urged the Soviet Delegation to submit proposals which would meet this objection, but despite our urging no new proposal has been offered us by the Soviet Delegation.

It is clear now that no agreement can be reached on the Austrian treaty if the Soviet Delegation is unwilling to make any greater effort than it has made so far to reach an understanding on German assets in Austria. Unless, therefore, the Soviet Delegation has some concrete proposal to make on this subject, which will make clear that German assets do not include assets which in justice and equity should be restored to non-Germans, we must accept the fact that further progress in the Austrian treaty is impossible at this conference.

I have one further suggestion to make. If we are unable to reconcile our views before the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations in September, I hope that we may join in asking the General Assembly to make recommendations on this subject under article 14. It is our view that we should not permit differences among us to deny to Austria her independence and her right to be free from the burdens of occupation.

107. LONDON MEETING OF THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS, NOVEMBER 25-DECEMBER 15, 1947: STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY MARSHALL 1

1

(a) Questions Addressed to the Soviet Union Regarding German Assets in Austria, December 4, 1947

For nearly two years we have been struggling to achieve agreement on a treaty for Austria.

While there have been many problems, the greatest obstacle to progress has been our failure to agree on what assets in Austria are German and thus subject to transfer under the Potsdam agreement. We have tried to meet this problem by agreeing on the meaning of the words "German assets". The definition has been argued and discussed in numerous and prolonged conferences, without agreement.

Then we appointed a commission to meet in Vienna and consider this and other treaty problems. For five months the commission collected, studied, and discussed the concrete facts on German assets in Austria. As a result, three Powers arrived at substantial agreement as to what constitutes legitimate German assets in Austria-and found themselves in substantial disagreement with what the Soviet Union has chosen to regard as German assets transferable to it.

In the closing days of the Vienna conference, the French introduced an outline of a proposal for a concrete settlement of the Germanassets problem. It was not discussed in Vienna but was referred to our deputies here. It has been discussed and considered by them at their meetings. Now they report to us no agreement either in principle or in fact. We must find a solution to this interminable conflict between Soviet claims to German assets in Austria and our declared objective to establish a free and independent Austria. So I ask, "What is to be done now?"

Department of State Bulletin, December 14, 1947, pp. 1183-1184. See also report by Secretary Marshall on the London Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, printed under II, Postwar Conferences.

I have several questions to ask in order to clarify the problem and give us some prospect of completing the treaty:

Does the Soviet Delegation now have any proposal to resolve the differences, other than that the three western Powers reverse their firm convictions and agree to the Soviet position on German assets?

Does the Soviet Union repudiate the Moscow declaration regarding the reestablishment of a free and independent Austria?

Exactly what is it that the Soviet Union wants from Austria? What properties, interests, or values does it regard as bona fide German assets in Austria?

Does the Soviet Union agree that German assets shall remain wholly subject to Austrian law, and, if not, what special exceptions or privileges are asked at the expense of Austrian sovereignty?

So far as I know the Soviet Union has never stated its claim in specific terms. Both the Austrian people and the Allies are entitled to know what that claim is. I ask for it now.

(b) Extraterritorial Status of German Assets in Austria Not Defined, December 4, 1947

Regarding the statement of the Soviet Union's beneficent purposes and actions in Austria and the American program of enslavement, I will only repeat my remark of the other day that I do not think Mr. Molotov could possibly convince me that he really believed his allegations and implications.

The distortion of United States motives just made we have all heard before. I stated recently that there was no foundation whatsoever for such charges. I now repeat that statement, but beyond that categorical denial I will not take the time of my colleagues by engaging in futile and, I feel, unseemly name calling and propaganda attacks, so wholly out of place when we are, I assume, endeavoring to proceed on a basis of calm and reasonable discussion of these questions of vast importance to all the world and not merely to the four countries we have the honor of representing. We all are aware of the real purpose of attacks of this nature. Indeed, it has been announced. It is to disrupt the great cooperative movement that is being launched for the economic recovery of Europe.

The Soviet Union has stated that the Soviet position is based on Potsdam. It is not the intention of the Government of the United States to repudiate any of its international commitments, including the Potsdam agreement. But it is likewise not the intention of the Government of the United States to allow any agreement to be distorted to accomplish purposes which most certainly were not the intentions of original signatories.

There is no mysterious reason why Four-Power agreement has not so far been achieved on German assets in Austria. There is the matter of amount.

The Soviet Delegation has consistently declined to specify its demands, but if we take the Soviet so-called "definition" of German assets at its face value, as set forth in the report which the Austrian Treaty Commission has presented to us, the Soviet Union appears to be claiming an amount and number of properties which, in the opinion of the United States Delegation, is far more than was awarded at Potsdam.

