Page images
PDF
EPUB
[blocks in formation]

ly most convenient, on all accounts, that this instalment should follow its present destination, and the necessities of the Treasury be provided for by other means.

Again, if you pass this bill, what is it? It is a mere brutum fulmen; of itself, it will not produce any good if you do pass it. All admit there is no money; therefore the bill will give no relief to the Treasury. This bill, Mr. President, will not produce to the Secretary one dollar: he acknowledges himself that at all events it will not produce him many, for he says he wants other aid, and he has applied to Congress for an issue of some millions in Treasury notes. He gets the money, therefore, just as well without this bill as with it; the bill itself, then, is unnecessary, depriving the States of a sum which the Secretary cannot avail himself of, and which sum, notwithstanding this bill, he proposes to supply by an issue of Government notes. He calls this collateral aid to the measure of postponement. But this evidently reverses the order of things, for the Treasury notes are his main reliance; to them only he looks for immediate relief, and this instalment now to be withheld is (as a productive source of revenue) only subsequent and collateral to the issue of the

notes.

But now, sir, what sort of notes does the Secretary propose to issue? He proposes, sir, to issue Treasury notes of small denominations, down even as low as twenty dollars, not bearing interest, and redeemable at no fixed period; they are to be received in debts due to Government, but are not otherwise to be paid until at some indefinite time there shall be a certain surplus in the Treasury beyond what the Secretary may think its wants require. Now, sir, this is plain, authentic, statutable paper money; it is exactly a new emission of old continental. If the Genius of the old Confederation were now to rise up in the midst of us, he could not furnish us, from the abundant stores of his recollection, with a more perfect model of paper money. It carries no interest; it has no fixed time of payment; it is to circulate as currency, and it is to circulate on the credit of Government alone, with no fixed period of redemption! If this be not paper money, pray, sir, what is it? And, sir, who expected this? Who expected that in the fifth year of the experiment for reforming the currency, and bringing it to an absolute gold and silver circulation, the Treasury Department would be found recommending to us a regular emission of paper money? This, sir, is quite new in the history of this Government; it belongs to that of the Confederation which has passed away.

Since 1789, although we have issued Treasury notes on sundry occasions, we have issued none like these; that is to say, we have issued none not bearing interest, intended for circulation, and with no fixed mode of redemption. I am glad, however, Mr. President, that the committee have not adopted the Secretary's recommnendation, and that they have recommended the issue of Treasury notes of a description more conformable to the practice of the Govern

ment.

I think (said Mr. W.) there are ways by which the deposites with the States might be paid by the funds in the banks. There are large sums on deposite in some of the States, and an arrangement might be made for the States to receive the notes of their own banks in payment of this instalment, while the Treasury is at the same time relieved by its own measure; and all the inconvenience, disappointment, and disturbance, which this bill will necessarily create, would be avoided. At any rate, the payment of this deposite could do no more than in some measure to increase the amount of Treasury notes necessary to be issued; it is a question of quantity merely. Much of the instalment, I believe, might be paid, by judicious arrangements, out of those funds now in the banks, which the Secretary cannot use for other purposes; so that the whole might be provided for, by no great augmentation of the

[SEPT. 14, 1837.

proposed amount of Treasury notes. I am, therefore, of opinion that this instalment should not be withheld: 1st. Because the withholding of it will produce great inconvenience to the States and to the people. 2d. Because provision may be made for paying it, without any large addition to the sum which it is proposed to raise, and which, at all events, must be raised for the uses of the Treasury. In relation to the general subjects of the message, there is one thing which I intended to have said, but have omitted; it is this: We have seen the declaration of the President, in which he says that he refrains from suggesting any specific plan for the regulation of the exchanges of the country, and for relieving mercantile embarrassments, or for interfering with the ordinary operation of foreign or domestic commerce; and that he does this from a conviction that such measures are not within the constitutional province of the General Government; and yet he has made a recommendation to Congress which appears to me to be very remarkable, and it is of a measure which he thinks may prove a salutary remedy against a depreciated paper currency. This measure is neither more nor less than a bankrupt law against corporations and other bankers.

