The third case, somewhat similar to the one that I last referred to, was upon the application of the State for patent of the United States to certain low-lying lands in the Florida Keys. They were located in the edge of the Florida Straits, just east of the island on which Key West is located. In that case also the Department of the Interior advised the State that in its judgment the lands were not of swamp character, and used this language:

The title thereto would appear to be in the State by its right of sovereignty. The letter also referred to the fact that the areas and the bottoms were out in the Straits of Florida.

Senator HATCH. In each of those cases the State was seeking to obtain title from the United States Government, and that application was rejected because the United States Government held that they already belonged to the State of Florida; is that correct?

Mr. ELLIOT. That is correct, sir. The basis on which the State was applying for title was under the Swamp Land Grant Act to lands that come under the purview of that act. In those cases it is necessary for the State to make what is called swamp selections, and in a good many cases along and near the coast in the tidal regions it is purely a matter of judgment as to what classifications those lands may come in. If they are a little bit higher than would ordinarily be affected by tide they would probably be classified as swamp, but where they are affected by the ebb and flow of the tide then they are classified as lands belonging to the State by its right of sovereignty. But it is necessary sometimes to have the Interior Department pass on that in order to make clear the status.

The fourth case is a deed from the State of Florida to the United States to a parcel of land or to submerged bottoms on which the jetties protecting the Atlantic entrance to the St. Johns River are located. The War Department, on behalf of the United States, made application to the State of Florida for a deed to a parcel of land beginning at what is called Xalvia Island, lying just off the mouth of the St. Johns River, and that parcel as described and as requested to be deeded by the War Department extends two and three-quarter miles out under the Atlantic Ocean-nearly out to the 3-mile limit. The State executed deed to those bottoms in favor of the United States. Copy of the deed is included in this memorandum.

The last case came up quite recently, on March 18th. The board of trustees, Internal Improvement Fund of the State of Florida--which is the State's land agency, similar to the Interior Department with respect to the United States-the Trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund of Florida received a letter from the War Department of the United States, signed by the engineer officer at Jacksonville, Fla., asking that the State set aside certain areas in the Gulf opposite Crystal River on which to deposit material excavated from the channel of the Crystal River entrance. That application had not been acted on when I left Florida, because it was so recent. But following the long-established policy of the State, the request of the United States in that respect is certainly going to be granted.

I could mention many, many other cases. It may be that a large number of cases would, by cumulative weight, have some additional effect, but every single one of them is to the same effect. There is no difference in the principle. There is not a single case that I know of in Florida where the United States, or any department thereof, has ever

laid claim to any of the tidal lands or to the submerged lands. These cases simply show what the Department of the Interior says about the title, and the letter and the deed from the State to the United States indicate what the War Department of the United States thinks about the title in asking the State for title.

As to this proposition of procuring petroleum for the use of the Navy or anything else for the use of the Navy; with respect to that we certainly have no difference of opinion with the committee or what is contained in that resolution. We think it is something greatly to be desired, to procure and have available in time of need whatever the Navy may require, whether it be oil for fuel or for lubrication or what not. It is not that with which we take issue, but it is the manner of the getting; it is the method proposed to be pursued in taking—a method which would upset titles given in good faith by the State of Florida to private persons, title to municipalities, to counties, for various purposes, purposes of almost every description, and the title to the remaining areas which would be in the State. That is what Florida objects to in this resolution.

It has been suggested that a simple form of resolution might be as effective to bring about an adjudication or ascertain where the title lies as the language in this resolution. I am not going to refer to that, because as an engineer it might not be becoming in me to argue that sort of a proposition.

The assistant attorney general of Florida will follow me, and if necessary he will present those points to you.

I should like to offer this memorandum, which contains copies of all of the letters and of the documents to which I have made reference, and photostat copies of those instruments, in order that the copies that I have offered may be compared with them, if necessary. I have sufficient copies for the use and convenience of members of the committee if they desire to have them.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Elliot. Are there any questions you wish to ask the witness, Senator?

Senator HOLMAN. No; thank you.

STATEMENT OF LAURENCE A. TRUETT, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL OF FLORIDA, TALLAHASSEE, FLA.

