are admitted to exist, only as they are perceived at least by all the disciples of Locke and Des Cartes. With respect to the primary qualities of matter, greater doubts have been entertained. Berkeley has certainly employed some forcible reasoning, to show, that they have no external existence. I shall content myself, with endeavouring to explain, in what manner they are contemplated by the mind; and in order to do this with greater precision, I shall treat separately, in three following chapters, of solidity, extension and motion." The sixth chapter briefly treats the question of solidity. This is a subject on which it may appear surprising that controversy should have existed. The human faculties are evidently incapable of communicating any other idea of solidity than of resistance, which however insuperable by any force which we are able to employ, we have no means of ascertaining to be infinite.

The important subject of extension furnishes the next topic of investigation. After attempting to show with the bishop of Cloyne what extension is not, the author proceeds, in one of the few instances of this nature which occur in his volume, to advance a positive theory, which we therefore think it our duty to present to our readers, without professing to vouch for its perspicuity.

"Thus far, therefore, I shall be found to have coincided with the bishop of Cloyne; and to have arrived by a different induction to a similar conclusion. Still something more is necessary to explain my notions concerning extension; for it belongs to philosophy to point out both what may be improbable, and what may have the appearance of the greatest probability.

"As it is by the sight and the touch, that we acquire our notions of any extension, and as it is also by the comparison of such ideas, that we learn to distinguish the relative proportions of magnitudes; so we may not improperly term extension a simple mode of duration. I shall endeavour to illustrate this theory, as clearly as I can.

"Let any whole visible extent, answering to the whole visual angle, at which all the rays of light falling upon the retina are concentrated, be denominated a continuous quantity. Again, let any apparent disunited quantities, equal to particular objects, and making parts of continuous quantity, be called discrete. Continuous extension will be equal to what I term the simple mode of duration; and discrete quantities to particular combinations of the same simple idea. In the extension, which is continuous, we only consider the simple mode itself; but in discrete quantities, the mode is not contemplated simply, but as mixed with other modes; and ANN. REV. VOL. IV.

this in fact gives us the difference, as we shall have occasion afterwards more fully to show, between one discrete quantity and another.

"When I look out of my window, the objects, which I see before me, give me notions of discrete quantities. The mind cannot contemplate more than one idea at a time, with whatever rapidity whole trains may pass before it; and a regular series of images passes in my imagination, while I survey the prospect before me, and while the neighbouring shores, covered with buildings, gardens, and vineyards, the sea, a remote promontory, and a farther island, fill the painted field of my vision, and successively attract my notice. But all these objects, with their different distances, and relative magnitudes, being, as it were, summed up, make me perceptive of the simple mode of duration, which has been called continuous extension."

On the subject of motion, the author likewise advances a theory terminating in this definition: motion is "mutation in the combinations of our ideas of extension." This observation scarcely required to be advanced with the formality of a theory, containing nothing more than the plain fact that whatever be the cause or the nature of motion, its effect is a change in the order of those perceptions, which we are accustomed to consider as the representatives of material archetypes.

The ninth chapter contains a series of observations on the senses, intermixed with various digressive remarks, which prove the erudition, the taste, and the science, of the author. The purpose of them in relation to the subsequent parts of the work must be to establish a theory of pure idealism.

Some of the sceptical arguments in this chapter seem to be urged rather too far, when the residence of what are termed the qualities of matter is deduced to be in the mind itself, from the various judgments which men exercise respecting them. Surely the most zealous advocates of material archetypes never maintained that the operation of the cause is not modified by the circumstances of the percipient being through whose organs it acts.

The second book is divided into ten chapters, at the head of each of which stands the name of some celebrated philosopher, some of whose opinions our academical disputant finds it necessary to call into question. The writers who here pass the ordeal of his examination are the fol

lowing: Descartes, Bacon, Newton, Spinosa; some mechanical philosophers, who suppose the vital or animal spirits to be the X X

immediate instruments by which the soul holds communication with the external world; Hartley, Tucker, Leibnitz, Hart,

Reid. The conclusion of the article on

the philosophy of Descartes, affords a favourable specimen of Mr. Drummond's powers of writing.

