YEATON V. &c. but their courts of justice have decided otherwise; THE BANK, and it would be singular if an erroneous opinion, entertained by that body, should have all the effects of a law passed by it. But there is not a word contained in this preamble which may not be fully satisfied, without producing any necessary implication against the general law of Virginia, relative to the liability of the endorsor. When the legislature speaks of a person indebted by endorsement, it can only be understood to speak of one indebted according to the legal liability of an endorsor; which is only, by the laws of Virginia, in case of the insolvency of the drawer. When it speaks of a consent in writing, that it may be negotiable at the said bank, it can only mean what it expresses; and intends it for the purpose of subjecting the individual to the summary recovery given in such a case; for, as to his general liability as endorsor, such a consent was in nowise necessary; that liability existed in its full extent with out it. And as to the supposition of the endorsor's liability to be sued when the note becomes due, this also is strictly and literally true, if the drawer should then be insolvent, or (I suppose) if he should become so at any time before the trial of the issue. Upon the whole, therefore, it appears to me that there is no possible difference between the liablity of an endorsor generally, and an endorsor of a note negotiable in the bank of Alexandria; that the legislature intended to make no distinction; and, if it had expressly declared such to be its intent, no such change would have been produced, without following up that intention with sufficient enacting words; but that in fact, its sole object was to do that which it professes to intend, and alone has effected, viz. to give a summary remedy against all persons becoming indebted to that bank, whenever their legal liability is incurred. In fact it may, with the utmost correct YEATON V. &c. ness, be affirmed of an endorsor that he is indebted, and that he may be sued when the note becomes due, THE BANK, without at all interfering with the laws of Virginia on this subject: for a thing may be debitum in presenti, and yet no cause of action exist against him; he may lie under a present obligation to pay a sum of money, upon some contingency or future event. And, with regard to his liability to be sued when the note becomes due, it may be very correctly afirmed that it is not due from him until the insolvency of the drawer can be shown. As to the drawer, the note is due when it is made payable; but the principles of the Virginia law add a contingency to the liability of the endorsor, so that, in fact, his undertaking is collateral and contingent, and the amount is not legally due from him until after the day of payment, and provided the drawer should prove insolvent. THE HOPE INSURANCE COMPANY OF PRO- ERROR to the circuit court for the district of A corporation Rhode Island, in an action upon a policy of insu- aggregate can rance. not be a citizen -and cannot litigate in the courts of the The only question decided in this court was that United States, relative to the jurisdiction of the courts of the unless in conUnited States. character must appear by pro sequence of the character of the individuals who comThe parties were described in the declaration as pose the body follows: "William Henderson Boardman, and Pascal politic, which Paoli Pope, both of Boston, in the district of Massachusetts, merchants and citizens of the State of Massa- per averments chusetts, complain of The Hope Insurance Compa- upon the reny of Providence, a company legally incorporated by the legislature of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, and established at Providence in "said district," cord. HOPE INS. V. BOARDMAN. The question of jurisdiction was not made in the court below. Ingersoll, for the plaintiffs in error, contended, that the jurisdiction must appear upon the face of the proceedings, according to the decision in the case of Bingham v. Cabot, 3 Dal. 382. And that it does not appear upon this record that the parties are citizens of different states; a corporation aggregate cannot be a citizen of any state; and here is no averment of citizenship of the individuals who compose the corporation. Adams, contra. The whole argument against us depends upon the single case of Bingham v. Cabot; for although in other cases the same point has been decided, yet the subsequent decisions are all founded upon that case. The effect of that decision has been to exclude many cases upon nice questions of pleading,、 which would otherwise have been clearly within the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States. No exception was taken to the jurisdiction in the court below; and this court would not willingly turn us out of court, after encountering all the risk, expense, delay and labour of a jury trial, upon an exception, which, if taken in the first instance, might have prevented all that risk, expense, and delay. In the case of Abercrombie v. Dupuis, (ante, vol. 1. p. 343.) the present Chief Justice (Marshall) intimated a doubt how the question would then have been decided if it were a new case, and if the court was not bound by the case of Bingham v. Cabot. This doubt shows that the court was not then inclined to extend the principle farther than that case warrants. At the time the court decided the case of Bingham v. Cabot, the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States was an object of jealousy, and there was probably a desire on the part of the court to remove all ground of suspicion, by deciding doubtful cases against the jurisdiction. This circumstance probably induced them to be over scrupulous upon that HOPE INS. V. subject. But it is as much the duty of this court to exercise jurisdiction in cases where it is given by the constitution and laws of the United States, as to BOARDMAN. refuse to assume it where it is not given. The person who drew the declaration in the present case seems to have been aware of the decision in the case of Bingham v. Cabot, and to have intended to describe the parties in such a manner as to give the court jurisdiction. The defendant is described as "a company legally incorporated by the legislature of the State of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, and established at Providence in the said district." The term citizen could not with propriety be applied to a corporation aggregate. It could only be a citizen by intendment of law. It is only a moral person; but it may be a citizen quoad hoc, i. e. in the sense in which the term citizen is used in that part of the constitution which speaks of the jurisdiction of the judicial power of the United States. The term is indeterminate in its signification. It has different meanings in different parts of the constitution. When it says "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states," the term citizens has a meaning different from that in which it is used in describing the jurisdiction of the courts. To say that all the individual members of a body. corporate must be citizens of a certain description, destroys the idea of a body politic. It is the body politic, the moral person, that sues; and not the individuals who compose the corporation. Its powers, its duties and capacities are different from those of the individuals of whom it is composed. It can neither derive benefit from the privileges, nor suffer injury by the incapacities, of any of those individuals. Thus the infancy of any or even of all the members of a body corporate does not affect the validity of its acts. Nor does the alienage of the members Co. &c. HOPE INS. prevent the body politic from holding lands. A majority of the members of the bank of the United States are aliens. V. BOARDMAN. The objection goes to exclude all corporations aggregate from the federal courts. For if a corporation cannot be a citizen it cannot be an alien. And as the individual members are constantly changing by the transfer of stock, it is impossible to ascertain at any precise moment who are the individuals who constitute the corporate body; and it would at any、 time be in the power of a corporation defendant to evade the jurisdiction of the court, by taking in a new member who should be of the same state with the plaintiff. At all events it is an objection which ought to be pleaded in abatement according to the course of the common law, so that the plaintiff may have a better declaration; and by that means much expense, time and labour would be saved. The reason of giving jurisdiction to the courts of the United States in cases between citizens of different states, applies with the greatest force to the case of a powerful moneyed corporation erected within, and under the laws of a particular state. If there was a probability that an individual citizen of a state could influence the state courts in his favour, how much stronger is the probability that they could be influenced in favour of a powerful moneyed institution which might be composed of the most influential characters in the state. What chance for justice could a plaintiff have against such a powerful association in the courts of a small state whose judges perhaps were annually elected, or held their offices at the will of the legislature? If the jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited by the letter of the constitution, they have no jurisdiction in a case between a citizen of one state and a citizen of another state; because the constitution speaks of citizens, in the plural, so that there must |