CHAPTER XVI.

EXTINCTION OF DOMINION (a).

CCLXXXIV. As Dominion is acquired by the combination of the two elements of fact and intention, so, by the dissolution of these elements, or by the manifestation of a contrary fact and intention, it may be extinguished or lost (b). In this case the dominion is lost, actually or by presumption, with the consent of the State which loses it.

CCLXXXV. The title of Prescription in another State is often, though not necessarily, founded on the presumed dereliction of the possession by the original owner.

It must be borne in mind that this presumption, like all others, is liable to be repelled by proof of sufficient strength (c), that is, by evidence of a state of facts wholly inconsistent with such presumption. On the other hand, it should be observed that there is a conduct, and that there are acts on

(a) Grotius, 1. ii. c. ix.-Quando imperia vel dominia desinunt, 1. iii. c. ix. 9.

Martens, t. ii. 1. ix. pp. 340-4.
Günther, vol. ii. p. 213.
Heffter, 72.

Mühlenbrück, 1. ii. c. iii. s. 270.

(b) "Fere quibuscunque modis obligamur, iisdem in contrarium actis liberamur; quum quibus modis acquirimus, iisdem in contrarium actis amittimus. Ut igitur nulla possessio acquiri, nisi animo et corpore potest, ita nulla amittitur, nisi in qua utrumque in contrarium actum est."-Dig. L. t. xvii. 153; xli. t. ii. 8.

(c) "Quia vero tempus memoriam excedens quasi infinitum est moraliter, ideo ejus temporis silentium ad rei derelictæ conjecturam semper sufficere videbitur, nisi validissimæ sint in contrarium rationes."Grotius, de J. B. 1. ii. c. iv. s. 7.

the part of a State, which must be construed as an abandonment of her previous rights. For instance, a State may make herself a party to some convention upon another matter, but in which the possession or right originally belonging to her is indirectly, though of necessity, treated as belonging to the claimant by prescription; and such convention being concluded without any reservation on the part of the nation, would be very strong evidence of the abandonment of her right.

Again, if a nation suffer other nations in their mutual arrangements to deal with the right of possession in question as belonging to one of them, and makes no protest in favour of her claims, she must be held to have acquiesced in the transaction. An individual may indicate his acquiescence by his words or by his deeds. "Recusari hæreditas non tantum "verbis, sed etiam re potest, et alio quovis indicio volun"tatis" (d) is the doctrine of the Roman Law; and upon it Grotius (e) remarks, " Sic si is qui rei alicujus est dominus, "sciens cum altero eam rem possidente tanquam cum domino "contrahat, jus suum remisisse merito habebitur: quod cur

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non et inter reges locum habeat, et populos liberos nihil "causæ est." And again: "Venit enim hoc non ex jure civili "sed ex jure naturali, quo quisque suum potest abdicare, et ex jure naturali præsumptione, qua voluisse quis creditur quod sufficienter significavit : quo sensu recte accipi potest quod Ulpianus dixit, juris gentium esse acceptila❝tionem " (f).

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Heineccius, in his Commentary on Grotius, expresses concisely the same doctrine: "inter gentes loco signi est pa"tientia scientia " (g).

It is indeed true that, according to Grotius, silence cannot be construed as an assent, unless it be "scientis et libere

(d) Dig. xxix. t. ii. 95.

(e) L. ii. c. iv. s. 4.

(f) Ib. Dig. xlvi. t. iv. 8.

(g) Prælect. 1. ii. c. iv. s. 4. See, too, Mably, Droit public, t. ii. pp. 21, 22.

"volentis; " but he adds that " temporis in utrumque magna "vis est ;" and in fact these conditions are presumed after the lapse of time (h).

CCLXXXVI. The practice of nations confirms this theory: they have frequently entered protests (i) in favour of their alleged rights upon the conclusion of Treaties in which these rights were expressly, or by implication, negatived. It is hardly necessary to add, that a nation, who is herself a party to such a Treaty, without making any protest, has unquestionably abandoned her rights. The Congress of Aix-laChapelle (1748) was the last in the eighteenth century at which these protests were made. Thus, the Pope has perpetually protested, from the Treaty of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna, against all Treaties recognizing or confirming the confiscation of Church property effected at or since the time of the Reformation (j).

(h) Grotius (de Jure Belli, 1. ii. c. iv. ss. 5, 6) says: "Sed ut ad derelictionem præsumendam valeat silentium duo requiruntur, ut silentium sit scientis, et ut sit libere volentis; nam non agere nescientis, caret effectu, et alia causa cum apparet, cessat conjectura voluntatis.

"Ut hæc igitur duo adfuisse censeantur, valent et aliæ conjecturæ : sed temporis in utrumque magna vis est. Nam primum fieri vix potest, ut multo tempore res ad aliquem pertinens non aliqua via ad ejus notitiam perveniat, cum multas ejus occasiones subministret tempus. Inter præsentes tamen minus temporis spatium ad hanc conjecturam sufficit, quam inter absentes, etiam seposita lege civili. Sic et incussus semel metus durare quidem nonnihil creditur, sed non perpetuo, cum tempus longum multas occasiones adversus metum sibi consulendi, per se, vel per alios suppeditet, etiam exeundo fines ejus qui metuitur, saltem ut protestatio de jure fiat, aut, quod potius est, ad judices aut arbitros provocetur." Κάτοχον καὶ βέβαιον τὴν κτῆσιν πεποιηκότος τοῦ χρόνου.—Dionys. Halicarn, c. ix. t. ii. p. 155.

