Cases on Torts: With Abstracts of Lectures Upon Several TortsHepbron and Haydon, 1920 - 534 էջ |
Այլ խմբագրություններ - View all
Cases on Torts: With Abstracts of Lectures Upon Several Torts Charles Albert Keigwin Ամբողջությամբ դիտվող - 1915 |
Cases on Torts: With Abstracts of Lectures Upon Several Torts Charles Albert Keigwin Ամբողջությամբ դիտվող - 1915 |
Cases on Torts: With Abstracts of Lectures Upon Several Torts Charles Albert Keigwin Ամբողջությամբ դիտվող - 1920 |
Common terms and phrases
accident action for malicious actual damage alleged appears arrest assault assumpsit authority breach brought this action cause of action charge circumstances claim committed common law conduct consequence constable contract contributory negligence conversion crime criminal dangerous declaration defamatory defect defendant defendant's duty entitled evidence fact false imprisonment felony fendant fraud ground guilty held horse imputation indictment infra injury judge judgment judicial jurisdiction jury justice justified King's Bench liable libel LORD LORD ELLENBOROUGH magistrate maintain malicious prosecution matter ment moral negligence obligation occasion offence officer opinion owner Palo Pinto County party peace person plaintiff plea possession present principle privilege probable cause proceeding proof proved punishment purpose question Railway reason refused result rule servant slander special damage statement statute street sued sufficient suit Supreme Court sustained tiff tion tort trespass trial trover unlawful unless verdict violation want of probable warrant words writ wrongful act
Սիրված հատվածներ
Էջ 224 - It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit, when the very point is presented for decision.
Էջ 59 - One of the most valuable of the criteria furnished us by these authorities, is to ascertain whether any new cause has intervened between the fact accomplished and the alleged cause. If a new force or power has intervened of itself sufficient to stand as the cause of the misfortune, the other must be considered as too remote.
Էջ 522 - And with respect to such a visitor at least, we consider it settled law, that he, using reasonable care on his part for his own safety, is entitled to expect that the occupier shall on his part use reasonable care to prevent damage from unusual danger, which he knows or ought to know...
Էջ 190 - A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter In which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contain criminatory matter, which, without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable...
Էջ 449 - Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would ordinarily have done under the circumstances of the situation, or doing what such a person under the existing circumstances would not have done.
Էջ 510 - ... it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbor, who has brought something on his own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property...
Էջ 468 - ... one person being in fault will not dispense with another's using ordinary care for himself Two things must concur to support this action. An obstruction in the road by the fault of the defendant, and no want of ordinary care to avoid it on the part of the plaintiff.
Էջ 188 - Malice in common acceptation means ill-will against a person, but in its legal sense it means a wrongful act, done intentionally, without just cause or excuse. If I give a perfect stranger a blow likely to produce death, I do it of malice, because I do it intentionally and without just cause or excuse.
Էջ 63 - The question always is, was there an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury, — a continuous operation? Did the facts constitute a continuous succession of events, so linked together as to make a natural whole, or was there some new and independent cause intervening between the wrong and the injury?
Էջ 366 - It is a well-established principle of the common law that, in actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, a jury may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive or vindictive damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff.