tion.

although we may have good reason to complain of our- Predestinaselves, for not using what was sufficient.

Predestina- may therefore be necessary that the providence which superintends them should accommodate itself to circumstances. This, however, is not injurious to the divine sovereignty; for God himself is the author of that freedom of agency which he is pleased to watch over. He is not less the Lord of the universe; and surely his wisdom and benevolence are more conspicuous when he brings good out of evil, and renders the perverse wanderings of the human heart subservient to purposes of mercy, than when he hurls into the immensity of space the most enormous mass of dead and passive matter subjected to unerring laws.

28 The ine

for.

As for the inequalities of moral situation that are to qualities of be observed in the world, and the giving to some naProvidence tions and persons the means of improvement, and the accounted denying them to others, the Scriptures do indeed ascribe these wholly to the riches and freedom of God's grace. And we confess, that the ways of Providence are often dark and mysterious. In this world there are many things which are hard to be understood, and many which appear altogether unaccountable: we see the wicked man prospering in his wickedness, though it impose misery upon thousands; we see truth hiding its head, and the world governed by fraud and absurdity. Still, however, we can venture to assert, that God bestows upon all what is necessary to enable them to fulfil the obligations expected from the state in which they are placed; and it is elsewhere shown, that physical evil is among men the parent of moral good. (See PROVIDENCE). God winketh at the times of ignorance; much is required of them to whom much is given; and it shall be more tolerable in the day of judgment for the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah than for the enlightened cities of Galilee. Thus God will be just when he judges; none will meet with condemnation excepting those who are inexcusable. For although he grants more to some than may be absolutely necessary, yet he grants less to none; and where he grants little, he will suit his judgments to the little which he gave. There is no injustice in this. If it was the intention of the great Creator, that his creation should contain within its ample bosom every possible variety of intelligent natures, it was necessary that there should be somewhere such a being as man; and, in forming all possible varieties of human minds and situations, it was necessary that every particular individual should exist. Hence a man may as well complain that he was not formed one of the flaming seraphims that surround the throne of the Eternal, as that he is not placed in other circumstances in life than those which he now occupies; for if little is given, little will be required from him. Thus the designs of Providence go on according to the goodness and mercy of God. None can complain, though some have more cause for joy than others. What happens to individuals may happen to nations in a body; some may have higher privileges, and be placed in happier circumstances than others; but none can complain of the wise and just disposer of all, who has given enough,

tion.

29

explained.

As to the case of those who are not blessed with the light of the gospel, we may consider, that if they have fewer and less advantages than others, their nature and capacities must likewise be inferior; to which their future state may be proportioned. God is not obliged to make all men equally perfect in the next world any more than in this; and if their capacity be rendered less than that of an ordinary Christian, a lower degree of happiness may fill it. However, we need not be extremely solicitous about their state, much less cast any ungrateful imputations on the Governor of the world for not having dealt so bountifully with them as he has with ourselves; since we know that Christ died for the whole race of mankind; that every one will at length be accepted according to that he has, and not according to that he has not; and that to whomsoever much is given, of him shall much be required' (B). Upon these principles, we can easily explain all the Scriptural passages in the New Testament concerning the purpose, expressions the election, the foreknowledge, and the predestination of God. They relate to the design of calling the Gentile world to the knowledge of the Messias: This was kept secret, though hints had been given of it by several of the prophets, so that it was a mystery; but it was revealed when the apostles, in consequence of Christ's commission, to go and teach all nations, went about preaching the gospel to the Gentiles. This was a stumbling block to the Jews, and it was the chief subject of dispute betwixt them and the apostles at the time when the Epistles were written; so that it was necessary for them to clear, up this point very fully, and to mention it frequently. But in the beginning of Christianity there was no need of amusing men with high and unsearchable speculations concerning the decrees of God; the apostles therefore take up the point in dispute, the calling of the Gentiles, in a general manner. They show, that Abraham at first, and Isaac and Jacob afterwards, were chosen by a discriminating favour, that they and their posterity should be in covenant with God; but that, nevertheless, it always was the intention of Providence to call in the Gentiles, though it was not executed till these later times.

