JANUARY, 1812.

and temper of those times, and he had taken oc- Mr. S. then proceeded to draw his parallel becasion to state that like bills, and treason bills,tween the crisis which produced the quasi war too, were to be expected in the train of the many in 1798, with France, and the crisis which is evils to grow out of the present proposed war. now to carry us into a war with Great Britain; He had not intended to say that a treason bill and declared that he could not, in his conscience, ought not to pass, if we commence the war. | believe the ground and causes of the present war Once involved in that state of things, it would not were equal, in either magnitude or character, to be expected that our own citizens would be al- those of the former period. He would again, he lowed to supply and cherish the enemy with im- said, beg leave to read, and bring to the view of punity. the House one or two of the many outrageous decrees, or arrets, of that Government in 1798. "The character of vessels," say they, "in what concerns their quality as neutral or enemy, shall be decided by their cargo; in consequence, every vessel found at sea, laden in whole or in part with merchandise, coming from England or her possessions, shall be declared good prize, whoever may be the proprietor of those productions, or merchandise." Under edicts of this kind, for there were others of a similar character, the French cruisers carried on a system of plunder and depredation, surpassing, to an immense amount, anything we have experienced since from the British, or any other, Orders of Council. If it were otherwise, how comes it to pass that we are not shown to the contrary, and convinced of our errors? The best answer is, it cannot be shown. Let it appear when it would, the amount of our injuries, at that period and the present, would bear but a poor comparison.

His colleague (Mr. MACON) had argued, that no one apprehended invasion from France in the years 1798 and 1799, and therefore the armies then authorized were not to have been justified. This position could only be correct as it respected the Republican minority. They, doubtless, did not believe it; but the Government avowed their fears, and justified themselves in raising a regu lar army of only ten thousand men as a due precaution against such an event. As the majority, they were responsible for the security of the country, and no one had a right to say what they did or did not believe. Though we, who were the minority, an army-opposing minority, were without any such fears or belief, how stood the facts? Our then Envoys to France, in their despatches to the Government, which are now on the files of the House, communicated conversations they had held with the underling agents of Talleyrand, which, under existing circumstances, went fully to authorize such apprehensions. But, still, to show the more aggravated characAbout this time, too, it was known that one of ter of the former crisis, he would beg leave to the finest armies that ever had been raised in read another of those French decrees, having refFrance, had been sent upon some distant expedi-erence to our seamen only. It declares, "every tion, and no one knew where, for a considerable person, native of friendly countries, allied to the time. It was at length ascertained that it had French Republic, or neutral, holding a commisgone to Egypt with Bonaparte at their head.sion, given by the enemies of France, or making But whether Federal distrusts and apprehensions, C part of the crews of the vessels of war, or other

ject.*

as to what the Government of France intended, enemy vessels, shall, for that act alone, be deor their agents might menace, were such as theyclared a pirate, and treated as such, without beprofessed, or not, it was not for him to say. Buting allowed, in any case, to allege he was forced he stood prepared to repeat what he had stated by violence, menaces, or otherwise." on the previous day, and could prove it, if neces- Mr. S. said, thus, while the British take our sary, upon the most unquestioned authority-au- sailors to make sailors of them, the French deterthority entitled to the fullest Republican cred- mine to take them and hang them; but whether ence, he would state-that the French Directory this decree of the Republic had ever been put in did meditate sending a force to this country at that execution or not, he had no recollection or knowl time. He had stated what he did state deliber edge, but it would, nevertheless, hold out the exately, and had nothing to retract, on the sub-treme career of folly and madness, into which that Government had gone at that time; and how tory. The two latter gentlemen made particular inquiry respecting the disposition of the Republican party to receive the assistance of France. To such insin uations he uniformly declared that, however attached the citizens of the United States were to France, they were only so, as far as the Government of France acted with justice, and consistent with the principles of her Revolution, that, should she lose sight of these, and not only continue her depredations on our commerce, but should violate the territory of the United States, every citizen of our country would become her enemy; that the same spirit of independence, which influenced the citizens of the United States to oppose the armies of Britain in 1775, would engage them at all times to oppose the hostile attack of any other Government on

We are informed that Doctor Logan is the authority above alluded to. The occasion of his visit to France at that time, and his interviews with that Government, and the characters near it, (says our informant,) make him the best authority for such a piece of information. He affirms the observation to be correct, "that the French Directory in 1798 were not without some views of sending a military force to the United States, not with any intention of conquest, but as in Holland, in case of certain events, to support a party they considered devoted to the interest of France. The impression made on his mind at the time, resulted from conversation with the Marquis Lafayette, at Hamburg; with Mr. Schimmelpennick, the Batavian Minister at Paris; and with Mr. Merlin, the best informed, most active and influential member of the Executive Direc- earth."

