mend vice, or even virtue, to the rest of mankind, in so extraordinary a way, by one who shews he does not believe in the expediency of his own precepts, nor consequently in the divinity of his own miracles. But in case nothing of this kind is discovered, it will then be proper, in the third place, to give a more close attention to his performances themselves, to examine sharply whether they may not be done by concert and connivance; whether he uses any apparatus, or takes up any time in doing them, or exhibits only in certain places, and at appointed hours; whether they are of one or two particular kinds; whether he is as ready to do them. before men of sense, as among ignorant and superstitious people; and on sudden and accidental calls, as with previous warning; whether they are in themselves acts of real utility and beneficence, or only useless tricks; and lastly, whether they are really and truly so contrary to that part of nature, which we know by continual experience, that no power, but his who controls nature, could possibly have effected them. If his miracles are wrought in great abundance, and with great variety, and so freely and openly, as to give every one that pleases an opportunity of putting their genuineness to the test, and no signs of imposture are discovered; if he is not only harmless and innocent in all parts of his beha viour, but full of meekness, beneficence, and candour, omitting no opportunity of doing good, even to such as use him worst; we must conclude, that God is with him, and that we cannot slight or oppose him, without slighting or opposing God, who would never have seconded the preachings of any man with such transcendent power, if he had not thereby intended to give him credit with all mankind for whatsoever he shall inculcate in his name. But if, besides all this, it should so happen, that, seven or eight hundred years before, the miracles he works, together with the chief transactions of his life, should have been foretold in a prophecy still extant; and if the time and place of his appearance should have been also predicted in a prophecy near as old, and still also extant: nay, if it should appear by other prophecies then in being, that he had been promised, from time to time, during the space of near four thousand years; and, what is yet more, if he utters several very extraordinary prophecies himself, some of which most unex

pectedly take effect soon after, contrary to the endeavours of his powerful enemies to vilify him, by falsifying them; these predictions, joined with his miracles, must put our incredulity greatly to a stand, if not wholly overcome it. We should not indeed make a proper use of either of the rules laid down, should we retain any doubt concerning the divinity of his mission, or the truth of the religion he preaches. After standing so severe a trial, he hath a full right to our faith, and may challenge the utmost attention and veneration for what he says; especially, provided the matter of his doctrines shall appear to be, not only conformable to the essence of the original religion, but in itself useful, wise, and weighty; for we cannot suppose God should send one to teach us things of little significance, or such as we knew before, or such as neither required nor admitted any farther enforcements.

And this brings us to the consideration of the third sign or mark of divine original in a religion; namely, the edification of those to whom it is proposed. In order the more clearly to discern this sign, we ought candidly to consider, whether we stand in any need of instructions, or not; whether we are as wise and good as we could wish to be; and whether, in some particulars, relating to futurity, and reformation of manners, or to the terms of acceptance in the sight of God, our ignorance and uncertainty are not such as may make farther information necessary. It is requisite, on this occasion, that we should neither be too diffident of our own judgments in discerning the truth, or falsity, of a religion proposed; nor too confident of our sagacity in finding out the true religion, without assistance. However, there is greater danger of too much confidence; because the presumption against us is very high and strong, both from the natural short-sightedness of the human mind in things of this kind, and from the great abundance of the miracles, which he who takes upon him to teach us, performs. It is hard to suppose his instructions unnecessary, who awakes our attention, and demands our conviction, by works so far exceeding the power of nature.

Two things then are here carefully to be examined; first, our own understandings, that we may judge, whether, of ourselves, we know, or may know, enough of religious mat

ters, to make farther information needless; and secondly, in case we are sensible we do not, we are next to examine the instructions proposed, that we may see whether they come home to our wants, and are qualified to dispel that darkness we modestly lament in ourselves.

