philosopher. We are by no means equally satisfied with the explanation afterwards given of the supposed case, that A excites be without the intervention of a, by means of the similarity of the general state of mind; as this seems to be rather the stating of an appearance than the explaining of a fact.

The next objection which is taken to association as the all-sufficient expounder of mental operations, arises from its inade quacy to account for the faculty of judgment. Here again we must refer our readers to the work itself.

It is probable that neither Hartley himself, nor any of his followers, ever attained to a tolerably distinct notion of the way in which the will results from the association of ideas. The observations on this head are entitled to much attention.

"I conceive first that volition necessarily implies thought or foresight, that is, that it is not accounted for from mere association. All voluntary action implies a view to consequences; a perception of the analogy between certain actions already given, and the particular action then to be employed; also a knowledge of the connection between certain actions and the effects to be produced by them; and lastly, a faculty of combining all these with particular circumstances so as to be able to judge how far they are likely to impede or assist the accomplishment of our purposes, in what manner it may be necessary to vary our exertions according to the nature of the case, whether a greater or less degree of force is required to produce the effect, &c. Without this discourse of reason,' this circumspection and comparison, it seems to be as impossible for the human mind to pursue any regular object, as it would be for a man, heimmed in on all sides by the walls of houses and blind alleys, to see his way clearly before him from one end of London to the other, or to go in a straight line from Westminster to Wapping. One would think it would be sufficient to state the question, in order to shew that mere association, or the mechanical recurrence of any old impressions in a certain order, which can never exactly correspond with the given circumstances, would never satisfactorily account (without the aid of some other faculty) for the complexity and subtle windings and perpetual changes in the motives of human action. On the hypothesis here spoken of, I could have no comprehensive idea of things to check any immediate passing impulse, nor should I be able to make any inference with respect to the consequences of my actions, whenever there was the least alteration in the circumstances in which I

must act."

The discussion of this difficult point is very loosely conducted, and is grievously

interrupted by incidental remarks; especially by a refutation of a certain whim of Mr. Macintosh's respecting general benevolence. Mr. Macintosh, indeed, however unmetaphysical and destitute of subtlety his lectures may have been, seems to have succeeded in making a pretty strong impression upon our author's imagination, who goes out of his way more than once to have a rencontre with him, and treats him with a degree of contempt bordering upon the abusive. We mention this as an exception to the calm and dispassionate temper that in general pervades the work.

We have already extended this article to a length that precludes our controverting the forcible objections which are here opposed to the Hartleian theory of the will. We shall only remark, en passant, as a hint to those who may wish to engage in the controversy, that this objector has not quite satisfied us that the 21st and 77th propositions in the Observations on Man are altogether nonsensical. We still think that "voluntary powers may result from association." We do not pretend to see clearly the manner how. But since the voluntary motions are acquired, and since their strength corresponds to the number and force of the associations that have been formed, we think there is some share of reason for supposing it probable that the will may depend upon, or consist in, a certain state of association; meaning however association in the extended sense understood by Hartley, and not as limited by this writer. We forbear saying more, as we are not prepared to push the discussion to the point requisite for determining the question.

After having accumulated difficulties upon the doctrine of association generally, the essayist proceeds to its supposed application against the disinterested hypothesis, and finds that it avails nothing. For, granting all the force to association which the Hartleians contend for, he ob

serves,

"That the same kind of association must apply to the interest we take in the feelings of others, though perfect strangers to us, as well. as to the interest we feel for ourselves. All that can ever take place, in the imaginary anticipation either of our own feelings or those of others, can be nothing more than some sort of transposition and modification of the old ideas of memory; or if there is any thing peculiar to this act of the mind, it is equally necessary to our feeling any interest in our own future impressions, or those of others."