Now, Mr. President, it is certainly true that the constitution authorizes Congress to establish uniform rules on the subject of bankruptcies; but it is equally true, and abundantly manifest, that this power was not granted with any reference to currency questions. It is a general powera power to make uniform rules on the subject. How is it possible that such a power can be fairly exercised by seizing on corporations and bankers, but excluding all the other usual subjects of bankrupt laws? Besides, do such laws ordinarily extend to corporations at all? But suppose they might be so extended, by a bankrupt law enacted for the usual purposes contemplated by such laws; how can a law be defended, which embraces them and bankers alone? I should like to hear what the learned gentleman at the head of the Judiciary Committee, to whom the subject is referred, has to say upon it.

How does the President's suggestion conform to his notions of the constitution? The object of bankrupt laws, sir, has no relation to currency. It is simply to distribute the effects of insolvent debtors among their creditors; and I must say, it strikes me that it would be a great perversion of the power conferred on Congress to exercise it upon corporations and bankers, with the leading and primary object of remedying a depreciated paper currency.

And this appears the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the President is of opinion that the general subject of the currency is not within our province. Bankruptcy, in its common and just meaning, is within our province. Currency, says the message, is not. But we have a bankruptcy power in the constitution, and we will use this power, not for bankruptcy, indeed, but for currency. This, I confess, sir, appears to me to be the short statement of the matter. I would not do the message, or its author, any intentional injustice, nor create any apparent where there was not a real inconsistency; but I declare, in all sincerity, that I cannot reconcile the proposed use of the bankrupt power with those opinions of the message which respect the authority of Congress over the currency of the country.

Mr. WRIGHT said it might become him to say a few words in relation to the bill before the Senate. His position in reference to this and other bills, perhaps, required him to do so. He would, however, confine himself strictly to the present subject, and to the most brief justification of his own course, and that of a majority of the Committee on Finance, who had concurred with him in reporting the bill.

Immediately upon the appointment of the committee, and the reference to it of the important subjects treated of in the message of the President, and the report of the Secretary of

[ocr errors]
[blocks in formation]

the Treasury, the committee found that the Treasury of the United States was, very soon, to be in want of means to meet the current demands upon it, without regard to any further transfer to the States. They also found that this fourth instalment of the deposites with the States was to become payable on the 1st day of October, and amounted to about nine and one-third millions of dollars.

The state of the Treasury, as developed by the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, was, as he now recollected, (and he thought he could not be materially mistaken,) that, at the time when the statement appended to that report was made up, about the first day of the present month, (he believed the exact date was the 28th of August,) there was in the Treasury, subject to draft, available and unavailable, but eight million one hundred and some odd thousand dollars. The report was printed, and upon the table of every Senator, and would verify his correctness in this particular. This amount was exclusive of the sums already deposited with the States, being some twenty-eight millions.

[SENATE.

transfer should still be made, and should provide the means for making it. These facts and conclusions were fully before the committee.

It then became necessary for them to see what would be the state of the public Treasury, upon the supposition that the October instalment of the deposite with the States should be withheld. In prosecuting that inquiry, they found that the funds in the Treasury subject to draft were to so great an extent unavailable, that it would be indispensably necessary to resort to the use of the credit of the Government, in some form, to anticipate the practical use of the unavailable portions of those funds for the purpose of current payments.

At this stage of the inquiry, two other important interests, both public and private in their character, pressed themselves upon the attention of the committee. In any settlement with the late deposite banks, which should have proper regard to the present deranged and depressed state of the business of the country, and to the security of the To arrive at what would be the condition of the Treasury public moneys yet remaining in their possession, the comon the 1st of October, the expenses of the present month, mittee were forced to the conclusion that indulgence to which, from drafts already made and anticipated, were these institutions, beyond their legal liabilities, was indisestimated at about two and a half millions, must be de- pensable. The conclusions of the committee upon this ducted from the eight million one hundred and odd point had been embodied in the shape of a bill, and was thousand; thus leaving in the Treasury, subject to draft now before the Senate in a printed form. The other great on the 1st day of October, less than six millions, without interest to which he referred was a similar indulgence upthe transfer of a dollar to the States towards the October on the revenue bonds. There, also, the committee had instalment. This, too, included all the funds in the Treas-reported a bill, which was before the body. In both cases, ury, subject to draft for payments, or transfers to the States, whether available or not, upon the drafts of the Treasurer; the funds on deposite with the States not being taken into the computation.