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Perceptiones nostræ, says Des-Cartes, sunt etiam duarum specierum, et quadam animam pro causa habent, aliæ corpus: omnes perceptiones quas nondum explicui, veniunt ad animam opera nervorum, et inter eas hac est differentia, quod quasdam referamus ad objecta externa quæ sensus nostros feriunt, alias ad nostrum corpus, aut quasdam ejus partes, et denique alias ad nostrum animam. But there was a period when the author doubted of the existence of his nerves, of his body, and of external objects. He nevertheless affirmed, that he thought, and perceived; nor did he doubt, that he had all those perceptions, which he now tells us, have his body and external objects for their causes. It is evident, then, that during this period of scepticism Des-Cartes must have thought, that he was solely perceptive of his sensations and ideas. Now if it be possible for the human mind to contemplate to-day, what is called the external world, without being perceptive of any thing but sensations and ideas; it seems rather unaccountable, that in again surveying the same objects to-morrow, the mind shall discover things, which are either Sensations, nor ideas. If all the objects, which I perceived an hour ago, existed only in my own mind; am I now to pretend, that they are perceived by me, as existing out of my mind? We may indeed suspect that DesCartes was not hitherto satisfied with his own reasoning concerning the existence of the material world, since his belief in it finally rested upon this, that the Deity could not desire to deceive him. The supposition would be impious. God does not deceive us; but we deceive ourselves. We are not satisfied with speaking of the objects of our perception of what we feel and understand. We seek to attach ideas to mere abstractions, and to give being to pure denominations. The dreams of our imaginations become the standards of our faith. Essences, which can not be defined; substances, which cannot be conceived; powers, which have never been

comprehended; and causes, which operate, we know not how; are sounds familiar to the language of error. Accustomed to hear them from our infancy, we seldom enquire into their meaning. Our early associations form the code of our reason. We forget our first impressions; nor recollect how simple are the elements of all our knowledge. Deluded

by his own mind, man continues to wander

in the mazes of the labyrinth, which lies before him, unsuspicious of his deviations from the truth. Like some knight of romance in an enchanted place, he mistakes the fictious

for the real, and the false for the true. He is dazzled by the effulgence of the meteor, and thinks he sees by the light of the sun. The prisoner who dreams in his dungeon, imagines himself walking abroad in the field, or in the streets. He enjoys the sweets of fancied liberty. See, how gladly he inhales the fresh air of the morning, or embraces the friends whom he loves. He suspects not, that the world, which he has revisited, exists only in himself; and that he must shortly awake to the conviction of his error-to solitude, captivity, and sorrow. Is there no being, who resembles this dreamer? Is there not one, who perceives his own ideas, and cals them external objects; who thinks he dis tinguishes the truth, and who sees it not; who grasps at shadows, and who follows phantoms; who passes from the cradle to the tomb, the dupe and often the victim of the illusions, which he himself has created?"

In the unconnected state in which these chapters appear, it will not be necessary shall content ourselves with referring to to enter on a minute analysis of them; we the most remarkable passages and obser vations.

In the article of Bacon, the subject of power, and the supposition of distinct mental powers and faculties, is resumed.

We do not fully comprehend Mr. Drummond's hypothesis respecting power, and we suppose that in the subsequent volume it will be more fully developed and employed. We fully agree with him that the human mind is incapable of forming an idea of power; but some parts of the following paragraph, if not incautiously expressed, might tempt his readers to suppose that he denies its existence.