As to our own understandings, we must consider whether we brought any stock of religious knowledge into the world; what we could have afterward acquired independent of all instruction; and how much the rest of mankind could have taught us, if God had never, by revelation, taught them any thing. In order to make a right judgment in this matter, we are fairly to reflect on the doubts and uncertainties that puzzle our own reason, and the religious disputes about the object of worship, the nature of worship itself, and the duration of our own being; which have perplexed the world wherever either no revelation, or a very defective tradition of revelation, hath been received. Socrates and Plato were of opinion, this darkness of the human understanding, as to matters of so great moment, called for a revelation. Others think, on the contrary, either that it is no great loss to be ignorant in things of this kind, or else, that human reason, with no other assistance than what the works of creation afford it, may easily attain to a sufficient knowledge of religion. Which of these two opinions hath the best right to plead experience for its voucher, we must determine for ourselves, before we either receive, or reject, an instructor pretending to come from God. If we find ourselves sufficiently knowing, it will be an egregious folly to lend an ear to any man on the subject of religion; whether he takes upon him to speak from God, or his own discoveries. But if we judge ourselves deficient in religious knowledge, it will be our business to hear what he, who says he comes from God, hath to say, since he gives such proof of his mission, as we cannot convict of imposture. If what he tells us is no more than what we knew before, or is wide of our purpose, he may be a fit instructor for others, but can be of no service to us; and therefore we are to have nothing farther to do with him. But in case he tells us the very things we doubted of, clears up our ignorance as to the very points we were utterly at a loss in; for instance, teaches us how to think justly of God, and our duty to him; of ourselves, and our duty to one

another; of our chief good and happiness, and how to secure it; of our chief evil and misery, and how to escape it; if in this he appears to deal fairly by us, proving such things, as admit of it, by reason; and such as do not, by the authority of his miracles; and if for all his labours he seeks no other reward, no other gratification, than the dissipation of our doubts and errors, and the reformation of our manners; we must be lost to common sense and goodness, in case we refuse, or even hesitate our assent. Yet, after all, should he, in addressing himself to us, evidently appear to catch at our applause, or inveigle our assent, by rhetorical flourishes, and parading speeches, it ought greatly to stagger our opinion of his mission. We cannot easily suppose God would condescend to be served by arts like these; or that a message, from him, supported with real miracles, could need these aids, which imposture and fallacy have so long employed, that they are now qualified only to bring suspicion on the cause that retains them. On the other hand, there is some danger of taking the simplicity, wherewith the teacher may happen to deliver himself, for insignificance. To a false taste, that which is not high-seasoned, is apt to appear insipid. That we may not therefore be deceived either by him or ourselves, we are carefully to weigh the depth, the solidity, and the pertinence of its matter; and by no means either to admire him for the garniture, or despise him for the artless plainness of his elocution.

However, there is still another sign of divine original, which it concerns us not a little to have an eye to; and that is, the power and efficacy of his doctrines over the hearts of such as shall receive them. If God sends us a religion, it must not only be right and true; but of force sufficient to attain its end; namely, the happiness of mankind. The infinitely gracious Being cannot be supposed to give us a religion for any other end. Neither can the infinitely wise Being be supposed to give us a religion for that end, which contains not means equivalent thereunto. Now since our happiness cannot be provided for, but by the reformation of our manners, these means must be of sufficient strength to work this reformation; otherwise the religion that proposes them, must be unworthy both of the goodness and wisdom of the author it pretends to derive from.

To know how great the strength of these means should be, we must well consider the difficulty of the work they are applied to, and the delicacy of that work in beings morally free. As to its difficulty; he knows little of himself, of the corrupt nature, and inveterate habits, he hath to correct and subdue in a mind so irresolute, so inconstant, who is not thoroughly convinced, the means of his reformation must be very efficacious to be successful. A sensible man, who hath studied himself, sees plainly, that, unless he is very powerfully assisted, he cannot be thoroughly reclaimed. His many ineffectual anxieties on this subject, his baffled resolutions, attended with little else than continual falls, and shameful disappointments, serve sufficiently to teach him this lesson. of humility. He cannot help considering the lower half of his nature, as a vicious and refractory beast, that is not broken to the bridle without infinite skill and strength; nor the upper, as a raw and feeble rider, by no means equal to a task so arduous. Convinced of this, he must be satisfied, that none but he, who made him, is able to mend him; and that in the true religion only, the means of this amendment are to be hoped for.

And as to the delicacy of this work, in regard to his freedom, he cannot but be sensible, that means of prodigious efficacy may be used with him, before they amount to compulsion, or do more than counterbalance his bias to evil. He knows God will assist his virtue, not force his services; and therefore, in having recourse to religion, he looks for such assistance, at least, as may keep his corruptions at bay, and suspend him in a state of liberty.

Now this he hath reason to hope for, in a religion that calls God its author, and hath already given such proofs of its divinity. But if he reflects attentively on the matter, he will find there are but two conceivable ways whereby this may be effected; first, by the influence of the Divine Being, working on his thoughts; and secondly, by future rewards and punishments proposed to his desires and fears. God, he knows, is present everywhere; and can assist him, and all men, as he pleases. He knows also, that he alone can so proportion the assistance to the want, as to enable his creature to get the better of his irregular dispositions, without infringing on his freedom. And as to rewards and punish