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LEMMA II.

§ 3. Second. Faithfulness, not only demands objects, but itself, as subject, necessitates the supposition of a thing, not, like a pure object, beyond itself. For, Faithfulness plainly can only come to be exercised with reference to Promises, Covenants, or Engagements of some kind. And it is not difficult to see that all these are at bottom one. A covenant, an engagement, an obligation of any description whatsoever, come under, or entered into, by GOD, is just a promise in another form. All the rest are resolvable into the first : The whole class contains but one species, Divine Promise.1

§ 4. As, therefore, there are relative attributes; among the relative attributes, this attribute of Faithfulness is by no means the least relative.

DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. In the proof of the Proposition, no great measure of force will need to be expended. The attribute of Truth being once established, the foundations of the Faithfulness have been laid. Faithfulness, as an attribute, implies not a great deal more than Trueness. Truth is not Faithfulness, but the latter involves the former, and is neither more nor less than an application, a particular application of Truthfulness. To be faithful, is to be something more

1 Of course, the generalisation accords with the formula of Logic. Men of Natural Science use "class" and "species," in another way: but we do not follow the physical philosophers in a meta-physical tractatus. A logician knows (and can know) of only a species--generalisation as to all things above,—and a genus-generalisation as to all things below. The genera and species receive, in the different physical or natural sciences, a variety of names, ex. gr. "group," ," "order," "class," &c. &c., owing to the number of divisions of which each of those heads is, for the sake of convenience, made to consist.

than being true, for it is to be true as to engagements contracted. Faithfulness Truth as to Engagements. Simply so. †

§ 2. As, therefore, 'tis so that Faithfulness holds so directly of Truth, a separate and lengthily drawn out demonstration is by no means necessary: it would not even be expedient, since it would have a tendency to obscure rather than to enlighten farther. If a separate demonstration be not absolutely necessary, such might serve the same sort of ill purpose which some other works of supererogation accomplish: it might give birth to the thought, that a mountain was to be removed, where all is a plain already.

§ 3. A Divine Promise, however, is a serious thing. The Faithfulness of GOD is an attribute which, more than many of the attributes, depends on the other than GOD: Nevertheless, the faithfulness in question is the true heavenly archetype, or (should you object to such form of words) the real archetypal ground of every "law" "which altereth not." GOD's faithfulness to a promise is the GOD of Truthb Himself with reference to a promise. A divine promise, once made, is sure, yea unchangeable. A promise by GOD is GOD Himself promising. A divine promise broken, would be GOD un-God-ed. In fine, "it is impossible for God to lie," because it is impossible that GOD should cease to be.

§ 4. We cannot hesitate, therefore, to maintain, that the doctrine of the necessary Faithfulness of GOD is necessarily sound doctrine.

§ 5. GOD is, then, necessarily Faithful.

a See the Lemmas.

b Proposition II.

+ See Note to this Corollary.

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PROPOSITION III.

God is necessarily Inflexibly Just.

LEMMA I.

§ 1. If the preceding Proposition demanded a postulate to be previously grounded,a the present one equally, or much more, makes the same requirement. If to manifest Truth, to do the Truth (as one saith), objects are required; to manifest Justice requires, no less, objects on which the Justice is to be

exercised.

§ 2. And not to repeat at length considerations advanced under the previous Proposition,b the objects presented to the Justice must be, or, at any rate, shall be, considered to be men. They must be so considered, taking the nature of the lower animals, and all beneath the lower animals, into account. And the objects of the Justice shall be considered to the exclusion of angel-spirits, or any possibly existing higher natures.c

§ 3. Our Proposition is tantamount, then, to this, that GOD is Just to Men.

LEMMA II.

And the same sort of thing is involved with regard to Justice, as was involved in the position with regard to Truth.d Thus, it is here involved that God acts towards those His creatures,

As He is, and as they are.

a See Div. III. Prop. II. Lemma I.
b Prop. preced. Lemma I. Sect. 2, 4, &c.

c Ibid. § 7.

d Prop. preced. Lemma II.

LEMMA III.

§ 1. But it falls to be now noticed, that another element, with special regard to one at least of the factors, must be introduced. While the proposition, GOD is True, regards, or may regard men, simply as men; the proposition, God is Just, regards, always regards, men in the farther light of being

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A moral designation, therefore, is added to the objects. The men are always considered to be, Virtuous, Moral, &c.; or, on the other hand, Unvirtuous, Immoral, &c.t

§ 2. The propriety of the introduction of that new element will not be seriously gainsayed. To be True, nothing more is required than to do as things are, and not as they are not; and the notion is complete without considering whether the creatures, who are the objects to whom the Truth is manifested, are good or bad. But it is different in the case of Justice. GOD cannot be the Just GOD to men unless their moral condition be taken into account. Justice, in fact, is a quality having necessary reference to the

+ See Notes to this Lemma: Note A.

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deserts or merits, and the demerits, that is, the goodness or badness, of its objects. Take away moral states, and you obliterate the possibility of the exercise of Justice.

§3. There needs no elaborate proof of the propriety of what is now advanced. 'Tis involved in the propositions themselves, as the use of language shows. No necessity can lie upon one to prove that common language means what it means. The use of language must proceed, no doubt, from the firm realities in the region of absolute ideas,-as an effect involves the existence somewhere of its cause; and the good use of language has fixed, that to be True is different from being Just, and that to be Just requires that there be some merit, or some demerit, in each of the objects. Unless men be considered to be good, and bad, they are not fit objects for the display of Justice. Justice, in fine, has a distinct additional element in it over and above that which Trueness of necessity involves. Truth has to do with existences simply: Justice, with moral existences only as such.

§ 4. GOD, as Just, must, then, act to His creatures, Men, As He is, and, at same time, as they are.a

Moreover,

GOD, as GOD, acts towards the good man as being a good man; and towards the evil or bad, as being so.

GOD cannot act otherwise, and be Just. But (as shall be demonstrated) GOD must be Just: He is necessarily a GOD of Justice.

§ 5. The present Proposition, therefore, relates to a relative Attribute. If there be degrees in relativeness, this Proposition were more relative (if this be possible) than even the preceding one. †

Lemma II.

+ See Notes to this Lemma: Note B.

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