of the forty-ninth parallel to the ocean, it will be found that the southern end of Vancouver's Island was alone the stumbling-block. The British government refused to concede it to the United States, four-fifths of the island being north of the forty-ninth parallel; and the southern end, with its harbors, being the most valuable portion. The United States, considering the disadvantages of a divided jurisdiction of the island, and the probabilities of difficulties arising therefrom, reluctantly yielded it. This was the sole object in deviating from the forty-ninth parallel, and reduces the water boundary to a very simple question. It was a second compromise line. Divested of all quibbles, the meaning of the treaty is that the forty-ninth parallel shall be the dividing line between the territories of the United States and the British possessions until it reaches "the middle" of the nearest natural boundary to Vancouver's Island; and thence the line shall be run to the ocean by the nearest natural boundary, in such a direction as will give the whole of Vancouver's Island to that power upon whose side the greatest portion would fall by the prolongation of the parallel to the ocean.

ARCHIBALD CAMPBELL, Commissioner Northwestern Boundary Survey.

Hon. LEWIS CASS,

Secretary of State.

The British govits intention of ob

No. 73.

Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons.

[Extracts.]

FOREIGN OFFICE, August 24, 1859.

The Earl of Aberdeen, to whom I have referred, informs me that he distinctly remembers the general tenor of his conversation with [112] Mr. MacLane on the subject of the Oregon boundary, and it is certain that it was the intention of the treaty to adopt the ernment announces mid-channel of the straits as the line of demarkation, without taining the island o any reference to islands, the position, and, indeed, the very existence, of which had hardly, at that time, been accurately ascertained; and he has no recollection of any mention having been made during the discussion of the Canal de Haro, or, indeed, any other channel than those described in the treaty itself.

San Juan.

I also inclose a memorandum drawn up by Sir Richard Pakenham, the negotiator of the treaty of 1846.

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The adoption of the central channel would give to Great Britain the island of San Juan, which is believed to be of little or no value to the United States, while much importance is attached by British colonial authorities, and by Her Majesty's government, to its retention as a dependency of the colony of Vancouver's Island.

Her Majesty's government must, therefore, under any circumstances, maintain the right of the British Crown to the island of San Juan. The interests at stake in connection with the retention of that island are too important to admit of compromise, and your lordship will consequently bear in mind that whatever arrangement as to the boundary line is finally arrived at, no settlement of the question will be accepted by Her Majesty's government which does not provide for the island of San Juan being reserved to the British Crown.

LORD LYONS, &c., &c., &c.

J. RUSSELL.

Sir Richard Pakenham on the Water Boundary under the Oregon treaty

of 1846.

Sir R. Pakenham

Rosario to be the

I have examined the papers put into my hands, by Mr. Hammond, relating to the line of boundary to be established between the British and the United States possessions on the north- in 1859 denies the west coast of America, and I have endeavored to call to mind channel of the treaty.. any circumstance which might have occurred at the time when the Oregon treaty was concluded (15th June, 1846) of a nature either to strengthen or invalidate the pretension now put forward by the United States Commissioner, to the effect that the boundary contemplated by

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the treaty would be a line passing down the middle of the channel [113] called Canal de Haro, and not, as suggested on the part of Great Britain, along the middle of the channel called Vancouver's or Rosario Strait, neither of which two lines could, as I conceive, exactly fulfill the conditions of the treaty, which, according to their literal tenor, would require the line to be traced along the middle of the channel (meaning, I presume, the whole intervening space) which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island. And I think I can safely assert that the treaty of 15th June, 1846, was signed and ratified without any intimation to us whatever, on the part of the United States. Government, as to the particular direction to be given to the line of boundary contemplated by article I of that treaty.

All that we knew about it was that it was to run "through the middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island, and thence southerly through the middle of the said channel and of Fuca's Straits to the Pacific Ocean.”

It is true that in a dispatch from Mr. MacLane, then United States. minister in London, to the Secretary of State, Mr. Buchanan, dated 18th May, 1846, which dispatch, however, was not made public until after the ratification of the treaty by the Senate, Mr. MacLane informs his government that the line of boundary about to be proposed by Her Majesty's government would "probably be substantially to divide the territory by the extension of the line in the parallel of 49° to the sea, that is to say, to the arm of the sea called Birch's Bay, thence by the Canal de Haro and straits of Fuca to the ocean."

It is also true that Mr. Senator Benton, one of the ablest and most zealous advocates for the ratification of the treaty, (relying, no doubt, on the statement furnished by Mr. MacLane,) did, in his speech on the subject, describe the intended line of boundary to be one passing along the middle of the Haro channel.

