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The law of 1815 authorized the issue of two classes of Treasury notes: 1st. Such as bore no interest, but which, the very hour they were issued, might be funded in a 7 per cent. stock, to be redeemed like other stocks of the Government. 2d. Treasury notes bearing an interest of five and two-fifths per cent., capable of being funded in like manner, in a 6 per cent. stock. These stocks were to be issued on application by any commissioner of the revenue in any State. Now, what comparison is there between either of these classes of Treasury notes and those recommended by the Secretary, which bear no interest, and for which no fixed redemption is provided?

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I said that this Government had never issued such paper repose this responsibility where he (Mr. B.) thought it money as the Secretary has now recommended. Now, sir, should be-namely, in Congress. For this purpose he propoalthough I am pleased to see the happiness which the gen-sed to insert "provided the three first instalments already paid tleman enjoys, yet I believe I must dash it a little. Most do remain on deposite until further directed by Congress." assuredly, sir, it authorizes no such paper as is now propo- Mr. NILES said he must ask for the yeas and nays on sed. I was persuaded it could not, as I have a pretty good the amendment, and was sorry it had been offered. If it was recollection of the proceedings of Congress on such subjects to be fully considered, it would renew the debate on the deat that time. posite act, as it went to change the essential principles and terms of that act. A majority of those who voted for that act, about which there had been so much said and so much misrepresentation, had professed to regard it—and he could not doubt that at the time they did so regard it as simply a deposite law; as merely changing the place of deposite from the banks to the States, so far as related to the surplus. The money was still to be in the Treasury, and liable to be drawn out, with certain limitations and restrictions, by the ordinary appropriation laws, without the direct action of Congress. The amendment, if adopted, will change the principles of the deposite act, and the condition of the money deposited with the States under it. It will no longer be a deposite; it will not be in the Treasury, even in point of legal effect or form: the deposite will be changed to a loan, or, perhaps more properly, a grant to the States. The rights of the United States will be changed to a mere claim, like that against the late Bank of the United States; and a claim without any means to enforce it. We were charged, at the time, of making a distribution of the public revenue to the States, in the disguise and form of a deposite; and this amendment, it appeared to him, would be a very bold step towards confirming the truth of that charge. He deemed the amendment an important one, and highly objectionable; but he saw that the Senate were prepared to adopt it, and he would not pursue the discussion, but content himself with repeating his request for the ayes and noes on the question.

I affirm again, therefore, sir, all that I have said, namely, that the notes recommended by the Sceretary are regular paper issues, like the old emissions of Congress and the States before the adoption of the present constitution; and that no precedent has been found for them, and I am sure none can be found, in the practice of this Government.

Mr. BUCHANAN said he did not think the Senator, with all his ingenuity, had got out of the difficulty. Under the section of the law of 1815, which he had just read, Treasury notes were to be issued without interest; they were to circulate as a currency without interest; they might continue to circulate for years without interest. It did not alter the case that the holder of them above a certain amount had the privilege of funding them, and converting them into a stock bearing interest. This interest did not commence from the date of their issue, but from the time they were funded. All the time they remained in circulation, they were Treasury notes without interest. They were what the Senator from Massachusetts had supposed never was issued under the present constitution. Mr. B. however, agreed with the Senator that at this time no Treasury notes ought to be issued which did not bear interest.

Mr. CALHOUN said that he was decidedly of the impression that, under the circumstances of the case, this postponement ought to be made. The object of the deposite law was to draw the revenue out of the grasp of the Government, and to restore it to those to whom it ought to be restored. And now, when there was no surplus, it was not contrary to the purpose of that law to withhold it. But the responsibility of doing so would rest on gentlemen of the administration and those of the opposition who made last year the extravagant appropriations of thirty-two millions, exceeding the estimate of the Secretary of the Treasury. They were then told of the folly of raising the revenue, and of raising the disbursements. The result now was, that the Government was bankrupt. Were they never to look ahead, and see the difficulties that threatened them?

Another era had now arisen. They had got through with the surplus, and Mr. C. trusted they were through with extravagant appropriations. If they did not economize and retrench, he saw a new age commencing-perhaps that of Treasury notes-when the compromise act would be annulled, and the high tariff revived. But Mr. C. would agree that the fourth deposite should be withheld, since that law had fulfilled its main purpose, and since a new series of extravagances was now to arise unless they kept a good❘ lookout.

Mr. WALKER moved an adjournment; when, a division being called for, the Senate refused to adjourn.

Mr. BUCHANAN then rose to offer an amendment, if in order; the object of which was to take off from the Secretary the responsibility of calling upon the States, and to

Mr. BUCHANAN said he had not imagined this amendment would meet with opposition. He wished to know if it was right and proper that the Secretary should be made responsible for not calling upon the States for this money, as the law required him to do? The condition of the States was such that the Secretary cannot make such call upon them. He (Mr. B.) was therefore desirous to relieve him from this embarrassment. The substituting Congress instead of the Secretary would not, Mr. B. thought, make any change in the nature of the fund.

Mr. CALHOUN said he fully concurred in the proposed amendment. It was due to the States in their sovereign capacity not to subject themselves to be called upon for the money by any other authority than Congress.

The question was then taken on the amendment offered by Mr. BUCHANAN; and the yeas and nays being called for, were as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Allen, Bayard, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clayton, Crittenden, Fulton, Grundy, Kent, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Knight, Linn, Lyon, Morris, Nicholas, Norvell, Preston, Robbins, Robinson, Sevier, Smith of Indiana, Southard, Strange, Swift, Tallmadge, Wall, Webster, White, Williams, Young--33.

NAYS-Messrs. Benton, Clay of Alabama, Hubbard, Niles, Pierce, Rives, Roane, Ruggles, Smith of Connecticut, Tipton, Walker, Wright-12.

Mr. TALLMADGE then moved, as an amendment, to strike out all the bill after the enacting clause, and insert the following as a substitute therefor:

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That the money deposited, and to be deposited, with the States, under the 13th section of the act of June 23, 1836, shall remain on deposite with the States until otherwise directed by Congress.

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Mr. T. made a few brief remarks in support of this amendment, which he said embraced the substance of the amendment offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania, [Mr. BuCHANAN.]

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The yeas and nays being ordered, the question was taken on Mr. TALLMADGE's amendment, and decided in the negative, as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Bayard, Clayton, Crittenden, Fulton, Kent, Knight, Lyon, Nicholas, Norvell, Preston, Robbins, Smith of Indiana, Southard, Swift, Tallmadge, Tipton, Webster, White-18.

NAYS-Messrs. Allen, Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Grundy, Hubbard, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Linn, Morris, Niles, Pierce, Rives, Roane, Robinson, Ruggles, Sevier, Smith of Connecticut, Strange, Walker, Wall, Williams, Wright, Young-27.

The question on engrossing the bill as amended, and ordering it to a third reading, was then taken, and decided in the affirmative, as follows:

YEAS-Messrs. Allen, Benton, Black, Brown, Buchanan, Calhoun, Clay of Alabama, Fulton, Grundy, Hubbard, King of Alabama, King of Georgia, Linn, Morris, Niles, Pierce, Rives, Roane, Robinson, Ruggles, Sevier, Smith of Connecticut, Strange, Walker, Wall, Williams, Wright-27.

NATS-Messrs. Bayard, Clayton, Crittenden, Kent, Knight, Lyon, Nicholas, Norvell, Preston, Robbins, Smith of Indiana, Southard, Swift, Tallmadge, Tipton, Webster, White, Young-18.

The Senate then, on motion of Mr. NICHOLAS, adjourned.

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 15. Mr. HUBBARD called up the resolution offered by him yesterday, by which it was proposed that the Senate should meet in future at 10 o'clock.

Mr. H. modified his resolution to read, "that after this week, the Senate meet at 11 o'clock, A. M. ;" and this was agreed to.

FOURTH INSTALMENT.

The bill to postpone indefinitely the payment of the fourth instalment of the deposite bill, was read a third time; and the question being upon its passage,

Mr. PRESTON, of South Carolina, said he should not now undertake to make a formal opposition to this bill, as he understood its fate to have been decided on the second reading, and it might be considered as having already pass ed. He thought, however, it ought to have met with more discussion than had taken place upon it, and he would therefore beg the indulgence of the Senate while he briefly expressed his opinion upon its merits.

The first inquiry he should make was, whether a case had been made out justifying the withholding of this instalment of the deposite with the States; and, secondly, he would inquire if, supposing the case had arrived, this was the proper and the most advisable course to be adopted to assist in replenishing the Treasury.

