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2119-2132. STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

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2113. As to the legality of imposing the District of Columbia gasoline tax on the sale of gasoline by the post exchange, Army War Collège, to members of the services, Held, That as to gasoline brought into the District of Columbia by the Government and sold by the post exchange for use in privately owned vehicles, the tax should be collected and disposed of as provided in section 14, act of April 23, 1924 (43 Stat. 109), but as to gasoline brought into the District of Columbia by an importer, who is required to pay the tax, the Government agency need not again pay it. 463.7, Feb. 15, 1928.

MOTOR VEHICLE

2114. An officer inquires whether he is subject to the personal property tax of the District of Columbia, under the act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat. 617), upon an automobile owned by him. It appears that at the time of this assessment the officer was a temporary resident of the District, where he lived for a period of more than three years during a tour of duty in the War Department. The existing laws with reference to taxation of personal property within the District of Columbia are found in the District of Columbia Deficiency Appropriation Act of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat, 552, 617-622), as amended by the act of April 28, 1904 (33 Stat. at. 563, 564); act of March 4, 1913 (37 Stat. 938, 1006); and the act of March 3, 1917 (39 Stat. 1004, 1046). Congress has provided, among other exemptions, that the following shall not be taxed: "Household and other belongings not held for sale and owned by any person in the public service temporarily residing in the District of Columbia who is a citizen of any State or Territory and who is taxed on such personal property in such State or Territory." Act of March 4, 1913 (37. Stat. 1006). An Army officer stationed in the District of Columbia is a person in the public service temporarily residing in the District of Columbia, within the meaning of this exemption, provided, of course, that he is not a legal resident in the sense that the District is in fact his actual domicile or permanent abode. If therefore the officer's residence in the District was merely a temporary one, that is to say, if during that interval he was still a citizen and legal resident of a State or Territory, and if, in addition,

his automobile was taxed in such State or Territory for a period falling within his temporary residence in the District, the automobile was not subject to taxation under the law of the District of Columbia; otherwise it was so subject to taxation. 012.313, June 11, 1921.

A later act with reference to taxation of personal property is act of February 18, 1929 (45 Stat. 1226).

PERSONAL PROPERTY

2115. An officer of the Army left the District of Columbia in January, 1923, after having paid only the first half of the taxes on tangible and intangible property assessed against him by the District for the fiscal year, and the question arose as to whether he was required by law to pay the second half of the taxes, which became payable May 1, 1923. Held, That the taxes in question, levied on July 1, 1922, became a liability from that date, notwithstanding that the time of payment was postponed, and that the officer should pay the balance of the taxes assessed against him for the fiscal year. 012.313, June 20, 1923.

Real estate and personal taxes, excepting the tax on motor vehicles, are, by section 5, act of February 18, 1929 (45 Stat. 1227), payable semiannually in September and March. Army officers on duty in Washington are persons in the public service temporarily residing in the District of Columbia and are, therefore, subject to the tangible personal property tax, provided that such a tax is not levied and collected upon their tangible personal property in their respective States or Territories of which they are citizens. (Dig. Op. J. A. G. 1912, p. 1021.) Confusion will be avoided if the marked distinction between the intangible and tangible personal property tax laws is borne in mind. 012.313, July 3, 1922. For liability to tax on intangible property, see section 4, act of February 18, 1929 (45 Stat. 1227).

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2116. An officers' club composed solely of Army officers and located on a military reservation, furnishes soft drinks to its members only. Such club is not exempt from Federal taxation and is liable to tax on club dues under section 801, act of February 24, 1919 (40 Stat. 1057, 1121). 012.2, Apr. 22, 1919. See section 413, Revenue Act of 1928 (45 Stat. 864), in pari materia with section 801, Revenue Act of 1919.

In an opinion of October 3, 1931, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue held that dues and fees paid by members of the Officers' Club, U. S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga, were not subject to the tax imposed by sec. 413, Revenue Act of 1928, supra.

TOBACCO

2117. Tobacco and tobacco products purchased by the Government for shipment to United States troops overseas and stored in bonded warehouses without affixing internal-revenue stamps thereon can not be sold to the public through

retail stores temporarily operated by the Quartermaster Corps unless the Government tax is paid and internal-revenue stamps affixed. It may be sold to manufacturers or jobbers, delivery to be conditional upon prepayment of tax and affixation of stamps, under direction of an authorized officer of the office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The Treasury Department can not lawfully transfer revenue stamps to the War Department without prepayment therefor, and no appropriation is available for the purchase of such stamps. 012.2, Dec. 12, 1919.

