right to do this directly as we have to do it indirectly. We have as much power to employ our army and navy in recapturing fugitive slaves, as we have to make a treaty with the Indians to retake such fugitives, and then employ our army and navy to compel the Indians to do it. We have as much power to tax the free states, and apply the money directly for the purchase of fugitive slaves, as we have to tax them to carry on a war for the purpose of compelling the surrender of such slaves; or even to apply the national treasure to the holding of such treaties. In truth, sir, we have no power whatever over the subject or institution of slavery within the several states of this Union. We have neither the power to sustain nor abolish it, to create or destroy it. I mean, sir, that we have no such pow ers delegated to us for any purpose whatever. We have not the power to sustain it in the South, or establish it in the North. I know it is said, and repeated, and asserted, that a portion of the people of the free states hold that we have the power to abolish slavery in the States. I can only say that I have never met with any intelligent man who has advanced such doctrine in my hearing. For my own part, I believe we have as much power to establish slavery in the free states as we have to abolish it in the slave states. I say nothing of the constitutional power of Congress over the slave-trade between the states. But, Mr. Chairman, I am not willing to believe that any gentleman on this floor will urge the right of taxing the freemen of the North for the holding in slavery the colored men at the South."

This is the basis of the doctrines put forth and illustrated by "Pacificus." They are, however, more clearly summed up in a pamphlet published in 1845, at the request of Eastern friends, and which has been very widely circulated. The introduction. to it is as follows:

"The Rights of the Free States subverted, or an Enumeration of some of the most prominent Instances in which the Federal Constitution has been violated by our National Government, for the Benefit of Slavery. By a Member of Congress.

"INTRODUCTION.-Perhaps no subject was ever more generally misunderstood than the contest now going on between a porVOL. I.-S

tion of the people of the free states and those who are attached to the slaveholding interests of the South. Until quite recently, the Southern doctrine, from the adoption of the Constitution, has been, that slavery is strictly a state institution, over which the Federal government has no control! This is believ ed by the people of the North, generally, to be the constitutional doctrine; those who dissent from it are so few that they can hardly be said to form an exception. That eminent statesman, Henry Clay, in 1844, declared, that the existence, maintenance, and continuance of slavery must depend entirely upon the power and authority of the states in which it exists."

"From this position few Northern men will dissent. All agree that Congress has no power to uphold it; and if the states in which it exists are unable to sustain it, it should be left to perish. Congress possesses no power to compel the people of the free states to uphold the slavery of the South, neither has it any power to compel the slave states to abolish it. It can not interfere for either purpose. Still, Southern politicians and Southern statesmen have so often reiterated the fact that Northern men were endeavoring to interfere with their 'peculiar institution,' that many Northern statesmen yet seem to be unconscious that those who have said and done most in regard to the encroachments of slavery have merely endeavored to protect the rights of the free states, and to preserve the Constitution from being subverted. They have put forth their efforts to save the people of the North from being unconstitu tionally involved in the expense and crime of supporting slavery.

"The most objectionable feature of our Constitution is that provision which gives to the slave states a representation in Congress proportioned to the number of slaves which they hold. This was a privilege conceded to those states. By it they now have nineteen members of Congress more than they would be entitled to were freemen alone included in the ratio of representation. Yet these members, like the others, are bound by the Constitution, and possess no right to pervert the government to the support of slavery. Again: it is supposed by some, that that provision of the Constitution which relates to the arrest of fugitive slaves directly involves the people of the free states in the support of slavery. But, under the construction which that clause has received, it appears that the whole pow

er of Congress consists in prohibiting the people of the free states from interfering to prevent the master, or his agents, from arresting his fugitive slave. We may feed, and clothe, and lodge the slave, knowing him to be a fugitive. It seems that we may go further: we may inform him of his rights, tell him how to escape, and furnish him with arms to defend himself, without making ourselves liable under the Constitution or laws of the United States. We may also refuse to feed, or to lodge the slaveholder while in pursuit of his slave; we may spurn him from our presence; and we may stand and see his slave defend himself, even to taking the master's life, and incur neither moral nor legal responsibility. Yet we may not secrete the slave from, nor defend him against, his master. So far as this supineness involves us in a negative support of slavery, so far are we liable to maintain that institution. Again: it is urged by some that, so far as the Constitution makes it the duty of the Federal government to suppress internal violence, it subjects the people of the free states to the support of slavery. The duty of the Federal government goes only so far as to suppress the violence. It takes no notice of slavery. But if slaves commit violence in order to obtain their liberty, such violence must be suppressed. Yet, when the violence ceases, the power of the government ceases. Our troops can not go further and deliver the insurgents to their masters, nor can they inquire whether they be masters or slaves. The business and duty of our troops is with the violence, and not with slavery. But so far as the suppression of domestic violence tends to the support of slavery, so far the people of the free states may constitutionally be compelled to support that institution. I make this explanation in order that I may be definitely understood. Taking this as the true construction of the Constitution, we must regard every exercise of the national influence for the purpose of sustaining slavery, every payment of money from the national treasury, every employment of the navy or of the army for such purpose, as violations of that instrument."