My opinion (said Mr. P.) decidedly is, that the casus foederis has not arrived for Congress to encroach upon the fund set aside for deposite with the States; and I further am of opinion that, even if it had now arrived, yet this is not the course by which we shall best consult the interests of the country, in attempting to bring relief to the Treasury.

[SEPT. 15, 1837.

even their extravagant demands, and gave them thirty millions. Then it was, sir, that this deposite bill was originated. It went hand in hand with bills of the most extravagant and prodigal expenditure.

Now, sir, under these circumstances, when we give so prodigally to the departments, at a time of high prices, it is well worth our while to inquire whether the time has not arrived to lop off and curtail from our expenditure, rather than to withhold this instalment from the States. I am of opinion we might save the nine millions of this instalment by curtailing the extravagant expenditures of the departments, and so pay the instalment-not by distressing the States in withholding it, but by introducing a wholesome measure of retrenchment in the expenditure of Government. This, sir, is the ground I take; namely, that it would be far better to curtail our expenditure than to stop the pay

ment of this instalment.

Again, I would ask, does the proposition contained in this bill go to relieve in any manner the pressure upon the people? Not in the least, sir. Neither will the Government place itself in funds by the operation of this law. The banks have laid violent hands on the deposites; they will pay them no longer in the medium they were expected to pay them in. Of what use, then, will this bill be to Government? The money is locked up in the banks; and the wildest enthusiast in favor of this measure would not go so far as to say that by the mere fiat of this body a bill such as this is going to fill the country with gold and silver. We have not got the magician's wand, by one touch of which we can make the gold come forth from its hiding places. We may call, indeed, by our enactments, the spirits from the vasty deep; but will they come when we do call them? Will money be obtained for the Government bill will bring no money into the Treasury. when you pass this law? No, sir; we all know that this

It would be better, therefore, under such circumstances, to let the law go on, and let the States receive the whole of the deposite. The States, sir, are willing to take the instalment in the only medium in which the State institutions are able to pay it. They are not going, at this crisis, to clamor for a hard-money currency. They will be satisfied with receiving the State currency-their own domestic currency. But the President says "no;" and by passing this bill, according to his recommendation, you will not let them receive a currency which they are willing to receive. The amount of the instalment now in the banks would be useful, in that currency, to them, for they would gladly receive it; but it will be of no use whatever to the Government, for the Government will not receive it. Then, sir, if I may use a homely similitude, by such an enactment as this you act the part of the dog in the mangeryou will not take the money of the States yourselves, and you will not let them have it, though they wish to receive it. Is this a noble, or even a politic proceeding? Is this your reforming the currency? Is this aiding and relieving the embarrassments of the people, to stamp a bad name upon their currency, to refuse to receive it yourselves, to pass laws fixing a stigma upon it, and then to forbid others to receive it?

Again, sir: there is another view which I think ought to be taken of this subject; and, had it received its due conLet us briefly consider the history of the deposite act. sideration, such a measure as this could surely never have That act was passed contemporaneously with other acts of been proposed. In fifteen days from now, this instalment most prodigal expenditure. We had a surplus which we will be due to the States. They have already made their knew not how to dispose of. To expend-to get rid of our disposition of the money. It has been disposed of in overflowing funds-was then the order of the day. We various contracts, and been directed to various great and were in the full tide of an inauspicious prosperity, and the useful purposes; and now, suddenly, at this short notice, departments were stimulated and goaded on to find out the expected sum-the sum which the law had pledged to how much they could spend, while the majority in Con-them-is, by another law, to be withheld. But, by the gress seemed to be employed in finding out how much they could give. The departments asked for twenty millions; and Congress, eager to get rid of the surplus, outstripped

terms of the deposite law, a specific time was fixed upon and accorded to the States, in which the States were to have notice of any demand to be made upon them for the

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sum deposited. By the law, therefore, they are entitled to a notice before this fourth instalment can be withdrawn from them-for they have already expended it; and this bill to withhold it is equivalent in its action to taking back the money from them, without the notice which the law provided for.

