first four shares, the contract to take those shares being concluded by A's letter, but not in respect of the four additional shares, the contract as to these being left incomplete by the first two letters, and the third letter having introduced into the contract a new term, as to forfeiture, which A had not subsequently accepted. The deed of settlement of a company provided that the executors of a shareholder should either sell, or by executing the deed become proprietors in their own right of their testator's shares, and should not in the meantime receive the dividends; and also that no one person should hold less than five shares. The executors of D, a shareholder, were allowed by the directors to receive the dividends on D's shares for several years, and were not required to execute the deed of settlement. The directors, in pursuance of a resolution to allot certain reserved shares among the existing shareholders in proportion to their original shares, offered two reserved shares to the executors of D; and R, one of them, who held no shares in his own right, without consulting his co-executor, agreed to accept the two shares as executor of D. The company being wound up,-Held, that neither R in his own right, nor the executors as such, were contributories in respect of the two shares. In a similar case, both the executors having agreed to take two reserved shares as executors," neither of them having previously any shares in his own right,— Held, that they were contributories as executors.-In re Leeds Banking Co., 35 L. J., Ch. 75.

COPYRIGHT (Alien Friend.)—An alien friend is entitled to British copyright in a work composed by him, and first published in England during the time of his residence in any part of the British dominions; in this case in Canada. The word "author," in 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, includes alien authors.-Low v. Routledge, 35 L. J., Ch. 114.

NUISANCE (Increasing Pollution.)-A brook, into which part of the sewage of Tunbridge Wells was discharged, flowed through the plaintiff's land, entering it 13 miles from the town, and leaving it 4 miles from the town. The evidence showed that the water of the brook had been at some time (not clearly defined) fit to drink; that it was no longer so; that it was getting gradually worse, and that the deterioration was owing to the sewage,-Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction to restrain the defendants from allowing any sewage to flow into the brook so as injuriously to affect the water on the plaintiff's land, although the sewage there did not as yet amount to an absolute nuisance.-Goldsmid v. the Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners, 35 L. J., Ch. 88.

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.-Where goods have been contracted to be sold, delivery by the vendors on board a ship ostensibly belonging to a firm of which the vendee is a member, and of which ship he is sole registered owner, is not a delivery of such goods to the vendee, so as to exclude the vendor's right of stoppage in transitu, if such ship is a general ship and takes up the goods in the course of one of its regular trips, even though the bills of lading, signed by the captain for such goods, should be made in favour of the vendee and his assigns, and one of such bills should be retained by the captain.-Schotsman v. the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company, 35 L. J., Ch. 100.

SUCCESSION DUTY (Testator domiciled abroad.)—The operation of the Succession Duties Act, 16 & 17 Vict. c. 51, is confined to successions to which persons become entitled by the laws of this country. Therefore, where a testator, domiciled abroad, died, leaving pure personalty situate in England,-Held, per Cranworth, C., that no succession duty was payable in respect thereof.—Wallace v. the Attorney-General, 35 L. J., Ch. 124.

COMPANY (Winding up.)-An incorporated company was being wound up, under the Companies' Act, 1862; and a quarrying lease to the company (containing no provision against assigning) for a term, the chief part of which was unexpired, was assigned by the liquidator and the company to a stranger. On an application by the lessor, who objected to the assignment, the Lorda Justices (reversing judgment of the Master of the Rolls) directed a claim to be entered

against the company's estate for the whole amount of the future rent during the term.-In re the Haytor Granite Co., ex parte Bell, 35 L. J., Ch. 154.

INSURANCE ON PLATE GLASS (Notice of Loss.)—The defendants insured the plate-glass in plaintiff's shop window "from loss or damage originating from any cause whatsoever, except fire, breakage during removal, alteration or repair of premises," and a condition of the policy was, that in case of damage notice be given to the manager or to some known agent" of defendants. The plate-glass so insured was broken by a crowd assembled to witness a fire at a house adjoining plaintiff's, and who, having broken the glass, took away some of plaintiff's goods whilst he was engaged in removing his property to a place of safety. The fire never reached the glass or the shop front,-Held, that the proximate cause of the injury was the crowd, and that the damage did not originate either from "fire or breakage during removal" within the meaning of the exception in the policy. Held, also, that a notice of the loss to the local agent through whom the policy had been effected, though he had afterwards ceased to be the defendants' agent by reason of their transferring their business as insurers to another company, was a sufficient compliance with the policy.—Marsden v. the City and County Assurance Co. (Lim.), 35 L. J., C. P.

LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT, 1845.-Premises adjoining a railway, but untouched by it, were injured by vibration, noise, and smoke, caused by the running of trains after the railway had been completed. The premises sustained no structural injury,-Held, that the owner was not entitled to compensation from the company under the Lands Clauses or Railways Clauses Acts.-Brand v. Hammersmith and City Railway Co., 35 L. J., Q. B. 53.

NUISANCE. A difference is to be marked between an action for a nuisance on the ground that the alleged nuisance produces material injury to property, and an action for a nuisance on the ground that the alleged nuisance is productive of sensible personal discomfort. In certain cases persons living in society are required to submit to that amount of discomfort which may be necessary for the legitimate and free exercise of the trade of their neighbours, though they may not be required so to submit to circumstances the immediate result of which is sensible injury to the value of property. Therefore, where T. became proprietor of an estate, and shortly afterwards persons commenced smelting operations, which caused noxious vapours, whereby material injury was done to the trees and shrubs of T., it was held that, in an action brought by T. in respect of such injury, the Judge had rightly directed the jury to find for plaintiff if they were satisfied that real, sensible injury had been done to the enjoyment of his property, or the value of it, by the noxious vapours sent forth from defendants' works; and had also rightly directed the jury that the place where works were carried on so as to occasion an actionable injury to another was not, in the meaning of the law, a convenient place. The St. Helens Smelting Co. (Lim.) v. Tipping (House of Lords), 35 L. J., Q.B. 66.

PATENT.—A disclaimer cannot be used for converting a barren and unprofitable generality in a specification into a specific practical description, or to convert that which upon the description in the specification is not applicable to any one definite form into a description applicable to a specific and definite mode of proceeding. The object of the act authorizing disclaimers is, that where a specification containing a sufficient and good description of a useful invention is imperilled by the description having something annexed to it which is capable of being severed, leaving the original description good and sufficient, without the necessity of addition, (except of such slight additions only as may be required to render intelligible that which remains),-the vicious excess may be lopped off. Therefore, where the specification of a patent for improvements in embossing and finishing woven fabrics, alleged the invention to consist in the use of rollers having any design grooved, fluted, engraved, milled, or otherwise indented upon them, and the disclaimer afterwards filed stated that the effect desired could only be produced by the use of a certain species of roller not particularly described in the specificaVOL. X. NO. CXIV.-JUNE 1866.

tion (namely, a roller of hard metal or other suitable material having circular grooves around its surface), and all other rollers were disclaimed, such disclaimer was held to be bad. The description, "a roller of hard metal or other suitable material," was not too uncertain, on account of the use of the words "or other suitable material;" such words would mean any material equally sufficient for the purpose with hard metal-per The Lord Chancellor, Westbury. It is not every useful discovery that can be made the subject of a patent. It must be shewn that the discovery can be brought within a fair extension of the words a new manufacture," per Lord Cranworth. Ralston v. Smith (House of Lords), 35 L. J., C.P., 49.

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SHIPPING (Conflict of Laws.)-The rights of parties under a contract not expressly provided for thereby, but arising incidentally within the sphere of the relation created by it, are to be determined by that general law which the parties intended to govern the transaction, or rather by which they may justly be presumed to have bound themselves. Primâ facie, the law of the place where a contract is made is that which the parties intended, or must be presumed to have adopted, ought to prevail in the absence of circumstances indicating a different intention; but a contract of affreightment made between a charterer and owners of the ship, being persons of different nationalities, in a place where both of them were foreigners, to be performed partly there by the ship breaking ground in order to start for the port of lading, where both would also have been foreigners; partly at the latter port, by taking the cargo on board; and partly on board the ship at sea, subject there to the laws of the country of the ship; and partly by final delivery at the port of discharge, is to be construed by the law of the nation of the ship.-Lloyd v. Ginbert (in Exch. Cham.), 35 L. J., Q.B. 74.

CHARITY.-The court has jurisdiction to alter a scheme settled by it for the administration of a charity, and for the leasing of the charity estates, whenever lapse of time or change of circumstances makes an alteration desirable in the interests of the charity.-Attorney-Gen. v. St. John's Hospital, Bath, 35 L. J., Ch. 207.

