then could not be required to answer interrogatories attached to the bill." Where no such waiver was made, the former rule then still prevailed; and the sworn statement by the defendant, in direct response to an allegation in the bill, was deemed to be true, unless contradicted by two witnesses or a single witness and corroborating circumstances.8 Under the new rules this doctrine has been applied. Such a waiver does not relieve the defendant from answering interrogatories subsequently propounded.10 Irresponsive allegations were not evidence,11 nor was the court bound by the construction placed in the answer upon facts that were therein pleaded.12 Such an answer was not evidence of new facts, set up by way of evidence of the allegations of the bill.18 Neither were allegations upon information and belief, nor allegations sworn to positively, concerning facts of which it was evident the respondent could have no personal knowledge.15 The admissions of the defendant are binding upon him; and unless he can obtain leave to amend his answer by withdrawing them, he cannot disprove them at the hearing.16 v. Mickle, 55 N. J. Eq. 567, 37 Atl. 738. 7 Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 130 Fed. 726; Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Carter, 148 Fed. 127. But where he undertook to answer, it was held, that he must answer fully. Ibid. 8 Clark's Ex'rs v. Van Riemsdyk, 9 Cranch, 153, 160, 3 L. ed. 688, 690; Union Bank of Georgetown v. Geary, 5 Pet. 99, 110, 8 L. ed. 60, 64; Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 580, 582, 24 L. ed. 179, 180; Vigel v. Hopp, 104 U. S. 441, 26 L. ed. 765; Slessinger v. Buckingham, 17 Fed. 454, 456; Kennedy v. Custer, C. C. A., 174 Fed. 972. See the Responsive Answer in Equity, considered as Evidence for the Defendant, by J. M. Gest, 52 Am. L. Reg. 5. 9 Wilcox v. El. Banco, C. C. A., 255 Fed. 442. But see Watts v. Crabb, C. C. A., 257 Fed. 717. 10 Luten v. Camp, 221 Fed. 424. Infra, § 348. 11 Pennsylvania Co. v. Cole, 132 Fed. 668. 12 Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Boyd, C. C. A., 177 Fed. 804. 13 Sargent v. Larned, 2 Curt. 340; Seitz v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 580, 24 L. ed. 179. 14 Berry v. Sawyer, 19 Fed. 286; Allen v. O'Donald, 28 Fed. 17; Earle v. Art L. Pub. Co., 95 Fed. 54. 15 Clark's Ex'rs v. Van Riemsdyk, 9 Cranch, 153, 161, 3 L. ed. 688, 690; Allen v. O'Donald, 28 Fed. 17. 16 Gold & S. O. S. Co. v. U. S. Dis. O. Co., 6 Blatchf. 207, 310. See Troy I. & N. Factory v. Corning, 6 Blatchf. 328, 336. Historical Pub. Co. v. Jones Bros. Pub. Co., C. C. A., 231 Fed. 638. An allegation that the patented machine had been used by the defendant be It was held that an admission of defendant's indebtedness to complainant in the amount named in the complaint was a waiver of an objection because of the omission of the complainant to allege that the claim had been reduced to judgment and execution returned unsatisfied.17 The defendant must answer every allegation in the bill which is material to the plaintiff's case, and an answer admitting which would not expose him to a penalty. forfeiture or criminal prosecution, or expose a privileged communication.18 A failure to answer an allegation, a discovery of which might incriminate defendant, might be a ground for taking that part of the bill as confessed by him.19 Under the chancery practice, the complainant was obliged to answer specifically and categorically, distinguishing between matters within his personal knowledge and those within his information and belief.20 He had then to answer not only as to all facts within his knowledge, but as to all which he could ascertain from an inspection of books and papers in his possession or under his control.21 He was also required to give a full answer con cerning any information that he could obtain upon the subject from persons in his employ.22 If he asserted ignorance as to any matter, he was required to aver that he was ignorant both of his own knowledge and as to information and belief.2 23 But if fore the application and that he was the inventor when not supported upon proof was held to be an admission of infringement. Reed v. Cropp Concrete Mach. Co., C. C. A., 225 Fed. 764. 17 Re Wm. S. Butler & Co., C. C. A., 207 Fed. 705. 