If, then, the October instalment was to be transferred to the States, all the means in the Treasury, of all descriptions, on the day when that instalment was, by the deposite law, made transferable, would not be equal to two-thirds of the arount; and money must be borrowed upon the credit of the United States, to supply the deficiency.

Another and stronger view, however, was presented to the committee by the head of the Treasury Department. The largest portion of the funds in the Treasury at present, and which would remain there on the 1st of October, were wholly unavailable upon the drafts of the Treasurer. They were in the Western and Southwestern banks; and experience had already shown that the drafts of the Treasurer upon these banks would not be received in payment by the public creditors. It was equally proved that the States, other than those in which the banks were located, would not take those drafts, and give their obligations for a repayment of the amount in money, in pursuance of the provisions of the deposite law. The transfer to the States, therefore, could not be made, even to the amount of the funds in the Treasury subject to draft, by reason of the character of the funds to be drawn upon; and, if to be made a loan, to a much greater amount than the deficiency of those funds upon paper, would be regarded indispensable, from the unavailable condition of these funds.

Still it would be seen by the Senate, that this disposition of the funds in the Treasury, and of the public credit, would leave the Treasury without a dollar to answer the current demands upon it. The appropriations for the year were large, almost beyond example; and the current calls upon the public Treasury must be measured by them. Hence it had been an object of primary interest with the Secretary to devise the means for carrying on the Government, and fulfilling its obligations to the public creditors; and, in reaching that object, he had, as he (Mr. W.) considered, wisely and properly suspended his efforts to make this last transfer to the States. In pursuance of this necessity, he had told Congress, in his printed report, that he should make no movements towards the accomplishment of that object, until the action of Congress should signify its will that that

the least indulgence had been proposed, which the committee believed to be consistent with the great private interests of the community, or the security of the public property involved. They had been induced to believe that the time granted to the banks was the least which would enable them to meet the payments in the manner required by law, and that any dependence upon a more speedy collection of the merchants' bonds would result in disappointment to the public Treasury, and a consequent failure to pay the public creditors.

It being assumed that Congress would agree with the committee in these conclusions, and that these bills would meet with approbation, what then would be the state of the Treasury with reference to a transfer of the October instalment to the States?

Mr. W. said he understood the estimates of the department to be, that, without these indulgences to the banks and the merchants, and with the postponement of the October instalment of the transfer to the States, the whole means in the Treasury might be adequate to its wants; in case Congress should be willing to grant the use of the public credit temporarily, that that portion of the funds which were at present unavailable might be brought into practical use, until time should render them available for the redemption of that credit. If those indulgences should be granted, then the use of the public credit would be required beyond the current year, because material portions of the existing means, and of the otherwise accruing revenue, would be placed without the reach or control of the Treasury for more than that period.

Upon these calculations and hypotheses the bills of the committee had been framed; and it was now his duty to give these facts and conclusions practical application to the measure under discussion.

This was a bill to postpone the October instalment of the transfer to the States. If he had been correct in his statements, and had made himself intelligible to the Senate, it would be seen that nothing existed in the Treasury out of which this transfer could be made, and that nothing within its power could enable it to make it without the aid of Congress. It would also be seen that the whole means of the Treasury were inadequate to meet the current calls upon it without the temporary aid of the credit of the nation; and that, if a reasonable indulgence were granted to public

[blocks in formation]

debtors, (such as the condition of the country and the security of eventual collections seemed to demand,) the use of that credit must extend beyond the current year, and could, at best, be only eventually met and redeemed by the means of the Treasury, existing or in prospect, without a further transfer to the States.

In view of these facts, Mr. W. said his own mind had been brought to this simple and plain conclusion: that the United States had no longer any moneys to be safely kept by the States; that if the October instalment of the transfer provided for by the deposite law of 1836 were made, the means to make it must be borrowed upon the credit of the United States; and that Congress must place itself in the singular position of using the public credit to borrow money, merely that it might be safely kept by the States when it was obtained. He understood these provisions of the deposite law, upon their face, to be mere provisions for the safekeeping of the public money. He understood this to be the object of those who advocated and supported that law at the time of its passage. In that sense he was disposed to regard it now; and he did not, therefore, view it as creating any claim in favor of the States, or as imposing any debt upon the United States. If, therefore, we were called upon to borrow money to fulfil the provisions of that law, he could only view it in the light of a call upon us to borrow money, merely that it might be safely kept when so borrowed. He had not felt, and could not feel, himself authorized to recommend a loan upon the credit of the nation for such a purpose. He believed he spoke the sentiments of those of his colleagues upon the committee, when he said that these were the views which had actuated him and them in consenting to report this bill.

