aggressions upon SENATE. to the verdict of the national spirit and expectations. But it is now said, or intimated in substance, that this official responsible standard is only ostensible, and that the true standard for estimating the quantum of force demanded, must be derived from the decrepit state of the Treasury and the [financial fame of the gentleman at the head of that department. This subject will require a distinct consideration; but, in the meantime, it is sufficient to say, that the committee unanimously refused to be influenced by any considerations, but those resulting from the official responsible communication, and their own reflections upon the state of the nation as disclosed thereby. They unanimously rejected informal, inofficial communications. It thus appearing, said Mr. G., that the force demanded was for the purposes of war, if unfortunately we should be driven by Great Britain to that last resort; and that although the war would be undertaken upon principles strictly defensive, yet, in its operation, it must necessarily become offensive on our part; and that Congress was to determine exclusively upon the adequacy of the means for conducting it; he would now proceed to inquire more particularly, first, whether the committee had recommended a force more than adequate to the purposes of the war; and second, whether it was within the capacity of the United States to supply the force thus recommended. It will be observed, too, in the Message, the President, in his more specific recommendations, But, sir, the President does not stop here. He after designating the kinds of force suited to the tells us that notwithstanding our protracted mod- occasion, leaves the quantum of each to be judged eration, &c., &c., Great Britain, with hostile in- of and decided by Congress, where the responsiflexibility, perseveres in trampling on essential bility did and ought to rest; and he was unwillsovereign rights; rights at least," which no inde-ing, by receding from his Constitutional duty, to pendent nation can relinquish." Here then, it is revert this responsibility upon the Executive. evident, the President conceives, that our independence as a nation is brought into question, and put at hazard. Can any subject present a more awful and imperious call upon Congress to exert and apply the whole energies of the nation, than a question of independence? The plain English of all this communication, he understood to be, that all the inefficient measures, which have been adopted in relation to the belligerents for three years past, had not answered the expectations of their projectors; but, instead of the expected recession, had produced, on the part of Great Britain at least, inflexible hostility. This was a very natural result, and one which he had always anticipated, as was well known to this honorable body. But the Administration, having learnt wisdom by these feeble experiments, had Bow determined to change its course, and for the purpose of rendering this hostility more flexible, had at length resolved, instead of commercial restrictions, to try the effect of physical force. An adequate force is therefore demanded by the Executive, and the adequacy of the force is very properly referred to Congress, where the responsibility is placed by the Constitution, where it ought to rest; and, for one, he was willing to take his full share of it. But, sir, the President goes on further. After designating the objects, he points out the standard for ascertaining the adequacy of the force demanded for their effectuation. In his official responsible Message, he tells us that "Congress will feel the duty of putting the United States into an armor and an attitude demanded by the crisis, and corresponding with the national spirit and expectations." The standard here pointed out for calculating the quantum of force to be supplied is "the crisis," which had been previously described in the most solemn and imposing terms, and "the national spirit and expectations." Whether the committee had reported too great a force for subduing the crisis, he was willing to submit Mr. G. said, that in estimating the quantum of force demanded by the existing crisis, it appeared to him, gentlemen had not given sufficient consideration to the attitude assumed by the United States in relation to the Floridas-to the extension of our Southern and Western frontiers-to the late hostile acts and threatenings in that quarternor to the importance of Orleans, its exposed position and defenceless situation. These circumstances, however, entered deeply into the consideration of the committee, had induced it to conclude that the whole Military Establishment now authorized by law, if completed, would not be more than sufficient, perhaps insufficient, to answer the necessary objects of the Government in the scenes just described. It was, therefore, intended that the whole of that force should be left free to act therein, according to circumstances, and that the additional force now recommended should act exclusively in the northern and eastern portion of the Union. This force no gentleman will pretend can be too great for our objects in that quarter, in the event of war unaided by the existing establishment. Hence it was a matter of great surprise to him that the Western gentlemen should wish to diminish the number of men now proposed to be raised; because he believed SENATE. Additional Military Force. DECEMBER, 1811. that every man deducted from the proposed force, and important position, that 1,000 would not anwould take one from the force intended by the swer, with the precarious and accidental aid of committee to protect our Southern and Western the local militia; that 2,000 ought to be calculafrontiers. These gentlemen, he presumed, must ted on for that service; and if, with the aid of the be better judges than himself, how many of these local militia, they could protect New York against men they can generously spare from their own the force Great Britain might detach against that protection; but, for his