Mr. P. then proceeded to show that there were other and better methods of raising money for the Treasury, without resorting to this expedient, which, while it would be onerous and oppressive to the States, would be, at the same time, virtually useless and unproductive to the Government. One mode which he should point out was, that of an issue of certificates of deposite, which would immediately provide available funds for the Government, without this measure of withholding an expected and promised instalment. Mr. P. remarked that such a provision had been originally inserted in the deposite bill; but he greatly regretted that, in order to overcome the prejudices of an illustrious person, and to make the bill acceptable to him, (the late President of the United States,) that provision had been stricken out of the bill, in order to secure its passage and save it from his veto. He also remarked that he should not permit himself now to dwell upon that painful recollection, but should content himself with merely expressing his deep regret that so wise and salutary a provision had been stricken out of the bill from considerations so individual, personal, and little.

If (continued Mr. P.) that wise and salutary measure had been carried out in the original deposite bill, we should not now be here. The Senate would not now be fatigued with its present labors, and all the trouble we are now undergoing would have been avoided. The Treasurer would then have only had to throw the certificates into the market, to raise what sum he required for the use of the Government. Such a course, sir, (observed Mr. P.) would have been enough and ample to pry up the Government out of the Slough of Despond in which now it is sunken. Not only would it have given funds to the Government, but also it would have given relief to the people. It would have thrown money into circulation; it would have benefited all parties. It would have been twice blessed, giving double relief both to the States which gave the certificates, and to the General Government, which received them.

By this proposition to suspend or postpone the payment of the instalment, Mr. P. said, no one will be benefited. He would venture to suggest how both parties might be benefited, and the issue of Treasury notes might be avoided. Let the clause exscinded from the original deposite bill be re-enacted; let the States issue their certificates, which will be as good as specie to the Government. Let the States receive this instalment, and let the Treasury receive the certificates, and sell them. In this manner, instead of adding to the general distress of the times, both parties would be eminently benefited. Surely (said Mr. P.) those gentlemen who hold our destinies in their hands, who carry all the measures they please to imagine, good or badand he (Mr. P.) was sorry to say he could not look back and call all their measures good, nor could he look at this measure and deem it either wise, or good, or politicsurely, he would repeat, those gentlemen ought to be willing to adopt such measures as would be the least distressing, the least painful, onerous, and disturbing, at a time of general distress, such as the present, when we are called together to relieve, not to aggravate; to benefit, and not to injure; to heal, and not to take vengeance.

I entreat those gentlemen, therefore, (said Mr. P.,) to take these things into consideration. I entreat them to give more time to the States-not to stop the payment of this ins alment; I entreat them to let the money go where it might almost be considered a vested right it should go. Mr. P. concluded by saying he was sorry to have detained the Senate at this stage of the bill; he had not expected VOL. XIV.-3

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that he could have weight enough to change the course of the gentlemen of the majority, or to prevent the passage of this disastrous bill. All he had desired was, to give brief expression to his views of it. He had now done 80, and, in doing so, he felt that he had done his duty.

Mr. CALHOUN said he thought it would be better for his colleague [Mr. PRESTON] to make a motion at once for the repeal of unexpended appropriations to the amount of nine millions of dollars, the amount of the instalment. There would then be a surplus to that extent, which might go for the payment of the fourth instalment. If Mr. P. felt unwilling at this stage of the bill to make such a motion, he (Mr. C.) would agree to the laying of the bill on the table in order to give time. He confessed that the idea had occurred to him which his colleague had just stated; but he did not see any probability of such a proposition being attended with success. He had done his utmost to stop the extravagant course pursued at former sessions in granting the appropriations. His efforts had been unsuc cessful, and now he thought there was still less chance of getting back that which it had not been possible to prevent from being legislated away. He agreed with his colleague that it was entirely useles to lock up this money. It would do no good to the Government; when, if let go, it would do good to the States.

Mr. CRITTENDEN, of Kentucky, said he fully concurred in the views just expressed by the gentleman from South Carolina, [Mr. PRESTON.] In the State which he came from, he said, the general opinion was that retrenchment was wanting, and ought to be exercised in the scvcral departments of the Government. The profusion to which they were becoming habituated it was time should be checked, and he (Mr. C.) agreed with the honorable Senator from South Carolina, [Mr. PRESTON,] that now was the time, if ever, to put in force such a necessary retrenchment. He (Mr. C.) could not well understand the reason why any other course should be resorted to; for it clearly appeared to him that, by proper retrenchment in the expenditures of Government, enough, and more than enough, might be curtailed from its superfluous disbursements to make up the amount which the payment of this instalment would require.