TARIFF

2118. It is asked whether Army supplies purchased in Canada (woolen blankets and clothing) are admissible free of duty. Held, That the customs act in force, as construed by the officers administering the same, requires all imports to pay the prescribed duties; that they are only admitted duty free where some Federal statute authorizes such admission; and that as to the supplies under consideration, there being no statute providing for their admission free of duty, the required duties must be paid, although the supplies are consigned to the proper officers of the Quartermaster Corps; and that if it is desired that such supplies be admitted free of duty, express legislation must be procured for that purpose. 90-313, Aug. 10, 1917.

After the execution of a contract binding the contractor to furnish the Government with table linen at a specified price, the duty on such cloth was raised by the Government. Held, That in the absence of specific provision in the contract, the officers of the Government can not modify the contract so as to allow a higher price to the contractor in order to meet an increased duty charge. 167, Nov. 12, 1918.

There is no provision of law authorizing waiver of remission of customs duties upon dutiable quartermaster stores. 012.412, July 24, 1919.

A bale of cotton rope was purchased in Canada by the Ordnance Department, and shipped to the ordnance officer, Fort Hamilton, N. Y., under authority contained in appropriation act of June 15, 1917 (40 Stat. 182, 198). No provision exists which exempts ordnance purchases made abroad under this act from payment of import duties, which are payable from the same appropriation as a part of the cost of the supplies. 012.412, Jan. 9, 1920. Similar provisions appear in current appropriation acts.

Since post exchanges are Government agencies or instrumentalities expressly recognized by Congress and designed to carry out a Government purpose, supplies imported by them would appear to be exempt from the payment of duties if similar supplies imported by the United States Government are exempt. However, the tariff act of 1922 (42 Stat. 858) did not exempt from tariff duties supplies imported by the United States Government. Held, That, in the absence of some statutory provision specifically exempting them from payment of duty, fourrageres are subject to duty in the same manner as if imported by private parties. 012.412, Sept. 25, 1923.

Nor is there such a provision as is above referred to in the tariff act of 1930 (46 Stat. 590).

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Secs.

STATE, COUNTY, AND MUNICIPAL

2119-2122. GASOLINE.

2123-2124. LICENSES AND FEES.

2125-2126. MOTOR VEHICLE.

2127-2129. PERSONAL PROPERTY,

2130-2132, REAL PROPERTY,

Secs.

GASOLINE

2119. SALE BY POST EXCHANGE. 2120-2122. SALE TO UNITED STATES.

SALE BY POST EXCHANGE

2119. The post exchange system was inaugurated, established, and is being maintained, with congressional sanction, to discharge governmental obligations in the lawful exercise of constitutional powers, and is a governmental agency. Being the means employed for the performance of Federal functions, purchases by it can not be legally subjected to State taxation. Further, State statutes do not have application to it when it is located upon lands acquired by the Federal Government in accordance with the provision of the Federal Constitution, because such lands have ceased to be a part of the State and have become Federal territory over which the Federal Government has complete and exclusive jurisdiction and power of legislation. Such lands being beyond and without the State, both in a jurisdictional and legal sense (though geographically within the borders of the State), commerce moving thereto or therefrom, from or to a State or Territory, constitutes interstate commerce and as such can not be subjected to other than Federal taxation or regulation. 463.7, Sept. 21, 1929.

SALE TO UNITED STATES

Secs.

2120. IN GENERAL,

2121. INCLUDED IN PURCHASE PRICE.

2122. SHIPMENT IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE.

IN GENERAL

2120. A State law imposing a tax on the sale and delivery of kerosene and gasoline would not be applicable to such commodities when owned or used by the Federal Government; a State law taxing such products could only affect the same prior to the transfer of title to the United States. If such commodities were purchased by private agencies, to be subsequently sold to the United States, the use to which they were to be ultimately devoted-that is, to be sold to the United States-as well as the motives prompting the purchase, would not relieve such property from State taxation, unless the agencies purchasing were Federal agencies, acting and purchasing as such. 012.31. Mar. 8, 1918.

INCLUDED IN PURCHASE PRICE

2121. It is asked whether the United States should pay the tax on gasoline levied under an act of the Kentucky Legislature of March 23, 1922.

It is firmly settled that a State may not tax the property, operations, or agencies of the United States. (McCullough v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. Bank, 9 Wheat, 738; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449.) Nevertheless, the privilege of engaging in the business of selling gasoline at retail in Kentucky is a matter, or subject, over which the sovereign power of that State extends, and is therefore an object of taxation. (McCullough v. Maryland, supra.) The payment of one cent on each gallon of gasoline sold, as provided in the act, is a direct tax imposed upon the business. If the tax should ultimately fall upon the United States, a voluntary purchaser and consumer, it would be paid not as a tax but as a part of the market price of the gasoline. 012.311, Oct. 24, 1922,

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