CONTRIBUTORY.-B, the registered holder of 110 shares in a limited company, received a notice requiring payment of calls in arrear, and stating that on default his shares would be forfeited without further notice," in pursuance of clauses in the articles of association, set out in the notice. Bat the same time received notice of an extraordinary general meeting for considering as to winding up. Before the day named, B called and paid his arrears upon ten shares, explaining to the secretary that as to the remaining 100 shares he should submit to forfeiture. B attended the meeting, and was entered (without his knowledge) in the list of persons present, as the proprietor of 110 shares. The directors had previously passed a resolution that the shares of several defaulting shareholders should be forfeited, but no such resolution was passed as to B, and the directors had never intended his shares to be forfeited. Upon the winding up of the company, B applied to be struck off the list of contributories in respect of his 100 shares,Held, per Wood, V. C., that the shares were not absolutely forfeited, but only liable to be forfeited at the option of the directors, and that the shareholder must be held as a contributory in respect of the full number of his shares.-In re_the East Kongsberg Mining Co. (Lim.); (Bigg's case), 35 L. J., Ch. 216; 1 Law Rep. Eq. 309.

COVENANT (Running with the land: Acquiescence: Building scheme).—A restrictive building covenant entered into by the grantee of one of several plots of ground with the grantor, his heirs and assigns, runs with the land in favour of subsequent assigns of other plots, and any such assign may alone sue the infringer. Acquiescence in a breach of covenant not attended with substantial damage, will not bar the right to restrain a subsequent breach so attended. The owner of building ground conveyed each plot, subject to a perpetual rentcharge; and the purchasers bound themselves, their heirs and assigns, by restrictive covenants entered into with the grantor, his heirs and assigns,-Held, that the plaintiff,

owner of one plot, was entitled to maintain a suit for breach of covenant against the defendant, owner of another plot, who claimed under an original purchasedeed prior in date to plaintiff's, without making the owners parties. Also, that the grantee of the rentcharge on defendant's plot could not release the covenant. Where the owner of a house and garden was under covenant not to build on the garden,-Held, that throwing out a bow eight feet deep into the garden, was such an infringement of the covenant as the court would restrain, though not sufficient to maintain a suit for obstructing ancient lights.-Western v. M‘Dermot, 35 L. J., Ch. 190.

SCOTCH SETTLEMENT (English will: double portions).—Testator by his will, executed in England and in the English form, gave legacies to the younger children of his deceased daughter. By a settlement of prior date made in the Scotch form upon his daughter's marriage, he had covenanted to pay to trustees a principal sum, to be divided, after the death of the parents, among the younger children of the marriage. The obligation was never satisfied in his lifetime, and no reference to it was contained in the will. The legacies were in excess of the portions which would have arisen from the settlement,-Held, that testator placed himself in loco parentis, and the will being construed according to English law, the legacies were to be taken in satisfaction of the provisions in the settlement.-Campbell v. Campbell, 35 L. J., Ch. 241; 1 Law Rep. Eq., 383.

COMPANIES ACT, 1862, Sec. 165.-The discretionary power conferred by the 165th Sec. of dealing summarily with delinquent directors and other officers of a company, applies only to cases in which the individual charged the alleged misfeasance is living, and cannot be exercised against his representatives if he is dead. In re the East of England Bank, ex parte Feltom's Executors, 35 L. J., Ch. 196; 1 Law Rep. Eq. 219.

ADMINISTRATION BOND.-Scotch sureties to an administration bond allowed where there were no creditors, and the administrator was the only person interested in the estate of the deceased.-In the Goods of Houston, 35 L. J., Pr. and Matr. 41.

DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE (Adultery: Collusion).—If it be shewn that a'husband has promised his wife to commit adultery in order that she may obtain a divorce, and that the wife follows a course the husband has indicated to watch him, that adultery takes place subject to that understanding, and that evidence is obtained accordingly, the court will hold that the parties are acting collusively, and will dismiss the petition.-Todd v. Todd, 35 L. J., Pr. and Matr., 34.

EVIDENCE OF MARRIAGE.-In a suit by a husband for dissolution of marriage, the only evidence of the marriage was that the petitioner and the respondent had, in May 1850, left England together for the purpose of being married at Gretna Green, that they shortly returned and stated that they had been married, and lived together for many years as man and wife,-Held, sufficient evidence of the marriage.-Patrickson v. Patrickson, 35 L. J., Pr and Matr., 48.