But he (Mr. C.) was at a loss to understand what object the Government could have in view by the measure here proposed. Such was its tenacity for a metallic currency, so great was its abhorrence of any other media, that it refused to take, or acknowledge as available funds, the money of the country and of the people. It could, thereforc, get no available funds by this bill. The banks could not pay its demands now in gold or silver, nor were they likely to be able to do so for some time to come. Why, then, did the Government seek by this bill to deprive the States of funds which were available to them, but which were altogether unavailable to the Government? He could not comprehend the reasons and motives of such a measurc. If this bill would benefit the Government by making the sum it withholds from the States available to the Gencral Government, there might be, indeed, some reason in it.

But why, he asked, take from the States that which would benefit them, in order to hand it over to the General Government, to whom it will confessedly be of no benefit whatever? The State of Kentucky, and other States aiso, had made provisions for the expenditure of this moneyhad already applied it to various great and useful objects, relying on the solemn faith of a law of Congress, passed after the fullest deliberation by that body. On such a law, not deeming that it would be lightly broken or rescinded upon the first pretext, Kentucky had built her expectation of this money, and had acted upon that expectation, and had disposed of it by anticipation. Therefore, not only on the ground that this money would not be available to the General Government was this bill objectionable, but also

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on the ground that its present withdrawal from the States would be highly injurious and inconvenient to them. On this ground the bill, in his view, was eminently objectionable.

Was the faith pledged by an act of Congress to be so lightly broken? Was an expectation, based upon such ground, to be with such indifference and facility disappointed? Was it worth no effort-no exertion-no trouble, to keep a promise? to stand by a law? to fulfil an engagement? The States were invited to accept this deposite; it was no boon of their soliciting; and now, after it has been offered-after it has been promised-after it has been accepted-after it has been spent-after numberless schemes and plans for its employment, all beneficial to the States, have been devised and settled, and are waiting the payment of this fourth instalment for their completion-is it now the time to recede from our engagement? Is it now the time to break a promise? Is it now the time to violate a pledge, and say that you have not got the money? Might it not be replied, You have got the money, but you will not let the States have it! Such, in fact, would be the effect of the passage of this bill! Yes, sir, the money is there; the money is in the banks; the States are willing to receive it; but Congress interposes, and, by this bill, says "No, you shall not receive it."

We are told by the supporters and advocates of this bill that it must be passed, because it would be highly impolitic to borrow money in order to deposite it with the States. This, sir, is not the correct view of the case; this is not a fair statement of the question; this, sir, is not the question at all. The question is this: The States have been led to expect this fund, on the faith of a law; they have made improvements, entered into contracts, incurred expenses on the expectation of receiving this money, pledged to them by the law; and now, sir, the question is, "is there no right on the part of the States-is there no obligation on the part of the General Government to fulfil the law?" Shall the law be set aside on the mere plea of inconvenience? That, sir, is the question-the great question! Whether a solemn law shall be fulfilled-whether a pledge shall be redeemed--whether a promise shall be performed whether there exists any obligation to fulfil promises given, and not to disappoint expectations gratuitously raised! Shall we be told, sir, that there exists no such obligation? It is, in my view, the highest obligation which attaches to any Government. Now, in answer to this, we are met by the plea of convenience. We are told it would be very inconvenient to fulfil this contract with the States; that money will have to be borrowed for the purpose; and, therefore, since it would not be quite convenient to fulfil the obligation, the obligation ought to be broken, and the faith of the law violated!

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But there is also another plea for this measure. derstand gentlemen to say that there is not money enough in the Treasury to pay this fourth instalment. But, sir, laying aside the question how far such an argument ought to prevail to induce the violation of a solemn engagement, let us ask, as to the fact, whether there are indeed no funds for the purpose of meeting this engagement? On looking over the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, (said Mr. C.,) I only find a probability spoken of. He says there may probably be a deficit, and not that there is. The argument, therefore, is divested of its main strength and that is, of the absolute fact necessary to sustain it. But, sir, if there are no funds adapted to the wants of the General Government, there are funds which the States would willingly receive. They have confidence in the banks; they would receive their paper. They are not engaged in warfare against them; they do not wish to destroy them, and to destroy the credit of the country and of the people; while, on the other hand, there are no funds for the use of the General Government, only because it will not

[SEPT. 15, 1837.

recognise our money, our funds, our credit, and will only receive gold and silver. It is not willing to go hand in hand with the people in aiding and assisting to support and sustain that credit which is the life and soul of the business, trade, and commerce of the nation.