"The doctrine of necessity has been severely stigmatised by many writers of great authority. It may be questioned, however, whether the blame do not rest in a considerable degree with themselves. Had they been less strenuous in asserting the necessary connection between causes and effects-had they not insisted on that occult operation by which one thing is said to act upon another-had they not, in short, supposed the existence of powers which can never be contingent, whenever they wished to account for phænomena of nature and the world, they would not have been so much embarrassed by the danger ous conclusions which are made by neces sarians, and which, upon the principles admitted by both parties, are more eastly denied than proved to be false. p. 192.”

The third chapter boldly, but in our opinion unjustly, charges the Newtonian system of the world with a tendency to

atheism. Be it admitted that matter is endowed with powers by which the operations of the universe are conducted, does not the arrangement of matter so as to be capable of exerting these powers in reference to the purposes of the system, still point, with undiminished certainty, to an intellectual author of the scheme? The movements of the watch are effected by the laws of elasticity and percussion; but the intellect of the artificer appoints the direction and objects of those powers.

The fourth chapter is occupied by a copious and able representation of the system of Spinosa, in a dialogue between Theophilus, an orthodox theist, Hylus, a Spinosist, and Eugenius the arbiter of the dispute, who sustains, we suppose, the person of the author. He does not, however, favour us with any systems of his own, but expresses his hope on another occasion of explaining his sentiments and system. Addressing himself to Theophilus, he says, "In the mean time I do not hesitate in declaring that the doctrines of Hylus appear to me to be altogether erroneous; and yet with every wish to support your cause, and with a firm conviction of the truth of the two great principles which you have taught, namely, the existence of a Deity, and the immortality of the soul, I cannot assent to many of your arguments. I do not mean to say, that you spoke ineloquently; but I think you set out with making many injudicious concessions to Hylus. If he did obtain any advantages in this discussion, it has been owing to your imprudence. Verum hæc hactenus; cætera quotiescumque voletis, et hoc loco, et aliis, parata vobis @runt."

In the seventh chapter, Tucker, the author of the Light of Nature pursued," falls under the examination of our enquirer. His mechanical system is justly condemned, and occasion is taken to controvert the encomium bestowed on him by Dr. Paley, as unrivalled in the talent of illustration. This leads to a critical digression on the varieties of style applicable to the treatment of different subjects, and that especially which is suitable to the investigation of metaphysical topics.

The eighth chapter is employed in the investigation of the system of Leibnitz, which is well stated, and its merits fairly

appreciated. As a production of genius it receives a merited portion of praise; as a philosophical investigation, it is evidently deficient in the most requisite circumstances of evidence and proof.

A German philosopher of no mean fame in his country, but whose system, if intelligible, is at least little understood by the philosophers of this country, Emanuel Kant, is next brought forward, and provokes rather more than an usual portion of Mr. Drummond's severity. To a representation of his system we profess ourselves totally inadequate, and we have reason to suppose that for a just and able statement of it, it would be necessary to have recourse to German literature, or the Latin translations of the professor's works. With the latter Mr. Drummond appears to be acquainted, and the result of his enquiry is an utter condemnation of the Kantian philosophy as a system of mysticism, tending to the revival of the scholastic philosophy, or some other system of equally laborious trifling, under the disguise of a formidable nomenclature, in the acquisition of which reason is fatigued before definition can be ended.

The philosophy of Dr. Reid, which is the last subject of discussion, is diametrically opposed to the system which Mr. Drummond appears inclined to establish, that of pure idealism. The accurate and investigating spirit of the author receives however a just tribute of respect.

Our analysis of many parts of this work has been sufficiently minute, and our extracts sufficiently copious, to enable our readers to appreciate its character and merits. In one respect, as we have before observed, it appears under a disadvantage, as stating no positive system, and occupied by distinct topics of controversy, the reference of which to a common purpose, it is not always easy to discover. Mr. Drummond has however fully established his own character as a man of learning and taste, and an acute metaphysical enquirer. The elegance of style with which his book is written, though not entirely free from indications of the lime labor, is such as renders im, in this respect, not an unfit associate of Berkeley and Hume. We shall be anxious to witness the continuation of his labours.

