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proach against them. The public debt of a na- | which, from the manner of taking loans, and for tion was always a fair object of speculation, and other reasons, cannot in this country be so suc if, by a course of improvident conduct, we drive cessfully adopted. ourselves to the necessity of yielding to ruinous and unconscionable demands, the fault lies at our own door, and we ought to be made accountable to the nation for the result. Under such a system of management, it is impossible to say what prudent capitalist would trust us at all, or upon what, even tolerable, terms. But, suppose for a moment that all doubts of this sort were removed, what would be the inevitable effect of throwing into the market annually such an increased amount of public debt as this system must require? The same at least as glutting it with any other commodity beyond the natural rise and demand, and, from the delicate nature of public credit, probably much greater and more sensible. The result of it for only two years is briefly alluded to in the report of the committee, going on the supposition of an extraordinary expenditure of eleven millions a year. We must, if no additional resource be provided, raise by loan for the next year $17,560,000, and for the succeeding year, $18,220,000, exclusive of $1.570.000 annually for the reimbursement of the old debts agreeably to existing contract, making an average of nearly twenty millions annually. The effects of such an operation upon the price of public stocks, and the consequent terms of all future loans, must be abundantly manifest.

We are not (said Mr. B.) without some experience also on this point. He had been informed, from sources that he believed could be depended upon, that, owing to the difficulty of making remittances from Great Britain to this country by means of British manufactures, American merchants had been in the habit, during the last year, of purchasing American stocks which were owned in Great Britain, and remitting them to this country. The whole amount, however, did not probably exceed three millions. But, the effect of throwing only this unusual quantity into market had, he was assured, sunk the price of stocks, for a considerable part of the year, as much as four per cent. below their former price, and had at one time reduced them below par. They had in some measure recovered from this depression. But he perceived that, though it was now nearly at the close of a quarter, when they were usually a little higher than at other periods, they were now quoted in the price currents of the day as but barely at par; in one instance he had lately noticed they were stated as a little below. From this circumstance, then, we may perhaps judge something of the effect which may be produced by a sudden influx of new stock to the annual amount of twenty millions.

It is well known that the Government of Great Britain, with her immense mass of funded debt, does not venture to put into circulation at once a very large portion of new stock. It is there let out gradually, and as the state of the market will bear, through the medium of the bank, who act as the agents of the successful bidders of the loan, and support them in all their operations-a mode

It was not his disposition (Mr. B. said) to overrate the strength or wisdom of our adversary, much less to undervalue those of our own country. But we are about to engage in a solemn conflict with Great Britain, and it may be well for us to estimate accurately in the outset, not only her military and her naval strength, but what is of at least equal importance in modern warfare, her pecuniary and financial strength; for, to understand truly the full extent of the force which we may have to encounter, affords the only probable chance we have for overcoming it. We have been accustomed to consider the situation of British finances to be such that her Government must be on the very verge of bankruptcy. Perhaps it was so. With respect to her general paper system he did not pretend to be able to make any certain calculations. But, if we have not the wisdom or the firmness to raise even so large a portion of our current expenditures by adequate revenue as is now asked for by the Executive and by the committee, he would hazard the prediction that we should very shortly indeed advance much more rapidly in the road to national bankruptcy than Great Britain has as yet done, with all her follies and all her prodigality. How far, then, does she rely upon a mere system of loans and public credit for the supply of her annual expenditures? In the year 1808, her whole annual expenditure, including the sums applied to the redemption of her debt, was about seventy-five millions sterling, of which she raised within the year about fifty-eight millions by taxes, and about seventeen millions by loans.

The interest of her public debt was about twenty millions, and the amount of principal extinguished during the year was more than nine millions, being more than half of the whole amount borrowed, and leaving a net increase of debt of but about eight millions, or less than oneninth part of her whole expenditure. In 1811 the proportions raised by taxes and by loans were about the same. It may also be remarked, that on every new loan which was authorized by that Government of late years, they made it a prin ciple to provide funds from accruing revenue sufficient not only to pay the annual interest on the loan, but also to reimburse annually one per cent. on its principal. From these and other provis ions which had been adopted into her financial system, the Government was enabled to borrow money at a lower rate of interest than they had done twenty years since, notwithstanding the immense increase of their debt within that period. Great Britain as well knows the. extent and strength of our financial means as we do ourselves, and let us not, by a feeble, a ruinous, and a shortsighted system, teach her to despise us.