Again, sir, let me expose another monstrous idea which seems to possess the gentlemen who have brought forward and those who advocate this bill-an erroneous idea indeed, of which it were well that they were dispossessed; and it is this, sir: they seem to imagine that this money belongs to the Government. Not so, sir, (said Mr. C.;) far from it: it belongs to the States-it belongs to the people, from whom the Government has gathered and collected it; but which gathering and collecting did not make it its own. Therefore, sir, in addition to the many strong reasons why this money should not be withheld from us, the reason above all is, that it is our own money.

The President of the United States, in his message, had read a lecture on economy to Congress and to the people of this country, and had told them that the distress and exigency of the times which have brought us here are to be attributed to the extravagance of the people. Now, sir, it is very strange that it never occurred to the President that economy was, of all things, that in which the Government itself was most deficient; that economy was especially needed to be put in practice by it; that the tide of prodigality and high expenditure of millions upon millions, in which it had of late years indulged, it was now high time should be stopped. Strange, sir, is it that the President, before he made this charge upon the people, did not look to the crying necessity for reform and economy in the Government itself.

In a time of distress like this, when the Government gives to the people such lessons of economy, what conduct do we behold in the Government? Any approach, sir, to economy? No, sir, none whatever; on the contrary, all the recommendations of the message, and all the measures of the administration, are, notwithstanding the people's distress, and notwithstanding the lessons of economy read to them by the President, directed and aimed at the one single and only object of filling the Treasury with money-of keeping the Government going-of providing means for a profuse and wild extravagance of expenditure. Before we vote for the issue of Treasury notes, I feel it my duty, sir, to inquire to what extent retrenchment may not be carried into the expenditures of the departments. All eyes are turned upon you; the people look to you for relief; and what do we behold? Why, sir, all the inquiry made, all the measures proposed, are merely how to fill the Treasury with money! Sauve qui peut! is the cry of the Government. All its efforts are directed to help itself, to save itself; to cut loose from the general wreck, and leave the country to help itself as it best may be able. Is this the duty of a Government?-when we come here for the express purpose of giving relief, then only to bring forward a bill like this, to withhold money from the States; and other bills, as bad in their principle, to raise more money from them, in order to sustain, and help, and fill the Treasury, while nothing is done or thought of for the people?

Mr. BROWN said he had not intended, at that stage of the bill, to delay its early passage by any remarks of his; but in consequence of the observations which had fallen from the two gentlemen who in the course of that morning had addressed the Senate, he would take the occasion to make a few remarks in reply, and in justification of the vote which it was his purpose to give on the measure then before them.

In addition to the arguments which had already been urged, and which to his mind were conclusive, in favor of withholding the fourth instalment payable to the several States on the 1st of October, under the deposite act, another argument, entitled to still more weighty considera

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tion, had decided his mind in favor of that course. If we refuse to pass the bill having that object in view, the obligation will unavoidably devolve on Congress to provide the means to meet the payment of the instalment which will otherwise become due to the States, the available means of the Treasury being inadequate for that purpose. Now he (Mr. B.) could not see in any part of the constitution the power to raise money, and, of necessity, the power to tax our constituents to pay the money thus raised, for the mere purpose of depositing it in the treasuries of the several States. The power to raise money was limited to the objects and duties with which the General Government was charged by the constitution; and in no part of that instrument was the power to be found, either by express grant or implication, to raise it for any such purpose. It could not be pretended that to raise money for such purpose was to carry into effect any power belonging to the General Government. To his mind, therefore, it was a palpable violation of the constitution to exercise such power, which they unquestionably would have to do, in providing the means to meet the remaining instalment, if its payment should not be postponed. He drew a distinction between the power of Congress to authorize the deposite of a surplus in the State treasuries which already existed, and the power to raise money for the sole purpose of thus deposit. ing it. It was in that point of view that he deemed the deposite act of last year justifiable; that act had, in the course of its execution, exhausted the surplus, which was the true object Congress had in view in passing it; and, having fulfilled its great end, he was of opinion its further operation should now cease. He thought the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. PRESTON] would have much difficulty in reconciling the vote which he had announced his intention to give on this question, with the doctrines of a strict construction of the constitution, of which he had heretofore professed himself a zealous advocate. He called on that gentleman to show what constitutional authority Congress had to pass a law raising money, not in execution of any of its conceded powers, but for the avowed purpose of being deposited with the States. It had been argued by the same gentleman that strong expectations had been created among the States that the instalment which it is now proposed to withhold would be paid over to them, and that an equitable obligation was imposed on Congress not to disappoint those expectations. He contended that the idea of an equitable obligation on Congress to pay over the money was utterly destroyed by the power given to the Secretary of the Treasury in the deposite act to call on the States, under certain restrictions, for the repayment of the sums deposited with them. The power thus given to that officer by the act in question was, in effect, a notice to the States that the Government of the United States might want the money deposited with them; and, in that event, would require its repayment. He considered the same notice as substantially applicable as regarded the instalment yet unpaid, and was, in itself, a very significant indication that Congress would withhold any part of the money unpaid, should a contingency arise making it necessary to do so. That contingency had arisen, making it proper, in his opinion, to withhold that which remained unpaid; but he trusted that none would arise making it neces sary to call on the States for that portion of the surplus revenue already deposited with them.

