judicial offices and had done most of the work of compilation of 1827. Judge Morell had been nominated by President Jackson, with Judge Wilkins to succeed Judges Chipman and Woodbridge in 1832. He was a native of Berkshire county, Massachusetts, but received most of his legal training in New York, where he was a fellow student with Governor Marcy and Chancellor Walworth, and where he obtained a good reputation at the bar and in various offices in public life. He was one of the most thoroughly trained common lawyers in the state, and transacted business with readiness and accuracy. His circuit was the most laborious of all, and his work was promptly and well done. Upon the resignation of Judge Fletcher, in 1842, he was made chief-justice for the remainder of his term. Judge Ransom came to Michigan not far from the close of the territorial period, having been a successful practitioner in New England. At the close of his first term in 1843 he was made chief-justice to succeed Judge Morell, and continued to fill that office until he became governor, January 1, 1848. He was much respected for ability and uprightness and exercised his judicial functions acceptably to the people and the bar. He was a man of good common sense as well as legal sufficiency, and had great personal popularity.

Judge Wilkins was appointed district judge of the United States for the district of Michigan several months in advance of the admission of the state, and did not become a member of the state judiciary. He remained in office until 1870, when he retired on full pay, having reached and passed his threescore years and ten, and having served thirtyeight years on the bench in Michigan. He was a member of the constitutional convention which in 1836 rejected the proposition of congress to give up the disputed territory to Ohio in exchange for so much. of the upper peninsula as was not within the state boundaries. He was also one of the persons who called shortly thereafter the irregular body known as the frost-bitten convention, that undertook to accept the congressional scheme on their own responsibility, and got the state into the Union through the back door. He took an interest in most public matters, and was a very useful regent of the university. In private life he was genial and humorous.

The first chancellor, Elon Farnsworth, was admirably fitted for his office. He was a thorough scholar as well as lawyer, with cool judgment and intimate knowledge of men, and an enlightened sense of justice. Under his careful administration, the equity system became well adapted to the necessities of the community and divested of unreasonable conditions and vexatious delay. Very few of his decisions were

reversed, and still less ought to have been. He belonged to the same class of wise and sensible jurists as Chancellor Kent, whom in charac ter and attainments he closely resembled. He gave up his office before his term expired, and was succeeded by Randolph Manning, who himself resigned in 1846, upon the action of the legislature looking to the abolition of the court, and Chancellor Farnsworth reluctantly accepted a re-appointment in the hope at the bar that his popularity might induce the restoration of that tribunal. The tide, however, had set in another direction and could not be turned. Chancellor Manning was an able and upright judge, who had filled other offices usefully and made an excellent chancellor. Unfortunately, during his term, there was great occasion for severity in dealing with a good many frauds and corporate insolvencies, growing out of the general business disasters, and he became more or less obnoxious to some influential persons who opposed him strenuously. With all his firmness and positiveness, he was a warm-hearted and generous man, who was held in the strongest esteem by those who knew him best.

The system of practice was slowly simplified and rendered less cumbrous. Judge Morell and Chief-Justice Fletcher were both thoroughly trained under the old systems, and were quite averse to serious innovations. Fortunately, it happened about this period, that the English courts adopted a series of rules for the simplification of pleadings and practice, and after a sharp struggle the new methods were introduced here. The process has gone intelligently on until our present system is quite free from defects of any sort.

One of the first things to which the attention of the legislature was called was the necessity for a revision of the laws, and Judge William A. Fletcher was appointed for that purpose. His report was submitted and adopted in November, 1837. It was unfortunate. There were many important changes and omissions which were not noticed. at the time by the legislature. In some cases the positive instructions given the reviser were disregarded. He had, for instance, been distinctly directed by the legislature to provide for the abolition of imprisonment for debt. He did nothing of the kind. In many other things he followed his own inclinations and ideas, and thus introduced many important changes. The arrangement and printing of this code was assigned to two commissioners appointed by the governor-E. Burke Harrington and Elijah J. Roberts. Owing to the ill health of the latter, the former really performed the work. It was issued just before the legislature of 1839 assembled, and much of the time of that body was spent in rectifying the mistakes and supplying the omissions of

this unfortunate revision. The session laws of 1839 bear witness to this work.

In 1838 it was found necessary to enlarge the judicial force and Charles W. Whipple was added to the supreme bench, and a fourth circuit was created, over which he presided. Alpheus Felch succeeded Judge Fletcher in his circuit, and Daniel Goodwin took the place of Judge Morell. Judge Felch and Judge Goodwin are still among us in the full vigor of their mental powers. Judge Felch, who had previously been auditor-general, was, during his judicial term, elected governor, and then United States senator, and still later commissioned to investigate land titles in California, and in all his life has been distinguished for diligence, capacity and fidelity. Judge Goodwin, who has also filled several important Federal and state offices by appointment or election, resigned his position on the supreme court bench after a comparatively short service. He was afterwards president of the second constitutional convention, judge of the district court of the upper peninsula till it became a circuit, and thereafter circuit judge through various terms, retiring at the last judicial election after a long and honorable service seldom equaled. The old supreme and circuit court system continued until the constitution of 1850, Judges Warner Wing, Abner Pratt, Sanford M. Green, George Miles, Edward Mundy and George Martin at various times forming parts of it. Judge Mundy, the first lieutenant-governor, was appointed as a fifth judge in 1848. In 1849, by a constitutional amendment submitted and in due time adopted, the office was made elective, and George Martin was the only member of that court who was elected and not appointed.

