" fissionable material in sufficient quantities to permit them to operate atomic power plants without hazard to peace. In such cases, the Authority would have to exercise control over the design of the atomic energy-producing part of the power plants, to prevent the possibility of conversion to "dangerous" use, to facilitate inspection, and to insure safety to personnel. The Authority should also be prepared to render engineering assistance to achieve maximum efficiency of power units. Their design, construction and operation should at all times be under Authority inspection. Such power plants must operate under license from the Authority and must use |