This indeed is sufficiently obvious; and

distinction is inaccurate. The moralist must learn what has been, before he can know what ought to be. The chemist investigates the products of his compositions, and the results of his analyses: he searches for the particular effects which follow particular chemical changes. The moralist searches for the particular consequences which follow particular actions. The chemist assumes that the same change, which now produces a given effect, will always continue to produce it. The moralist assumes that the same actions will generally be followed by the same consequences. The chemist shows how his knowledge may be made subservient to the conveniences of life; and the moralist points out those actions which will lead to happiness, and those which will lead to misery. Both enquire what has been, and what is, that they may know what ought to be. This attempted dis

tinction therefore has failed.

The author next proceeds to state his opinion of the ultimate object of human pursuit on this subject all men have agreed, both in doctrine and in conduct. The attainment of happiness, in some state of existence, has formed the basis of all systems of morality, and the object of all human pursuit. The author has evolved a doctrine, of which no one will dispute the originality, but many we believe will question the accuracy. From the diffuse and declamatory manner in which it is stated, we should have attempted an abridgement, had not the doctrine been so singular, (we had almost said so ridiculous,) that we might have been suspected of mistaking the meaning of the author. We shall endeavour to pick out those paragraphs which contain the most condensed statement.

"It appears to me then, that the great object which the human race ought to pursue, and the attainment of which they ought to regard as the business of their lives, is not to produce happiness, pleasure, or felicity, in themselves or others; but that, on the contrary, the end for which they were formed, and which alone they can pursue with success, is the improvement of their whole intellectual faculties, whether speculative or active. In one word, it is the business of man in this world to endeavour to become an excellent

being, possessing high powers of energy and intelligence. This is his chief good; and ought to be the great and ultimate object of his pursuit, to which every other consideration ought to be sacrificed.

"If this principle, that intellectual excellence or the perfection of the mind and of its

rational powers, is the most important and valuable object of human pursuit, can be clearly established, it will follow, that those actions are good, and right, and best, which produce, not happiness or pleasure, but the intellectual perfection in the world; and that greatest portion of knowledge, ability, and those actions are the worst, which produce, or have a tendency to produce, not suffering, but the greatest degree of ignorance, of stupidity and of intellectual weakness and degra dation. It will even follow, that the rulers of nations (though they are seldom so well employed) do actually misapply their labour, and mistake their duty, when they imagine that their proper business consists in conferring felicity upon their fellow-creatures.

64

I shall here endeavour to prove, that the great task, to the performance of which the existence of every inan ought to be devoted, consists of two brauches: first, to produce the intellectual improvement of his own individual mind and character; and, secondly, to produce the improvement of the minds of other

rational beings.

afford

"I. 1st. In all undertakings, the first question among rational men is uniformly this: Supposing us to engage in a particular pursuit, what prospect have we of success? The object of the undertaking may be great and valuable; but if there is no reason to expect that the pursuit of it can prosper, it is justly disregarded as an idle project that will never precisely the case with regard to happiness. It is no doubt a fine thing if it could be attained; but none ever pursued it with success. It is like the country in the romance, in which the stores of the field are all gems and gold, and in which overflowing plenty abounds: it is a fine country, but nobody can go there.

reward for our efforts, This is

any

"It is scarcely necessary to attempt to prove, by arguments, that a state of happiness cannot be attained in this world. The history of mankind, both in ancient and modern times, sufficiently establishes the fact. Some have expected to find felicity in riches; others have sought it from power, from pleasure, and even from fair and upright conduct: but they have all been unsuccessful. Disappointments have awaited them; and bad health, or other unforeseen calamities, have rendered their efforts fruitless. Even when no visible cause of infelicity existed, it has been found impossible to enjoy a high degree of happiness for any long period, merely because all human pleasure diminishes by a repetition of enjoyment.

"Good health, and a natural cheerfulness of temper, produce as high a degree of happiness as we are capable of enjoying for any length of time. But these we cannotbestow upon ourselves; although we may no doubt throw them away. The true state of the case seems to be this: A certain limited degree or portion of pleasure is enjoyed by man in this world; but this portion or degree is not pros

duced by human labour or industry. It is a gift bestowed by the Author of our existence, and arises not from any contrivance on our part. It is even given with little appearance of discrimination. The young and the old, the high and the low, the rich and the poor, the wise and the foolish, are all nearly upon a level with regard to it. Like the rain, or the light of heaven, it comes freely, or not at all; insomuch, that those men who have seriously engaged in the pursuit of happiness have uniformly confessed, that all anxiety and labour concerning it are absurd, as they enjoy it

most who court it least."

