The question under consideration being the following amendment offered by Mr. HALE, of New Hampshire, to the bill making appropriations for the fegslative, executive, and judicial expenses of the Government, for the year ending the 80th of June, 1860:

"And be it further enacted, That the first section of the act entitled 'An act for the admission of the State of Kansas into the Union,' approved May 4, 1858, be, and the same is hereby amended by striking out the following words, to wit: Whenever it is ascertained, by a census duly and legally taken, that the population of said Territory equals or exceeds the ratio of representation required for a member of the House of Representatives in the Congress of the United States; which words are hereby repealed."

Senator BROWN, of Mississippi, addressed the Senate, and upon the conclusion of his remarks

Mr. DOUGLAS rose and said: Mr. PRESIDENT

Mr. LANE. Mr. President, I rise to a question of order. I believe the call of the roll has been commenced, and debate cannot proceed without the unanimous consent of the Senate.

The PRESIDING OFFICER, (Mr. IVERSON in the chair.) The present occupant of the chair was not in the chair at the time the call of the roll commenced; but he inquired of the Secretary whether an answer to the call had been recorded, and he was told no; and that the roll was considered as not called.

Mr. BROWN. I can explain it. I was on the floor and had addressed the Chair; but the Vice-President did not hear me. I spoke again, and he still did not hear me. If there was a response it was out of order. Nobody had a right to answer while I was claiming the attention of the Chair. I rose precisely at the instant the Senator from New York was taking his seat.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If the first person who had been called had answered yea or nay, debate would have been out of order; but there was no response to the call, and debate is in order.

Mr. DOUGLAS. If no other northern Democrat desires to be heard on the points presented by the Senator from Mississippi, I feel it incumbent on me to say something in vindication of my own position, reluctant as I am to occupy time at this stage of the session in a discussion of this question. I admire the frankness, candor, and directness with which that Senator has approached this question. No man can accuse him, none will suspect him, of a desire "to cheat or to be cheated;" and I hope that I shall be able to put my opinions on the record in a manner that will acquit me of the slightest suspicion of desiring to cheat or to be cheated. To a certain point, that Senator and myself agree. Then there comes divergence, which grows wider and wider the further we travel. We agree that, under the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, slaves are property, standing on an equal footing with all other property; and that, consequently, the owner of a slave has the same right to emigrate to a Territory, and carry his slave property with him, as the owner of any other species of property has to move there, and carry his property

with him.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. Will the honorable Senator allow me

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am replying to the Senator from Mississippi now, and would prefer, therefore, to go on.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I wish to put a question to the honorable Senator from Illinois on that point.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I desire to deal with this point now. At another time the Senator can present his point. The right of transit to and from the Territories is the same for one species of property as it is for all others. Thus far the Senator from Mississippi and myself agree that slave property in the Territories stands on an equal footing with every other species of property. Now, the question arises, to what extent is property, slaves included, subject to the local law of the Territory? Whatever power the Territorial Legislature has over other species of property, extends, in my judgment, to the same extent, and in like manner to the slave property. The Territorial Legislature has the same power to legislate in respect to slaves, that it has in regard to any other property, to the same extent, and no further. If the Senator wishes to know what power it has over slaves in the Territories, I answer, let him tell me what power it has to legislate over every other species of property, either by encouragement or by taxation, or in any other mode, and he has my answer in regard to slave property.

But the Senator says that there is something peculiar in slave property, requiring further protection than other species of property. If so, it is the misfortune of those

who own that species of property. He tells us that, if the Territorial Legislature fails to pass a slave code for the Territories, fails to pass police regulations to protect slave property, the absence of such legislation practically excludes slave property as effectually as a constitutional prohibition would exclude it. I agree to that proposition. He says, furthermore, that it is competent for the Territorial Legislature, by the exercise of the taxing power, and other functions within the limits of the Constitution, to adopt unfriendly legislation which practically drives slavery out of the Territory. I agree to that proposition. That is just what I said, and all I said, and just what I meant by my Freeport speech in Illinois, upon which there has been so much comment throughout the country.

But the Senator says that while non-action by the Territorial Legislature excludes slavery; and, while the Territorial Legislature may, within the limits of the Federal Constitution, adopt such a system of unfriendly legislation as in effect to exclude slavery from its limits, yet it is wrong for the Legislature to pursue that policy; and, because the Territorial Legislature ought not to adopt that line of policy, he will not be content with such legislation, but will appeal to Congress, and demand a congressional code of laws protecting slavery in the Territories, in opposition to the wishes of the people. Well, sir, his conclusion is a logical one, unless my position is right. All men must agree that non-action by the Territorial Legislature is practical exclusion. If the people of a Territory want slavery, they will protect it by a slave code. If they do not want slavery; if they believe it is not necessary; if they are of opinion that their interests do not require it, or will be prejudiced by it, they will not furnish the necessary remedies and police regulations, usually called a slave code, for its protection.