Mr. W. said he owed it to himself to say that he had felt most sensibly the remarks of the honorable Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. WEBSTER] as to the inconveniences and disappointments which must grow out of withholding the transfer of this instalment to the States. With a much less knowledge of the varied business and pecuniary affairs of our extended country than that distinguished Senator, he had not been insensible to these considerations. The course pursued by his own State, in the disposition of this money, had compelled him to be awake to them. The law of his State for the investment of its portion of this money had placed the matter even beyond its control, and had compelled its chief fiscal officer, long since, to announce to its citizens that this instalment would be paid from the treasury of the State, whatever might be the action of Congress upon the subject. This would, beyond doubt, be done; and those who sent him here, and whom it was his duty and desire faithfully to represent, should this bill pass, would be compelled to indemnify, from their own public funds, the individuals interested as borrowers of these moneys against disappointment, damage, or loss, from the action of Congress. Yet, under these delicate and difficult circumstances, he had not been able to convince himself that he could properly do otherwise than to support the bill. He owed a high duty to those constituents, but he owed, in his estimation, a higher to the nation and to the constitution of his country. He could not think that the power granted to Congress to borrow money upon the credit of the United States could be properly exercised for the mere purpose of raising money to be safely kept; and this he must consider the simple question presented. He might be mistaken in this view of the matter, but such was the deliberate conclusion of his mind, upon the most mature reflection; and that conclusion must govern his action upon the bill, as it had done his action as a member of the committee which reported it. Having said thus much, Mr. W. said, he would only correct two or three errors of fact into which the honorable Senator who had just resumed his seat [Mr. WEBSTER] seemed to him to have fallen, and he would detain the Senate no longer.

[SEPT. 11, 1837.

The honorable Senator seemed to suppose that the means to make this transfer to the States were in the Treasury; and that the only difficulty, separate from the other demands upon it, grew out of the present unavailable character of those means. The statements he had already made had shown the error of this hypothesis. He had already shown that the whole means in the Treasury, even when the Secretary of the Treasury made his report, at the commencement of our present session, of whatever character, whether available or not, were less, by more than a million of dollars, than the instalment required to be transferred to the States under the deposite law. He had further shown that those means, such as they were, were, before the 1st of October, when that transfer was required to be made, to be still further diminished by the whole expenses of the Government for the present month, ascertained and estimated to amount to two and a half millions of dollars. Hence it would follow, that the whole means in the Treasury on the 1st day of October next must be from three and a half to four millions less than the transfer required. It was in vain, therefore, Mr. W. said, to escape from the conclusion, that, if Congress should insist upon this transfer, it must authorize a loan of money upon the public credit, to enable the Treasury to make it: in other words, that it must authorize a loan of money upon the credit of the United States, in order that that money, when loaned, may be deposited with the States for safekeeping.

Another error of the honorable Senator [Mr. WEBSTER] which he felt bound to correct was in his strictures upon the recommendations of the Secretary of the Treasury, as to the manner of issuing Treasury notes. The honorable Senator had criticised this part of the report of the Secretary of the Treasury with some severity, and had held him up to the Senate and the country as striking out a new path for the supply of the Treasury; as recommending the issue of paper money, of a description of paper similar to that which we know by the denomination of "continental money" and of doing this for the first time since the organization of the Government under the constitution. The fault complained of consisted in a recommendation, merely discretionary and alternative, to issue Treasury notes bearing no interest, and payable to the bearer, in case the public creditors should be found willing to receive such notes in payment of their demands against the Government, at par; otherwise, to give the notes such an interest as would bring them to par.