"The contrary of all this takes place with regard to the perfection of our intellectual character. It is not bestowed, but may be gradually acquired. We are all born equally ignorant, and equally feeble. Some do indeed appear to possess more quickness of apprehen sion than others; but this inequality is easily rectified by superior industry: and those men never fail to attain to the highest degrees of intellectual excellence, who pursue it steadily, and make it most completely the business of their lives. An infant has none of it. A man always has a portion of it; and he is always capable of acquiring more of it than he actually possesses; for there is no end of the degrees in which it may be attained.

This being the true state of things, it is evident that happiness cannot, in this world, be justly regarded as a rational object of pursuit, as it must always be pursued in vain. The great error with regard to it consists in supposing that it can be attained, or that it can be increased, by our efforts, and in forgetting that it cannot be purchased by a price; that wherever it comes, it comes as a gift from heaven; and that our nature cannot rise by industry to the possession of higher degrees of it. But an excellent or improved mind is never given: it is always purchased; and the progress we are capable of making in it is unbounded."

In the most important parts of this extract the author declaims rather than argues, he dogmatizes rather than proves : that an equal portion of happiness is enjoyed by every individual, and that this happiness is independant of his exertion, he certainly states; but he leaves his reader to guess by what process of reasoning he canie to these conclusions. Surely Mr. Forsyth will not deny that a man perfect in body, and cultivated in mind, raised by fortune above the fear of poverty, preserved by judgment from inaccuracy of conduct, and blest in his pursuits with universal success; a being enjoying all the pleasures of sense, possessing the gratifications of prosperity, and commanding the delights of intellectual culture; surely such a being as this enjoys a portion of happiness far greater than the man un

healthy, stupid, poor, and unfortunate; deprived of the pleasures of sense by disease, and of the pleasures of intellect by mental imbecility; who suffers under the inconveniences and trembles at the terrors of poverty, whose every action is a blunder, and every pursuit a failure. These are not imaginary characters only; they are frequently to be found in the world. The happiness enjoyed by different individuals, although seldom existing in such different proportions, is very unequally distributed. Again, can we doubt for a moment that much of the happiness of life depends on a skilful government of our actions, i. e. on human exertion? Does it not make us temperate, and thus produce the ease of health? Does it not make our conduct accurate, and thus afford us the cheerfulness of prosperity? Does it not enrich our minds, and thus open to us the pleasures of intellectual culture? There can be little doubt therefore that happiness is considerably the fruit of human exertion, and consequently a fit object of pursuit. We would examine Mr. Forsyth's arguments against this opinion. but he has given us no arguments for refutation. But even granting that we are wrong in the foregoing reasoning; and supposing with him that human happiness is equally distributed among mankind, and cannot be increased by them; and sup posing also that intellect is as attainable as he is determined to think; we still deng that such a being as man should endeavour to attain it, unless as a means of procuring happiness. Such is the nature of man that happiness alone is adapted to his apperites. It is the essence of value; it is the principle of good, and every thing which is desirable is desirable for producing it. This is an ultimate fact which we cannot pass, in our speculations on the comparative value of human possessions, If intellect may be acquired at will, (a doctrine extremely consolatory to the student ardent with the love of faine) it does not follow that it ought to be pur sued for its own sake. The possibility does not prove the value or the propriety of an acquisition. Intellect is valuable not for itself, but as it multiplies the sources of our pleasure.

The chapter on the human understanding, and its subordinate faculties, is executed in many parts with inexcusable slovenliness, and incomprehensible obscurity, It contains nothing new, and the reader will frequently be offended by a want of clearness or accuracy.