part, he thought there city, they would perform their full share of the was not one to spare from these objects, and the toils and perils of the war. Two thousand men, committee were willing to give the whole of completely furnished with all the means of anthem that destination. noyance, possessed of all the skill that military With respect to the protection of New Orleans, science could afford, and impelled by all the subhe knew it was the expectation of the late Ad-ordination and management that military disciministration, that in the event of war, Great Brit-pline could impose, with the aid of the local miliain would possess herself of that city; and it was not their intention to incur the expense of being constantly prepared to repel the first incursions of the enemy-he did not know the intention of the present Administration in that respect, but presumed it was acting on the same policy. In case the British should take possession of Orleans, the Western people must necessarily be called upon to drive them out, and he doubted very much whether it would be either a very acceptable occupation or a very easy task. He had always disapproved of this policy, and in the event of war, he thought it wise, not only to be prepared for defence at all points, but to give the first blow. He believed, in the end, it would be found not only the wisest, but the most economical policy, both in blood and treasure. Having presented to the Senate the objects to which the existing Military Establishment ought to be assigned, according to the views of the committee, he would proceed to inquire, whether the additional force recommended would be more than competent to the objects to which it must necessarily be assigned, and which ought unquestionably to be effected by it. In case of war, an event he deprecated as much as any gentleman present, the new army would have to man your fortifications on the seaboard, from Norfolk to the extremities of our territory, North and East, and to occupy Canada. These are the contemplated and indispensable objects of this army, in the estimation of the Executive and the honorable mover, as well as of the committee. The question will, therefore, turn upon the accuracy and correctness of their respective calculations as to the quantum of force necessary to effect these objects. Mr. G. said he had a conversation with the Secretary for the Department of War, in his character of chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations, in which the Secretary did endeavor to demonstrate to him, that a smaller number of men than 25,000 would answer these objects; but so far from producing this conviction, it satisfied him that the number was too small. He thought that every inference drawn by the honorable Secretary ought to have been inverted. For instance, he was asked, how many men were indispensably necessary to man the fortifications at New York? The honorable Secretary replied 2,000; but he intended to make 1,000 answer, and would rely for the rest of the complement on the local militia. Now, Mr. G. said, he inferred, if 2,000 men were necessary for that most exposed tia also, would deserve well of their country if they should preserve New York from the grasp of Great Britain, in case she should think proper to direct the force she might have at command against that city. Then why send one thousand on a service, when we know that two thousand are necessary, and perhaps incompetent? Is it because the United States have not the capacity to send 2,000? That question shall be examined presently. The same observations will apply to the protection of Rhode Island, where 2,000 more will be necessary; and 1,000 will be as few as can possibly be detached for the other fortifications. Admitting then 5,000 men to be necessary to man the various fortifications on the seaboard, and supposing every man to be raised, as proposed in the bill, there will be a disposable force of only 20,000 men for the occupation of Canada. But upon the Executive project there would be left for that service only 5,000 men; unless indeed the Western and Southern frontiers should be left unprotected, or the fortifications on the seaboard should be only half manned, and of course left to the sport of the enemy. Mr. G. said he apprehended that, in the first onset of the war, Great Britain would direct her force to the occupation of New York and New Orleans; and if she should possess herself of those two points, he would venture to predict that the Administration which commenced the war would not finish it; especially under a system of policy, which would only furnish one half of the means deemed necessary for their protection-yes, sir, known to be inadequate at the time of applying it. What apology could be made to an injured nation under such circumstances? We knew 2,000 men to be necessary for the defence of New York; but we sagely determined to apply 1,000 only to that object, for fear of incurring the expense of the requisite numher. This would be self-condemnation. The people would lose all confidence in such calculators, and would certainly make the experiment of a change. Under such circumstances, Mr. G. said he would be the first to cry out for a change of Administration, for it would not be possible to lose by it. Defend New York with all the judgment and skill you can command; fill the fortifications with the full complement of troops amply provided, call in the local militia, &c., and he should not be surprised if the British should get possession of that city. But then there would be no blame on the Administration; all its duties will have been performed; and the result would rest upon the fortune of war; but a single act of neglect or misconduct would certainly deprive the Administration of the public confidence. If, sir, Great Britain should get possession of New York and New Orleans, and you should get possession of Canada, you would be very glad to make the exchange upon the termination of the war. Therefore, take care of these two points. Mr. G. said, he also