ment of the Court of Common Pleas, that, assuming the above arrangements to be real and not colourable, defendant was not liable as a partner.-Bullen v. Sharp, (Ex Ch.,) 35 L. J., C.P. 105; 1 Law Rep., C.B. 86.

FRIENDLY SOCIETIES.-The Friendly Societies Act (18 and 19 Vict. c. 63. s. 24) gives summary power to Justices to order an officer, a member of a friendly society, or his assignee, who by false representation or imposition may obtain possession of any monies, &c., of such society, or having the same in his possession, may withhold or misapply the same, &c., to deliver up such monies, &c., or repay the money applied improperly,-Held, that this section does not give the Justices power to order an assignee for the creditors of an officer of such society to repay out of his effects a sum equal to the balance of the society's monies in the hands of such officer at the time he made the assignment, such balance not consisting of specific monies, and the amount having come into the possession of the assignee solely in his representative character.-The Minerva Lodge v. Gladstone; Ex parte O'Donnell, 35 L. J., Mag. Ca. 99.

MARRIAGE (Scotch Divorce-Legitimacy.)-Buxton, an Englishman, married Elizabeth Hickson, an Englishwoman, in 1828, but was separated from her immediately after the marriage ceremony, and, being convicted of procuring the marriage by fraud and conspiracy, and sentenced to three years imprisonment, never lived with her afterwards. After vain attempts to procure an Act of Parliament declaring the marriage null, and subsequently to obtain a separation a mensa et thoro, an agreement was made between Buxton and his wife's friends, especially a Mr. John Shaw, who wished to marry her, in consequence of which Buxton, for a pecuniary consideration, went to Scotland, and resided there for forty days, in order to give the Scotch Court jurisdiction to entertain a suit against him by his wife for a divorce. The suit was instituted, and a decree of divorce, on the ground of adultery, was pronounced by the Scotch Court in 1846. Shortly afterwards, a marriage was solemnized in Scotland between Shaw, who was domiciled in Scotland, and practised as an advocate in Edinburgh, and Elizabeth Buxton, and three children of such marriage were born in Scotland during the life of Buxton: -Held, per Kindersley, V.C., that the Scotch divorce was null and void, and consequently the marriage with Shaw was invalid, and the children were illegitimate; that neither Shaw nor Elizabeth Buxton were justifiably ignorant of the subsistence of the prior marriage, notwithstanding the divorce, as an impediment to their marriage; and that even if either of them had been so ignorant (in which case their children would, according to an opinion of eminent Scotch advocates, have been legitimate according to the law of Scotland, notwithstanding the invalidity of the marriage), their children could not take under an English will, either real estate devised to the children lawfully begotten of Elizabeth, or personal estate bequeathed to her children. In an English instrument "children" will be construed, unless otherwise explained by the context, to mean children lawfully begotten.

The Vice-Chancellor observed:-Before the passing of the act establishing the Divorce Court, it was one of the incidents of an English marriage that it was indissoluble by the sentence of any Court whatever. The law of this country did not recognize the authority of any Court, domestic or foreign, to dissolve an English marriage for any cause or pretext whatever, and any judgment purporting to dissolve that marriage was treated as a mere nullity. This was decided in Lolley's case, which was much discussed, and though some suggestion is made as to Lolley's case being questioned in subsequent decisions, it appears to me that the law of Lolley's case has been asserted down to the present time as the law of marriage in this country.

Now, in decreeing a dissolution of the marriage with Buxton, the Court of Session took upon itself to disregard the quality of indissolubility, which the law of England attached to an English marriage, and dealt with the marriage with Buxton, not according to the law of England where it was solemnized, but according to the law of Scotland, in which country the suit for divorce was instituted; that is they dealt with it, not according to the lex loci contractus, but according to the lex fori. In so doing, the Scotch Court violated that very principle of

international law now invoked by the Shaws as a reason for maintaining the validity of the marriage with Shaw. The sentence of divorce pronounced by the Court of Session must be treated by this Court and every English Court as a mere nullity, and as totally incompetent to dissolve the marriage with Buxton; and if that marriage remained undissolved, as unquestionably it did, the marriage with Shaw was not valid. If the validity of the marriage with Shaw were recognized by the Courts of this country, this consequence must necessarily follow, that an English Court of justice must hold that Elizabeth Hickson had two husbands simultaneously; Buxton was her husband by the law of England, and continued so, because the marriage could not be dissolved, and yet it is said that Shaw must be recognized as being at the same time her husband. The monstrous consequences are too obvious to require to be pointed out; whether such a state of things is possible by the law of any other civilized Christian Country, it is unnecessary to inquire; all I mean to say is, that it is impossible by the law of England. -In re Wilson's Trusts, 35 L. J., Ch. 243; 1 Law R. Eq. 247.

SHIPPING (Collision-Liability for loss of life.)—The liability of a shipowner in respect of loss of life to the seamen of a vessel run down by his ship, extends to, and is measured by £15, (and not £8,) per registered ton of such ship, affirming dec. of L. Romilly, M.R., supra p. 26.—(Glaholm v. Barker, 35 L. J., Ch. 259; 1 Law Rep. Ch. Ap. 223.)

VENDOR AND PURCHASER (Contract for interest until completion).—A contract for the purchase of land contained the usual clause that, if from any cause whatever, the purchase should not be completed by the day therein named, interest should be paid. There was a delay of upwards of ten years in consequence of the vendor having a difficulty in establishing his title; the interval was occupied by considerable litigation, undertaken with the knowledge and consent of the purchaser for the purpose of establishing the title. The purchaser had all along used the purchase-money in his trade:-Held, that no relief from the strict application of the clause as to interest could be given.-(Williams v. Glenton, 35 L. J., Ch. 284; 1 Law Rep. Ch. Ap. 200.)

CONTRIBUTORY (Collusive forfeiture of shares.)-Directors entered into an arrangement allowing a shareholder to retire. The arrangement was not within their powers:-Held, rev. decision of the Master of the Rolls, that though the transaction appeared in the share registry-book and in the minutes of the directors, and though twelve years had passed during which the shareholder was treated as having retired, yet his executrix was a contributory. It is no part of the duty of a shareholder to look into the management, nor will notice be imputed because he has not done so. Spackman's case followed. Lord Belhaven's case distinguished. All agreements with directors whereby a shareholder may, by payments or otherwise, be relieved from liability as a contributory are invalid.-(In re Agriculturist Cattle Ins. Co., Stanhope's Case, 35 L. J., Ch. 296, 1 Law R. Ch. Ap. 161.)

PRESUMPTION (Age of child-bearing)—A fund in court paid out and distributed upon the assumption that a spinster, aged fifty-three years and two months, would never have issue:-Quære, whether this age is not too low. Haynes v. Haynes, 35 L. J., Ch. 303.

LANDS CLAUSES CONSOLIDATION ACT (Offer including costs).-Upon a claim for compensation under section 68, the promoters offered a sum for compensation, such sum to include claimant's costs, and the jury gave a verdict for less than that sum:-Held, that claimant was not deprived of his right to costs under section 51, inasmuch as the offer was bad because it included costs. Such an offer to be valid must be for that which is the subject of compensation merely, unclogged with conditions. Quære-Whether a sum offered to a claimant under section 68, contemporaneously with service of the notice of the time and place of inquiry, but after the claimant has incurred the expense of attending at the nomination of the special jury, is a sum "previously offered" within section 51.-(In re Balls v. Metrop. Board of Works, 35 L. J., Q. B. 101; 1 Law R., Q. B. 337).

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.-A sold to B goods lying at X, one of defendants' stations; a portion were, by B's orders sent to Y, another of the defendants' stations, were there taken by him and paid for; B refused to take any more, but A sent the remainder to Y to him; B refused to take them and they were sent back to X; A also refused them, and they were again sent to Y, where they remained till B became bankrupt; A then directed defendants to keep them for him, and they did so. In an action of trover by B's assignee.-Held, that A had a right of stoppage in transitu, and that the defendants were therefore justified in detaining the goods for him.-(Bolton v. the Lancashire and Yorkshire Rail. Co., 35 L. J., C.P.137.)

MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-Plaintiff occupying premises under a lease from J. F, expiring 4th Dec., 1864, obtained from J. F. a reversionary lease for twenty-one years and twenty-one days, to commence from said 4th Dec., 1864, on payment of a premium. In Nov. 1863, J. F. died; and was found to have had no power to grant this reversionary lease. F. V. who was entitled to the premises, refused to ratify it, and plaintiff was obliged to accept a lease from F. V, to commence 28th Dec., 1863, for seven years only, at a greater rent. Plaintiff brought an action against the executor of J. F. on a covenant for quiet enjoyment contained in the void lease:-Held, that plaintiff was entitled to be indemnified for what he had lost by the breach of covenant, and that under the circumstances the difference between the value of the two leases might be used as a test of the amount of damages. (Lock v. Furze (Ex. Ch.), 35 L. J., C.P. 141.)

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.-The defendants gave a bond to the churchwardens of a parish in which, after reciting that S. had been appointed collector of the poor's rates of the said parish in March 1852, and that in March 1856 he had also been appointed collector of sewers and general rates under an Act, they became bound that S should pay to the churchwardens all sums collected by him in his said office of collector of all or some of these rates. In an action on said bond defendants pleaded that S's duties as collector were increased by certain statutes passed after the granting of said bond, under which S was appointed by said churchwardens collector of another rate; Plea held bad, collection of poor's rates being treated by the parties as a separate employment, and the plea did not show any alteration of S's condition as collector of poor's rates.-(Bonar v. Macdonald, 7 Bell's App. 379 explained. Skillett v. Fletcher, 35 L. J., C. P. 154; 1 Law R. C. B. 217.)

CARRIERS BY RAILWAY (Packed Parcels.)-Defendants, having a special act, containing an equality clause, in ordinary form, requiring them to take the same rates and tolls from all persons under the same or similar circumstances, were in the habit of charging a tonnage rate on packages weighing more than 1 cwt., and a higher rate on packages weighing less. When several parcels were delivered by the same person in one consignment, addressed to the same consignee, they were not weighed and charged for separately, but were weighed together, and a tonnage-rate charged for the whole consignment, if the gross weight exceeded 1 cwt. Plaintiffs, common carriers, trading under the name of "Pickford & Co.," were in the habit of collecting parcels in London and forwarding them to the country. Each parcel was addressed to the person to whom it was ultimately to be delivered; but it was labelled with the name of "Pickford & Co," and that of the station to which it was to be sent; and all the parcels for the same station were delivered in one consignment consigned to the plaintiffs at that station. Defendants refused to charge plaintiffs for the carriage of their parcels at a tonnage-rate upon the gross weight, and charged for each parcel separately according to its individual weight:-Held, that this created an inequality. Held, also, that the rule as to preferences or advantages to particular persons did not apply to arrangements made by a railway company with steam-boat owners for the conveyance of goods beyond the limits of their own line. (See Napier v. G. and S. W. R. Co., 4 Macph. 87.)-Baxendale v. South Western Ra. Co., 35 L. J., Ex. 108; 1 Law R. Ex. 137.

REVENUE. (Duties on Railway Fares-Parliamentary Trains.) See Great Western Ra. Co. v. Attorney-General in H. of L., 35 L. J. Ex. 123; 1 Law Rep. App. 1

CONTRIBUTORY (Executors.)—Executors who accept reserved shares in a company allotted in respect of the testator's original shares, having no power to do so, are contributories in their individual capacity. Even if by the company's deed of settlement they had no right to hold shares in their own right, they are personally liable unless the contract be set aside. So held by L. Justices, rev. dec. of Kindersley, V. C. In re Leeds Banking Co., Fearnside and Dean's Case. 35 L. J., Ch. 307; 1 Law Rep. Ch. Ap. 231.

MINES AND MINERALS. A conveyance of lands in 1801, after reciting that the royalty was reserved to vendor, reserved to him "all mines and seams of coal, and other mines, metals, or minerals, as well opened as not opened, within and under" the lands, "with full liberty to search for, dig, bore, sink, win, work, lead, and carry away the same."-Held, per L. Justices, freestone included in the reservation, but that it could only be worked by underground diggings. Mine and Quarry distinguished.-Bell v. Wilson, 35 L. J., Ch. 337; 1 Law Rep., Ch. Ap. 303.

NUISANCE (Prospective increase—sewage.)—The Court will not generally interfere by injunction to prevent a nuisance, unless where the injury is proved to be serious and permanent. But, in estimating the injury, the Court has regard to all the consequences which may flow from the nuisance, not only to its present effect upon the comfort or convenience of the occupier, but also to any prospective increase of the nuisance and the probable deterioration in the value of the estate. Scientific conclusions from facts are to be regarded as secondary in importance to facts proved.—Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells Commissioners, 35 L. J., Ch. 88, 382.

COLLISION (Evidence-admissions in the answer.)-A steam vessel steering N.E. N. and a schooner close hauled on the starboard tack and heading W. came into collision. The owners of the steam-vessel alleged that the schooner was seen three-quarters of a mile off on the starboard bow, but that she had no lights, and was mistaken for a vessel going the same way as the steam-vessel. All the crew of the schooner were drowned, and the evidence for plaintiff consisted of one witness as to the state of the schooner's lights some hours before the collision. The defendants called no witnesses:-Held, that plaintiffs were not bound to call witnesses from defendants' vessel; and that from the admissions the schooner was seen in ample time for the steam-vessel to have avoided her, and that, therefore, the steam-vessel was alone to blame.-The Aleppo, 35 L. J., Adm. 9.

CONTRACT (Prostitution.)—It is a good defence to an action for hire of a brougham for a term that defendant was a prostitute to the knowledge of plaintiff at the time of hiring; and it is not necessary to prove that it was supplied in the expectation that defendant would pay for it out of her earnings as a prostitute. -Pearce v. Brookes, 35 L. J., Exch. 134; 1 Law R., Ex. 213.

MARINE INSURANCE (insurable interest.)-The fact of a person's name appearing in a bill of lading as shipper and consignee is only prima facie evidence that he has an insurable interest in the goods. Plaintiff, a broker, sold on commission a cargo of goods, which were shipped under a bill of lading, deliverable to the order of plaintiff or his assigns, and he retained the possession of the bill of lading until the purchaser had accepted a bill for the amount of the goods. Plaintiff was not a factor, but a mere agent, who had not possession of the goods, or any lien for advances, commission or otherwise. The goods were lost; and in an action upon a policy of insurance effected by plaintiff, the jury found that there was no sale of the goods until after their loss; and it was ruled that plaintiff had an insurable interest, as the bill of lading made the goods deliverable to him or his assigns. Held, that such ruling was wrong, and that having, in fact, nothing to suffer and incurring no liability by the loss, he had no insurable interest.-Seagrave v. Union Mar. Ins. Co., 35 L. J., C. P., 172.

COURT OF SESSION.

FIRST DIVISION.

PROUDFOOT V. LECHY.-May 22.
Jury Trial-Expenses.

The pursuer in this case brought an action of damages for wrongful dismissal from a situation in which he had a salary of £200 a-year-two years of his engagement being still to run at the date of his dismissal. The jury returned a verdict for the pursuer, with one farthing of damages. The pursuer moved the Court to apply the verdict, and for expenses.

The Court applied the verdict, but, in the circumstances of the case, found no expenses due to the pursuer.

Pet., HORNE FOR DISCHARGE.-May 22.

Sequestration-Discharge of Deceased Trustee.

This was a petition for the discharge of a trustee who died during the dependence of the sequestration. The Bankrupt Act makes no provision. for such a case. The representatives of the deceased trustee applied by petition to the Inner House, who, ex nobili officio, entertained the petition, remitted to the Lord Ordinary to inquire into the circumstances, and on a report by his Lordship that the account of the trustees was correct, discharged the deceased trustee, and allowed the expense of the application to be charged against the sequestrated estate.

PATERSON V. THE PORTOBELLO TOWN HALL COY. (LIMITED.)-May 22.

Joint Stock Coy.-Lease-Reduction.

This is an action at the instance of Mr Paterson, the clerk to and representing the Magistrates of Portobello, as Commissioners of Police of the burgh of Portobello, against the Portobello Town Hall Company (Limited). The action is brought to set aside, on a variety of grounds, a written lease granted by the defenders to the Commissioners of Police of Portobello, dated 10th and 12th February 1863. The defenders (who are incorporated under the Joint Stock Companies' Act, 1856), are proprietors of the building known as the Portobello Town Hall. A portion of the building was let by the defenders to the Commissioners of Police of Portobello for the accommodation of the police of the burgh, under a written lease (being that now sought to be reduced) for 15 years, as from Whitsunday 1863, at a yearly rent of £80, payable by moieties at Martinmas and Whitsunday. Under this lease the Commissioners of Police entered to the premises at Whitsunday 1863, and, after having been in possession for about six months, they raised various objections to the validity of the lease, declining to pay the first half-year's rent, payable at Martinmas 1863. A suspension of a charge for payment of this rent, afterwards brought by the Commissioners on precisely the same grounds as those on which the lease is now sought to be reduced, was refused by the Court, with expenses, affirming the judgment of the Lord Ordinary on the Bills (Lord Curriehill). After payment of the rent charged for, the present action was brought to reduce the lease, the VOL. X. NO. CXV.- -JULY 1866.