Sir R. Pakenham erdeen's instruction

But, on the other hand, the Earl of Aberdeen, in his final instructions, dated 18th May, 1846, says nothing whatever about the Canal de Haro, but, on the contrary, desires that the line misstates Lord Abmight be drawn "in a southerly direction through the cen- by suppressing his ter of King George's Sound and the Straits of Fuca to the channel of the treaty. Pacific Ocean."

description of the

It is my belief that neither Lord Aberdeen, nor Mr. MacLane, nor Mr. Buchanan possessed at that time a sufficiently accurate knowledge of the geography or hydrography of the region in question to enable them to define more accurately what was the intended line of boundary [114] than is expressed in the words of the *treaty, and it is certain

that Mr. Buchanan signed the treaty with Mr. MacLane's dispatch before him, and yet that he made no mention whatever of the "Canal de Haro ,, as that "through which the line of boundary would run, as understood by the United States government."

My own dispatch of that period contains no observation whatever of a tendency contrary to what I thus state from memory, and they, therefore, so far, plead in favor of the accuracy of my recollection.

Mr Cass on the

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No. 74.

Mr. Cass to Mr. Dallas.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

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Washington, October 20, 1859.

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SIR: The words of the treaty are "through the middle of said channel and of Fuca's Straits to the Pacific Ocean." Ordinarily, and in channel of the treaty. the absence of any other controlling circumstances, the way which would be selected from one given point to another would be the shortest and the best way. In the present case this is the Canal de Haro, which is, undoubtedly, the broadest, the deepest, and the shortest route by which the Straits of Fuca can be reached from the point of deflection. This pre-eminence was given to it by De Mofras as long ago as 1841, and it has been fully confirmed by subsequent surveys. The Canal de Haro may, therefore, be fairly regarded, from its own intrinsic merits merely, as the main channel down the middle of which the treaty boundary is to pass to the Straits of Fuca.

It is the only channel, moreover, which is consistent with the purpose of those who negotiated the treaty, for it is the only channel which separates Vancouver's Island from the continent without leaving something more to Great Britain south of the forty-ninth parallel than the southern cape of that island. The Rosario Channel, claimed by Captain Prevost, would surrender to Great Britain not only Vancouver's Island,

but the whole archipelago between that island and itself; while [115] the middle channel, which is *proposed as a compromise by Lord John Russell, would, in like manner, concede the important island

of San Juan.

These considerations seem to be almost conclusive in favor of the Haro Channel. But they are abundantly confirmed by evidence contemporaneous with the negotiation of the treaty. The description given by Mr. MacLane, immediately after he had an interview on the subject with Lord Aberdeen, of what the British proposal would be, has already been mentioned, and carries the line in so many words down the Canal de Haro. Equally clear is the statement of Senator Benton as to what the proposition was. Colonel Benton was one of the most earnest members of the Senate in his support of the treaty; and he was better acquainted, perhaps, than any other member with the geography of the region in dispute. His construction, therefore, of the treaty, at the very time it was before the Senate for ratification, is entitled to no inconsiderable weight. that occasion he said: "The first article is in the very words which I myself would have used, and that article constitutes

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the treaty. With me it is the treaty. question was that of boundary.

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the line reaches the channel which separates Vancouver's Island from the continent * it proceeds to the middle of the channel, and thence turning south through the channel de Haro (wrongly written

Arro in the maps) to the Straits of Fuca." Mr. Buchanan, who signed the treaty, was equally explicit in his understanding of this part of it. On the 28th December, 1846, Mr. Bancroft having written to him on the subject from London, he inclosed to him a traced copy of Wilkes's Chart of the Straits of Arro, and added in his letter: "It is not probable, however, that any claim of this character will be seriously preferred by Her Britannic Majesty's government to any island lying to the eastward of the Canal de Arro, as marked in Captain Wilkes's map of the Oregon Territory." Mr. Bancroft, who was a member of President Polk's Cabinet when the treaty was concluded, wrote repeatedly to Lord Palmerston after receiving this chart, and uniformly described the Straits of Arro "as the channel through the middle of which the boundary is to be continued." The Canal de Haro, then, as being the best channel leading from the point of deflection to the Straits of Fuca; as answering completely the purpose for which the deflection was made; as being the only channel between the island ]116] and the main-land *which does answer this purpose, and as being supported, also, by a large amount of personal testimony contemporaneous with the treaty, must fairly be regarded, in my judgment, as the treaty channel.