Much has been said out of this House, and considerable within it, though not in debate, upon the facility with which all our expenses might be defrayed, by some sort of paper system, called

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omitted. This can only be done by the early organization of a revenue commensurate to the preservation of our credit unimpaired.

must rely. If we provide a system of revenue this year, it will not come into the Treasury until the next; the question then was, not whether we should carry on the war one year upon loans; but whether we should postpone for this year the providing of revenue to the extent proposed by the committee, and rely for two years upon loans for the payment of all our extraordinary expenses -a greater portion of the ordinary ones, and the interest on our new and old debt. He hoped that such degree of improvidence would not be listened to.

Exchequer bills and Treasury notes; and it seemed to possess the minds of some gentlemen that this species of Government paper might be invested with a sort of magical effect, which But it may be said, that we can well enough would at once acquire unbounded credit, without carry on a war for one year upon our credit alone, danger of depreciation, although no particular and that it will be time enough after that to proprovision should be made for paying the interest vide additional revenues. It is probably forgotupon it, or for its ultimate redemption. It had ten that this is the very basis assumed by the indeed been casually mentioned by the Secretary committee, and on which we must proceed. For of the Treasury that such papers might occa- the expenses of this year we have already authorsionally be issued to a small but moderate ex-ized a loan of eleven millions, and upon that we tent; and it was evident that he did not calculate upon it as anything more than a small auxiliary aid to the principal revenue, and as something perhaps in anticipation of it, or to make good unexpected deficiencies. What is the nature of these Exchequer bills, and to what extent are the Government able to rely upon them, even in Great Britain, from which, it is presumed, our notions of them are taken? If gentlemen will give themselves the trouble to look into the subject, they will find that they are nothing more or less than a Government security bearing interest from the time they issue, circulated through the agency of the bank, usually funded like other public stocks at the end of the year or other short period, and the interest provided for and paid, leaving to the Government but little advantage over an ordinary loan. So great is the danger of this depreciation, and so cautiously are they resorted to there, that out of an annual expenditure of seventy or eighty millions they rarely venture to issue more than three or four millions of Exchequer bills. How small an aid, therefore, should we be able to derive from them, and at the same time preserve our and their credit.

Of all the other disastrous effects that might be apprehended from the worst events of a foreign war, Mr. B. said he should most deplore those which must result from a broken public credit, and a depreciated paper currency. Its operation upon the character of our Government, both at home and abroad, would be such as it would hardly recover from for a century to come. Upon the habits and morals of the country it would be most corrupting and disastrous, producing a state of general distrust, speculation, and fraud, the ruin of the honest and unsuspect*ing, and the enriching of the avaricious and unprincipled. The state of public securities during and after the Revolution afforded us some experience on this head; and could we again consent to see our public paper purchased up by a few sagacious and wealthy capitalists at one-eighth of its nominal value, and eventually redeemed, as it must be, at par? He said it must be, because if this paper should settle, as it would do, mostly in those sections of the country where money capital was the most abundant, and the Government should, after a peace, refuse to perform its engagement to the holders, it must produce a shock upon the Government, which all the artificial bonds of our national Union would be unable to resist. He trusted that, in order to provide against an occurrence of this nature, no means within our power would for a moment be

It had sometimes been whispered that our citizens might be found unwilling to hear of taxes even in prospect until they were fairly engaged in the war, and that then they would submit to them with cheerfulness. Mr. B. said, he much doubted whether war in itself, under any circumstances, was attended with so many alleviating considerations as to render altogether acceptable in fact that which it was supposed could not be tolerated by our citizens even in prospect. If the people will not bear the necessary taxes, it cannot with propriety be said that they will bear the contemplated war, and the sooner we know it the better. For his part, he could not reconcile it with his ideas of an honest and a fair policy to hold out any delusive expectations to the people. He wished them to look upon war as he looked upon it, and as it really was, a rugged and a thorny road, and not a primrose path of mere pastime and revelry. Let us not content ourselves with hobbling along upon the temporary expedients of the day, which must soon fail us, and with them the people themselves will desert us. Let us rather do our duty to ourselves and to the people, leaving it to them to do what they shall think theirs to us.

If then, (said Mr. B.,) the necessity of providing at this time additional revenue is apparent, at least to the extent proposed by the committee, the remaining question is, as to the sources from which it can most easily and conveniently be drawn. These, in this country, it is well known, are not numerous. Our internal moneyed capital is comparatively small; and those branches of industry and manufacture, which in most European countries are the sources of large revenues, are few and feeble. It has been the general endeavor of the committee to select such as promised to be the most productive in themselves, and as, in their judgment, he presumed, would bear with the most equality upon the different sections and interests of the country. Whether they had attained this object, was a question for the House to decide.