requested the honorable Secretary to consult with the President, and inform him, as the President's Secretary, whether the President wished to have the number of men reduced? or whether he had a preference for any other number? The reply, after the consultation, very properly, was, that the President had no opinion to offer on that point. He considered it a subject of legislative discretion, &c. Of course any informal Executive views ought not to be substituted for our own discretion and responsibility. Mr. G. said, he knew it had been suggested, and perhaps from very high authority, that nothing was necessary to induce Great Britain to recede from her aggressions, but to convince her, that, instead of opposing to them inefficient commercial resrictions, they would be resisted with physical force; and that raising ten thousand men would produce this conviction, without incurring further expense. This suggestion furnished some of his strongest objections to limiting the force to be raised to ten thousand men. So far from producing that conviction on the British Cabinet, he was convinced it would produce precisely the opposite effect. The British Cabinet would look at the means provided for effecting the object, as the best evidence of the object itself. And as these means would be viewed so utterly inadequate to the purposes of war, the Cabinet would necessarily conclude that we were not in earnest, that we were joking, even upon the most serious subject; that war was not intended, and would not be resorted to under any circumstances. This impression, the necessary result of our former measures, has become so general, both at home and abroad, that we have much to do to retrieve our lost reputation; we do not stand upon original ground. Our measures must be of a very different character from what they have been to produce the desired conviction, either at home or abroad. Having changed our principle of action, from commercial restrictions to physical force, limiting that force to ten thousand men would be, in his judgment, as much trifling with the energies of the nation, as inefficient commercial restrictions had heretofore been trifling with the character and interests of the nation, and he feared was, dictated by the same unfortunate imbecile spirit and policy. Mr. G. said, that whilst upon this part of the subject, he begged to be excused for reading a few paragraphs from a newspaper, which he accidentally picked up last evening, containing the annunciation of the President's Message at Quebec, the very point to which the proposed force might probably be directed. fully demonstrates the impressions existing there, and which have been produced by our former measures. SENATE. "QUEBEC, November 18. "President's Message.--Happily the expectation of Mr. Madison's speech steps in opportunely, as something of an antidote to the effect of the European dearth. From that speech shall we learn that the terrible being, John Bull, does not suffer his thousand armed vessels, manned and equipped at an enormous expense, to lie wholly idle; but that they are guilty of the audacious tyranny of being, in some degree, a check on the violent inclinations of Dame Columbia to extend her arms to cherish, aid, and assist her admired hero, Napoleon, in effecting John's annihilation. Much Ocean is not powerful to no purpose, and does not dewill the speech complain that the Sovereign of the scend to, and put himself on a level with the imbecility of the United States, with their dozen ships. Unpardonable is the grievance that the Leviathan is not as powerless as the Cod: that the Jackall, whom nature meant for the Lion's provider, is not permitted to divert its provender to the support of the Tiger, with a view to the destruction of the Lion. 1 "The speech may not say these things in direct terms; but such will, unquestionably, be its meaning: "With syllogisms 'twill make a clatter, With abstract rights three-deckers batter; An empty purse at millions shake, And no trade 'gainst a free trade stake: Of rotting produce count the gain, A seaboard boast shut from the main; To seamen recommend the loom, And on each mast to fix the broom; Merchants, for lack of foreign wares, To retail apples, plums, and pears." Limit all your mighty efforts to ten thousand men, and it will afford a better subject for another pasquinade, than the President's Message had done for the one just read. He should not have ventured to read these paragraphs to the Senate, however, if these impressions were merely local. But he believed similar impressions pervaded Europe and America, and had unfortunately found their way into the French and British Cabinets. Nor should he have thought these sarcasms worth regard, were it not for the truisms with which they were pointed. When the Duc de Cadore, upon his review of our proceedings, told us officially that he would have expected more from a Jamaica Assembly, he thought it both impertinent and insolent; but the point of the offence was a consciousness that it was too much like the truth. It is a truism which forms the sting of every sarcasm. We find the Emperor Napoleon, too, acting under these same impressions, when he seizes and confiscates your property, without even a plausible pretext. The only ground upon which he acted, was a conviction that you would not resent it, and he, therefore, might plunder with impunity. The same impressions direct the British Cabinet in its “inflexible hostility," and its war upon our commerce, both in character and effect, "brought home to the threshold of our territory." If our protracted moderation, wonderful moderation, It&c., by which he presumed were meant our feeble contrivances for the last three years, and of which, he feared, the requisition of ten thou sand men was a breach, both in spirit and policy, should still be continued, he believed it would degenerate into something of a very different character, and would receive a very different denomination from the public. DECEMBER, 1811. tions, not of Great Britain. Great Britain