Senator HATCH. Mr. Truett, will you state your name and your position for the record?

Mr. TRUETT. My name is Laurence A. Truett. I am attorney general of Florida. Tallahasse, Fla.

On behalf of the State of Florida and at the express direction of the trustees of the Internal Improvement Fund, I appear in opposition to this resolution or any other resolution that is now pending before the Congress of a similar nature.

I should like to point out just exactly how the State of Florida becomes interested in this matter, because, as Mr. Elliot said, we have no known petroleum deposits. We do bave some explorations going on in the State of Florida. It all at the present time is in the uplands, however, and there are none within the 3-mile limit.

Senators, we think that this resolution as drawn is very ambiguous; that it contains a veiled threat, and it is somewhat along the system that has been adopted by the present rulers of Europe to grab just

a small portion of the land that they desire, and by that undermining process then go ahead and take other lands as they see fit.

The third section of the resolution contains a provision that it does not waive any rights of the United States, and the last three words are particularly important. It seems to me that if it is the Navy Department's idea to obtain a petroleum reserve, that it would be expressed in clear language, without any inferences, and without any attempt to cloud title that we believe to be well established. You will notice that they not only do not waive any rights, but with respect to any other of the coastal lands of the United States having petroleum deposits they also say "for other purposes," which means that later on if they desire to do so they will attempt to take the lands regardless of the fact that it does not contain petroleum deposits. We do not think that provision should be in there.

I also take up the first part of the resolution. The third paragraph undoubtedly clouds the titles of all of this land within the State of Florida. You will notice in line 4 on the first page of this resolution No. 92, that the word "adjacent" is used. I understand the Navy Department to contend-and I think they stated that they did not intend by this to take any of the lands adjacent to the so-called 3-mile limit. But the word as used there might mean any land that was adjacent to those particular waters, and come into our bays, our rivers, and our harbors. We think that that word, therefore, is particularly objectionable.

You will also notice that there is a declaration of policy in the first section of this resolution which I think was put there for the specific purpose of foreclosing the rights of the State in the event of court action. You will also notice that the Attorney General is particularly directed to bring ejectment proceedings. The effect of that would be that upon the institution of those suits by the United States Government, if we attempted to defend because we say that we have the title by virtue of the legal propositions that have been made to this committee, they would then contend that it was a political question, and that we had no rights in court.

We think we should be placed on an equal footing in the event that there is a suit, and that there ought not to be an attempt, not only to prejudice our rights, but more or less as an indication to the courts as to what the Congress should like the courts to do.

We go on down to the tenth line on page 2 of the resolution, which seems to negative the proposition that it is a declaration of policy, and it makes the resolution very ambiguous. If it is the desire not to prejudice the rights of the States then the declaration of policy should be eliminated.

The resolution provides that it is subject to any superior title, and so forth, of the State of California or any other person. Now if they are words of limitation upon the declaration of policy, it seems to me for the sake of clarity that all of those words should be eliminated. I am inclined to believe that in this resolution they have the cart before the horse, and that what it should do would be to give a direction to the Attorney General of the United States to bring a suit to settle the dispute that has arisen, if there must be a suit, and then there should be established a petroleum reserve in those waters.

It does not seem fair to me to single out the State of California. It seems to me that if the United States Government owns these

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lands it should apply equally to all of the States, and the suit that is directed to be brought should settle this question once and for all, so that in the event there is a failure in California, and the State of Florida not being specifically a party, so that they will not then claim that that is not binding, and will attempt at some future date to come into the State of Florida and take our lands.

I do not think a suit is necessary. It seems to me that from all the decisions which have been read here the matter has been certainly settled. It seems to me further from the letters and deed which have been presented by Mr. Elliot that the Departments of our Government have placed the same construction that we have placed upon the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and upon our Constitution.

You will also note that in all the letters from the Interior Department, they bear the approval of the Board of Law Review, so I presume that these letters were sent out with the approval of the attorneys for the Interior Department. And it seems to me that since all of these titles have become settled for such a long period of time, that there should be no attempt now to cloud those titles.

