which they pass from the general to the particular, and from the particular to the general, their perfect mastery is evidenced. And in this method of discovering and demonstrating the law is their peculiar and distinctive merit, unlike the German Schöffen in this respect, that their art reaches scientific perfection in regard of its cognitions and its language, yet without suffering in the perspicuity and vivacity which are usually peculiar to more primitive ages.' (Savigny, Das Beruf unseres Zeitalters für Gesetzg. und Rechtswiss., pp. 30, 31.)

THE MONTH.

Inner House Practice.-Reform in the Court of Session has so long been a subject fruitful of controversy, and barren in result, that the recent Act of Sederunt might have been expected-and we are glad to say that the expectation has not been disappointedto be hailed with satisfaction and with thankfulness. But the tide of reform which has once set in, is not to be lightly kept back. And accordingly it is matter for no surprise, that grievances that have long been endured in patience, are now loud in complaint, and clamorous for redress. One of these-and not the least considerable is the present practice according to which the same case is liable to be called day after day within half an hour of the adjournment of the Court. No doubt the evil is to a certain extent unavoidable. But surely some remedy may be devised to obviate the necessity, or at least to mitigate the rigour of a practice which has a most material influence in determining the unpopularity of the Court of Session both with the country and the profession. These remarks are immediately suggested to us by a case which recently depended in the First Division (The Magistrates of Aberdeen v. Irvine), about which we mention the following facts: It was first put out for hearing on the 9th of November during the extended sittings. It was three times called after 3 o'clock; for three days after it had been partly heard it was not called at all; and it was not taken to avizandum till the 7th of December, after it had been partly heard on each of eight different days. This case does not equal the celebrated case of Gordon v. Grant, in the time of Lord Justice-Clerk Hope, where the interlocutor runs, 'having heard parties' procurators at great length on nineteen different days.' Still it is

difficult not to see that several days' discussion might have been saved. The objection which most readily occurs is, of course, the expense which is thereby entailed on litigants, so long as the rule of the profession is maintained that counsel in the Inner House are entitled to refreshers for every day that a case is called; and no consideration could be held more relevant to determine the Court to instant action in the matter. But the practice involves, at the same time, a very obvious obstacle in the way of succinct and effective pleading. Recapitulation which cannot be avoided lengthens the debate, and the argument is presented piece-meal and in fragments. Another evil-and it is one which the dignity of the Court may reasonably be expected to hold in view-is, that agents who come from the country to attend the debates, must either do so at an enormous outlay of time and money, or cease to attend them altogether. A remedy which suggests itself at once-and it would be difficult to devise a simpler one-is, that certain days should be set aside for the hearing of causes in the Summar Roll, and others for those in the Short Roll. Some difficulty is, of course, to be looked for in arranging the details of this scheme. Cases on the Summar Roll do not preserve the same regularity of condition that cases do in the Short Roll. And it might occasionally result from the plan we suggest that the Summar Roll of the day would be exhausted before the hour for the adjournment of the Court; but taking advantage of the half-day on Saturday, we are satisfied that the plan could be put into operation with tolerable security both to the time and the convenience of the judges. Another remedy is, that no case in the Summar Roll should be called in preference to a case in the Short Roll which has been partly heard. To this it may be objected that there is a certain amount of summary procedure in the Court requiring instant despatch; but as Saturday is set apart for the Summar Roll, nothing could be delayed beyond a week; and the class of cases does not occur that would be injured by such delay. And even if these proposals were found impracticable, why, it may be asked, should the Court not so adjust the rolls, or call the cases, as to prevent the hardship and expense which, in many cases, it is quite obvious will be the result of pursuing a strict undeviating order? Surely that is within the power of the Court, and its machinery elastic enough to admit the exercise of such discretion.

Legal Education.-We should be glad to hear that this subject,

which we understand is at present under consideration of the Faculty of Advocates, in connection with the recently instituted degree of Bachelor of Laws, and has also been before one at least of the Universities, was followed by some action. Our readers are aware that the degree was established by an ordinance of the Commissioners acting under the last Universities Act, and requires candidates, being also Masters of Arts, to undergo an examination in the six following branches: Constitutional History; Public Law, including both public and private international law; Civil Law; Conveyancing; the Law of Scotland; and Medical Jurisprudence, special regard being had to the subject of public law. The applications for the honour have not as yet been very numerous; but if a high standard of examination is maintained-by which we mean something more than merely formidable-looking questions-we have no doubt it will become an object of considerable solicitation; and a great deal might be done to make it so, by conferring upon it the privilege or recognition that attaches to other degrees. It is some time ago since the Faculty of Advocates, with, we think, a wise discrimination, resolved that the degree of Master of Arts should be held to be sufficient evidence of the general literary instruction which is required of every candidate for admission to the Bar. We think that a similar resolution might now be beneficially passed as to the degree of Bachelor of Law, with reference to the professional qualifications which intrants are now called upon to evidence by examination. We look upon this as a reasonable tribute to the degree itself, which contemplates, if it has not already assumed, a high standard. In Scotland, the interdependence between the Universities and the professions is so great, that a degree of this sort, necessarily the aim of a limited number, has no chance to establish itself unless it is fostered in every possible way. It is of very little use-in this country it is found so practically-to found a chair in a University, such, for example, as the chair of Public Law, unless the higher walks of the profession come to an understanding that the new branch shall form a subject of examination of those who seek admission to their ranks. We do not by any means commend the doctrine that knowledge should be declared the possession of any particular spot, by the restriction of students to appointed seats of learning. If a candidate for the Bar has learned his civil law under Professor Rudorff of Berlin, why should he not be taken on trial as readily as one who has learned his under Professor Muirhead at