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He would say for himself, that, though he had fully assented to the general system recommended by the committee, he could not profess to be entirely satisfied with all the details and proportions of some of the duties proposed. One thing at least, be thought, might safely be affirmed in the general, that the interior or agricultural interest had no right to complain when they compared their burdens with those proposed to be laid upon the cities and the seaboard generally; and he had rather, for one, that some of them had been a little differently apportioned. He would very briefly notice them all in this point of view, and in relation to their local and sectional bearing.

The first was, the additional duty of impost. This being generally a tax upon consumption, was probably more equal upon the whole, in relation to its local bearings, than any other mode of raising money which we could resort to, which, added to the consideration of its more easy collection, had made it heretofore almost the only one on which we had relied, and would probably be so again on the return of peace. The great question, in relation to it, was the extent to which it could safely and practically be carried; and in this point of view he would notice it hereafter.

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The duties upon sales at auction, so far as it applied to goods and merchandise, could be considered in its operation as but an additional im post on foreign goods, falling pretty much upon the consumer. As it applied to the sale of ships and vessels, it would fall the most heavily on the mercantile sections of the country.

The duties on sugars refined, must from their nature fall upon the consumers in every part of the Union, and was perhaps as equal in its operation as any other existing duty.

The duty upon carriages must fall much the most heavily on the Atlantic States, both Northern, Middle, and Southern, at least as far as Virginia; but would be felt in a very inconsiderable degree by the Western States-he considered it comparatively as a pretty heavy one.

The stamp duties would in their operation be found to apply almost exclusively to banking and mercantile operations in the first instance; but, so far as they might have a tendency to raise the interest of money, would probably indirectly fall more or less upon almost every portion of the country.

The direct tax, upon whatever principles it might be laid and assessed, would, it was very The second object proposed, was the retention certain, be found to fall much the most heavily of twenty-five per cent. on the amount of draw-upon the agricultural, interior, and newly settled backs. This he considered might fairly be put down as a deduction from mercantile profit on that branch of our export trade, which consisted of re-exportations of foreign articles, and operating of course almost exclusively upon the commercial sections of the country. In time of war, the amount of that trade must be very inconsiderable, and the product of the duty of course small. The additional tonnage duty might appear at first view to fall also entirely on the mercantile part of the community; but would not it incorporate itself, in a great measure, with the freight, and like that fall eventually very much upon the consumer of the articles which were the subjects of freight? He apprehended it might.

The salt tax, it was evident, fell almost exclusively upon the agricultural part of the country, and principally upon that portion of them living in that section between the seaboard and the Western waters-the former, from their contiguity to the salt water, requiring the use of very little salt, and the latter being supplied from their interior manufactures.

portions of the Union-the aggregate wealth and the active disposable capital which could be spared for the purpose of contributing to the payment of any species of tax, being so much less than in the commercial and old settled States, a tax which was apportioned merely by numbers of inhabitants would undoubtedly be found much more difficult to pay. The alleviating considerations which had been suggested by the Secretary of the Treasury in regard to its actual operation upon the Western States, however, furnished a very great drawback upon their real weight; and those States had, he apprehended upon the whole, the least right of all others to complain of the combined operation of the whole system.

Mr. B. said, he had thus given briefly, imperfectly, and, perhaps, very incorrectly, such views as he had been able to form in relation to the general bearings of the system under consideration. He was sensible of his great incompetence to do justice to so extensive and complicated a subject. His impressions were given with real diffidence. and he should be happy to see his errors corrected by gentlemen of more experience and sagacity. He trusted that gentlemen who concurred in the necessity of raising at this time, in some way or other, the amount of revenue which had been proposed by the committee, would not be governed in their votes by mere local considerations, growing out of the unequal operation of any one species of tax upon their particular constituents; but that The tax upon retailers, including tavern- they would rather look to the combined operation keepers, he considered as likely to fall with much of the whole system, and with those enlarged the greatest weight upon the cities in the first views, by the aid of which alone we could explace, and generally upon the northern and mid-pect to come to a successful and practicable redle portions of the Union; though some gentlemen professed to view it otherwise, it was, in his view, compared with others, a very heavy one.