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own merchants for spoliations her cruisers had committed upon them. This sum was now known not to have been sufficient, and that her spoliations had far exceeded that amount. He would ask gentlemen to show that, under the Orders in Council, half that amount had been seized and condemned. It was not enough to say that the principle was the same, whether one or fifty vessels had been unjustly captured and condemnedthat would not be denied. A single act of wanton, wilful injustice on the part of a nation, might be justified as a good cause of war, as in the case of the attack on the Chesapeake; yet the policy of such a war, on the part of the United States, might be questioned. and, in that case, was not justified under Mr. Jefferson, although a case of insult, which was superadded to the very wrongs for which we are now to go to war. Under the greater wrongs and insults we are taught to forbear-the true "policy of the United States forbidding a war of aggression"-under the lesser, we are to fight for our honor, according to the new policy?

the act suspending commercial intereourse with France, as having had the effect to reduce the price of tobacco, a principal staple of the State, from ten to three dollars; to procure also a reduction of the Army; prevent an augmentation of the Navy, and to effect a proportionate reduction of the taxes. These views were all seconded in Kentucky, and the doctrines of peace carried farther, perhaps, than Virginia herself had carried them. The zeal and the talents with which she enforced her opposition to the measures of the day could scarely have been surpassed upon any occasion. It is certain the celebrated resolutions of that State against the alien and sedition laws, were couched in language more strong and decided than appeared from any other quarter. As to these things, Mr. Speaker, said Mr. S.. yourself, and other gentlemen from the State would be able to bear witness.* But while these things were passing in these two solitary Republican States, as then they used to be termed, what part was the minority in Congress acting? They were all alive to the peace, and, as they believed, to the true and permanent interest of the nation, and at a moment when a declaration of war was expected from the majority; they preoccupied the floor, and laid a resolution on the table, in these words: "Resolved, That it is inexpedient to resort to war with the French Re-cient cause of war, under General Washington, public." This, too, was accompanied with ano- when it commenced, nor under Mr. Adams, nor ther, requesting the President to institute a new under Mr. Jefferson, when carried to its greatest mission to France. The cry was then, as it is extreme. Mr. S. then turned to the last report now, that this was the doctrine of " submission," upon the subject, made in April, 1810, where it and "non-resistance," that it would be crouching appeared nine hundred and three was the amount to our enemy, which the honor and independence of the returns, of which "two hundred and eighof the country forbade. Mr. Adams, however, did ty-seven had been discharged on application, thircommission the other Envoys to France. They ty were duplicates, thirty-four had voluntarily enwere received, and succeeded to form a treaty. tered," and, among the rest. some were found And the great, solid, and permanent, interest of" totally ignorant of the United States;" some the United States prevailed over what was then deemed the bubble idea of honor, and had not been since called up to assume a serious aspect until the present time.

The abuses we have suffered under the British system of impressment, said Mr. S., was a just source of complaint, and a grievance seriously to be regretted by every feeling American; but, under all circumstances, it was not deemed a suffi

desertions," some "taken in privateers," and some "with fraudulent and erased protections." He had appealed to this report, he said, with no other view than to show that a great proportion of the But, sir, said Mr. S., the British Orders in Coun- complaints on this subject proceeded from percil are to be contrasted with the French decrees. sons not citizens of the United States, and thereIt would be acknowledged they both exhibit to us fore not entitled to our protection; and, withal, a deliberate system of plunder, and though alike to show the great number of their subjects we in their effects upon our commerce, and were are in the constant habit of employing on board alike violations of all usage among civilized na- of our vessels, and the extreme difficulty the subtions, disposed to be just, he did not believe gen-ject presented as a matter of negotiation between tlemen would contend those of the French were the two countries. Under these circumstances, less violent or outrageous in either the letter or we knew it had not been deemed a good and suf execution. For his part, he believed they were ficient cause of war, under General Washington's far more so. That French depredations at that Presidency, nor under any subsequent Adminis time exceeded those of the British at any subse-tration, until the present. It had been always quent period, there can be no question. Mr. S. said, he held in his hand some proof of the extent of French depredations, which, he said, gentlemen would not have it in their power to deny as authentic. He then referred to the convention of 1803, between France and the United States, where she stipulated that we should pay, as part of the purchase of Louisiana, $3,750,000 to our

General Desha was understood to be in the Chair of the Legislature of Kentucky at the time.

hoped the matter might be negotiated and ar ranged in some amicable way. Mr. Monroe, Mr. S. trusted, would be received as good authority upon the subject, at this time of day. A paragraph or two from the letter, explanatory of his rejected treaty, would serve to show that Mr. Jefferson was not disposed, even to the last of his Administration, to break the peace of the country on that ground:

"The impressment of seamen (says Mr. Monroe in that letter) from our merchant vessels, is a topic which

