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have we not only quite disarmed atheism of atomicism, or shewed that the latter, (rightly understood) affordeth no manner of shelter or protection to the former; but also made it manifest, that it is the greatest bulwark and defence against the same; which is a thing afterwards further insisted on."

This extract from the preface contains the outline of the first chapter, and points out the basis and principle of its argument; and surely if the atheist were to be confuted from his own notions, it was essential that these should be fairly and candidly stated. The second chapter therefore proceeds to state the several forms in which atheism has presented itself to the world. This enumeration is hardly worth our notice in this article, except to repeat that it is made fairly, as by one prepared to overthrow the several sophistries, and not sneeringly, or with exultation, as by one who wishes to raise more difficulties than can be easily removed.

The third chapter proceeds to a more minute and analytical inquiry into all the several forms of atheism, together with what our author calls a necessary digression concerning a plastic or artificial nature. We transcribe the first section of this chapter, wherein is stated the difference between the hylozoic and the atomic atheism.

"We have now represented the grand mysteries of atheism, which may be also called the mysteries of the kingdom of darkness; though indeed some of them are but briefly hinted here, they being again more fully to be insisted on afterward, where we are to give an account of the atheists' endeavours to solve the phenomenon of cogitation. We have represented the chief grounds of atheisms in general, as also of that most notorious form of atheism in particular, that is called atomical. But whereas there has been already mentioned another form of atheism, called by us hylozoical; the principles hereof could not possibly be insisted on in this place, where we were to make the most plausible plea for atheism, they being directly contrary to those of the atomical, so that they would have mutually destroyed each other. For, whereas the atomic atheism supposes the notion or idea of body to be nothing but extended resisting bulk, and consequently to include no manner of life and cogitation in it; hylozoism, on the contrary, makes all body, as such, and therefore every smallest atom of it, to have life essentially belonging to it (natural perception and appetite,) though without any animal sense or reflexive knowledge; as if life, and matter or extended bulk, were but two incomplete and inadequate conceptions of one and the same substance, called body. By reason of which life, (not animal, but only plastical,) all parts of matter being supposed able to form themselves artificially and methodically (though without any deliberation or attentive consideration) to the greatest advantage of their present respective capabilities, and therefore also sometimes by organization to improve themselves fur

ther into sense and self-enjoyment in all animals, as also to universal reason and reflexive knowledge in men; it is plain, that there is no necessity at all left, either of any incorporeal soul in men to make them rational, or of any deity in the whole universe to solve the regularity thereof. One main difference betwixt these two forms of atheism is this, that the atomical supposes all life whatsoever to be accidental, generable, and corruptible; but the hylozoic admits of a certain natural or plastic life, essential and substantial, ingenerable and incorruptible, though attributing the same only to matter, as supposing no other substance in the world besides it."

The greatest blemish in the work, we conceive to be the fanciful and superfluous digression concerning this plastic nature. It was well to prove that the atomic physiology was not only consistent with, but absolutely required the acknowledgment of a Deity; but it was superfluous to encumber the argument by the admission of the plastic nature, which introduces, as it were, another substance between God and the universe. It would have been better to have exploded the notion altogether, as a mere word invented to cover atheistic ignorance. The very ground and reason of its introduction are bad-for the same principle which requires this, might, with a very little ingenuity, be extended to the introduction or palliation of polytheism. It may be necessary to give the learned author's own words on this subject. We must content ourselves with a partial, though a long extract-for the whole digression occupies too vast a space to be transcribed entire.

"For unless there be such a thing admitted as a plastic nature that acts vená Tov, for the sake of something, and in order to ends, regularly, artificially, and methodically, it seems, that one or other of these two things must be concluded; that either in the efformation and organization of the bodies of animals, as well as the other phenomena, every thing comes to pass fortuitously, and happens to be as it is, without the guidance and direction of any mind or understanding; or else, that God himself doth all immediately, and, as it were, with his own hands, form the body of every gnat and fly, insect and mite, as of other animals in generations, all whose members have so much of contrivance in them, that Galen professed he could never enough admire that artifice, which was in the leg of a fly, (and yet he would have admired the wisdom of nature more, had he been but acquainted with the use of microscopes): I say, upon supposition of no plastic nature, one or other of these two things must be concluded; because it is not conceived by any, that the things of nature are all thus administered, with such exact regularity and constancy every where, merely by the wisdom, providence, and efficiency of those inferior spirits, demons, or angels. As also, though it be true, that the works of nature are dispensed by a divine law and command, yet this is not to be understood in a vulgar sense, as if they were all effected by the mere

force of a verbal law or outward command, because inanimate things are not commandable nor governable by such a law. And therefore, besides the divine will and pleasure, there must needs be some other immediate agent and executioner provided, for the producing of every effect; since not so much as a stone, or other heavy body, could at any time fall downward, merely by the force of a verbal law, without any other efficient cause; but either God himself must immediately impel it, or else there must be some other subordinate cause in nature for that motion. Wherefore, the divine law and command, by which the things of nature are administered, must be conceived to be the real appointment of some energetic, effectual, and operative cause for the production of every effect.

"Now to assert the former of these two things, that all the effects of nature come to pass by material and mechanical necessity, or the mere fortuitous motion of matter, without any guidance or direction, is a thing no less irrational than it is impious and atheistical. Not only because it is utterly inconceivable and impossible, that such infinite regularity and artificialness, as is every where throughout the whole world, should constantly result out of the fortuitous motion of matter; but also because there are many such particular phenomena in nature, as do plainly transcend the powers of mechanism, of which therefore no sufficient mechanical reasons can be devised--as the motion of respiration in animals: as there are also other phenomena, that are perfectly cross to the laws of mechanism; as, for example, that of the distant poles of the equator and ecliptic, which we shall insist upon afterward. Of both which kinds there have been other instances proposed by my learned friend, Dr. More, in his Enchiridion Metaphysicum, and very ingeniously improved by him to this very purpose, namely, to evince, that there is something in nature besides mechanism, and consequently substance incorporeal.

