THE

ARGUMENT, A PRIORI,

FOR THE

MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

SCHOLIUM.

§ 1. In place of the words, "The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy," as well as "perfectly Good," as occurring in the last section of the last Sub-Proposition;a or in place of any such collection of words; for the future, we shall employ the one term GOD. That is, so often as is desirable.

$2. This substitution will be highly advantageous. It will save repetitions of words, in clauses consisting of many words. And 'twill be certainly a great object gained, to prevent the necessity, ever recurring, of using so many words, in cases where each word, or phrase, is simply syncategorematic, or a part only of the complex term which forms the subject of the proposition. In being able to avoid, in the generality of cases, circumlocutions, apt to become troublesome, reader and author have, in fine, reasons for congratulating each other.

§ 3. There is, too, another consideration. This is not a case of mere substitution of one word for another.

Viz. Div. III. Prop. I. Sub-Prop. § 7.

It so

B

happens, that the great majority of persons, including many of our best etymologists, are of opinion, that the term “God” is tantamount, linguistically speaking, to "The Good One."1 + Then, our demonstration having argumentatively compassed the existence of The Good One; we shall henceforth employ the term in question as being simply equivalent to The Good Being to wit, that Good Being whose existence the demonstration had attained to; namely, The necessarily existing Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration; who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, completely Happy, and, also, perfectly Good. The term chosen as substitute has, therefore, the great virtue of suitableness.

4. It was of importance to save the circumlocutions, as so many words, long words too, were to be transported along. Besides, the substitute is no arbitrary selection. Last of all, the term in question is, from its established associations in men's minds, admirably adapted for the situation it has been fixed on to fill. That single word is associated with most men's ideas of supreme, absolute Sovereignty over all things, in combination with Complacency, Benevolence, Kindness, &c., &c. It is, in short, a word felt to be worthy of all honour.

§ 5. In fine, in substituting "God," we are in possession of a word expressive of an idea tantamount to the last predicate. The term conveys the great attribute, the latest element, as yet, in the demonstration. Perfect Goodness is necessarily existing: that is, a Being, perfectly Good, necessarily exists: that is, there is necessarily a God.

1 If the fact, regarding the etymology, be not as I suppose; let the term chosen be—if not by etymology, by hypothesis-equivalent to the whole complex term constituting the subject in such propositions as we have in view. Ex hypothesi, let GOD = The Good One.

See Note to this Scholium.

PROPOSITION II.

God is necessarily True.

PROLEGOMENON I.

§ 1. For the nouns themselves, The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, completely Happy, and perfectly Good; or for the substitute on which we have fixed; or, finally, for the neuter pronoun "it," as standing for those nouns-not divulsed, of course, from their own adjectivesor so many of them,b or for the substituted term: the word "He" shall be employed to denote the same thing. Not that there can be an intention to attach any idea of sex to the Being denoted by the more noble pronoun: but the one word will be more suitable than the other. To us, the inhabitants of Great Britain, and, in general, the peoples who speak our English tongue, it is more decorous and reverential to apply the word He to the great and good Being in question than any such word as it. Such the genius and contexture of our language.

§ 2. It is to be borne in mind, that we are arrived at a stage in the ratiocination where we have right to so many attributes, and so conspicuous ones; as the natural attributes of Immensity and Eternity; the intellectual ones (if you will permit me to call them so) of All-knowingness, Allpowerfulness, entire Freeness; as well as the moral ones of consummate Happiness and perfect Goodness. In fact, we appear to have now an established right to those attributes,

a Vide Schol. præced.

b As used, ex. gr., in Div. III. Prop. I. § 3, & Sub-Prop. § 4.

of which each was, in turn, a predicate to which we proved our claim. Having such right, we may consider our present position as conferring powers and privileges: the title, for example, to use, when we think proper, the abbreviation of a single word, where before we used many words. And 'tis but another step in the same free direction to substitute the more noble personal pronoun "He," embracing, of course, the cognate "Himself," in the place of the impersonal pronoun "it," and its cognates. Logically speaking, we may take the higher ground, and, being so privileged, it is becoming that we should do so.

PROLEGOMENON II.

§ 1. Viewed as an affair of language, the proposition, God is True, may be taken in one or other of two distinct senses. First sense: GOD is True, may be held to mean, that He truly, or in truth, or according to truthfulness, is GOD. So, we say, or may say, "This is the True GOD." Again: "Ye turned to GOD from idols, to serve the Living and True GOD."

§ 2. Second sense. GOD is True, may mean that He acts truly, or with trueness, or truth, or truthfulness. In this way, we may say, Let GOD be True, but every man a liar." Or, "He that hath received His testimony hath set to his seal that GOD is True." Sometimes, these two meanings are strangely blended or confounded together; although they are so different.+

§ 3. Of course, it is only in the latter sense, that our Proposition, GOD is True, is to be taken. The other sense has

a As laid down in preceding Scholium.

See Note to this Prolegomenon.

been well, if only virtually, elaborated, and, 'tis trusted, most successfully established, in the previous portions of this demonstration.

LEMMA I.

§ 1. Now, there is one thing involved in, or rather by, this proposition, which must be considered at the very outset. For we can advance not so much as a single step without the aid of the supposition in view. Although indeed one might (as is so often done in other cases, so far alike) go on arguing on the supposition without ever so much as noticing, by the slightest hint, that such a supposition is necessary: far less, that the author has, in reality, subsumed it in his reasonings.

§ 2. The supposition in question-whether expressed, or only tacitly understood; for it is by no means always necessary that a necessary supposition should be formally expressed-is, that there are objects of GOD's Truth, objects in relation to which GOD'S Truth must be. This becomes very evident on reflection: 'tis a position containing its own evidence within itself. The notion of GOD's Truth clearly implies that GOD has objects for the manifestation of that truth. Without these, there is palpably no place for the truth. No possibility of its existence. GOD cannot act with truthfulness in relation to- -nothing. Tis, then, quite plain, that the supposition in question is actually involved in our Proposition.

§ 3. And this being so, the distinction of absolute Attributes, and relative Attributes, has been therefore introduced, fairly and thoroughly. Now, the distinction between an absolute attribute, and a relative one, lies in this, that the former expresses what GOD is in Himself, or without relation to anything beyond Himself, or His own Essence: while