In substance, the Soviet Union appears to claim all assets in eastern Austria to which Germans held any kind of title, regardless of how that title was acquired. Yet it is abundantly clear that Hitler's Germany, as a result of the annexation of Austria, acquired extensive property interests in Austria by the abuse of power, by duress, by Aryanization, by involuntary transfer, and by the discriminatory interpretation and application of laws. It forced the transfer into German hands of a substantial part of the economic wealth of the country. Any claims for German assets based on German ownership acquired by any of these means are clearly outside the scope and intent of the Berlin protocol.

There is the equally important question of the extraterritorial status of those assets:

I would emphasize that nowhere under the Potsdam agreement is there given any power the right to demand or receive extraterritorial rights with respect to any properties which may be transferred to it as German assets.1

JAPAN 2

108. DECLARATION OF WAR WITH JAPAN, DECEMBER 8, 1941 JOINT RESOLUTION Declaring That a State of War Exists Between The Imperial Government of Japan and the Government and the People of the United States and Making Provisions to Prosecute the Same3

Whereas the Imperial Government of Japan has committed unprovoked acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America: Therefore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the state of war between the United States and the Imperial Government of Japan which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and the President is hereby authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the Government to carry on war against the Imperial Government of Japan; and, to bring the conflict to a successful termination, all of the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

Approved, December 8, 1941, 4:10 p. m., E. S. T.

109. INSTRUMENT OF SURRENDER, SEPTEMBER 2, 1945 1 We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Head

1 For communiqué and statement by President Truman on the Paris meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, May 23-June 20, 1949, see part II, Conferences on the Peace Settlement.

For more comprehensive treatment of this subject, including documents, see Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress, Department of State publication 2671, Far Eastern Series 17; Activities of the Far Eastern Commission: Report by the Secretary General, Department of State publication 2888, Far Eastern Series 24; Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Two Years of Occupation, General Headquarters, August 1947.

* 55 Stat. 795.

• Terms signed at Tokyo Bay, September 2, 1945; effective September 2, 1945; Department of State publication 2504, Executive Agreement Series 493, also, The Axis in Defeat, Department of State publication 2423, pp. 36-37. See Potsdam Declaration, July 26, 1945 printed under I. Wartime Documents. See also Axis in Defeat for texts of Japanese offer of surrender, August 10, 1945; Japanese acceptance of Potsdam Declaration, August 14, 1945; Imperial Rescript (Proclamation), September 1-2, 1945; and President Truman's radio address, September 1, 1945.

quarters, hereby accept the provisions set forth in the declaration issued by the heads of the Governments of the United States, China and Great Britain on 26 July 1945, at Potsdam, and subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four powers are hereafter referred to as the Allied Powers.

We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and all armed forces under Japanese control wherever situated.

We hereby command all Japanese forces wherever situated and the Japanese people to cease hostilities forthwith, to preserve and save. from damage all ships, aircraft, and military and civil property and to comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to issue at once orders to the Commanders of all Japanese forces and all forces under Japanese control wherever situated to surrender unconditionally themselves and all forces under their control.

We hereby command all civil, military and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders and directives deemed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this surrender and issue by him or under his authority and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts and to continue to perform their non-combatant duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his authority.

We hereby undertake for the Emperor, the Japanese Government and their successors to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.

We hereby command the Japanese Imperial Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to liberate all allied prisoners of war and civilian internees now under Japanese control and to provide for their protection, care, maintenance and immediate transportation to places as directed.

The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate these terms of surrender.

Signed at Tokyo Bay, Japan, at 0947 on the second day of September, 1945.

(EDITOR'S NOTE.-Signatures to document, signed on the U. S. S. Missouri, are of Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu and Gen. Yoshijiro Umezu of the Imperial General Staff, and for the United Nations the signatures are of Gen. Douglas MacArthur for the Allied Powers, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz for the United States, Gen. Hsu Yung-Ch'ang for China, Admiral Sir Bruce A. Fraser for the United Kingdom, Lt. Gen. Kuzma Derevyanko for the Soviet Union, Gen. Sir Thomas Blamey for Australia, Col. L. Moore Cosgrave for Canada, Gen. Jacques Le Clerc for France, Admiral C. E. L. Helfrich for the Netherlands, and Air Vice Marshal Leonard M. Isitt for New Zealand.)

110. UNITED STATES INITIAL POST-SURRENDER POLICY FOR JAPAN, SEPTEMBER 6, 1945 1

PURPOSE OF THIS DOCUMENT

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This document is a statement of general intitial policy relating to Japan after surrender. It has been approved by the President and distributed to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers and to appropriate United States departments and agencies for their guidance. It does not deal with all matters relating to the occupation of Japan requiring policy determinations. Such matters as are not included. or are not fully covered herein have been or will be dealt with separately.

1 The Axis in Defeat, Department of State publication 2423; pp. 107-114; also, Department of State Bulletin, September 23, 1945, pp. 423-427. Policy statement prepared jointly by the Department of State, the War Department, and the Navy Department and approved by the President on September 6. The document in substance was sent to General MacArthur by radio on August 29 and, after approval by the Presi dent, by messenger on September 6.