18 Atwill v. Ferret, 2 Blatchf. 39, infra, §§ 348, 349; Boyd v. N. Y. & H. R. Co., 220 Fed. 174. Where in a suit to remove a cloud on title a defendant who has charged with having conspired with the others to create the cloud and he answered merely by disclaiming any interest, right or title in or to the lands, his disclaimer was stricken out because he had failed to answer as to the conspiracy charged. McDonald v. McDonald, 203 Fed. 724. See § 196, infra. 19 Webb v. Samuels, 227 Fed. 948. 20 Brooks v. Byam, 1 Story, 296; Kittredge V. Claremont Bank, 3 Story, 596; s. c., 1 W. & M. 244; Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Carter, 148 Fed. 127. It has been said that the defendant must answer not only as to all facts within his knowledge, but to all which he can ascertain from an inspection of books and papers in his possession or under his control. Davis v. Mapes, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 105. 21 Davis v. Mapes, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 105. 22 Rasbotham v. Shropshire Union Ry. Co., 24 Ch. D. 110. 23 Odger's Pleading, 4th ed. p. he denied knowledge and information he was not required to state his belief.24 He could not deny that he had knowledge as to a subject which the bill charged as a personal transaction in which he took part.25 This last rule, it has been said applies, as well as the others to officers of corporations.26 If new officers have succeeded those in office at the time when the matters charged are said to have occurred, it is their duty, when called upon for discovery, to ascertain the facts by searching the records of the corporation and by inquiry of their predecessors.27 It has been said that "a corporate answer should be made by the principal officer of the corporation, who should be able to admit or deny the facts charged and interrogated about, or to state want of knowledge clearly and truly as a reason for not doing it." 28 Where one or all of the officers of the corporation could not answer without self-incrimination, it was held that it was the duty of the corporation to select or provide an officer who would not be incriminated.29 It is insufficient to deny any "recollection or belief" as to a transaction in which the defendant is said to have been personally engaged.30 "The defendant in his answer must state the facts as they then are." 31 But where a bill charged that the 271. 24 Victor G. Bloede Co. v. Carter, 148 Fed. 127. 25 Burpee v. First Nat. Bank, 5 Biss. 405. In extraordinary cases, answers as to the defendants' remembrance have been allowed, even when there was no request for the remembrance upon the subject. Hall v. Bodily, 1 Vernon, 470; Carey v. Jones, 8 Ga. 516; Hall v. Wood, 1 Paige (N. Y.), 404; Story's Eq. Pl., 855. But see Talbot v. Sebree's Heirs, 31 Ky. 56. 26 Burpee v. First Nat. Bank, 5 Biss. 405; Kittredge v. Claremont Bank, 1 W. & M. 244. 27 Kittredge v. Claremont Bank, 1 W. & M. 244. 28 Wheeler, J., in Hale v. Continental L. Ins. Co., 16 Fed. 718, 719. 29 Simon v. Am. Tobacco Co., 192 Fed. 662. 30 Taylor v. Luther, 2 Sumner, 228. 31 Sir Thomas Plumer, V. C., in Knight v. Matthews, 1 Madd. 566. defendant would in future infringe a patent as he was charged to have done before, it was held insufficient for him to deny merely that he had done so since the trial of an action at law which established the complainant's rights.32 He should also answer as to his future intentions.33 The Equity Rules of 1912 merely provide that the defendant shall answer concerning his knowledge, and that when he is without knowledge he shall so state, such statement operating as a denial.34 A denial of two allegations conjunctively is not a denial of each 35 An admission in the disjunctive is binding.36 The statement that the respondent believes an allegation to be true is equivalent to an admission; 37 but the statement that he has no knowledge upon the subject seems to be equivalent to a denial,38 although, if full discovery be required, it is subject to exception for insufficiency.39 The denial 40 and the averment 41 of a conclusion of law, have no effect. A few of the earlier cases hold that a general traverse of the allegations concerning the citizenship and residence of the respective parties, do not raise an issue. 