With this key we can explain coherently the whole of St Paul's discourses upon this subject, without asserting antecedent and special decrees as to particular persons. Things that happen under a permissive and directing Providence, may, by a largeness of expression, be ascribed to the will and counsel of God; for a permissive will is really a will, though it is not the agent or cause of the effect. The hardening of Pharaoh's heart may be ascribed to God, though it is said, that his heart hardened itself, because he took advantage of the respites which God granted him from the plagues, to encourage himself to longer resistance. Besides this, he was a cruel and bloody tyrant, and deserved such judgments for his other sins; so that he may be considered as at that time

il

Fredestina- they have excelled in no small degree in the practice of nation the most rigid and respectable virtues, and have been the highest honour of their own ages, and the best models for imitation to every age succeeding. At the same time, it must be confessed, that their virtues have in general been rendered unamiable by a tinge of gloomy and severe austerity.

Pre-exist

ence.

34

So far as the speculative foundation of their principles is considered, however, neither party seems liable to censure in a moral point of view. Each of them wishes to support, though in a different manner from the other, the honour of the divine character. The Calvinists begin their argument with the notion of infinite perfection, independency, and absolute sovereignty, and thence deduce their opinions; making every difficulty yield to Matual for- these first and leading ideas. Their opponents are more bearance jealous of the respect due to the divine attributes of justice, truth, holiness, and mercy, and deduce their sentiments from the idea which they have formed of these. Each party lays down general maxims that are admitted by the other, and both argue plausibly from their first principles. Dr Burnet, whom we have here followed *Exposi very closely, justly observes, that "these are great 39 Articles, grounds for mutual charity and forbearance."

recom

mended.

tion of the

I

The Peripateties

maintained the eternity of the world.

PREDETERMINATION, in Philosophy and Theology, is that concurrence of God which makes men act, and determines them in all their actions, both good and evil, and is called by the schoolmen physical predetermination or premotion. See METAPHYSICS, Part III. chap. v. and PREDESTINATION.

PREDIAL SLAVES. See Predial SLAVES. PREDIAL Tithes, are those that are paid of things arising and growing from the ground only; as corn, hay, fruit, &c.

PREDICABLE, among logicians, denotes a general quality which may be predicated or asserted of several things: thus, animal is predicable of mankind, beasts, birds, fishes, &c.

PREDICAMENT, among logicians, the same with category. See CATEGORY and PHILOSOPHY.

PREDICATE, in Logic, that which, in a proposition, is affirmed or denied of the subject. In these propositions, snow is white, ink is not white; whiteness is the predicate which is affirmed of snow, and denied of ink.

PRE-EMPTION, a privilege anciently allowed the king's purveyor, of having the choice and first buying of corn and other provisions for the king's house: but taken away by the statute 19 Car. II.

PREENING, in Natural History, the action of birds cleaning, composing, and dressing their feathers, to enable them to glide more easily through the air. For this purpose they have two peculiar glands on their rump, which secrete an unctuous matter into a bag that is perforated, out of which the bird occasionally draws it with

its bill.

PRE EXISTENCE, a priority of being, or the being of one thing before another. Thus a cause, if not in time, is yet in nature pre-existent to its effect. Thus God is pre-existent to the universe. Thus a human father is pre-existent to his son. The Peripate ties, though they maintained the eternity of the world, were likewise dogmatical in their opinion, that the universe was formed, actuated, and governed, by a sovereign intelligence. See Aristotle on the Soul, and our

ence.

by Asiatic

sages.