Besides the constitutional objection to raising money for the purpose of depositing it with the States, the unavoidable consequence of providing for the payment of the remaining instalment to them would be to lay the foundation of a new national debt; than which nothing, in his opinion, would be more preposterous, when resorted to for the unauthorized purpose of dividing money among the States. He would in no event vote for any measure leading to the creation of a national debt, unless it could be made to appear

[SENATE.

indispensable to aid the Government in the performance of its legitimate functions.

It had not been without some surprise that he had heard the charge of harsh and unjust treatment towards the States, in reference to the proposed measure especially, brought against the General Government. Was it nothing that it had in the space of a few months past divided among the States near thirty millions of dollars? Was the distribution of this immense amount among the States (for he regarded it, practically and in point of fact, as a distribution) to be considered nothing? Or was it in this act that gentlemen found reason to complain of oppression, on the part of the General Government, against the States? He really thought, if gentlemen would take a dispassionate review of the conduct of the General Government towards the States, in its pecuniary transactions with them, if they did not find all their most extravagant expectations realized, they would at least find enough, in the magnitude of the distribution which had been made, to exempt the General Government from the harsh censure which they had cast on it.

The gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. CRITTENDEN] has taken strong exceptions to what he has been pleased to term the paternal advice given us by the President, in his message, against the increasing luxury and extravagance in the mode of living, which are rapidly diffusing themselves throughout our country; and thinks that it would have been more becoming in him to have set an example of economy and retrenchment, by the introduction of those principles into his administration, before he ventured his advice on such subjects. It was true (said Mr. B.) that the President had-not in the way of advice, as had been suggested by the gentleman, but in tracing the causes which had led to the present embarrassed condition of the country-enumerated that, among many others, in connexion with the inflated paper system existing in this country and in England, which, acting and re-acting on each other, have, in conjunction with the cause first mentioned, mainly contributed to produce the existing evils-evils which all experience, in both countries, proves belong to the paper system, and periodically recur under it, no matter in what form it exists, whether in the shape of a national bank or of State institutions. He would, however, before finishing his reply to the censure which had been cast on the President for this remark, take the occasion to say to the gentleman from Kentucky, if he would unite in carrying out the recommendation of the President to withhold the fourth instalment to the States, that it would be taking a step of no little importance towards bringing the Government back to economy and retrenchment. The state of the case between the views of the President and the gentleman from Kentucky, in relation to the measure alluded to by him, was simply this: the President recommends the passage of a law postponing the payment of the fourth instalment to the States, amounting to some nine or ten millions, and which the Government, not having the means to satisfy, owing to the default of the deposite banks, will necessarily, if paid, have to provide the means by going in debt for that sum; while the gentleman from Kentucky insists on the payment of the instalment to the States, the effect of which would be to compel the Government to raise the necessary means, either by an issue of Treasury notes or in some other manner. Now, he would submit it to the impartial decision of any one to determine who was for economy and retrenchment, and who was for extravagant expenditure-the President of the United States, or the honorable Senator himself?

We have been told, with much emphasis, (said Mr. B.) that although Congress had been specially convoked by the President, yet no measure of relief had been recommended for the people; that it was all for the Government. While he would say that this declaration was unsustained

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