"Moreover, those theists, who philosophize after this manner, by resolving all the corporeal phenomena into fortuitous mechanism, or the necessary and unguided motion of matter, make God to be nothing else in the world, but an idle spectator of the various results of the fortuitous and necessary motions of bodies; and render his wisdom altogether useless and insignificant, as being a thing wholly enclosed and shut up within his own breast, and not at all acting abroad upon any thing without him.

"And as for the latter part of the disjunction, that every thing in nature should be done immediately by God himself; this, as, according to vulgar apprehension, it would render Divine Providence operose, solicitous, and distractious, and thereby make the belief of it to be entertained with greater difficulty, and give advantage to atheists; so in the judgment of the writer De Mundo, it is not so decorous in respect of God neither, that he should ἀντουργῖιν ἅπαντα, set his own hand, as it were, to every work, and immediately do all the meanest and triflingest things himself drudgingly without making use of any inferior and subordinate instruments. Moreover it seems not so agreeable to reason neither, that nature, as a distinct thing from the Deity, should be quite superseded or made to signify nothing, God himself

doing all things immediately and miraculously; from whence it would follow also, that they are all done either forcibly and violently, or else artificially only, and none of them by any inward principle of their

own.

"Lastly: this opinion is further confuted by that slow and gradual process, that is in the generation of things, which would seem to be but a vain and idle pomp, or a trifling formality, if the agent were omnipotent: as also by those apagruara (as Aristotle calls them), those errors and bungles, which are committed, when the matter is inept or contumacious; which argue the agent not to be irresistible, and that nature is such a thing, as is not altogether incapable (as well as human art) of being sometimes frustrated and disappointed by the indisposition of matter. Whereas an omnipotent agent, as it could dispatch its work in a moment, so it would always do it infallibly and irresistibly; no ineptitude or stubborness of matter being ever able to hinder such a one, or make him bungle or fumble in any thing."

From these premises, the author concludes, that there must be a plastic nature diffused throughout the universe, and acting like the principle of vegetation. Now, we must confess, that to us this seems to be the most unphilosophical part of the work, and that it savours more of heathen than of Christian philosophy. But it would be strange if a mind so occupied in poring over the confused mass of speculations and fancies which abound in the writings of the Greek theists, should not imbibe some of their spirit. Our author is obviously pleased with this conceit, and has made it a complete hobby; but this very thing is an argument in favour of his sincerity, and though an excrescence, is not without its interest.

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The fourth chapter, which is by far the longest, is occupied by an attempt to prove that the intelligent pagans generally acknowledged one Supreme Deity. This is the part of the work that called forth the animadversions of the Catholic above alluded to, who contended that the gods worshipped by pagans, were but deified men and women. They may both right. The populace worshipped idols and deified mortals, and personified operations of nature, bonâ fide, as real beings. The philosophers were sceptical as to the popular theology, and as their theism was for the most part speculative and philosophical-not practical and religious, there was nothing in their acknowledgment of a Supreme Numen, that could render the Christian revelation superfluous, any more than if the whole mass of the Pagan world were sunk into the grossest and most palpable idolatry. But in the illustration which our author gives of this part of his subject, there should have been a distinction made between those heathen writers who flourished before the time of Christ, and those who were acquainted with the doctrines of Christianity. His argument in

this chapter goes to prove, that the polytheism of the pagans is no objection to the naturalness of the idea of the unity and supremacy of God; because the more intelligent could discern and did acknowledge one Supreme. This point should have been confined to the writers who were unacquainted with the Christian scheme. It is very natural to suppose, that when the absurdities of pagan idolatry were made the subject of attack by the Christians, that the advocates of that idolatry should endeavour to make out the best case that they could for themselves. Hence we find, that the spirit of paganism was considerably changed by the introduction of Christianity, as the Roman Catholic religion was somewhat softened by the influence of the Reformation. This, however, is abundantly obvious, viz. that if the idea of the supremacy of one God be not natural to man, yet, when proposed to the mind, it is readily recognized as conformable to truth. But we pass by this subject, not desiring to enter into a discussion which rather belongs to theology than criticism, and designing rather to give an account of what Cudworth has done, than of what he ought to have done.

This chapter brings into view the immense, the patient and accurate reading of its author, and yet it is not ostentatious withal. There seems to be an object, and that object kept steadily in view-there is no quotation which has not its palpable use in the argument, and though a hasty reader might be apt to imagine that less would suffice, yet it is felt in conclusion, that in all this abundance, there is no superfluity, and it may be said of judicious quoters, as of the Israelites gathering manna in the Wilderness," They that gathered little had no lack, and they that gathered much had none to spare."

The fifth and last chapter is entitled A particular Confutation of all the Atheistic Grounds. From this part of the work have been drawn abundant diluted arguments, on the subject of atheism indeed, there is scarcely a single topic that has been overlooked. Those of our readers who are not intimate with the logic of the Epicurean poet, will be diverted with the following extract concerning the logic of the atheists. After speaking of the evident traces of design which appear in the universe, he adds,

"Notwithstanding all which, the ancient atheists would undertake by their wonderful skill in logic, to demonstrate, that the frame of nature could not possibly be made by any intending cause, and for the sake of ends and uses; as for example, that eyes could not be first of all made intentionally for the use of seeing, nor ears intentionally for the use of hearing, and so for the rest; because, forsooth, these things were all of them in order of time and nature before their

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