Socratic

articles CREATION and EARTH. See also the Philoso- Pre-existphical Essays of Dr Isaac Watts, and the Principles of natural and revealed Religion, by the Chevalier Ramsay, where the subject of the world's eternity is discussed. Mr Home's speculations also, on this abstruse and ardu ous subject, had a greater tendency to dissipate its gloom than that philosopher himself could imagine. The pre-existence of the human soul to its corporeal Pre-existence of the vehicle had been from time immemorial a prevailing soul taught opinion among the Asiatic sages, and from them was perhaps transferred by Pythagoras to the philosophy of the Greeks; but his metempsychosis, or transmigration of souls, is too trivial either to be seriously proposed or refuted. Nevertheless, from the sentiments of Socrates concerning the immortality of the soul, delivered in his last interview with his friends, it is obvious that the tenet of pre-existence was a doctrine of the Platonic school. If at any period of life, say these philosophers, you should examine a boy, of how many ideas, of what a number of principles, of what an extent of knowledge will you find him possessed: these without doubt could neither be self derived nor recently acquired. With what avidity and promptitude does he attain the knowledge of arts and sciences, which appear entirely new to him! these rapid and successful advances in knowledge can only be the effects of reminiscence, or of a fainter and more indi- 3 stinct species of recollection. But in all the other opera- arguments tions of memory, we find retrospective impressions at-to pie-extending every object or idea which emerges to her view; istence renor does she ever suggest any thought, word, or action; futed. without informing us, in a manner equally clear and evident that those impressions had been made upon our senses, mind, or intellect, on some former occasion. Whoever contemplates her progress, will easily discover, that association is her most faithful and efficacious auxiliary; and that by joining impression with impres sion, idea with idea, circumstance with circumstance, in the order of time, of place, of similarity or dissimilarity, she is capacitated to accumulate her treasures and enlarge her province even to an indefinite extent. But when intuitive principles, or simple conclusions, are elicited from the puerile understanding by a train of casy questions properly arranged, where is the retrospective act of memory, by which the boy recognises those truths as having formerly been perceived in his mind? Where are the crowds of the concomitant, antecedent, or subsequent ideas, with which those recollections ought naturally to have been attended? In a word, where is the sense of personal identity, which seems absolutely inseparable from every act of memory? This hypothesis, therefore, will not support pre-existence. After the Christian religion had been considerably dif fused, and warmly combated by its philosophical antagonists, the same doctrine was resumed and taught at Alexandria, by Platonic proselytes, not only as a topic. Pre-existconstituent of their master's philosophy, but as an anence taught swer to those formidable objections which had been de- by Christian duced from the doctrine of original sin, and from the Platonists. vices which stain, and from the calamities which disturb, human life: hence they strenuously asserted, that all the human race were either introduced to being prior to Adam, or pre-existent in his person; that they were not, therefore, represented by our first parents, but actually concurred in their crime, and participated their ruin.

The

Pre-exist

ence.

* See Preadamites. 5

But no solution of

The followers of Origen, and such as entertained the notion of Pre-adamites*, might argue from the doctrine of pre-existence with some degree of plausibility. For the human beings introduced by them to the theatre of probation had already attained the capacity or dignity of moral agents; as their crime therefore was voluntary, their punishment might be just. But those who original sin. believe the whole human race created in Adam to be only pre-existent in their germs or stamina, were even deprived of this miserable subterfuge; for in these homunculi we can neither suppose the moral nor rational constitution unfolded. Since, therefore, their degene racy was not spontaneous, neither could their sufferings be equitable. Should it be said that the evil of original sin was penal, as it extended to our first parents alone, and merely consequential as felt by their posterity, it will be admitted that the distinction between penal and consequential evil may be intelligible in human affairs, where other laws, assortments, and combinations than those which are simply and purely moral, take place. But that a moral government, at one of the most cardinal periods of its administration, should admit gratuitous or consequential evil, seems to us irreconcileable with the attributes and conduct of a wise and just legislator. Consequential evil taken as such, is misery sustained without demerit; and cannot result from the procedure of wisdom, benignity, and justice; but must flow from necessity, from ignorance, from cruelty, or from caprice, as its only possible sources. But even upon the supposition of those who pretend that man was mature in all his faculties before the commission of original sin, the objections against it will still remain in full force: for it is admitted by all except the Samian sage, that the consciousness of personal identity which was felt in preexistence, is obliterated in a subsequent state of being.

Now it may be demanded, whether agents thus resuscitated for punishment have not the same right to murmur and complain as if they had been perfectly innocent, and only created for that dreadful catastrophe? It is upon this principle alone that the effects of punishment can be either exemplary or disciplinary; for how is it possible, that the punishment of beings unconscious of a crime should ever be reconciled either to the justice or beneficence of that intention with which their sufferings are inflicted? Or how can others be supposed to become wise and virtuous by the example of those who are neither acquainted with the origin nor the tendency of their miseries, but have every reason to think themselves afflicted merely for the sake of afflicting? To us it seems clear, that the nature and rationale of original sin lie inscrutably retired in the bosom of Providence; nor can we, without unpardonable presumption and arrogance, form the most simple conclusion, or attempt the minutest discovery, either different from or extraneous to the clear and obvious sense of revelation. This sense indeed may with propriety be extracted from the whole, or from one passage collated with another; but independent of it, as reason has no premisses, she can form no deductions. The boldness and temerity of philosophy, not satisfied with contemplating pre-existence as merely relative to human nature, has dared to try how far it was compatible with the glorious Persons of the sacred Trinity. The Arians, who allowed the subordinate divinity of our Saviour, believed him pre-existent to all time, and before all worlds; but the Socinians,

ence

Prejudice.

