recommended admission of these states only on a two-thirds majority vote of the Health Assembly, although several delegations had favored a simple majority. The decision of the Conference on this matter was taken by roll call in plenary session, 25 favoring a simple majority and 22 a two-thirds majority.

In cases where a member fails to meet its financial obligations, or in other exceptional circumstances, the voting privileges and services to which a member is entitled may be suspended (Article 7). The Canadian Delegate pointed out that in the extreme case of bacterial warfare it would be essential to withhold from the aggressor the epidemiological information revealing the effectiveness of the attack. The only difference of opinion in this matter was as to whether the power to suspend should reside in the Health Assembly alone or in the Executive Board as well as in the Assembly. The Conference decided in favor of the former (Article 7) on the ground that such an important decision should be made only by the Health Assembly. Restoration of voting rights and privileges is also within the Health Assembly's jurisdiction.

Associate Membership

The question of participation in the Organization by non-self-governing territories not eligible for full membership in the United Nations was referred to the Conference by the Technical Preparatory Committee.

The United States Delegation favored some form of representation of such territories, provided the nature of the rights and functions were determined by the Organization and provided further that the consent of the states responsible for such territories were made a prerequisite to their representation.

It was proposed by the Chinese Delegation that the Health Assembly might admit as associate members dependent territories "whose areas and populations are large enough, whose health problems are of world concern, and which have indigenous health administrations"; and that associate members should have all the rights and duties of full membership, except those of voting and holding office in the Organization.

Other delegations felt that such a proposal would make for administrative difficulties in that the Health Assembly would become unwieldy. They preferred to meet the question of representation of such territories by providing for it at the regional rather than at the central level. The United States Delegation felt that criteria for selection should not be included in the Constitution but should be left

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to the Health Assembly, and that the Constitution should not define the extent and character of the participation of such territories.

It was agreed (Article 8), on the proposal of the United States, that territories which are not responsible for the conduct of their international relations may be admitted as associate members by the Health Assembly upon application by the member or other authority having responsibility for their international relations. Upon the initiative of Liberia, there was included a provision that representatives of associate members should be qualified by their technical competence in the field of health and should be chosen from the native population. The nature and extent of the rights and obligations of associate members is to be determined by the Health Assembly.

The Legal Committee rejected a proposal that the number of associate members be limited to 20. It also rejected a proposal that their rights be determined by the Health Assembly in consultation with the members responsible for the conduct of their international relations. The fact that applications for associate membership can be filed only by the state or authority responsible for the international relations of dependent territories was considered to be a sufficient safeguard.

ORGANS (Chapter IV)

The Conference was in general agreement with the organizational structure proposed by the Technical Preparatory Committee. Accordingly, it decided that there should be a World Health Assembly, on which all members would be represented, an Executive Board, and a Secretariat.

The Delegate of Brazil proposed the inclusion, as a constitutional organ, of an Advisory Council, composed of persons of high standing in health affairs. He believed that such a Council might tend to prevent the Organization from becoming over-bureaucratic and might itself grow into an International Academy of Health. It was explained by the Rapporteur of the Technical Preparatory Committee that that Committee had given careful consideration to the question of an Advisory Council and, while appreciating its purpose, had decided that it should not be included as one of the constituent bodies of the Organization. The Technical Preparatory Committee had agreed that such an Advisory Council could be established, under the general authority of the Organization to establish committees, at any time the Organization might find it desirable. This explanation was accepted by the Conference, and no action was taken to provide for an Advisory Council in the Constitution.

THE WORLD HEALTH ASSEMBLY (Chapter V)

There was full agreement that the Health Assembly should consist of delegates representing members, each member having a single vote. The Technical Preparatory Committee had submitted alternative proposals concerning the composition of delegations to the Health Assembly: one, that each member be represented by not more than three delegates; the other, that each member be represented by a single delegate. The United States strongly supported the proposal for the larger delegation on the basis that it provided opportunity for representation of governmental and nongovernmental health interests at the same level of participation and dignity. This proposal was accepted by the Conference.

As to the composition of delegations, the Constitution provides that delegates should be chosen from among persons most qualified by their technical competence in the field of health, preferably representing the national health administration of the member. It was recognized that this provision is purely recommendatory. Delegations may also include alternates and advisers and the Constitution includes no criteria for their selection.

Since the Health Assembly will focus attention on the health prob- · lems of the area in which it meets, attracting public interest and support for health work in that area, it was felt that it should change its place of meeting each year in order to spread this benefit to all areas. The Constitution, therefore, provides (Article 14) that the "Health Assembly, at each annual session, shall select the country or region in which the next annual session shall be held, the Board subsequently fixing the place."