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claims a primary attention, from the order which it United States to hold and govern them. If we holds in your letter, but more especially from some did, we must infuse a little more energy into our important considerations that are connected with it. system of Government than it had at presentThe idea entertained by the public, is, that the rights the energy of standing armies and standing taxes. of the United States were abandoned by the American Great Britain, sir, said he, deserves war at our Commissioners in the late negotiation, and that their hands. deserves to be chastised, and made to be seamen were left, by tacit acquiescence, if not by for- just, if we had the power to do it. But we are a mal renunciation, to depend for their safety on the meryoung nation, and have not the power. To atcy of the British cruisers. I have, on the contrary, tempt it, is but to throw aside our pacific characalways believed, and still do believe, that the ground on which that interest was placed by the paper of the ter, and put on that of a belligerent military one; British Commissioners of November 8, 1806, and the in fact, to inflict ruin upon ourselves. She strugexplanations which accompanied it, was both honor-gles, sir, for her existence; and if she meets her able and advantageous to the United States; that it fate, it will have proceeded from the madness of contained a concession in their favor, on the part of her own councils, and the folly of her own measGreat Britain, on the great principle in contestation, ures. Her conduct conciliates no American feelnever before made by a formal and obligatory act of ings in her behalf; it ought not. But shall we, the Government, which was highly favorable to their therefore, permit ourselves to fall into the same interest; and that it also imposed on her the obliga- madness in our councils, and commit like folly tion to conform her practice under it, until a more com- in our measures? Can we persuade ourselves, plete arrangement should be concluded, to the just that a "war of aggression" and conquest can suit claims of the United States." the great agricultural interests of our country? Will it subserve the interests of commerce itself, or, indeed, any other interest, in the present state It was the more to be presumed, that the Govern- of the world? Though not impossible to hope, ment was willing to accept, in the mode which it proposed, the condition which we might be able to obtain it was certainly not reasonable to expect it. The in the other, from the consideration, that the latter were vexations of our commerce, from the one or the under its view at the time the instructions were given, other of the belligerents, since the French Revoby the paper of the British Commissioners, of Novem-lution commenced, had continued, without interber 8, and our letter of the 11th, and the certainty with which it, (the Government,) as well as we, must have been impressed, that more favorable conditions could not be expected." And again: "The Government was equally willing, with us, to enter into some arrangement, which would preserve the peace of the country, although it should not accomplish the object which had been so ardently desired."

He further adds, in another place:

ruption, during their wars to the present time, and afforded just cause of war to the United States, but the policy and expediency of it was denied, on the Republican side of the question, at all times.

Notwithstanding, sir, what gentlemen may say. we are at present the freest, happiest, and most prosperous people upon earth, combining the More on this head need not be added, as it is view of our internal improvements with our exmost manifest, if war was to grow out of im-ternal commerce. It may be well said, our merpressment, that it ought to have been declared while the Chesapeake affair hung over us, as that disgraceful occurrence grew out of impressment. But Mr. Jefferson cherished a different policy, and would not call Congress on the occasion.

Mr. Speaker, said Mr. S., if we are to raise the proposed army, commence a war of conquest, take possession of the Canadas, and, afterwards. as the gentleman from New Hampshire (Mr. HARPER) tells us, we are to turn our attention to the Bahama Islands, and conquer them also, when and where is this spirit of conquest and dominion to end? If we indulge in it, then are we to be overwhelmed with all the miseries of poor miserable Europes for there can be no end to wars of ambition and conquest. From a consciousness, on the part of Great Britain, that we could take possession of the Canadas, he believed she had forborne to make direct war upon us before now. She was not very squeamish on the subject of war; and when we prohibit all trade with her, which, he believed, it was just and right to do, she had no interest in a peace with us. Thus the Canadas, he observed, had served us as a pledge for her better behaviour. He would rather they should remain that pledge, than possess ourselves of them, and then not know what to do with them afterwards. It was impossible for the 12th CoN. 1st Sess.-22

chants are the Jasons of the day, and are literally fetching away from Portugal and Spain the golden fleece, and leaving Great Britain and France to contend for the carcass. Such was the price, and such the demand, for our wheat and flour in those countries. The truth is, sir, that the great commercial question is between the United States and France, and her continental system.* Her municipal regulations, and her exclusion of our commerce, deprives the Southern States of their greatest and best markets for their tobacco and cotton. These articles are not worth taking to market, and, without some change in Bonaparte's system, never like to be so again. That this is the state of the case, gentlemen cannot deny; a communication from the French Minister, and other documents on the table, go to show it. The President, in his Message, has recommended to Congress to adopt countervailing measures, but nothing has been yet done. British injustice has been justly met with the non-importation law-a countervailing system, such as has been relied upon heretofore, under

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view of all the attendant circumstances. Among these circumstances I readily admit, that the reputation of courage. the character of avenging wrongs, is entitled to great consideration, inasmuch as it often prevents future insult and injury. It is wisdom to determine on the best course, and when that course is determined on, it is courage firmly to pursue it; and it is honorable to listen alike to the dictates of wisdom, as well as of cour age. I confess I am too proud to calculate-in the language of unerring truth, "to sit down and count the cost."

