THURSDAY, April 15, 1824.

Occupation of Columbia River.

The committee to which was referred the resolution of the 29th day of December last, instructing them to inquire into the expediency of occupying the mouth of the Oregon or Columbia River, have had the same under consideration, and ask leave further to report: That they have considered the subject referred to them, and are persuaded, that, both in a military and commercial point of view, the occupation of that Territory is of great importance to the Republic; but, as much has been submitted to the House on these points, by former committees, they have now deemed it necessary only to present a view of the difficulties which would probably present themselves in accomplishing that object, and the manner in which they can be overcome.

To obtain information, a letter to this end was addressed to an officer of the Army, whose integrity in the public service is well known to the House, and whose military knowledge is entitled to the highest respect; that officer, Brigadier General Thomas S. Jesup, answered so satisfactorily to the committee, that they have presented the answer, in its entire form, to the House, and adopt it as a part of this report. QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, Washington, April 26, 1824. SIR: In reply to your letter, dated the 30th ultimo, requesting me to communicate " any facts, views, or opinions, which may have presented themselves to me, relative to the probable difficulty of making an establishment at the mouth of Columbia River, and the military advantages of that establishment," I have the honor to remark, that, ever since my attention was first directed to the subject, I have considered the possession and military command of the Columbia necessary not only to the protection of the trade, but to the security of our Western frontier. That flank of our country, extending from the Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico, is everywhere in contact with numerous, powerful, and warlike Indian nations; who, alto

the other hand, if such measures be adopted as to seof war, to command their co-operation, they, with the cure a proper influence over them, and, in the event aid of a few small garrisons, would not only afford ample protection for that entire line, but would become the scourge of our enemies.

The dangers to be apprehended, can only be averted post at the mouth of Columbia be intended to secure by proper military establishments; and whether the our territory, protect our traders, or to cut off all communication between the Indians and foreigners, Council Bluffs entirely across the continent necessary. I should consider a line of posts extending from the Those posts should be situated, as well with a view to command the avenues through which the Indians pass from the north to the south, as to keep open communication with the establishment at the mouth

of the Columbia,

lages, because, there the Missouri approaches within A post should be established at the Mandan vila short distance of the British territory, and it would have the effect of holding in check the Hudson's Bay and Northwest Companies, and controlling the RickaIndians, who either reside or range on the territory rees, Mandans, Minnatarees, Assiniboins, and other east, north, and west of that point.

A post at, or near, the head of navigation on the Missouri, would control the Blackfoot Indians, protect our traders, enable us to remove those of the British companies from our territory, and serve as a depot, at which detachments moved towards the Columbia might either be supplied, or leave such stores as they should find it difficult to carry with them through the mountains. It might also be made a depot of trade, and of the Indian Department.

To keep open the communication through the mountains, there should be at least one small post at some convenient point between the Missouri and the Columbia, and on the latter river and its tributaries there should be at least three posts. They would afford present protection to our traders, and, on the ex