Edinburgh and he is so received by the Faculty of Advocates. Neither Professor Muirhead nor any other teacher, guided by a high sense of duty and enthusiasm for his subject, would regard it as unfair to allow his contemporaries to compete with him. But he would have good ground for complaint if the various legal corporations of the country should resolve that henceforth civil law should be excluded from their list of pass qualifications. The practical result of that would be, that thereafter civil law should be no longer taught in Scotland. A degree such as that of Bachelor of Law is on precisely the same footing. As a general rule, it will not be sought in Scotland, except by those who look forward to the practical pursuits of a profession; and even with them it will very soon cease to be an object of aspiration, unless it is invested with some mercantile and tangible value. But not only on the ground of justice to the degree itself, but on a higher ground still, we plead that a professional sanction should be set upon it. It is no doubt true, and it is a possible objection we do not fail to notice, that the subject which the Commissioners desire shall have special regard, is not the law of Scotland; and it may be said with some plausibility and a prima facie colour, that the degree can be no evidence of qualification in that branch. But who does not know the difference, both in the standard and in the mode of examination, between a competition for University honours and a struggle to pass into a profession? These are directed in the one case to test general proficiency, and it is just general proficiency in law that an intrant should be expected to possess; and they are so directed in the other, that the direst lack of cultivation, and that of a professional kind too, fails to be detected. And accordingly, we do not hesitate to believe that the University test, notwithstanding the limitation that attaches to it, is at one and the same time more stringent and more effective than the professional one. If that be so, it is quite clear that the recognition of the new degree by the professions would serve a double purpose, and have a doubly beneficial result,—would, in the first place, tend to promote the interests of the higher legal education generally, and would introduce better informed, more cultivated men into the ranks of professional life. We are glad to observe that the degree is recognised by the Procurators Act as a sufficient test of professional qualification; but we fear that the other requirements of that Act are such as practically to neutralize that recognition, by making it almost impossible for those who desire

to become members of the different bodies of procurators to give the University attendance in the Faculty of Law which is required for the degree. But even this faint formal recognition is not given by the Faculty of Advocates or the other societies forming part of the College of Justice, nor do they even require evidence that intrants should, either in this country or elsewhere, have studied the subjects embraced by the lectures of the Professors of Public Law, and of Constitutional Law and History. Strange that the first recognition of the new scientific culture of law should have come from those bodies who are popularly supposed to represent the least advanced branch of the legal profession!

The late Sheriff of Linlithgowshire.-Mr John Cay, who died in Edinburgh on the 13th of December, was called to the Bar in 1812, and was appointed Sheriff of Linlithgowshire on the elevation of Mr J. H. Mackenzie to the bench as Lord Mackenzie in 1822. He had thus occupied that honourable position for fortythree years; and he was at his death, with the single exception of Sheriff Rutherfurd of Roxburghshire, the oldest sheriff in Scotland. His death was the consequence of an accidental fall last August, by which his thigh-bone was fractured. Mr Cay was a man of sound judgment and good parts; well read in law, and not without a taste for letters, as might be expected of the early friend of J. G. Lockhart, who was four years his junior at the bar. He was highly respected in his own county, both for his zeal and ability in the county business, and for the manner in which he performed his judicial duties. His decisions were well considered, and were regarded with such confidence that they were rarely advocated.

His interest in everything connected with his county, and his zeal for the monuments of Scottish history, led him to make strenuous efforts for the conversion of the ancient palace of Linlithgow into a court-house. Although in this he was unsuccessful, many will sympathize with his desire to secure the preservation of a building of such associations by adapting it to a useful and not unworthy purpose. Among his brethren of the bar he will long be gratefully remembered in connection with their Widows' Fund, of which he was one of the originators, and the first collector. In that office, as in everything, he was distinguished for diligent and careful accuracy; and to his enthusiasm the great prosperity of the Fund is in no small degree attributable. As chairman of the