Mr. W. said, as the committee, in the bill they had reported, had not followed this recommendation of the Secretary, it would be seen that no question was depending before the Senate, either in the bill now under discussion, or in any other, which rendered this point material; but he was sure his object would be fully understood and appreciated in making this correction. It was simply to defend this public officer against a mistaken accusation. It was not necessary for him to defend, at this time, the soundness of the recommendation, but to protect the Secretary against the charge of being the author of a principle now supposed to be so new and so dangerous. To do this, it was only necessary for him to read the third section of the act of the 24th of February, 1815, authorizing an emission of Treasury notes, in which all these dangers would be found to be embraced, adopted, and made imperative, as a part of the laws of the land.

[Mr. W. here read the section of the act, as follows:

"Sec. 3. And be it further enacted, That the said Treasury notes shall be prepared of such denominations as the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approbation of the President of the United States, shall, from time to time, direct; and such of the said notes as shall be of a denomination less than one hundred dollars shall be payable to bearer, and be transferable by delivery alone, and shall bear no interest; and such of the said notes as shall be of the de

[blocks in formation]

nomination of one hundred dollars, or upwards, may be made payable to order, and transferable by delivery and assignment, endorsed on the same, and bearing an interest from the day on which they shall be issued, at the rate of five and two-fifths per centum per annum; or they may be made payable to bearer, and transferable by delivery alone, and bearing no interest, as the Secretary of the Treasury, with the approbation of the President of the United States, shall direct."]

What, now, Mr. W. asked, was the condition and the fault of the Secretary? He had found the public treasury in want of means to pay the public creditors. The exigency had grown out of a reverse in trade and business, sudden and universal; and the use of the credit of the Government, in some form, seemed to him indispensable. It became his duty to suggest to Congress the means and the mode of supplying the Treasury. He examined the legislative history of the Government in former cases of embarrassment at the Treasury, and found, among other expedients, that emissions of Treasury notes paying no interest, payable to bearer, transferable by delivery alone, and without any restriction as to the denomination of the notes to be so issued, had been authorized. Among a variety of plans to meet the present wants, he suggested this, recommending that no note should be issued for a less amount than $20. Had he attempted to introduce any new principle? Certainly not. Was his conduct, in making this suggestion, in conformity with the previous practice of Congress itself, deserving of the high censure which had been bestowed upon it? He (Mr. W.) thought not.

A single other reply to the honorable Senator. That gentleman had supposed the President most inconsistent and contradictory with himself, in remarking, generally, in his message, that he did not recommend to Congress measures for the regulation of the general currency of the country, or of the foreign and domestic exchanges, because he could not find in the constitution any power conferred upon Congress to regulate these matters; and then, in the same message, recommending a bankrupt law, as applicable to banks and bankers. Where was the inconsistency or contradiction? The President had said he omitted to make further recommendations upon these subjects than those found in the message, because he could not find, and did not believe, that Congress possessed further power over them; but he did recommend a bankrupt law, because the power to pass bankrupt laws is conferred upon Congress by the constitution, in express terms. He did, therefore, recommend a bankrupt law, which the constitution authorizes; and he did not recommend any thing else, upon these points, because the constitution authorizes Congress to do nothing else. Is this inconsistent ?

Mr. WEBSTER said, in reply, if the act of 1815 authorized the issuing of Treasury notes, no circulation was ever made of such notes as the Secretary now recommends. All Treasury notes went on the ground of a temporary loan to the Government, to be paid or funded as soon as the Treasury would allow.

The member from New York [Mr. WRIGHT] had said that the question before the Senate was a simple proposition, whether they should borrow money to be safely kept with the States? By him, and by others, it had also been represented as a question whether they should borrow money to give away! Nobody, Mr. W. thought, would borrow money merely to give away, or deposite for safekeeping. But he would put it to the honorable member, if any Government had made a contract, or excited an expectation that a deposite would be made, and the other party had acted on the faith of this assurance, and had nearly completed their arrangements, whether it ought not to supply the means, even if it did not, at the time, possess them? And suppose it was the promise of a gift, instead of a deposite; might it not be found more just to borrow,

[SENATE.

than to defeat the expectation on which the other party had acted? What was the object of this bill? It was not to repeal, but to postpone what was hereafter to be fulfilled. Such being the case, it was doubtful whether it could ever be transferred to the States with more convenience than it could now from the banks.