The Senator from Mississippi says they ought to pass such a code; but he admits that it is immaterial to inquire whether they ought or ought not to do it; for if they do not want it, they will not enact it; and if they do not do it, there is no mode by which you can compel them to do it. He admits there is no compulsory means by which you can coerce the Territorial Legislature to pass such a law; and for that reason he insists that, in case of non-action by the Territorial Legislature, it is the right and duty of southern Senators and Representatives to demand affirmative action by Congress in the enactment of a slave code for the Territories. He says that it is not necessary to put the question to me, whether I would vote for a congressional slave code. He desires to know of all other northern Democrats what they will do; he does not wish an answer from me. I am much obliged to him for taking it for granted, from my past record, that I never would vote for a slave code in the Territories by Congress; and I have yet to learn that there is a man in a free State of this Union, of any party, who would.

Mr. MASON. Will the Senator be kind enough to explain what he means by a slave code?

Mr. DOUGLAS. Yes, sir. The Senator from Mississippi defined it very well in his speech. His position was, that while the Constitution gave him the right of protection in a Territory for his slave property, it did not, of itself, furnish adequate protection. He drew a distinction between the right and the fact, and said that the protection could only be furnished by legislation; that legislation could only come from one of two sources-the Territorial Legislature or the Congress of the United States. He would look to the Territorial Legislature in the first instance. If he got adequate legislation there, he was content; but if the Territorial Legisla ture failed to act, and give him that adequate legislation, in the form of what is commonly called a slave code, such non-action was equivalent to a denial of his rights; and, losing his rights, it was no consolation to him that he had been de prived of them by the non-action of a Territorial Legislature; and hence he would demand of Congress the passage of laws to protect his slaves, and to punish men for running them off; to furnish such remedies for the violation of his rights as he thought he was entitled to from the Territorial Legislature. He said he would demand this from Congress,

Mr. BROWN. Because the Territorial Legislature was the creature of Congress. Mr. DOUGLAS. He further said that he would, base his demand on Congress to pass this slave code on the ground that the Territorial Legislature was the creature of Congress; and, if it did not do its duty, Congress should pass such laws as were necessary to protect slave property in the Territories.

Mr. GREEN. Will the Senator permit me to ask him a single question}
Mr. DOUGLAS. Certainly.

Mr. GREEN. If a law merely providing protection is to be called a slave code, then, I ask, if larceny, in general terms, were punished by the Territorial law, and

tod of milliy me I BAITION AM the Legislature should except the larceny of slaves, would he say he would submit to that at the option of the Legislature!

Mr. GREEN. The Senator will permit me to say that I think he does not understand the point I presented, and I therefore desire to present it more explicitly. The Supreme Court having decided that slaves constitute property, if a Territory, authorized by Congress to legislate for itself, should pass a law punishing larceny of all property except slaves, would that make slaves equal to other property in the Territory or would it not be a violation of the Constitution!

Mr. DOUGLAS. If the Senator cannot understand my answer to that question by what I have said, and the train of my argument, it is useless for me to discuss it further. I say that I leave all kinds of property, slaves included, to the local law for protection; and that I will not exert the power of Congress to interfere with that local law with reference to slave property, or any other kind of property. If the people think that particular laws on the subject of property are beneficial to their interests, they will enact them. If they do not think such laws are wise, they will refrain from enacting them. They will protect slaves there, provided they want slavery; and they will want slavery, if the climate be such that the white cannot cultivate the soil, so as to render negro compulsory labor necessary. Hence, it becomes a question of climate, of production, of self-interest, and not a question of legislation, whether slavery shall, or shall not exist there.