has had her share of the spoils also. Let us then not undervalue our enemy. Sir, this project of limiting our efforts to ten thousand men, seems to be too much upon the plan of a scarecrow, and it appears to be regarded in that light by some gentlemen. He said Great Britain was the last nation on earth, that he would undertake to frighten with scarecrows; besides, even upon the scarecrow plan, he should suppose that twenty-five thousand men would be better than ten thousand. Mr. G. said he disliked this proforcibly impressed upon his mind. It must ject extremely, from another consideration, which evidently have been recommended by that same spirit and policy which had heretofore relied upon the chapter of accidents for success, and not upon our own energies and resources. It seems to have been founded on the hope that Great Britain would recede without an effort on our part. It is a fallacious hope. The hope itself will always defeat its own object, by avoiding the means to insure its own success. Mr. G. begged the Senate to turn its attention to the means of resistance now actually in Canada, which would probably be opposed to the contemplated force. From the best information he could obtain, the British had at this time in Canada from seven to ten thousand regular troops, and from twelve to fifteen thousand well appointed, well furnished militia, drawn from a population of nearly three hundred thousand souls.it therefore, your troops could be ready to act in the Spring before the breaking up of the ice, and before the British could throw further succors into that country, it appeared to him there would be very good employment for twenty thousand men in subduing this force and population; and, if undertaken with fewer men, a failure of the enterprise would probably be the consequence. Besides, sir, we should recollect that Great Britain is the same Great Britain we encountered in 1775, 1776, &c.; and although some gentlemen seemed to suppose that she was fully occupied with her European war; that she was impoverished, fighting for her existence, &c., and of course had at command very little disposable force, he viewed the subject very differently. Mr. G. said we had enjoyed a long course of prosperity, but we ought not to calculate upon perpetual exemption from the common calamities of nations. When days of adversity shall arrive, we should meet them with becoming fortitude and energy. He deprecated that spirit which appeared to be longing and whining after prosperity that is passed, as if it feared to look adversity in the face. Mr. President, when adversity comes, you must look her in the face; yes, sir, you must stare her out of countenance; you must meet her with courage, and with means sufficient to subdue her. Mr. President, if after we have been solemnly called together to receive communications of great and weighty matters, and after our meeting have been told that our independence is It is true Great Britain is engaged with a formidable enemy; but hitherto she has greatly the advantage in the war. Where has she lost one inch of territory? What acquisitions of territory and population has she not made, both in the East and West Indies? What obstacles is she now opposing to the occupation of the Southern Peninsula by her enemy? So far from her population being diminished at home, it appeared to be greatly increased by the last census, notwith-at standing all the distresses and starvations we have heard of, &c. Count the number of French and English prisoners, and you will find that Great Britain had the advantage of perhaps ten to one. Her fleet is unrivalled; of course left more free to act than at any time during the Revolutionary war. He, therefore, concluded that we should have to contend now with the same Great Britain we did then, with renovated powers and resources. Yet to this Power it is proposed to oppose only ten thousand additional troops. Mr. G. said it was uncertain how long Great Britain might keep her army upon the Peninsula; but whenever it shall be withdrawn, either by choice or necessity, she will have a formidable disposable force in numbers, skill, and bravery; and whether she withdraws that army or not, you will find that she will command a respectable force for the protection of Canada, if you wait for the breaking up of the ice, which now envelopes all the avenues of that country. Time, therefore, is all-important, and not a moment for preparations ought to be lost. hazard, that there is actual war, both in character and effect, upon our lawful commerce, brought home to the threshold of our territory; that rights are trampled upon, which no independent nation can relinquish, &c.; when, in short, our wrongs are painted in such glowing terms, as to have set the whole nation on fire-if, after all this, we should taper down to providing ten thousand men to subdue such a crisis, would it not be a wonderful discovery in the art of sinking? Would it not undervalue the resources and energies of the nation? Would it not insult and deceive the national spirit and expectations? Whether he viewed this subject in reference to the interests of the nation, or the party in power, he should equally protest against this little miserable policy of resorting to means so utterly incompetent to the objects. He cautioned the party in power now, as he often had done before, against longer sporting with the national sensibility, the national character, and the national interests. Mr. G. said, in making the calculations of the degree of force required, the committee was precluded from taking into the estimate any auxiliary France, it is true, has astonishingly aggran- force to be derived from the militia; because an dized herself during the existing war in Europe; impression appeared to be almost universally enbut it has been done at the expense of other na-tertained, that Congress could not constitutionally DECEMBER, 1811. Additional Military Force. SENATE. curred with the other experienced military gentlemen in these respects. Mr. G. said, upon an