WILL (Foreign, Change of Domicil, 24 and 25 Vict).-Testator, being domiciled in Scotland, executed an ante-nuptial settlement, which he also intended should operate as his will. His marriage subsequently took place in Scotland. By the law of Scotland, such a document as a disposition of property at death is not revoked by the marriage of the contracting parties. Testator after his marriage became domiciled in England :-Held, that as the settlement was valid by the law of domicil as a testamentary disposition at the time of execution, as also subsequently to the marriage and at the moment when the testator left the country, it continued valid notwithstanding the change of domicil. In the goods of Reid, 35 L J., Pr. and Matr. 43: 1 Law Rep., Pr. and Div. 74.

COMPANY (Allotment of shares).-Where shares in a joint-stock company are applied for, they must be allotted by the directors within a reasonable time, otherwise the applicant may refuse to receive them, and may recover back the deposit paid on application. Where shares were applied for on the 8th of June and allotted

on the 23d of November,-Held, not an allotment within a reasonable time.Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co. (Lim.) v. Montefiore, 35 L. J., Ex. 90: 1 Law Rep. Ex. 109.

DAMAGES (Breach of Contract, Consequential Damages). - The declaration stated that, in consideration that plaintiff would bring his ship to defendants' dock at a certain time, defendants promised to dock her therein, and that plaintiff brought her to the dock at the time appointed, but that defendants refuse to admit her into the dock, by reason whereof she grounded outside the dock when the tide ebbed, and was damaged. Evidence was given that the dock-gate could not be opened because a chain had broken, and that plaintiff was informed of this immediately on the arrival of his ship opposite the dock. There was conflicting evidence as to the reason for the ship remaining in the river opposite to the dockgate till she grounded. The jury were asked, first, whether there was a place of safety to which the ship could have been taken before the tide ebbed; and, secondly, whose fault it was that she was not taken there the captain's or the pilot's. They returned no answer to the first question; and replied to the second, that neither the captain nor the pilot was to blame,-Held, by Martin B., that the damages consequent upon the ship taking the ground were not too remote to be recovered by plaintiff. Held, by Pollock, C.B., Channell, B., and Pigott, B., that without more assistance from the jury, the case was not ripe for the decision of the court. (Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, discussed.)—Wilson v. the Newport Dock Co., 35 L. J., Ex. 97.

DEVISE (Words of Description, Easement).-The devise by the owner of two adjoining houses of one of them, in the words "house, outhouse, and garden, as now in the occupation of T. A.," does not pass to the devisee a right to go to a pump in the yard of the adjoining house to get water, though the said T. A., there being no water supply on his premises, had been in the habit for some time previous to the making of the will of going to the pump, to the knowledge of the testatrix. (See Ewart v. Cochrane, 4 Macq., App. 117.)-Polden v. Bastard, (Ex. Cham.) 35 L. J., Q.B. 92; 1 Law Rep., Q.B. 156.

MARINE INSURANCE (Illegal Act of Master).—A master of a vessel, though acting within the scope of his ordinary authority, who does an act in contravention of the laws of his country without the express knowledge or sanction of his owner, whether with or without a view to the owner's advantage, is guilty of an implied breach of orders. Therefore, where he has sailed on a voyage, within the 16 and 17 Vict. c. 107. ss. 170-2, with a portion of his cargo stowed on deck and without a certificate of clearance, and without the knowledge or authority of the owner, though with a view to the benefit of such owner, the illegality of the voyage does not affect the owner so as to prevent his recovering against an insurer for the loss of freight.-Wilson v. Rankin, (Ex. Ch.,) 35 L. J., Q.B. 87; 1 Law Rep., Q.B. 162.

So.

PARTNERSHIP (Constitution, Annuity out of Business).—Defendant's son having been elected a member at Lloyd's, on a representation made to the committee with defendant's sanction, that defendant would place £5,000 at the disposal of F (an underwriter), and would never let his son want further aid, if needed, the son entered into an arrangement with F, whereby the latter was to manage the underwriting business in his (the son's) name, and was to be paid a salary for doing The son, in consideration of defendant so guaranteeing him to the extent of £5,000, agreed to pay defendant an annuity of £500, which, on a given state of the profits, was to be increased to a yearly sum equal to one-fourth of the profits; but it was stipulated that defendant should not be considered as a partner in the said business. The son afterwards married, and by the marriage settlement all the monies and profits of the business were assigned to defendant and one D, upon certain trusts, the first being to pay the said annuity to defendant. The son kept no banking account, but paid such cheques as F gave him to defendant's bankers, on whom he was allowed to draw, until defendant put a stop to it,Held, by the majority of the Court of Exchequer Chamber, reversing the judg