But the Senator from Mississippi says he has a right to protection. The owner of every other species of property may say he has a right to protection. The man dealing in liquors may think that, inasmuch as his stock of liquors is property, he has a right to protection. The man dealing in an inferior breed of cattle, may think he has a right to protection; but the people of the Territory may think it is their interest to improve the breed of stock by discrimination against inferior breeds; and hence they may fix a higher rate of taxation on the one than on the other,

du is Mr. BROWN. The Senator from Illinois now makes a point which enables me to illustrate what I mean. I hold that the Territorial Legislature of Kansas-that being the Territory immediately involved in this discussion-has no right to enact the Maine liquor law. That is an act of sovereignty. It has the right to say that liquors carried into the Territory shall be so used as that they shall not corrupt the public morals nor endanger the public safety; but the power of prohibition does not belong to a Territorial Legislature. So I say in reference to slave property. As I said in my opening remarks this morning, while I demand justice, I will do jus tice. I hold that a Territorial Legislature has the right to regulate the relation between slave in such a manner that the master shall not permit the slave

to endster and ic safety or corrupt the public morals. That is what I mean,

power to regulate; and not seeing the point at which a court could intervene and arrest this power if it were abused, I said it never would, or rarely ever present a case which we could get before the court and upon which we could demand its judgment. By this I understood the Senator from Illinois to mean unfriendly legislation; that in the exercise of its power to regulate the relation between master and slave, it could act with such severity as effectually to exclude slavery as though it were a constitutional inhibition. That is what I meant.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I am willing to test this question by the illustration the Senator presents of a Maine liquor law. I shall not stop to inquire whether the Maine liquor law is constitutional or not; first, because Congress is not the tribunal to decide it; and, secondly, because, in the platform to which the Senator from Mississippi and myself both stand pledged as the rule of our political action, it is provided that that question shall be sent to the court to test the constitutionality of the law, and we shall not come to Congress to repeal the law. When the Nebraska bill was first pending in the Senate, it contained the old clause that the territorial laws should be sent here, and, if disapproved by Congress, should be void. The discussion proceeded on the basis that we were conferring the whole power of legislation on the Territory, subject only to the Constitution of the United States, with the right in the Territorial Legislature "to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way" and that if any man was aggrieved by such legislation, he should have a right to appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States to test its validity, but should not come to Congress to repeal the obnoxious law. When that argument was made, a distinguished Senator from Ohio, not now here, (Mr. CHASE,) asked us why we kept that clause in the bill requiring the laws of the Territory to be sent here for approval or disapproval? We could not answer the inquiry, and hence we struck out the provision requiring the Territorial laws to be sent here for approval or disapproval, upon the avowed ground at the time that the Territorial Legislature might pass just such laws as they wanted, with the right of appeal by any one aggrieved to the Supreme Court to test their constitutionality, but not to Congress to annul them. I undertake to say that this was the distinct understanding among the Northern and Southern Democrats at that time, and among all the friends of the Kansas-Nebraska bill. It was agreed that while we might differ as to the extent of the power of the Territorial Legislature on these questions, we would make a full grant of legislative authority to the Legislature of the Territory, with the right to pass such laws as they chose, and the right of anybody to appeal to the court to decide upon the validity and constitutionality of such laws, but not to come to Congress for their annulment. Hence, if the Territorial Legislature should pass the Maine liquor law, and anybody was dissatisfied with the provisions of that act, and thought it violated his constitutional right, he could not come to Congress for its annulment, but could appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States; and if that court decided the law to be constitutional, it must stand, no matter how obnoxious it might be to any portion of the American people. If it was unconstitutional, it became void without any interference by Congress, or any other legislative body. The Kansas-Nebraska bill was thus amended for the avowed purpose, at the time, of striking out the appeal to Congress, and substituting the appeal to the court.

After we had gone that far, a Senator from New Hampshire pointed out in the Nebraska bill the fact that no appeal could be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States unless the amount of property in controversy was $2,000 in value, and hence that a negro could not appeal for his freedom, nor could the owner of a single slave appeal to the Supreme Court to establish his title, if he thought that his rights were violated. In order to obviate that objection, we amended the bill by providing that where the title to property in slaves, or any question of personal freedom was the point in issue, the right of appeal to the Supreme Court should exist without reference to the amount in controversy..

Thus the Kansas-Nebraska bill stood, granting all rightful power of legislation on all subjects whatsoever to the Territorial Legislature, subject only to the Constitution of the United States, provided they should not pass any law taxing the property of non-residents higher than that of residents, nor any law interfering with the pri mary disposition of the soil, nor impose any tax on the property of the United States. But there was no exception made as to slavery. The intent was to confer on the Territorial Legislature all the power we had on the subject of slavery, to let them wield it for or against free institutions, as the people of the Territory chose; and the understanding was, that we would abide by whatever laws they might make, provided they did not violate the Constitution of the United States; and the Supreme Court was the only tribunal that could decide that question.