them. Philosophic linguists have mostly pursued the Aristotelic, the antient, method of reasoning, a priori; they have rarely recurred to the Baconian, the modern, method of reasoning, a posteriori. They have examined ideas instead of phenomena, suppositions instead of facts. The only method of ascertaining in what manner speech originates, is to enquire historically into the changes which single words undergo; and from the mass of instances, within the examination of our experience, to infer the general law of their formation. This has been the process of Mr. Horne Tooke. He first examined our prepositions, conjunctions, and adverbs, all those particles of speech foolishly called insignificant, and shewed that they were either nouns or verbs in disguise, which had lost the habit of inflection. He now examines our adjectives and abstract substantives, and shows that they too are all referable to nouns or verbs, describing sensible ideas.

Whether this opinion is strictly new, scarcely merits enquiry; it was never applied before on so grand a scale, and in so instructive a manner. A critic on the first volume of the Diversions of Purley states, that Schultens had derived a long string of Hebrew adverbs, prepositions, and conjunctions, from nouns extant in that language; and that he adds: Apud Latinos quoque conjunctiones multæ a nominibus oriunde. Lennep again in his Analogia observes: Er octo igitur partbus orationis, vulgò statuunt grammatici, verbum et nomen principem locum obtinent, cùm relique omnes facile ad harum alterutram referri queant. Gregory Sharpe, in his Origin and Structure of the Greek Tongue, reveals the important fact, that the personal inflections of verbs have been formed by coalescence with auxiliaries. Such scattered solitary observations may have prepared and do confirm the conprehensive generalizations of Mr. Horne Tooke; but to him the English language owes the pristine introduction of just principles, and a most extensive, learned, and detailed-application of them to the etymology of its terms. He has laid the groundwork of a good dictionary.

Aristotle, and other ancient grammarians, had perceived and taught that language consisted of verbs and nouns. To this grand distribution of the parts of speech, Horace, talking of the invention of language, alludes:

-"Sic verba, quibus voces sensusque notarent, Nomina ple invenere,"

Yet if we attend to the process of acquirement among children (and it is by the same steps that a savage horde must collectively pass in the evolution of a dialect), we shall be compelled to rank the interjection first, as the original kind of word. It is long before children can dis tinguish between objects and phenomena; their first articulations describe sensations and perceptions, which they have not yet learnt to refer to external objects. The first sounds they utter are simple vowels, the oh and ai of pain, the ee and ah of attention and wonder, the oo of disgust. Such sounds describe an enduring action, or rather passion, of the child's frame; and therefore approach nearer to verbs than to nouns. The radical or auxiliary verb seems to have been originally an interjection imitative of suction. The Latin sum signifies I suck; it is etymologically connected with sumen the pap, or dug, The English I am is derived from the same root with ammel nipple, amme nurse, and emma mother. The first nouns again rather describe impressions than objects, and thus begin by being interjections The sheep is called baa, the cataract gush, the bird cuckow: all is onomatopeia with the savage. The indicative interjection he in many languages forms te basis of the demonstrative pronouns, ci the articles, and of the substantive pronouns of the third person. Lord Mos boddo is of opinion that verbs grew out of interjections, and preceded nouns. "From this account (says he in the Origin and Progress of Language, Vol. I. p. 481) it appears that the first sounds articulated were the natural cries of men, by which they signified their wants and desires to one another, such as calling one another for certain purposes, and other such thing are were most necessary for carrying in any joint work. Then in process of time other cries would be articulated, to signe fy that such and such actions had been performed or were performing, or that such and such events had happened rel tive to the common business. Then naces would be invented of such objects as the were conversant with. This increase of words would make more articulation necessary: and thus the language wouli grow by degrees; and as it grew it woul! be more and more broken by consonants, but still the words would retain a great deal of their original nature of animal cries."