His doctrine, in short, is, that slavery should be let entirely alone-an issue which is now before the country as connected with the results of the Mexican war.

Acting on these views, he offered a series of resolutions on the 21st of March, 1842, having relation to the case of the brig

"Creole," which led to a censure by that body, to his resignation, and to his re-election by an overwhelming expression of public sentiment in his district.

The brig "Creole," of Richmond, Virginia, Captain Ensor, bound to New Orleans, sailed from Hampton Roads on the 27th of October, 1841, with a cargo of merchandise, principally tobacco, and slaves, numbering about one hundred and thirtyfive. On the evening of the 7th of November, some of the slaves rose upon the crew of the vessel, murdered a passenger, named Howell, who owned some of the negroes, wounded the captain dangerously, and the first mate and two of the crew severely. The slaves soon obtained complete possession of the brig, which, under their direction, was taken into Nassau, a British port in the island of New Providence. At the request of the American consul in that place, the governor ordered a guard on board, to prevent the escape of the mutineers, and with a view to an investigation into the circumstances of the That investigation was made by two British magistrates, and an examination also took place by the consul. On the report of the magistrates, nineteen of the slaves were imprisoned by the local authorities as having been concerned in the mutiny and murder; and their surrender to the consul, to be sent to the United States for trial for these crimes, was refused, on the ground that the governor wished first to communicate with the government of England on the subject. Through the interference of the colonial authorities, and even before the military guard was removed, the greater number of the remaining slaves were liberated, and encouraged to go beyond the power of the master of the vessel or the American consul, by proceedings which neither of them could control.

case.

This is the substance of the case, as stated in two protests, one made at Nassau and the other at New Orleans, and the consul's letters, together with sundry depositions taken by him. It is proper to state that the facts were subsequently controverted, positive and officious interference by the colonial authorities to set the slaves free being alleged on one side, and denied on the other. The nineteen who were imprisoned in the first instance were subsequently liberated by order of the home government.

The government of the United States demanded redress, and

claimed indemnification from the government of Great Britain. We have no knowledge that either the one or the other has ever been obtained.

Now, it was the opinion of Mr. Giddings that no crime or offense had been committed on board the Creole-no crime or offense known or recognized by the laws of the United States, or of any state composing them. Slavery, he argued, was a local institution, unknown beyond the limits of the jurisdiction by which it was created-confined distinctly and definitely to the state in which it existed; and the moment a slave was taken by his master beyond the boundaries of that state, he was a slave no longer. Proceeding on these convictions, he offered the following resolutions:

"Resolved, That prior to the adoption of our Federal Constitution, each of the several states composing this Union exercised full and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject of slavery within its own territory, and possessed full power to continue or abolish it at pleasure.

"Resolved, That by adopting the Constitution, no part of the aforesaid powers were delegated to the Federal government, but were reserved by, and still pertain to, each of the several states.

"Resolved, That by the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, each of the several states surrendered to the Federal government all jurisdiction over the subjects of commerce and navigation upon the high seas.

"Resolved, That slavery, being an abridgment of the natural rights of man, can exist only by force of positive municipal law, and is necessarily confined to the territorial jurisdiction of the power creating it.

"Resolved, That when a ship belonging to the citizens of any state of this Union leaves the waters and territory of such state, and enters upon the high seas, the persons on board cease to be subject to the slave laws of such state, and thenceforth are governed in their relations to each other by, and are amenable to, the laws of the United States.

"Resolved, That when the brig 'Creole,' on her late passage for New Orleans, left the territorial jurisdiction of Virginia, the slave laws of that state ceased to have jurisdiction over the persons on board said brig, and such persons became amenable only to the laws of the United States.