During the late war there was great want of money, and a great disposition to use Treasury notes, and pass them as a medium of payment to the public creditors. But, in the difficulties and embarrassments of a foreign war, things were done, which, in a day of peace and abundance, we should be slow to do. And one thing which we should be slow to do was, to propose by law that we should pay the public creditors any thing less in value than gold and silver, on the condition that the creditors would voluntarily take it. The Secretary had said that the protested checks now in circulation were only a little depreciated below the value of specie, and argues that these notes will be as good at least as the protested checks. But suppose these notes should be depreciated only a little below the value of silver; was it proposed that they should be offered to the public creditors if they would receive them? What was meant when it was said that the officers of the Government may pay its creditors in Treasury notes, if they will voluntarily receive them? What was the alternative? Were the gold and silver held in one hand, and the Treasury notes in the other? On the contrary, it was a sort of forced payment, not as good as was required by law. All knew there was no choice. The men who labored in the streets of this city, on the public works, or who furnished the bricks and stones, would come for their pay; and they would be offered Treasury, notes, and asked if they were willing to take them. But would there be gold and silver in the other hand? No; nothing but the Treasury notes: and they would be asked if they were willing to take them; and then, if they should take them, that is called voluntary reception.

Now it is evident that, in such a case, the only choice is between Treasury notes, on the one hand, and something worse, or nothing at all, on the other. No man can be supposed to receive voluntarily any thing of less value than that which he is legally entitled to. The reception of such inferior medium is always the result of force or necessity, either greater or smaller. Neither the justice nor the dignity of the Government could ever allow of such a course. If Treasury notes were offered to the public creditor, there ought to be an actual choice afforded between them and the specie. And, especially, with what an aspect could this Government offer such payment, at the very moment when, with a stern countenance and iron hand, it was demanding of its creditors metallic money for every dollar of its dues? Was it not now the law that no officer of the Government should offer the public creditor any thing less in value than specie? Mr. W. thought, therefore, that the notes proposed by the committee were better than those recommended by the Secretary. He was in favor of that system which would put the public creditor in no such selection as between paper and nothing.

Mr. BUCHANAN said he had often admired the dexterity with which the Senator from Massachusetts could extricate himself from a difficulty, in which, however, he was seldom involved. On such occasions he always made a skilful retreat. Feeling the respect which he (Mr. B.) did for nis legal knowledge, he had received, as a matter of faith, his declaration that Treasury notes not bearing interest had never been issued under the present constitution; and when he called up the ghost of the ancient Confederation to act as godfather of these Treasury notes, Mr. B. remained satisfied that he had made himself fully acquainted with the laws in relation to that subject. But scarcely had he taken his seat, when the act of 1815 laid the ghost which he had conjured up; and by that it ap

[blocks in formation]

peared that Congress had done the very thing which he had declared had not been done since the days of the Confederation. Thus much was due to the Secretary of the Treasury. Mr. B., however, rejoiced that the Committee on Finance had proposed the issue of no notes not bearing interest.

In regard to this bill, a plain statement of facts would be the most conclusive argument which could be urged in its favor. He had voted for the deposite of June, 1836; and, upon a retrospect of all which had occurred since its passage, he had found no cause to repent of this vote. It was a choice of evils; and between the alternatives presented, he thought he had made the best choice. On the one side, after reserving five millions, nearly forty millions of dollars had accumulated in the deposite banks. This vast amount of money was used by them to increase the dividends of their stockholders, to expand extravagantly the paper circulation of the country, and to excite speculation to the greatest excess. On the other hand, strong objections existed against making the Federal Government an instrument for the purpose of collecting money that it might be deposited with the States. The precedent might in many respects be dangerous. But the money was on hand. It had been collected under existing laws. Placed in this situation, he thought it was more just, more politic, more safe, to place it in deposite with the States, that it might be used for the benefit of the people, than to suffer it to remain with the banks for the benefit of their stockholders, and to the injury of the country.

But does the deposite law, from first to last, contain one sentence-nay, does it contain one word-which resembles a gift or a loan to the States? Is it not, in terms, a bare transfer of the deposites from the banks to the States? Under its provisions, the faith of all the States is pledged for the safekeeping and repayment of their respective proportions of this money, whenever they shall be required by the Secretary of the Treasury, for the purpose of defraying the wants of the Treasury. The mode and manner in which he shall call for it are expressly prescribed. Nay, more; the case has actually occurred. If the Secretary had pursued the line of strict duty under the law, he would, ere this, have called on the States for a portion of the three instalments which have already been paid. He has acted wisely in not making this demand until the pleasure of Congress could be known. The States are not now in a condition to return inmediately any portion of what they have already received.