Mr. Jefferson's Administration, to save the United we must fight-that it is dishonorable to calculate. States from the calamities of a war-and was I deny that honor or prudence requires the insuch a one as must operate, and did operate, with discriminate resistance of injury, either in an inas much effect upon the enemy as the contem-dividual or in a nation: how long to bear, and plated war could do, and with far less evil effects when to resist, is the province of reason to decide, upon our own interests and happiness. The law not of passion-it is the business of sound calcuin question did not itself propose to the belliger-lation; it must be determined from an enlightened ents to go farther than to enforce non-intercourse with that one which should not repeal her edicts; and, for one, he was not disposed to go farther. Mr. S. said he had opposed the war, and the measures leading to it, as impolitic and unjust, in Mr. Adams's time, and should not feel himself an honest and consistent politician not to oppose the war now contemplated. It would be for others to reconcile the old Republican policy with the new, in their own way; it was not in his power to do it. The affair of the Chesapeake taken out of the question, the state of the case was plain and easy. The amount of French depredations is known to have been nearly four millions at that period, for we paid it to our own merchants according to the convention of 1803, and the character of the belligerent edicts are before us. We can see and compare them for ourselves. We predicate the present war without equal data, upon an alleged amount of wrongs.

If, sir, we pass the bill before us to raise the twenty-five thousand men, it will be rather a Congressional than a Presidential army. The President, under his view of the occasion, recommends an additional force of ten thousand men as sufficient to put the country in that armor and attitude which he deemed proper to meet the crisis; and still, not with views of immediate war, so far as we know, we make it twenty-five thousand, and declare them for purposes of immediate war. All this may be, as it should be, a just and wise course, but it appeared to him like supporting the Administration over much. He was willing to support it, and go with the majority so long as they adhered to the principles which brought them into power, and no longer.

Mr. STow. Mr. Speaker, as I am not in the habit of occupying the time of this House, I trust they will listen to the few observations I am about to make with patience. The subject is of the utmost importance, and as it is my misfortune to differ in opinion with most of my political friends, it is a duty I owe to this House, to my constituents, and to myself, to make some explanation.

We are this day called upon, Mr. Speaker, to decide the most momentous question which has ever came before the Legislature of this country since the Declaration of Independence. On our decision hang the future destinies of our country. Peace and war are alike before us. Our determination is, in my opinion, to pronounce whether this country shall have peace, plenty, laws, liberty and rational religion; or whether we shall have not a single war, of two, six or eight years, as the case may be but whether, by one war, we shall create an interest which will plunge us into all the future wars which shall agitate the civilized world. But we are told that whenever a nation is injured, honor imperiously calls it to war-that

For what do we go to war? Not for the comforts or conveniences of life-not for our lands, our wives, our children, our families-not for our laws, our liberties, or our institutions: all these we have, and they are safe. For I do maintain, Mr. Speaker, that our country is essentially prosperous. It is highly so, when compared with any other country, Our agriculture and manufactures are daily improving. Where is the person in America who suffers for want of the necessaries of life ?-for food, clothing or shelter? Where are the children who want instruction, or who go hungry to bed? If we go to war, it will be for luxuries, not for necessaries. I know that considerable difficulties exist in our mercantile towns from the interruption of trade, and I deeply regret them; but many of the evils of which we complain have not sprung from foreign injury-they are artificial-they have grown out of our extensive system of banking. By means of banks, credit has been obtained easily-money has appeared plenty: we have been too extravagant in our expenses, and we have contracted debts with too much facility. War will not remedy these evils-it will not pay our debts, but it will increase the disorder, and plunge us deeper into debt.

But we are going to war for commercc. Commerce will be annihilated by war. We are to fight for the right of carrying our productions to the Continent, where no prudent man would carry them. We are to go to war for what must be destroyed by war; and we are about to fight for the right of going where we do not want to go: or, are we to fight our cotton and tobacco through the hostile fleets of Great Britain, and through the municipal edicts of Napoleon, to a market. and then trust fortune for getting the avails of it back? For these idle projects-for these less than

shadowy forms"-we are about to plunge this nation into all the horrors of war. For these we are to have standing armies, and navies, and impressments, (for I do maintain, that from the nature of the thing, to make a navy efficient, you must resort to impressment,) and widows, and orphans, and taxes, and debts, and funding systems, and contractors, and stockjobbers, and speculators, and Executive patronage. Can any curse be