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Nor are there any important difficulties which seem to me to be necessarily in conflict with this conclusion. Lord John Russell, indeed, says that it is beyond dispute that the intentions of the British government were that the line of boundary should be drawn through Vancouver's Channel. But this assumption is wholly inconsistent, not only with the treaty itself, but with the statements both of the Earl of Aberdeen and of Sir Richard Pakenham. Lord Aberdeen declares that it was the intention of the treaty to adopt the mid-channel of the straits at the time of demarkation, without reference to islands, the position of which, and indeed the very existence of which, had hardly at that time been accurately ascertained; "and he has no recollection of any mention having been made during the discussion of any other channel than those described in the treaty itself." Sir Richard Pakenham is still more explicit. "Neither the Canal de Haro nor the channel of Vancouver," he says, "could, as I conceive, exactly fulfill the conditions of the treaty which, according to their literal tenor, would require the line to be traced along the middle of the channel, meaning, I presume, the whole intervening space which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island." He adds further, that he has no recollection whatever that any other channel was designated in the discussions than that described in the language of the treaty. Surely there is nothing in this testimony which supports the statement of Lord John Russell that the channel of Vancouver was the channel intended by the treaty; but on the contrary another and entirely different channel is suggested as that which the convention requires. After these statements of Lord Aberdeen and Sir Richard Pakenham, the Rosario Channel can no longer, it seems to me, be placed in competition with the Canal de Haro. Whether the latter is the true channel or not, in the opinion of the British negotiation, it is quite certain, by the concurrent testimony of both the American and British negotiators, that the former channel is not. In respect, moreover, to the Canal de Haro, the other considerations to which I have referred appear to me to quite outweigh the mere want of recollection of Lord Aberdeen and Sir Richard Pakenham, or their general impression at this time as to what is required by the literal language of the treaty.

[117]

*There is one allusion in Sir Richard Pakenham's memorandum to which I think it right to call your special attention. It is the

reference which he makes to his final instructions from Lord Aberdeen, dated May 18, 1846, and describing the boundary line which he was authorized to propose to Mr. Buchanan. These instructions were shown by Lord Napier to Mr. Campbell, and according to his clear recollection, the description quoted by Sir Richard Pakenham was followed in dispatch by these words: "Thus giving to Great Britain the whole of Vancouver's Island and its harbors." This places beyond controversy the object which was intended by deflecting the treaty boundary south of the parallel of 49°, and ought to have great weight, undoubtedly, in determining the true channel from the point, of deflection to the Straits of Fuca. * * *

GEORGE M. DALLAS, Esq.

LEWIS CASS.

The British governnot claim the so

No. 75.

Lord John Russell to Lord Lyons.

[Extracts.]

FOREIGN OFFICE, December 16, 1859.

MY LORD: In pointing out, therefore, to your Lordship that in whatever manner the question was ultimately settled, Her Majesment in 1859 does ty's government could not yield the island of San Juan, Her called Rosario as the Majesty's government were, by implication, abandoning a large part of the territory they had claimed, and were merely insisting on the retention of an island, which, from the peculiarity of its situation, it was impossible for Her Majesty's government to cede without compromising interests of the gravest importance.

boundary.

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The fact is, that, by the instructions with which Captain Prevost was furnished, he was authorized, in case he should be of opinion that the claims of Her Majesty's government, to consider the Rosario Strait as the channel of the treaty, could not be sustained, to adopt any other intermediate channel on which he and the United States commissioner might agree.

[118]

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** *Sir R. Pakenham seems to think that the conditions of the treaty would obtain their most exact fulfillment if the line were carried through the Douglas Channel.

* * * Or, again, if it would be inconvenient to both nations to have five or six islands partially divided between them, would it not be fair and expedient to look for a channel which shall be the nearest approximation to that line, midway between the continent and the island of Vancouver, which is designated by the treaty? And if Douglas's Channel fulfills this condition, is it not the line most in accordance with the treaty, as well as with general policy and convenience?

Lord J. Russell

moderation of his

* * * If I notice General Cass's allusion to the letters which he says Mr. Bancroft repeatedly wrote to Lord Palmerston does injustice to the in 1848, it is only for the purpose of placing on record what, own administration no doubt, Mr. Bancroft duly reported to his government at erston gave the ac- the time, viz, that Lord Palmerston gave Mr. Bancroft disquiescence of silence. tinctly to understand that the British government did not acquiesce in the pretensions of the United States that the boundary line should be run down the Haro Channel. * **

in 1848. Lord Palm

LORD LYONS.

J. RUSSELL.