any particular sensation, or mental phenomenon, is merely the fact of its existence; or, if any one be fond of employing circumlocution to express that which is abundantly plain without it, the only proof of its present existence is, the consciousness of the fact of its existence. If my consciousness cannot afford me information with regard to what is passing in my own mind, from what other quarter, pray, can such information be derived? Not surely from my fellow men, for the internal changes which my mind is undergoing, except in so far as they are developed by external acts and circumstances, neither lie open to the inspection, nor are cognizable by the senses of others. Not from reasoning, for this is a question of fact. Not from reflection, for as that faculty rests on consciousness or present knowledge as its basis, the evidence which it affords can never be more certain than that of consciousness itself. If, then, my consciousness or present knowledge be not to me sufficient evidence of what is felt by me, or is passing within my mind, at any given moment, I must e'en be content to remain without satisfaction as to the point altogether.

It also results from the very nature of consciousness, as above defined, that it must be infallible. The cause, and the only cause of the existence of consciousness at any time, is the existence in the mind of some particular sensation, thought, or volition, or of some particular train of sensations, thoughts, or volitions. This being the case, to suppose the mind to have the consciousness

+ Can another man perceive that I am conscious of any thing, when I perceive it not myself?-Locke, ut supra.

of any sensation, thought, or volition, when in reality no such sensation, thought, or volition exists, is equivalent to supposing the existence of an effect without a cause. The consciousness of mental phenomena, thus always and necessarily implying the existence of the phenomena themselves, or, in other words, it being impossible that where certain mental phenomena are not, there the conciousness of such phenomena should be, what more is requisite in order to prove that consciousness never can deceive us, or, that it is infallible.

It is, I presume, almost superfluous for me to add, that all the above observations relative to consciousness, are, in their fullest extent, applicable to the consciousness of believing. When the mind is persuaded of the truth of a testimony, that is, believes it, in the first place, it must be conscious that it so believes in the second place, it never has nor can have any evidence that it believes, superior to the fact of its consciousnes that it believes—and, in the third place, there can be no mistake in regard to the matter, for, the consciousness of belief can only exist, in consequence of the belief itself actually existing. Let any man, whether making pretensions to philosophy or not, overturn these averments by dint of facts and fair reasonings, and he shall be my magnus Apollo.

Do I require to support my views of consciousness by the authority of names ranking high in the department of metaphysics? If so, the language of the following eminent philosophers will surely be acknowleged to bear me out in all my assertions.

Mr. Locke thus pointedly expresses himself:-"Can a man think and not be conscious of it?. -It is altogether as intelligible to say that a body is extended without parts, as that any thing thinks without being conscious of it, or perceiving that it does so. They who talk thus may with as much reason, if it be necessary to their hypothesis, say, that a man is always hungry, but he does not always feel it; whereas hunger consists in that very sensation, as THINKING CONSISTS IN BEING CONSCIOUS THAT ONE THINKS."* "It is by the immediate evidence of consciousness," says the late Professor Stewart of Edinburgh in his elegant and instructive work on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, "that we are assured of the present existence of our various sensations, whether pleasant or painful; of all our affections, passions, hopes, fears, desires, and volitions. It is thus too we are assured of the present existence of those thoughts which during our waking hours are continually passing through the mind, and of all the different effects which they produce in furnishing employment to our intellectual faculties.+" Clear and explicit, however, as are the declarations of Locke and Stewart, the following testimony to the infallibility of consciousness borne by Dr. Reid, will be al

* Locke on the Human Understanding. B. 2. c. 1. s. 19. In the passage from which the extract in the text is taken, Mr. Locke is endeavouring to prove that the soul or mind does not always think. Such as are desirous to see the whole of this subject treated in the author's usual masterly style, should read carefully from the beginning of the tenth, to the end of the twentieth sections of the chapter quoted from.

+ Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. Part 2. chap. 1. s. 2.

lowed by all who are capable of appreciating the merits of that profound metaphysician, to supersede the necessity of farther quotations. "The operations of our minds are attended with consciousness; and this consciousness is the evidence, the only evidence which we have or can have of their existence. If a man should take it into his head to think or say that his consciousness may deceive him, and to require proof that it cannot, I know of no proof that can be given him; he must be left to himself as a man that denies first principles, without which there can be no reasoning. Every man finds himself under a necessity of believing what consciousness testifies, and every thing that has this testimony is to be taken as a first principle.”*

To those who have made the science of pneumatology their study, the whole subject of consciousness must be abundantly manifest. But for the sake of such of my readers as may be inexperienced and unskilful in researches of this kind, it will be proper to try, if possible, to simplify it still farther. There are two

questions which although in reality quite distinct, are not unfrequently confounded by the ignorance of some, and the craft and subtilty of others. The one is, why do you believe? The other, how do you know that you believe? In answer to the former of those, I am obliged to state the grounds, reasons, or evidences, upon which my faith rests, and the causes by which it has

Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man, by Thomas Reid, D.D. Essay 1. c. 2. p. 39, quarto edition, 1785.

been produced. But the answer to the latter question, if I should deem it worth my while to return any answer at all, is, in every case, without a simple exception, I know that I believe, just because I believe; or, if another mode of expressing the same thing be preferred, I know that I believe, just because I am conscious of believing. The reason for my treating the two questions so differently is obvious. The former is proper and legitimate, and as the Christian should be ready to give to every man that asketh him, a reason of the hope that is in him with meekness and fear,* it demands, and should receive a full and explicit answer. But as the man who puts the latter question to me, can only intend thereby either to insult me by insinuating doubts of my veracity, or to puzzle and perplex me, the scriptural advice, to answer a fool according to his folly, deserves here to be attended to. Now, in shewing the infallibility of consciousness, I am merely pointing out the grounds, and vindicating the propriety of the answer which I recommend every man to return to the latter of the two questions alluded to. I am endeavouring to assert the outraged rights of common sense-to bring men back to a point concerning which the most illiterate peasant is as competent to judge as the most enlightened plilosopher-and to expose the unfair nature of the controversial weapons of which artful and designing men are but too ready to avail themselves.

No objection, it is probable, would ever have been made to my remarks respecting the infallibility of

+1 Peter iii. 15.