Under these circumstances, the question is, whether we are bound, upon any principle, to deposite with them the fourth instalment, when the Secretary of the Treasury, the very next day, might demand a return not only of it, but of the three other instalments, in the manner prescribed by the law.

Mr.

The Senator from Massachusetts had not contended that we were bound by any contract to deposite this fourth instalment with the States. He had said, however, that if an individual, by his conduct, had induced a reasonable expectation that he would loan money to another, or give money to another, it might become his duty to borrow it, and pay interest for it, for either of those purposes. B. denied that the conduct of Congress was such as to afford any pretext for such an expectation. On the face of the act there was nothing but deposite written. Neither a loan nor a gift appeared upon it. It was a mere deposite, without interest, to be restored when demanded in the manner prescribed; and not a loan for a given period, much less an absolute gift. If the States, therefore, had enter. tained any such expectation, it was from other circumstances, and not from the solemn contract into which they had entered with the United States under this law.

Mr. B. knew that several of the States had made appropriations of this money, which would render it extreme

[SEPT. 14, 1837.

ly inconvenient for them to return, at the present time, any portion of the money which they had already received. He did not believe that it ought to be demanded from them by the Secretary of the Treasury, without the special direction of Congress. Still, this opinion was not founded upon any doubts which he entertained of their obligation to refund it.

Congress would not have been involved in its present difficulties in regard to this subject, but for the unfortunate amendment which had been made to the deposite bill by the House of Representatives, which was acquiesced in by the Senate. Had it not been for this amendment, we might now proceed and suffer the fourth instalment to be deposited with the States. The Secretary of the Treasury would then have received from them transferable certificates of deposite, in such convenient sums as he might have directed, bearing no interest until it became necessary for him to use them, but afterwards bearing an interest of five per cent., and redeemable at the pleasure of the States. At this very moment such certificates would command a premium in the market, and would be equal to gold and silver. The Treasury might have been replenished by their sale; and we might suffer the deposite law to take its course.

Mr. B. said, however much ingenuity might attempt to disguise this question, the result was, that we must now determine whether we will borrow the amount of the fourth instalment, either in the form of Treasury notes, or by a direct loan, and pay interest upon it, in order that we may deposite it with the States for safekeeping, and without interest. This was the plain and simple proposition. It was the result of all the argument. What man, in his senses, ever contracted a debt in order that he might deposite the amount of it with his neighbor for safekeeping? And is the Federal Government to be guilty of this absurdity? Are we, as the trustees of the people of the United States, to manage their concerns so unwisely as to involve them in a debt, and collect taxes from them to pay it, for any such purpose? However much the States might desire to receive this fourth instalment, and whatever attempts might be made to excite popular feeling upon this subject, he had full confidence that his constituents would approve his vote upon this bill.

The

Mr. B. said that he knew very well that this was a subject well calculated to enlist the feelings of Senators. instalment might be deposited with the States against his vote. In that event, he should bow most cheerfully to the will of the majority. Indeed, there was one consideration which had induced him to endeavor to bring himself to this conclusion; and nothing but a conviction of imperious duty had stood in the way. He knew that the greater amount of Treasury notes which we issued, the greater would be the relief to the community. Whatever amount might be issued, would be equal, in this respect, to the creation of so much gold and silver. They would assist in regulating the exchanges, both foreign and domestic. They would go to Europe in payment of our debt, and thus prevent the transportation of the precious metals. If this bill should not pass, their amount would be increased several millions; and thus additional relief would be afforded to the public. But however much he might desire, and however much he did desire this result, he could not consent to borrow money on the faith of the United States, not to carry into effect the legitimate purposes of the Government, but to place it on deposite with the several States.

In answer to Mr. BUCHANAN,

Mr. WEBSTER, having obtained and examined the act of 1815, said: The honorable member from Pennsylvania has been kind enough to say that I do not often get into difficulties in debate, and that when I do, I generally extricate myself better than I have done on the present occasion. He partakes in the supposed triumph of his friend from New York, [Mr. WRIGHT, ] in having proved me incorrect when

« ՆախորդըՇարունակել »