In 1846 Sanford M. Green was appointed to make a new revision of the laws, which he did in a very careful and symmetrical manner. The legislature in adopting it, however, interfered very seriously with its harmony of arrangement. Among other important changes introduced were the abolition of the court of chancery and the creation of elective county courts with first and second judges, having original civil and criminal jurisdiction. The chancery business was transferred to the circuit courts. The effect of this sudden change at the time was very bad, as the common law business was given the preference and the important and numerous equity cases encountered prolonged and serious delays. The chancery practice had also been a very distinct one up to this time, and a few lawyers devoted themselves to it, while the larger number of members of the bar had no special acquaintance with this branch. Every clerk of the court was also made by these changes a register in chancery, and this added to the con

fusion. It took a long time to get the mixed practices into working order. The county courts, as a body, also turned out badly. In spite of the good work of some excellent judges, there were no lamentations when these courts ceased to exist.

Capital punishment was abolished by the revision of 1847, and then, as now, there was much division of opin'on upon it.

In 1849 a constitutional amendment was adopted providing that all judges should thenceforward be elected by the people.

The constitutional convention of 1850, which adopted our present constitution, contained a very large number of members zealous for novelty. It also had many of the most experienced and statesmanlike citizens of the state. A natural result was that some very radi. cal changes were made, but little, if anything, which could be called revolutionary affected judicial matters. The most unpleasant features were a too great attention to details in grants and limitations of power, which have on some occasions endangered the public welfare for lack of discretionary authority in the legislature. Attempts to fix salaries and some other things which depend very much for their adequacy on changing circumstances, have led to some evil. But a thing which struck many persons unpleasantly was the number of provisions which seem to indicate that it was supposed the people could not trust their agents and representatives. There are few constitutions which have created, so much litigation concerning the validity of legislation. Much of this difficulty has been modified or removed by the lapse of time and the instinctive adaptation of popular ways to their surroundings. It has, as a whole, been a useful instrument. The evident unwillingness of the people to give it up entirely for a new one, shows that it is thought better to amend than supersede it. There are two important provisions which bear upon the statutes. One forbade the passing of laws with double objects or misleading titles, confining every act to the single purpose suggested by its title. This was an excellent rule, and prevented some frauds and much needless legislation. The other prohibited revisions of the statutes, and authorized compiled reprints of existing laws when needed. Such a compilation was authorized and carried out by Judge Cooley in 1857, whose excellent arrangement, based on the revision of 1846 as far as possible, was adopted in the second compilation of 1871 by Judge Dewey. A private enterprise since of Judge Howell's, on the same plan but annotated further, is in general use and well executed.

The repeal of the constitutional requirement of presentations of

crime by grand juries has led since to a practical abandonment of that system, although not absolutely abolished. The present generation can hardly appreciate either side of the argument. The assaults made upon the system as inquisitorial are in direct variance with the fact that it has been generally insisted on as a safeguard against official oppression. The average American freeholder is not the stuff inquisitors are made of. It is certainly a questionable policy which makes the prosecution of criminals depend on the will of a single justice of the peace and a prosecuting attorney. In many cases it probably is not of much importance. But experience has shown that there are some classes of crimes and some classes of criminals against which the public itself requires the aid of a substantial and fearless tribunal of accusation. There are powerful single and banded criminals against whom injured parties are afraid to complain before a magistrate, and who are known in every large community to count on their immunity from prosecution. Crimes against the election laws, which are the most dangerous of all in their public tendency, are of very frequent occurrence, and are very seldom complained of. The inefficiency of such grand juries as are now and then summoned is chiefly due to their inexperience. If the law required them to be summoned often enough to make their duties familiar, they would be a very great help to putting down crime, and inspire a wholesome caution in presumptuous wrong-doers.

The provision which allows cases to be heard by judges without juries, where parties do not choose to ask them, has never been complained of. There are many cases where a jury would be of no service. The right to demand one ought never to be denied, and there are cases where the intervention of a body of ordinary men, dealing only with facts, is essential to justice.

There is one constitutional provision which has never been carried out, and which deserves serious consideration. That is the provision which declares that "the legislature may establish courts of conciliation with such powers and duties as shall be prescribed by law." It seems to have been supposed that so long as parties can arbitrate, they need no other friendly tribunal. But when courts of conciliation exist it may be, and frequently is, made obligatory to resort to them in the first instance-even if parties should not be absolutely bound thereafter to abstain from further litigating, and a fair decision once made will have an effect in bringing parties to reason.

Those who have watched the course and causes of litigation, know that a great share of it arises from misunderstanding.

This