Now, sir, I stand on the Kansas-Nebraska bill as it was expounded and understood at the time, with this full power in the Territorial Legislature, with the right of appeal to the Supreme Court to test the validity of its laws, and no right whatever to appeal to Congress to repeal them in the event of our not liking them. I am ready to answer the inquiry of the Senator from Mississippi, whether, if I believed the Maine liquor law to be unconstitutional and wrong, and if a Territorial Legislature should pass it, I would vote here to annul it? I tell him no. If the people

of Kansas want a Maine liquor law, let them have it. If they do not want it, let them refuse to pass it. If they do pass it, and any citizen thinks that law violates. the Constitution, let him make a case and appeal to the Supreme Court. If the court sustains his objection, the law is void. "If it overrules the objection, the decision must stand until the people, who alone are to be affected by it, who alone. have an interest in it, may choose to repeal it. So I say with reference to slavery. Let the Territorial Legislature pass just such laws in regard to slavery as they think they have a right to enact under the Constitution of the United States. If I do not like those laws, I will not vote to repeal them; if you do not like them, you must not vote to repeal them; but anybody aggrieved may appeal to the Supreme Court, and if they are constitutional, they must stand; if they are unconstitutional, they are void. That was the doctrine of non-intervention, as it was understood at the time the Kansas-Nebraska bill was passed. That is the way it was explained and argued in the Senate and in the House of Representatives and before the country. It was distinctly understood that Congress was never to intervene for or against slavery, or for or against any other institution in the Territories; but leave the courts to decide all constitutional questions as they might arise, and the President to carry the decrees of the court into effect; and, in case of resistance to his authority in executing the judicial process, that he was to use, if necessary, the whole military force of the country, as provided by existing laws,

I know that some gentlemen do not like the doctrine of non-intervention as well as they once did. It is now becoming fashionable to talk sneeringly of "your doctrine of non-intervention." Sir, that doctrine has been a fundamental article in the Democratic creed for years. It has been repeated over and over again in every national Democratic platform-non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories. The Nebraska bill was predicated on that idea-the Territorial Legislature to have jurisdiction over all rightful subjects of legislation, not excepting slavery, with no appeal to Congress, but a right to appeal to the courts; and the legislation to be void, if the Supreme Court said it was unconstitutional, and valid, no matter how obnoxious, if the court said it was constitutional. Let me call attention to the language of the Kansas-Nebraska bill. Its fourteenth section provides:

"That the Constitution and all laws of the United States, which are not locally inapplicable, shall have the same force and effect in the said Territory of Nebraska, as elsewhere within the United States, except the eighth section of the act 'preparatory to the admission of Missouri into the Union,' approved March 6, 1820, which, being INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION BY CONGRESS WITH SLAVERY in the States AND TERRITORIES, as recognized by the legislation of 1850, commonly called the compromise measures, IS HEREBY DECLARED INOPERATIVE and VOID; it being; the true intent and meaning of this act not to legislate slavery into any State or TERRITORY, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people THEREOF perfectly FREE TO FORM AND REGULATE THEIR DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS IN THEIR OWN WAY, SUBJECT ONLY TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES."

Thus, in the Nebraska bill, it is declared that a congressional enactment on the subject of slavery is inconsistent with the principle of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the States and Territories. This same article of faith has gone Into the various Democratic platforms, and especially into the Cincinnati platform. Every Democrat, therefore, is pledged, by his platform and the organization of the party, against any legislation of Congress in the Territories for or against slavery, no matter how obnoxious the territorial legislation may be. If it is unconstitutional, you have your remedy; go to the court and test the question. If it is constitutional, you have agreed that the people of a Territory may have it. I hold you to the agreement.

Mr. CLAY. Will the Senator permit me to ask him a question!

Mr. DOUGLAS. Certainly, with great pleasure.

Mr. CLAY. I ask the Senator whether he believes that a citizen of the Southern States has a right to carry his slaves into the Territories under the Constitution! Mr. DOUGLAS. When the Senator gets through with his question, I will answer. Mr. CLAY. I should like the Senator to answer.

Mr. DOUGLAS. I do not like this thing of requiring categorical answers, when the Senator who puts the question holds the floor. When he gets through, I will give him an answer.

Mr. CLAY. If the Senator does not answer it, I will answer it. I think the citi zen has that right. When I am asked whence he derives the right, I say from the Constitution. The Supreme Court has so decided. Then, I ask the Senator, if the Constitution gives the right, how can the Territory deny it! and if the Territory pass a law inhibiting the introduction of slaves there, where is his redress! The Senator.