The Ways of Aristotle: Aristotelian Phrónêsis, Aristotelian Philosophy of Dialogue, and Action Research

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Peter Lang, 2008 - 560 էջ
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Preface 9
Part 1 Aristotle, Social Research, and Action Research 13
1. Introduction — The Challenge of Phrónêsis
15
1.1 Three Kinds of General Theory
25
1.2 Aristotle and Critical Action Research
33
2. Action Research Approaching Phrónêsis
39
2.1 A Philosopher Defending Action Research
40
2.2 Making Social Science Matter
43
2.3 Abandoning Techniques
45
Part 2 Reading Aristotle — Limits and Possibilities for Phrónêsis 49
3. Virtues — Intellectual and Ethical
53
3.1 Particulars of Ethical Virtues
59
4. Phrónêsis and the Other Intellectual Virtues
65
4.1 Theoretical Knowledge, and Knowledge about Things We Influence
68
4.1.1 Overlaps and Intermeshes
74
4.2 Phrónêsis as an Intellectual Virtue
77
4.2.1 Excursus: Knowledge Forms and Ways of Knowing in Aristotle
79
4.2.1.1 Praxis, Poiêsis, Khrêsis, Páthos And the Various Forms of the Epistêmai
81
4.2.1.2 Theoretical and Practical Truth
94
4.2 (Continued) Phrónêsis as an Intellectual Virtue
97
4.3 Phrónêsis and Rhetoric, Phrónêsis and Practical Syllogisms
105
4.3.1 The relationship to rhetoric
106
4.3.2 The relationship to practical syllogisms
111
5. Phrónêsis on Means and Ends, Phrónêsis and General Knowledge
115
5.1 Means and Ends, and Kinds of Causes
115
5.1.1 Poiêsis Makes Things, Praxis Makes Perfect
122
5.1.2 "Professional" Deliberations and Deductions
132
5.2 Knowledge, General and Particular
138
5.2.1 General Knowledge, Appropriate Knowledge, Knowledge in Action
138
5.2.2 Héxis (Habitus), and Empeiria (Experience)
149
5.2.3 Knowing Particulars
157
5.2.3.1 By What?
158
5.2.3.2 How?
160
5.2.3.3 Preconditions for a Universally Flexible Consideration
165
6. Developing and Defining Virtue
181
6.1 Developing Virtue
182
6.1.1 Epistêmê and Virtue through the Formation of Habit, Once More
186
6.1.2 What "Means" Means
194
6.1.3 Practical Development with a Hinge to It, the Question of Standards Again
196
6.2 Defining Virtue
205
6.2.1 Nóêsis as Dialogue, or, the Reason Why Aristotle Insists on Letting Phrónêsis Deliberate about Means Only
212
6.2.1.1 The Unfolded Know-How of Nous
214
6.2.1.2 The Topica and the Enfolded Habitus of Dialectics
217
6.2.1.3 The Philosopher, the Dialectician, and Experience
224
6.2.1.3.1 Dialogical Peculiarities
231
6.2.1.3.2 Dialogue and Experience
237
6.2.1.3.3 Basic Principle, Beginning, Medium, and End
251
6.2.1.4 Ways of Learning
256
6.2.1.5 Self-Evident First Principles?
263
6.2.1.6 Praxis1, and Praxis2
267
6.2.2 The Ethical Works do not Deliberate about Means, They Develop and Define Ends
271
6.2.3 Epistêmê, Virtue, and Phrónêsis Defined
281
6.3 Who Develops and Defines? The Art and Practice of Architectonics
292
7. Eudaimonia and Wisdom as "The Highest Practical Good"; Aristotelian Phron-Ethics, Theor-Ethics, and the Way of the Intellectual Commons
299
7.1 Kinds of Theory, Kinds of Practice
301
7.2 Ethics and Politics as Methodological Guidelines for Autonomous Practitioners
313
7.2.1 The Laws of Virtue
316
7.2.2 Tékhnê and Phrónêsis – At the Parting of the Ways
324
7.3 The Wisdom of the Commons – Common Wisdom
327
7.3.1 Tà Koiná – The Commons
333
7.3.2 The Common Skholê
340
7.4 Theor-Ethics and Primary Friendship
342
7.4.1 The Noetic "I" and the Psychological "Me"
349
7.4.2 Theorethical Interventions?
359
7.5 The Way of Theor-Ethics
361
7.5.1 Ethical Excellence – Settling with the Best "for Us", i.e. for the Second Best "Absolutely"
371
7.6 The Ways of Politics – Continuous Learning in Common
385
7.6.1 Community: What Are the Things Common?
387
7.6.2 Oikos, Pólis, and Constitutions
392
7.6.3 Developing Concord – The Ethico-Political Role of Dialogical Gatherings
399
7.6.4 Different Concepts of Politics
413
7.6.5 Unity and Diversity in the Pólis
422
7.6.6 The Koinópolis as Panarchy Aristocracy Suspended and Transcended
434
7.6.7 Religious Politics?
447
Part 3 Aristotelian Action Research – Wisdom and Eudaimonia Transposed, Social Research Transformed 455
8. Neo-Epistemic, Dialogical Action Research
459
9. From Oikos to Pólis, and Beyond
467
10. Aristotle, Marx, and Modern Work Life
479
11. Aristotle Suspended
493
12. Epilogue
503
References 509
Appendix 525
Index 527
 

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Preface
9
Introduction The Challenge of Phronesis
15
Action Research Approaching Phronesis
39
Virtues Intellectual and Ethical
53
Phronesis and the Other Intellectual Virtues
65
Phronesis on Means and Ends Phronesis
115
Developing and Defining Virtue
181
Aristotle Insists on Letting Phronesis Deliberate
212
of the Ways
324
Part 3
455
From Oikos to Polis and Beyond
467
Aristotle Marx and Modern Work Life
479
Aristotle Suspended
493
References
509
Appendix
525
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Eudaimoma and Wisdom as The Highest Practical Good
299

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Հեղինակի մասին (2008)

The Author: Olav Eikeland is a philosopher who has been working in Norway as an action researcher and organisational researcher at the Work Research Institute (WRI) since the mid-1980s. He holds a Ph.D. in ancient philosophy. His special interests are the connections between ancient dialogical philosophy, current action research, and organisational learning.

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