82 Poppenhusen v. N. Y. G. P. C. Co., 4 Blatchf. 185, s. c., 2 Fish. 74. 33 Poppenhusen v. N. Y. G. P. C. Co., 4 Blatchf. 185; s. C., 2 Fish. 74. 84 Eq. Rule 30. 35 Pierson v. Ryerson, 5 N. J. Eq. 196. 36 Adams Exp. Co. v. Adams, C. C. A., 159 Fed. 62. 37 There the plaintiff alleged that the defendant was a corporation organized under the laws of the State of New York, and the defendant, in its petition for removal and answer, alleged that it was "a corporation or joint stock company organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of New York.' 38 Brown v. Pierce, 7 Wall. 205, 212, 19 L. ed. 134, 136; Brooks v. Byam, 1 Story, 296. 39 Kittredge v. Claremont Bank, 1 W. & M. 244. 40 Union M. Ins. Co. v. Commer An averment that land cial M. M. Ins. Co., 2 Curt. 524; s. c. on appeal, as Commercial M. M. Ins. Co. v. Union M. Ins. Co., 19 How. 318, 319, 15 L. ed. 636, 637. Thus, when the bill alleged that the defendant executed and delivered a deed, a denial by the defendant of its delivery, accompanied by an admission that he made the deed and placed it upon record, is equivalent to an admission of its delivery. Adams v. Adams, 21 Wall. 185, 22 L. ed. 504. An admission that a deed bears a certain date does not estop the respondent from showing that it was fraudulently antedated. Holbrook v. Worcester Bank, 2 Curt. 244. 41 Klenk v. Byrne, 143 Fed. 1008, 1011. 42 Hill v. Walker, C. C. A., 167 Fed. 241; Bettes v. Brower, 184 Fed. 342. See supra, § 40, infra, $ 454. which is the subject of the suit was at the time of its commencement unoccupied is not denied by an affirmative allegation in the answer that defendants "are now in the quiet and peaceable possession" of the same. In a suit in equity, submitted on bill and answer, the complainant's title to real estate was deemed to be admitted by an answer in which the defendant pleaded an adverse claim of title, deraigned from a void judicial decree in a proceeding against the complainant to foreclose a lien for taxes, notwithstanding a denial of the complainant's title in the same In drawing such an answer, it is usual and often advantageous to interweave the discovery with a narrative of the transactions from the defendant's point of view in a continuous statement, so that it will be hard for the plaintiff to read as evidence the defendant's admissions without also reading the latter's own explanation and account of the controversy.45 § 175. Pleading defenses in answer. may now be pleaded.1 43 Klenk v. Byrne, 143 Fed. 1008. Where the holder of a tax title sued out a writ of possession from a State court, and, in a suit to set aside his deed as a cloud on title, filed a cross-bill praying possession, held that he thereby confessed that the possession was in complainant. Collier v. Goessling, C. C. A., 160 Fed. 604. Complainant in a suit to quiet title alleged the recovery of judgment in ejectment against defendant, and that plaintiff had been put in possession by the marshal on execution of a writ of possession. Defendant answered, denying that the marshal had executed the writ, and filed a cross-bill alleging possession since 1899, as also of a 20acre tract south and adjoining the land in controversy; that the marshal, in executing the writ of possession, removed defendant from such south 20-acre tract, and placed plaintiff's agent in possession thereof afterwards filing a return that Inconsistent defenses he had executed the writ by placing plaintiff's agent in possession of the land in controversy; but the cross-bill did not allege that the marshal did not in fact place plaintiff in possession of the land in controversy, nor was there any averment that defendant had paid taxes on such land. Held, that the crossbill was demurrable for failure to show that the writ of possession was not executed according to its return. Center v. Cady, C. C. A., 184 Fed. 605. 44 Klenk v. Byrne, 143 Fed. 1008. 45 It has been held that where the original answer intermingles objectionable and irrelevant matter with allegations that are good, so that the result of striking out what is objectionable would be to leave the remaining parts disjointed and not in good form, an entirely new answer must be filed. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Snellenburg, 152 Fed. 661. § 175. 1 Eq. Rule 30. This prac |