To strictly elementary speculations the interlocutors of these winged words sel. dom ascend: they do not discuss the uri

gin, but the progressive formation of early language. Their conversations are eight in number. The first treats of the rights of man, and explains the word right to mean that which is directed, or ordered. The four next are very valuable: they concern betraction, and reduce many words current among the metaphysicians to their precise and only intelligible employment. The jamentable decay of etymological studies in this country has been a great cause of the quantity of jargon offered to the public as reasoning. No man can write with propriety on any subject who does not understand the words he uses; yet scarcely any one of our metaphysical philosophers, except Hobbes, has even endeavoured to understand his terms. An entertaining excursion is that which respects the word lord.

Speaking of Varlets, you mentioned the word Lord. That word is not yet become quite an opprobrious terin, whatever it may be hereafter; which will depend entirely upon the conduct of those who may bear that tile, and the means by which it may, usually be obtained. But what does the word mean? For I can never believe, with Skinner, that it proceeds from "rlaf, panis, et Ford (pro Afford), suppeditare: quia scilicet multis panem largitur, i. e. multos alit." For the animal we have lately known by that name is intirely of a different description.

"You know, it was anciently written Plaford; and our etymologists were misled by raf, which, as they truly said, certainly

means and is our modern loaf. But when they had told us that loaf came from riaf, they thought their business with that word was completed. And this is their usual practice with other words. But I do not so understand etymology. I could as well be contented to stop at loaf in the English, as at riaf in the Anglosaxon: for such a derivation af fords no additional nor ultimate meaning. The question with ine is still, why rlof in the Anglosaxon? I want a meaning, as the cause of the appellation; and not merely a similar word in another language.

"Had they considered that we use the different terms bread and dough and loaf for the same material substance in different states; they would probably have sought for the etymology or different meanings of those words, in the circumstances of the different states. And had they sought, they probably would have found: and the meaning of the word rlaf would have saved them from the absurdity of their derivation of Lord.

66

Bread we have already explained: It is brayed grain. After breaking or pounding the grain, the next state in the process towards loaf is dough. And

"Dough-Is the past participle of the An

glosaxon verb deawian, to moisten or to wet.
Dough therefore or dow means weited.
that dew (A. s. deaw), though differently
"You will not fail to observe en passant,
spelled and pronounced, is the same parti-
ciple with the same meaning.

Heuinly begynnyng and original
"Ane hate fyry power, warme and dew,
Bene in thay sedis quhilkis we saulis cal.

Douglas, lib. 6. page 191.

"Of Paradise the weil in sothfastnes The soyle to adewe with his swete streames. Foyson that floweth in to sondry royames

Lyfe of oure Lady, page 165. "Wherefore his mother of very tender herte Out braste on teres and might herselfe nat stere, That all bydewed where her eyen clere.

Lyfe of oure Lady, page 167. "And let my breste, benigne lorde, be

dewed

Romeo and Juliet, page 54.

"Her costly bosom strew'd with precious orient pearl,

Bred in her shining shells, which to the deaw doth yawn,

Which deaw they sucking in, conceive that lusty spawn.

Poly-albion, Song 30."

The sixth conversation discusses adjecfinitions of Harris, Lowth, and other tives, and refutes convincingly many descholastic grammarians. The introductory part will suffice to explain the author's theory.

"You imagine then that you have thus set aside the doctrine of abstraction.

"Will it be unreasonable to ask you, What are these adjectives and participles by which you think you have achieved this feat? And first, What is an adjective? I dare not call it noun adjective: for Dr. Lowth tells us, page 41, Adjectives are very improperly called nouns, for they are not the names of things.'

"And Mr. Harris (Hermes, book 1. chap. 10.) says Grammarians have been led into that strange absurdity of ranging adjectives with nouns, and separating them from verbs; though they are homogeneous with respect to verbs, as both sorts denote attributes: they are heterogeneous with respect to nouns, as never properly denoting substances.' 66 You see, Harris and Lowth concur, that adjectives are not the names of things; that they never properly denote substances. But they differ in their consequent arrangement. Lowth appoints the adjective to a separate

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