As I said, we do not have any known oil deposits in the State of Florida. But suppose we did have? They do not just pop right out of the ground, but it takes a vast amount of money to find oil and to develop those properties, and it hardly seems fair to me that we should be placed in a situation which I shall now describe. Let us say that in the State of Florida we would grant leases to private individuals, as the trustees of the internal improvement fund do. I might say there that that money goes partially to the trustees of the internal improvement fund for the internal improvement of the State of Florida, and also to our permanent school fund, which must remain inviolate forever. You can only use the interest of that school fund for purposes of education. I might say right here that our children are also important. I realize that the Navy Department is important, but until we can train those children in our primary schools. the Navy Department could not have officers nor men. It seems to me, therefore, that they should be considered also.

As I started to say, it takes a vast amount of money to make this oil exploration. In many, many instances they never find oil. They have spent thousands and thousands of dollars in the State of Florida and so far have not produced one drop of oil. But suppose by their initiative and their money they do find oil, and later find oil off the coast of Florida. Should you then appropriate it? If the United States Government had developed this oil production, had spent the money of the Government for that purpose, it might be a little different question if private individuals had then come in and through some means had drilled into those same fields, but we do not have that question here.

I also want to call the attention of the comittee to this fact. The resolution does not give you any yardstick to define what lands contain petroleum deposits. Therefore I do not know how you would ever determine whether the lands off the coast of the State of Florida had petroleum or whether they did not have petroleum. I understand that they have wells down some 16,000 feet. But does it mean that we have to drill in every foot of the lands off the coast of the State of Florida an oil well to the now known depth of producing oil wells before it can be said that there is no oil there?

Lastly, I should like to call the attention of the committee to the fact that all of this is directed to the Attorney General of the United States, and yet we have not heard a word from his office. It seems to me that he should either be called before this committee, or he should voluntarily appear and give this committee his ideas of the necessity for this resolution, and tell the committee its legal effect insofar as he can. I know that you want everything that would be helpful, and I know that if this were the Legislature of Florida and such a resolution was directed at our office, that I should certainly want to appear and give the committee the benefit of any information that I could give that would be helpful to them in arriving at a correct conclusion.

Personally, I think that this resolution is wholly unnecessary. If, as has been contended here, the words "subject to certain rights' limits the declaration of policy, then all we have is a resolution directed to the Attorney General of the United States to do what it is already his duty to do. And it seems to me that if there must be a resolution, that it should go no further than simply to direct the Attorney General of the United States to bring this suit.

I do not think that there should be any resolution, and I do hope that this committee will effectually kill this resolution so that we will not be continuously coming up here and trying to defend the rights that we believe we already have, and that have been settled by the decisions of the court, and have been interpreted by the departments to the same effect, and their administrative construction is entitled to much weight. Those constructions would be given weight in court, and we think that the committee should also give those constructions equal weight.

I thank the committee for the opportunity to make this presentation. Senator HATCH. Thank you, Mr. Truett.

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH A. LORET, SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL OF LOUISIANA, BATON ROUGE, LA.

Senator HATCH. Mr. Loret, will you state your full name and your position for the record.

Mr. LORET. My name is Joseph A. Loret. I am special assistant attorney general of Louisiana, Baton Rouge, La.

May it please the committee, we have prepared a brief on behalf of the State of Louisiana on the legal questions involved here, which I desire to offer to the committee, and I ask that it be included in the record.

Senator HATCH. That may be done.

(The brief of the State of Louisiana is here printed in the record in full as follows:)

BRIEF OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA IN SUPPORT OF THE TITLE OF THE STATES TO THE BED OF THE SEA AND IN OPPOSITION TO H. J. RES. 176, H. J. Res. 181, S. J. RES. 24, AND S. J. RES. 83

BATON ROUGE, LA.,
March 14, 1939.

MR. CHAIRMAN AND GENTLEMEN OF THE COMMITTEE: H. J. Res. 176 seeks to establish a naval petroleum reserve of all of the bed of the sea adjacent to the State of California and within the three-mile limit. H. J. Res. 181 asserts that all of the bed of the sea within the three-mile limit adjacent to the coast of the United States containing petroleum deposits belongs to the United States and instructs the Attorney General of the United States to take such legal action