who esteemed his nature as well as his person merely Fre existhuman, insisted, that before his incarnation he was only pre-existent in the divine idea, not in nature or person. But when it is considered, that children do not begin to deduce instructions from nature and experience, at a period so late as we are apt to imagine; when it is admitted, that their progress, though insensible, may be much more rapid than we apprehend; when the opportunities of sense, the ardour of curiosity, the avidity of memory, and the activity of understanding, are remarked-we need not have recourse to a pre-existent state for our account of the knowledge which young minds discover. It may likewise be added, that moral agents can only be improved and cultivated by moral discipline. Such effects therefore of any state, whether happy or miserable, as are merely mechanical, may be noxious or salutary to the patient, but can never enter into any moral economy as parts of its own administration. Pre-existence, therefore, whether rewarded or punished, without the continued impression of personal identity, affords no solution of original sin.

PREFACE, something introductory to a book, to inform the reader of the design, method, &c. observed therein, and generally whatever is necessary to the understanding of a book.

PREFECT, in ancient Rome, one of the chief magistrates who governed in the absence of the kings, consuls, and emperors.

This power was greatest under the emperors. His chief care was the government of the city, taking cognizance of all crimes committed therein and within 100 miles. He judged capitally and finally, and even presided in the senate. He had the superintendence of the provisions, building, and navigation.

The prefect of modern Rome differs little from the ancient præfectus, his authority only extending to 40 miles round the city.

PREFECT of the Prætorium, the leader of the pretorian bands destined for the emperor's guard, consisting, according to Dion, of 10,000 men. This officer, ac cording to Suetonius, was instituted by Augustus, and usually taken from among the knights.

By the favour of the emperors his power grew very considerable; to reduce which, Constantine divided the prefecture of the prætorium into four prefectures, and each of these he subdivided again into civil and military departments, though the name was only reserved to him who was invested with the civil authority, and that of comes belli given him who commanded the cohorts.

PREGADI, in History, a denomination given to the senate of Venice, in which resides the whole authority of the republic. At its first institution, it was composed of 60 senators, to whom 60 more have been added. See VENICE.

PREGNANCY, the state of a woman who has conceived, or is with child. See MIDWIFERY.

PREHNITE, a mineral first brought by Colonel Prehn from the Cape of Good Hope, whose name it bears. See MINERALOGY Index.

I

PREJUDICE, or PREJUDGMENT, from præ and Definition. judicium, means a judgment formed beforehand, without examination; the preposition præ expressing an anticipation, not so much of time as of knowledge and due attention and hence the schoolmen have called it anticipation and a preconceived opinion.

Prejudice

13

Prejudice.

2

prejudice.

to.

Prejudice arises from the associating principle, which we have explained at large in another article (see METAPHYSICS, Part I. chap. 5.), and it is a weakness Origin of from which no human mind can be wholly free. Some are indeed much more than others under its influence; but there is no man who does not occasionally act upon principles, the propriety of which he never investigated; or who does not hold speculative opinions, into the truth of which he never seriously inquired. Our parents and tutors, yea, our very nurses, determine a multitude of our sentiments: our friends, our neighbours, the custom of the country where we dwell, and the established opinions of mankind, form our belief; the great, the pious, the learned, and the ancient, the king, the priest, and the philosopher, are characters of mighty efficacy to persuade us to regulate our conduct by their practice, and to receive as truth whatever they may dictate.

to exten

ion.

The case cannot indeed be otherwise. The occasions of acting are so frequent, and the principles of action are so various, that were a man to investigate accurately the value of every single motive which presents itself to his mind, and to balance them fairly against each other, the time of acting would in most instances pass away long before he could determine what ought to be done; and life would be wasted in useless speculation. The great laws of religion and morality, which ought to be the general and leading principles of action, no man of science will take upon trust; but in the course of a busy life a thousand circumstances will occur in which we must act with such rapidity, that, after being satisfied of the lawfulness of what we are about to do, we must, for the prudence of it, confide entirely in the general customs of our country, or in the practice of other individuals placed in circumstances similar to ours. In all such cases, though we may act properly, we act from prejudice.

But the dominion of prejudice is not confined to the ive domi- actions of the man of business: it extends over the speculations of the philosopher himself, one half of whose knowledge rests upon no other foundation. All human sciences are related to each other (see PHILO SOPHY, N° 2.), and there is hardly one of them in which a man can become eminent unless he has some general acquaintance with the whole circle; but no man could ever yet investigate for himself all those propositions which constitute the circle of the sciences, or even comprehend the evidence upon which they rest, though he admits them perhaps as truths incontrovertible. He must therefore receive many of them upon the authority of others, or, which the same thing, admit them by prejudice.

To this reasoning it may be objected, that when a man admits as true abstract propositions, which, though not self-evident, he cannot demonstrate, he admits them not by prejudice, but upon testimony, which has been elsewhere shown to be a sufficient foundation for human belief (see METAPHYSICS, N° 138.). The objection is plausible, but it is not solid; for testimony commands belief only concerning events which, falling under the cognizance of the senses, preclude all possibility of mistake; whereas abstract propositions, not self-evident, can be proved true only by a process of reasoning or by a series of experiments; and in conducting both these, the most vigorous mind is liable to mistake. When Sir VOL. XVII. Part I.

Isaac Newton told the world that it was the fall of an Prejudice. apple which first suggested to him the general law of gravitation, he bore testimony to a fact concerning which he could not be mistaken; and we receive his testimony for the reasons assigned in the article referred When he lays down the method of obtaining the fluxion or momentum of the rectangle or product of two indeterminate quantities, which is the main point in his doctrine of fluxions, he labours to establish that method on the basis of demonstration; and whoever makes use of it in practice, without understanding that demonstration, receives the whole doctrine of the modern geometrical analysis, not as a matter of fact upon the credit of Sir Isaac's testimony, but as a system of abstract truth on the credit of his understanding: in other words, he is a fluxionist by prejudice.

In vain will it be said, that in mathematical demonstration there is no room for mistake; and that therefore the man who implicitly adopts the method of fluxions may be considered as relying upon the veracity of its author, who had no inducement to deceive him, and whose comprehension was confessedly greater than his. In fluxionary mathematics, which treat of matters of which it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to have adequate and steady conceptions, the most comprehensive mind is liable to mistake; and it is well known that the celebrated bishop of Cloyne wrote his Analist to prove that the incomparable author of the method of fluxions had committed two mistakes in his fundamental proposition, which balancing one another, produced a true conclusion by false reasoning. One or other of these great men, of whom the least was an eminent mathematician, must have been bewildered in his reasoning, and have fallen into error; and therefore whoever follows either of them implicitly without perceiving the error of the other, is unquestionably under the influence of prejudice. This is the case with the writer of the present article. He perceives not the error of Bishop Berkeley's reasoning, and yet he admits the doctrine of fluxions on the authority of Sir Isaac's demonstration. That demonstration, however, he pretends not to understand; and therefore he admits the doctrine through prejudice.

ces from

We have made these observations, to point out the Impossible absurdity of the fashionable cry against the barbouring to eradicate of any prejudices. To eradicate all prejudices from all prejudithe human mind is impossible; and if it were possible, it the mind. would be very unwise: for we see that prejudice may exist on the side of truth as well as on that of falsehood; and that principles professed and believed by any individual may be useful and true, though he was brought to them not by a train of fair and candid reasoning, but through the medium of prepossession or authority. Indeed such is our nature, and such are the laws of association, that many of our best principles, and our obligation to perform many of the most amiable of our duties in common life, must evidently be acquired in this way. From endearing associations and authoritative instruction, we acquire a knowledge of our duty to our parents, and a facility in performing it, together with the first principles of religion, without a single effort of our own reason. Even when reason has begun to assert its power, and shows us the propriety of such duties, we are wonderfully assisted in performing them by the amiable prejudices which we had before acquired,

and