SCHOLIUM I. (PRÆPOSITUM.) There is a point which, for the sake of clearness, it will be as well to explain, and it can, with great propriety, be explained in this place. Whereas the word "good" is used several times in the course of the preceding Lemma, (as well as it shall be used frequently elsewhere): it is to be observed, that goodness in GOD is one thing; in man, it is another. That is, the word "good," or "goodness," when applied to man, has a different meaning from that which the word has when used with reference to GOD. Goodness, as to GOD; or as employed in our Sub-Proposition, a where the predicate is, being "perfectly Good;" is equal, or as equipollent as may be, to the meaning of Benevolence, or Benignity, or Kindness.† But goodness, as to man—at least, as we have been employing the term "good"-is equal to virtuousness, virtuousness or righteousness, in general: that is, when speaking of man, we have employed the term, as is generally done, to denote more, a great deal more, than simple (human) benevolence, or beneficence.‡ DEMONSTRATION. § 1. Now come we to the demonstration of the Proposition, that God is inflexibly Just, and that necessarily. The demonstration itself may surprise some by its brevity: but there shall be no lack of quality, if of quantity. § 2. There can be no sufficient reason why we should suppose the possibility of GOD being unjust. To suppose GOD has need to be unjust, would be to suppose a cause a Under Prop. I. Div. III. See Notes to this Scholium: Note A. without, or apart from, GOD, compelling Him' and 'tis absurd, in the case of GOD, as we have demonstrated His Existence, and so many of His Attributes, a to suppose a cause, outside Him, determining Him. § 3. Besides, nothing more absurd than to suppose GOD to be necessitated, from without, to act as He is not— to be obliged to act as He is not, to men good, and men bad, as being otherwise than they really are. The supposition in question would involve that GOD were not True, but False and Im-moral;-and indeed GOD's Justice is little more than His Trueness applied to the good, and to the bad, as being, respectively, good and bad;-and as the absurdity of GOD's being false has been demonstrated, the absurdity of the supposition which would involve that absurdity is also, at sametime, demonstrated. For GOD to be un-just; that is, acting to the good as if they were bad, and to the bad as if they were good; were to be not True, but False and Im-moral. But this is impossible: b Therefore, the other is impossible. And as has been already set forth, the simple supposition of GOD's injustice is so absurd in itself, that no position can by any possibility be more absurd. § 4. Nothing can be imagined more satisfactory than this demonstration. It is thoroughly convincing; and its brevity can only be adduced as an immense additional virtue. § 5. We can have no difficulty, therefore, in arriving at the conclusion, that GOD and Justice stand to each other as necessary inseparables; and so we maintain, that GOD is necessarily of inflexible Justice. § 6. GOD is necessarily, then, inflexibly Just. a See the Propositions in Divisions I. & II. b Prop. II. C ance. SCHOLIUM II. (POSTPOSITUM.) § 1. 'Tis incumbent upon us now to enter upon another part of our subject. We have noticed a special element which falls to be introduced when treating of Justice,a and we are arrived at the place where we must take notice of a second additional element, one, too, of the gravest importThe former element was weighty in one respect: this one will be seen to be so in another. The former went to make up the idea of what Justice implies, or what is Justice: and therefore it behoved to appear before the demonstration. But it may perhaps be, that the present element looks more towards the consequences of Justice, than the constitution itself of the idea thereof: and, so, its natural position is after the demonstration. Its fit place is in our posterior analytics. : § 2. We have seen, that the Justice of GOD implies that He act to the good as good; to the bad, as being really bad. But we now allege, that the goodb man is, as such, naturally happy he is happy so far as he is good, or as the good which is in him is uninterruptedly operative. Analogously, the bad man, as such, is infallibly unhappy, or, to adopt as plain a word, miserable. Goodness or virtue, in short, implies happiness, and vice implies misery, of a greater or a less degree. GOD, therefore, must act towards the good man as being a happy man, and to the evil man as being a miserable man. And we shall have an opportunity of observing how much, of even awful significance, is involved in these things.c § 3. It is, then, to be shown, that goodness in men involves happiness; and badness, unhappiness. Afterwards, a Above, Lemma III. b See Scholium above. c See below, Schol. III. Sect. 13, 14;-and other places. we shall attend emphatically to what is implied in GOD acting to the good or happy man, as being truly a happy man, and to the evil or unhappy man-to be plain with you, the sinner-as being indeed an unhappy, yea a miserable man.a Not omitting neither the consequences of such action. At the point indicated, the grand doctrine of Rewards and Punishments will break in upon us; and, in self-luminous flashes of light derived from the source of that doctrine, we shall have, at a certain point in our progress, glimpses of the unutterable blessedness of heaven; as well as be obliged to admit within the scope of our gaze (although blasting will be the vision) the lurid "darkness visible" of the horrific. damnation of hell. Such the dire necessity of the case. § 4. Thus, we are to address ourselves, in the first place, to the doctrine, that virtue involves happiness; and vice, misery. § 5. Now, when we say, that the virtuous, or good man is, as such, happy, we mean, that this is so according to the constitution and course of nature, the constitution and course of nature as experienced by us. But goodness is not the only thing or cause in operation, in any case. There is no man thoroughly good, and that continually and there are other disturbing forces at work besides those flowing from the man himself, directly, or indirectly; voluntarily, or hereditarily. There are other lines, some of them of course traversing lines, besides the main line of life. All those disturbing forces, from whatever quarter, being resolvable into the evil that is in the world. And the consequence of all this, the experienced, and the admitted consequence is, that goodness is not so much productive of, and attended by, happiness. simply, as it tends, always tends, to be so. Virtue, a Below, Schol. III. Sect. 13, 14. Also, Schol. IV. Sect. 16, 17. so far furth as it is virtue, involves happiness, so far as the virtue is singly operative. This length we must indeed go. But the confusion which there is in the actual world prevents us from being able to go farther. But, let it be believed, that length is quite far enough from being a short way. § 6. And, similarly, the same sort of thing holds with regard to the opposite, unvirtuousness. As, according to the constitution of nature, the good man is happy, so, after the same fashion, the vicious man is miserable, more or less miserable, and he always tends to become so, and more and more. But no wicked man alive is as evil as it is possible he might have been, or may hereafter come to be; by reason -if for no other reason-of the good, the great good, which there is in this world of sense, with all its deficiencies: The good will not allow the evil to be so evil, as, without the good, the evil would assuredly be. The good is always striving (such is its nature) to keep the evil within bounds, and to lessen, the effects, at least, of its malignity. And the experienced consequence is, that evil, or vice, is not attended by so much misery as it invariably tends to produce. For the same reason—that is, this is the reason-Sin, most prolific mother, does not sooner bring about Death, true, absolute Death. There are counteracting agencies at work, which keep the whole of the dreadful sin-brood in a sort of half-life, or lingering death. It is only when Sin hath conceived, in a completed way, that the dread monster effects its legitimate end, and bringeth forth Death. § 7. If there be any qualifications of the doctrine, abovedelivered, of Virtue leading to Happiness, and Vice leading to Misery, any qualifications other than have been already advanced; these of course should have a hearing. At present I am not aware of any other qualifications. I am aware indeed that the subject might be much drawn out: many |