Functions (Articles 18-23)

The Health Assembly is the general policy body of the Organization and is responsible for supervision of its activities, finances, and relationships with governments and other organizations. It may delegate its authority to the Executive Board, which it elects, as deemed appropriate.

It must consider recommendations bearing on health which are made to it by the General Assembly, Economic and Social Council, Security Council, and Trusteeship Council, reporting to them on action taken by the Organization to give effect to the recommendations.

Certain powers given to the Health Assembly are of particular importance. Among these are the authority to establish institutions for research and other purposes and the powers discussed below in regard to conventions, regulations, and recommendations.

Conventions (Articles 19 and 20)

The Health Assembly is authorized to adopt, by a two-thirds majority, conventions or agreements with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization. These will come into force for any member when accepted by it in accordance with its constitutional processes.

It has been necessary in the past for states with a particular interest in the health field to convene special conferences for this purpose. As a result, such conferences have been held at long and irregular intervals to deal only with particularly pressing problems. Sanitary conventions have remained unmodified for long periods during which scientific advance has often made their provisions archaic. This has tended to lessen the effectiveness of sanitary conventions. It was the hope of the Conference that the new mechanism would result in early unification and modernization of existing sanitary conventions which could then be kept abreast of scientific progress. The Arrangement establishing the Interim Commission of the Organization specifically authorized the Commission to undertake immediately the preparatory work necessary to accomplish this end.

Further strengthening the convention process, Article 19 contains an undertaking on the part of members to the effect that each will, within 18 months after the adoption by the Health Assembly of a convention or agreement, take action relative to its acceptance. Each member agrees to notify the Director-General of the action taken and, if it does not accept such convention or agreement within the specified time limit, it agrees to furnish a statement giving its reasons for not accepting.

The basic proposal regarding conventions was included in the report of the Technical Preparatory Committee but was expanded and strengthened by the Conference. It was also modified, on the request of Australia, in such a way as to make the procedure adaptable to federal states.

Regulations (Articles 21 and 22)

One of the most significant advances in the Constitution is the power given to the Organization to adopt regulations in certain prescribed technical fields, which will come into force for all members after due notice has been given of their adoption by the Health Assembly, except for such members as may notify the Director-General of rejection or reservations within a stated period. The principle involved, that of a state being bound without positive action on its own part, was opposed by the Ukraine. Belgium also opposed the provision, basing its objection on the possibility of a state becoming

bound through oversight. Eire, the United Kingdom and the United States effectively countered this argument by pointing out that each state concerned would have participated in the development of any regulation and that the constitutional provision allowing the Organganization to have direct access to the health administration of each member would permit notification of the adoption of regulations to be sent to the interested agency of a government.

The question of regulations, with particular regard to the basic principle involved, was referred to a special subcommittee for study. The subcommittee reported that it found no infringement of sovereignty to be involved. It cited provisions of the International Sanitary Convention for Aerial Navigation of 1933 as a precedent and was divided in opinion as to whether the agreement establishing the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization could also be considered a precedent. The Ukraine accepted the basic principle, but only if its application were limited, on a temporary basis pending later positive action by governments, to applying new knowledge and techniques to the control of the international spread of disease. Several proposals involving complicated safeguards were presented by the subcommittee as alternatives to the original proposal. These were, in turn, voted down in committee and the original proposal accepted, with only five votes in the negative.

The fields in which the Health Assembly was authorized to adopt regulations were enumerated by the Technical Preparatory Committee and broadened by the Conference. In the case of drugs moving in international commerce, the Technical Preparatory Committee proposals were limited to regulations establishing standards with respect to the safety, purity, and potency of drugs in official pharmacopoeia and biological products. This was broadened by the Conference to include "biological, pharmaceutical and similar products." The Preparatory Committee proposals provided for regulations concerning the labeling of drugs and biological products. The Conference, on the initiative of Panama, extended this to include advertising.

The concept underlying the regulatory power of the Organization was developed jointly by the Department of State and the Public Health Service, prior to the meeting of the Technical Preparatory Committee, in an effort to create a mechanism in the international field which would permit rapid general application of new scientific techniques in the international control of the spread of disease. This was done in pursuance of a suggestion made in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that some way be found to accomplish this without requiring that Committee to consider highly specialized technical matters. It is felt that the mechanism incorporated in the Constitu