The duty upon stills would probably fall the most heavy, compared with any other species of tax, upon the Middle and Western States, who manufactured the greatest quantity of domestic spirits. It would be remarked, that it was extremely light, indeed, and calculated to raise but half of what was collected from the same object in the year 1800.

sult; and that if, after all, any member should feel it his duty to withhold his assent from any one or more of the proposed objects of taxation,

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that he would at the same time endeavor to point out some source equally productive and more just in its operation to which it might be thought ex pedient to resort.

Mr. B. said, he would now add but a few observations in relation to the first resolution more immediately under the consideration of the committee, and would then submit the whole subject to the good sense of the House, reserving only such explanations as might be called for on the other propositions submitted in the report.

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of the House of Representatives, for the time being, be, and they are hereby, authorized to grant the use of the books in the Library of Congress to the Judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, at the times, and on the same terms, conditions, and restrictions, as members of Congress are allowed to use said books.

The resolution was read twice, and ordered to be engrossed, and read the third time to-morrow. WAR TAXES.

The House again resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the report of the Committee of Ways and Means, proposing a plan to raise the and two succeeding years;" and, after some time revenue necessary for the service of the present spent therein, the Committee rose, and reported their agreement to the resolutions therein con

1. Resolved, That an addition of one hundred per centum be made to the several rates of permanent duties now imposed, by law, on all goods, wares, and merchandise, imported into the United States,

on all drawbacks allowed by law, on the exportation 2. Resolved, That twenty-five per centum be retainof goods, wares, and merchandise, exported from the United States.

3. Resolved, That additional tonnage duties be laid at the following rates, viz:

1. On all vessels licensed for the coasting trade or fisheries, twenty cents a ton per year.

As to the amount to which it might be found practicable or expedient to carry the present duties of impost, he had not that practical knowledge which enabled him to determine with any great degree of certainty, though he was persuaded that they might safely be carried much higher than they were at present, if the exigencies of the coun-tained, amended to read as follows: try required it. He found that on every former increase which had taken place, it had been said by many gentlemen that they were already as high as they would bear, without incurring the danger of smuggling, and the consequent diminued tion of the revenue expected from them; such, however, had in no instance, he believed, been the result. He then adverted to the various periods when such increase of duties had taken place, and stated, that from official documents it appeared not only that the actual revenue had increased proportionably, but that the articles them. selves upon which such increased duties had been laid, had also experienced a regular and progressive increase of importation. What was the highest point to which the duty could now be carried, it was impossible to say; practical men of great weight and respectability differed widely upon this question, and it could probably be conclusively settled only by experiment. The high authority of the Secretary of the Treasury was decided. ly in favor of the amount recommended by the committee. He should be happy, he said, to hear the opinions of experienced members on all sides domestic materials, at any distillery at which there are 2. On stills solely employed in distilling spirits from of the House on this point, having very little conone or more stills of more capacity, together, than one fidence in his own opinions; but he would move, hundred and fifty gallons, at the rate of fifty cents per under his present impressions, that the Commit-gallon, on the capacity of such stills. tee of the Whole should concur with the Committee of Ways and Means in the adoption of the first resolution.

2. On all other vessels owned by citizens of the United States, twenty-five cents per ton on the entry of the vessel.

3. On all foreign vessels, one dollar and twenty-five cents per ton on the entry of the vessel. 4. Resolved, That a duty of twenty cents per bushel be laid upon all salt imported into the United States. 5. Resolved, That duties be laid on licenses to distil spirits at the following rates, viz:

1. On stills employed in distilling spirits from foreign materials, at the rate of seventy-five cents per gallon, on the capacity of such stills.

3. On other stills, solely employed in distilling spirits from fruit, at the rate of five dollars on each still a

year.

4. On other stills, solely employed in distilling spirits from any domestic materials, at the rate of fifteen dollars on each still a year.

6. Resolved, That duties be laid on licenses to retailers of wines, spirits, and foreign merchandise, including tavern-keepers, at the following rates, namely: If in cities, towns, or villages, containing more than one hundred families,

1. On retailers of foreign merchandise, including wines and spirits, twenty-five dollars.

2. Ditto, of wines alone, twenty dollars.

3. Ditto, of spirits alone, twenty dollars.

4. Ditto, of domestic spirits alone, fifteen dollars. 5. Ditto, of foreign merchandise, other than wines and spirits, fifteen dollars.

If any other place than cities, towns, or villages, containing more than one hundred families,

1. On retailers of foreign merchandise, including wines and spirits, fifteen dollars.