Χρόνος γὰρ εὐμαρὴς θεός,

according to the remarkable expression of Sophocles (Electra, 179). (i) Mably, Droit public, t. i. pp. 104, 342; t. ii. pp. 43, 193.

De Rayneval, Instit. du Droit de la Nature et des Gens, 1. ii. c. ix. s. 2. (j) Koch, Hist. des Tr. t. i. p. 316.

Mably, t. i. p. 143; t. ii. pp. 50, 130-9, præsertim (for History of the Renunciation of France in the Treaties of Utrecht), p. 148.

Wheaton, Hist. p. 87.

In 1814 (k) the King of Saxony published an admirable protest against the dismemberment of his kingdom. And at the Congress of Vienna (1815) the Pope and Gustavus IV., ex-King of Sweden, delivered protests (7).

CCLXXXVII. This dereliction of property is, however, often not left, and where it is possible never should be left, to the inferences of legal presumption. The solemn renunciation of territory and of rights by a State is one of the most important subjects of both Public and International Jurisprudence. Memorable instances of their importance are to be found in the Treaties of Utrecht. In these Treaties the renunciations of the Emperor of Germany, the King of France, and the King of Spain established the separation of the Crowns of France and Spain as a fundamental rule of European International Law, and severed Belgium, Milan, and Naples from the Spanish monarchy.

The States or State interested in the renunciation must take care that it be ratified by the Constitutional Authorities of the renouncing kingdom. We may close this subject with the remark of Mably: "Tous les peuples sentent la nécessité "des renonciations pour établir entre eux la sûreté, l'ordre, "et la paix; ne doit-il pas être absurde de douter de leur "validité ?” (m).

CCLXXXVIII. Another mode of extinguishing dominion is, as we have seen, by voluntary transfer of the possession; but it is important to observe, that if a part of a territory be alienated, it carries with it to the new owner all the obligations and debts by which it was previously bound; here, as in most cases, the principle of the Roman Law being applicable" Id enim bonorum cujusque esse intelligitur quod "æri alieno superest "(n). When property has been granted

(k) Garden, Tr. de Dipl. t. iii. p. 205, contains the Protest at length. See, too, p. 146-the Mémoire raisonné.

(1) Koch, t. iii. p. 500.

(m) Droit public, t. ii. p. 140.

(n) Dig. xlix. t. xiv. 11; 1. t. xvi. 125.

under a condition which has not been fulfilled on the part of the grantee, then redit dominium ipso jure to the grantor. And in this case it appears consonant to justice that the property should be restored to the grantor with its intermediate fruits and revenues, and without the burdens or obligations imposed on it during its temporary ownership, there being, as Jurists say, a dominii resolutio ex tunc (0).

CCLXXXIX. The doctrine of Postliminium (p), in the case of States, is borrowed from the Roman Law, and belongs to the time of Peace as well as War, though properly and chiefly to the latter, where it will be further discussed.

The jus postliminii, in the sense in which it is now about to be used, means the right of being reinstated in property (q)

(o) "Amittimus etiam dominium, quod sub resolventi conditione acquisiveramus, si conditio impletur. Hoc autem duobis modis fieri potest. Aliquando enim ita resolvitur jus nostrum, ut res nunquam nostra fuisse videatur, tum onera ei a nobis imposita evanescunt, et res cum fructibus et omni causa restituenda est. Hæc rescissio accidit, quoties sub casuali conditione res nobis alienata fuerat, veluti si ager sub lege commissoria emptus, ob pretium non solutum inemptus sit. (Exempla extant in fr. iii. 8. iii. D. 18, 2 (de in diem addictio.); fr. iii. D. 20, 6 (quibus mod. pign. vel hyp. solv.), c. iv. C. 4, 54 (de pactis inter emt. et venditor.) Redit dominium ipso jure.) Aliis in causis revocatio dominii in præteritum trahenda non est; quo casu res sine fructibus, sed cum oneribus ei a nobis impositis restitui debet. (Exempl. in fr. iii. in f. D. 20, 6 (tit. cit.), fr. iii. D. 18, 6 (de rescind. vend.), c. 2, C. 4, 54 (tit. cit.), Dominium ipso jure non redit, sed tenemur ad rem veteri domino tradendam.) Hodierni illam dominii resolutionem ex tunc: hanc vero er nunc appellare consueverunt. Hæc maxime tum obtinet, cum res sub potestativa conditione nobis abalienata erat.”— Warnkönig, Instit. Jur. Rom. Privati, l. ii. c. ii. tit. viii. s. 378.

(p) Grotius, 1. iii. c. ix., De Postliminio.

"Dictum est autem postliminium a limine et pos'; unde eum, qui ab hostibus captus, in fines nostros postea pervenit, postliminio reversum recte dicimus. Nam limina sicut in domibus finem quendam faciunt. Sic et imperii finem limen esse veteres voluerunt. Hinc et limes dictus est, quasi finis quidam et terminus; ab eo postliminium dictum, quia eodem limine revertebatur, quo amissus fuerat."-Institut. 1. i. tit. xii. Quibus modis jus patriæ potestatis solvitur, s. 5.

Bynkershoek, Q. J. P. l. i. c. xvi., de Jure Postliminii varia.

(q) Grotius, 1. ii. c. x., de obligatione quæ ex dominio oritur; or, according to Barbey rac's most correct translation, "De l'obligation que le droit de propriété impose à autrui, par rapport au propriétaire."