:

obviously a very different question from the other and quite possibly, this latter is a question which will fall to be answered in a very different manner from that in which reply must be made to the former.

§ 12. But the thing which concerns us is this, that, with the answer which ought to be returned to the latter question, we have nothing to do at the present stage, or as under this Proposition relating to Justice, to Justice only. The question, and the answer, must be reserved for the fit place.a The other question, however, concerns us; and it might, with some truth, be said that it concerns us all the more that we are obliged, in strict logical procedure, to pass over, now, the wider, and, probably, more deeply interesting, question.

§ 13. It has been said, that, there will be little difficulty in answering our questionb: I now add, our question as necessarily limited.c Will the punishment of the wicked, and the reward of the good, be for ever, so far as Justice alone is concerned?

§ 14. The solution of whatever difficulty there is, or may be imagined to be, is to be found in the circumstance that there is no new element introduced into the case put, except the (assumed) fact of the existence being after the death of the body on earth. Now, the introduction of this element of mere continuance of the life of men cannot disturb, in any way, or to any extent, the application of the rule valid for the Inflexible Justice; that is to say, its application to the same objects as before, substantially the same.

a See below, Scholium III. under Prop. IV.

§ 15. It must be plain to every mind, that the strict Justice of GOD is the same this year as it was the last year, and as it will be the next year, and for ever. Mere continuance,

any amount of perpetuity one likes to imagine, of existence of the objects can, of itself, make no difference in the application of the regulating principle. And, by hypothesis, the continued existence is the sole new element in the matter.a

§ 16. The law, or rule, is:

The inflexibly Just GOD acts towards

Good, who are also happy, men, as being, in reality, good, and happy, men; and towards

Evil men, who are likewise unhappy men, as being, in truth, such.b

Now, no difference can arise when the scene for the display of the Justice is in one state of being rather than in another; is in-word it this way, if you please the spiritual world rather than on this earth. The Inflexible Justice of the Supreme, which renders to every man according to his works, proceeding from the state of his mind, cannot alter itself, nor submit to alteration brought about from without, even if causes for alteration could exist, as they cannote: and the objects presented to the Justice being the same, to wit, good and blessed men here, and bad and miserable men there, the result is the same.

§ 17. The result is the same. The good are, in consequence of the manifestation of GOD, in His Justice, to them, made to be more happy; and the more manifestation, the more blessedness: While the evil are, by the same means,

a Preced. sect.

b Schol. III.

c See Dem. above, Sect. 2, 3.

+ See Note to this Scholium: Note F.

made to become more miserable, ever more miserable. And so on, with regard to both classes of men, without end.

§ 18. Without end? Ah! there's the rub. Without end, should you lay down that the men, the good men, and the bad men, have no end. But if your position were, that the men had an end; then, the natural reward, and the natural punishment would, of course, have an end too. How could it be otherwise? But what? shall the men, then, themselves have an end, or shall they continue in existence for ever? Of course, their reward, or their punishment, cannot go on without the men as subjects of inhesion: but as to the continuance perpetually of the men, themselves, the men good, and the men bad, how is it?

§ 19. Justice cannot tell. This attribute must admit, that the ground for the answer "is not in" her. Justice can, in fact, throw no light, not the faintest ray, upon this topic. If we want more light let in, we must open a window, exposed to another region of the heavens above us all.

§ 20. Thus, the question, Taking the single attribute of Justice into account, will the reward of the righteous, will the punishment of the wicked, last after death? has received its answer. And every reader must needs have been satisfied with the accuracy of the solution. We have kept within the mark, and we have answered correctly.

1 Words taken from Job xxviii. 14.

PROPOSITION IV.

Necessarily God is Love.

PROLEGOMENON.

§ 1. Having the Proposition, God is Loving, given as one to be evinced by strict demonstration, may seem indeed one of the most startling of strange proposals. Perhaps, it will startle the great majority of readers, even among the class who may be the most favourably disposed towards a priori argumentation for a real existence. Yet strange as this proposition may sound, when uttered by an advocate of a priori argument, still he is confident of being able to prove, by the severest reasoning, of the character demanded, and impervious to the shafts of the keenest logic which may be opposed, that GOD is Love. The careful reader must remember what has been already advanced: namely, That every position which undeniably follows from our first principles, themselves altogether unimpugnable, is introducible, and, in fact, has a real title to remain among the truths of our science.a Likewise, That, if any objector, who may present himself, has not very much to do, he has still something to do. An objector has only to show, that a priori reasoning is totally inapplicable, or point out wherein it has been positively misapplied in the detail.b

§ 2. But to facilitate our progress in demonstrating the proposition before us, I shall, first of all, lay down two presuppositions, in a distinct form. I might indeed have sub

a See § 5 of Schol. IV. under Prop. III. Div. III.

b Sect. 12 of Schol. III. under Prop. III. Div. III.

sumed them as I went along, without any such explicit enunciation, and verily in a noiseless and unpretentious way. Unpretentiousness is generally commendable: yet 'tis laudable only where no illicit assumption is concealed under the affected reticence; and every assumption is improper which is not meant for the eye. An assumption not meant for the eye is dishonest; and, so, it discreetly courts the shade. In fine, 'twas deemed best to proceed in the most undisguised and open manner. Besides, what ill consequences need be feared from the formal exposure of the postulates in question?

LEMMA I.

§ 1. On the supposition of a creation of the world, the continuance of the same in being is equal to (not, observe, identical with) the continually repeated creation of the particulars and their continent.

§ 2. 'Tis clear, that created existence implies the relative Creator. Existence, by reason of a Being having made the things begin to be, is dependent, of course, on the Being. In fine, conservation, or preservation of existence, is plainly tantamount to continued creation, on supposition of a creation.

LEMMA II.

On the supposition of the conservation of things, consequent on a creation; the supposition of the possibility of an annihilation of any, or of all, of the things actually existing, involves no contradiction, nor even difficulty. The supposition, that things began to be, involves that they may, as a possibility, cease to be. Creation involves the possibility of annihilation. A Creator, therefore, may annihilate.