impartial view of all the considerations he had the honor to suggest, he thought it was demonstrated, that the force proposed was not more than competent to the objects of the Government; and that a smaller number would correspond neither with the national spirit nor expectations. He would therefore proceed to consider, whether the number proposed exceeded the national capacity to furnish. command the services of the militia beyond the limits of the United States; of course, the regular force must be proportionally augmented. He said, although he believed he stood single and alone, he protested against this doctrine. He did not propose now to examine this question, because it would be useless. He would, however, read the clause of the Constitution, which gave to Congress the power of calling forth the militia, and make one or two remarks on it. Congress shall have power "to provide for calling forth the militia, to execute the laws of the Union, to sup- It will appear, said Mr. G., from the census press insurrections, and repel invasions." The lately taken, that the population of the United first object for which the militia may be called States is perhaps not less than seven and an half forth, is to execute the laws of the Union. A millions of souls. Now, sir, this must be a populaw declaring war, is a law of the Union; and if lation of a most extraordinary character, and unthe war is to be carried on beyond the limits of der the influence of a government of a most exthe United States, it is still a law to be executed, traordinary organization, if it cannot command although beyond the limits of the United States; the services of thirty five thousand men, upon the and he could see no reason why the militia could most extraordinary exigencies. But we are not not be called forth to execute it. Indeed, it is one without a memorable experiment upon the popuof those laws to the execution of which force is in-lation and Government of the United States, at dispensably and properly applicable; and if the a former period. In 1775, 1776, we commenced laws can have a legitimate influence beyond the the Revolutionary war with Great Britain, with limits of the United States, the power of Congress a population very little, if at all, exceeding two over the militia must be co-extensive with the millions of souls.* Let us see the number of laws, which are thus required to be executed. He regular troops,, not merely voted, but actually would only observe further, that when this sub-brought into the field, and paid for their services ject was more particularly brought into discussion upon a former occasion, it was said, that even in Great Britain, the militia could not be ordered out of Great Britain; no, not even to Ireland. But it should now be recollected, that since that time, the British Parliament, without even a question as to the right, has ordered British militia to Ireland, and Trish militia to Great Britain. Twenty-six regiments are said to be transposed at this time.. during the whole of that war. They are as follow: Total in pay, in 1775, 27,443; in 1776, 46.891; in 1777, 34,820; 1779, 27,699; 1780, 21,015; 1781, 13,292; 1782, 14,256; 1783, 13,476. These are the regular troops actually in pay, exclusive of militia. In making this comparative estimate, he was willing, in these degenerate days, to give two, nay, three for one, over the population of 1775 and 1776; and it would appear, that the committee had not drawn upon the existing population beyond moderation. With a double, nay threefold popu sources; with a capacity for furnishing munitions of war above one hundred fold, the committee proposed to draw upon the existing population for thirty-five thousand regular troops in the whole. In 1776 there were actually in the field and paid, forty-six thousand eight hundred and ninety-one regular troops, exclusive of militia. Great Britain, with a population of but little more than double that of the United States; laboring too under a debt of more than seven hundred millions of pounds sterling, has, at this time, in her land and naval service, perhaps, three hundred thousand men; yet an alarm seems to be produced here by a proposition to call into the service of the United States thirty-five thousand men. This too for repelling the aggressions of the same Great Britain we encountered in 1775 and 1776; and for the same cause. Yes, sir; it is as much a question of independence now, as it was then. It was then a question, whether Great Britain should impose a tax of Mr. G. said, that in considering the peculiar geographical situation of the United States, with colonies at each end of them, belonging to pow-lation; with more than quadrupled pecuniary reerful distant nations, with which we may be often brought into collision, it would be unfortunate for the United States if the militia bordering on the lines of separation could not be called forth for any purpose of chastisement, or any other object the Government might have in view, in relation to those colonies or their respective mother countries. If such be the unfortunate organization or interpretation of the Constitution, an amendment for remedying so important a defect ought to be instantly proposed and adopted. Its inconvenience is now sensibly felt, in precluding all reliance upon that important auxiliary force. Gentlemen, however, purpose to remedy this defect, by a volunteer force. Mr. G said, he would not reject, nor did he mean to disparage, this species of force. But, from the nature of its organization, it cannot be suited to offensive war, nor to the occupation of a country after it should be taken. He had been told too, by military gentlemen, without exception, that it was always found to be the most expensive and least efficient force. He hardly expected to have heard it relied * Population of the United States, at four several upon for the contemplated object, by the honor- periods, viz: 1780, 2,051,000; 1790, 3,929,326; 1800, able mover, because he thought gentlemen con- | 5,308,666; 1810, 7,239,903. |