THE REPUBLIC OF PERU.

This republic, by its agent, claimed indemnity for loss of guano shipped in American vessels and destroyed by the insurgent cruisers. These claims were dismissed by the court.

VESSELS UNDER FOREIGN COLORS.

(See Stevens rs. The United States; Schrieber & Meyer vs. The United States, post.)

THE HARVEST.

Mary Eldridge vs. The United States, No. 1254: This claim was brought by the mother and attorney in fact of John P. Eldridge, master of the bark Harvest, the latter being absent at sea.

The Harvest, a whaling-vessel, was destroyed when sailing under Hawaiian colors.

This petition and others, for loss sustained by seamen on this vessel, were dismissed.

PRACTICE.

(As to the practice of the court on motions for a rehearing, see case of Ann Eliza Gannett, administratrix, vs. The United States, post.)

It was further decided in several cases that after judgment and receipt of the money by the claimant, the usual rule would be adhered to, denying motion for a rehearing.

The question of amendments was ruled upon in the case of Schrieber et al., (post,) and generally amendments were allowed after the time for filing petitions had elapsed, where they did not have the effect of making a new claim or enlarging the old one. Before the time for filing petitions had elapsed all amendments were allowed.

In no case was the court called upon to punish for contempt or perjury, nor was any process issued to enforce the production of books and

papers.

COUNSEL FEES.

Section 18 of the act of June 23, 1874, provides that "at the time of the giving of the judgment the court shall, upon motion of the attorney or counsel for the claimant, allow out of the amount thereby awarded, such reasonable counsel and attorneys' fees" as the court shall determine "is just and reasonable," which allowance shall be entered as part of the judgment in such case, and shall be made specifically payable "to the attorney or counsel, or both."

Motions under this section were made in several cases. In one instance the motion was made after entry of judgment, but before it had been reported to the Secretary of State. Counsel who made the motion argued that under the words of the statute, viz, "at the time of the giving the judgment," his right to judgment for his fees was not excluded, because, in accordance with a well-known rule of practice, the judgment was under the control of the court during the term of the court at which it was rendered, and the term of the court in this case continued until the judgment had been certified to the Secretary of State. The motion was allowed.

In another case counsel moved for an allowance before entry of judg ment for an amount agreed upon between the complainants and himself.

The motion was denied, the court stating that this section of the act seems to refer to cases of disagreement between counsel and claimants, in which injustice is likely to be done to counsel, when the court is authorized to examine the circumstances of his employment the services rendered, and to fix such an amount as the court shall determine to be just and reasonable. That the fact that an attorney may be put to delay in receiving his money cannot be considered by the court, and no relief can be given counsel on that account.

Again counsel moved for an allowance under this section, stating that he had been employed by the attorney for the claimant to argue the cause and had prepared the argument, when other counsel were retained in bis stead. The court refused an allowance, not doubting that the counsel had rendered important services in the preparation of the case, but holding that they "under that section have the power to allow compensation only to the counsel or attorney who has actually appeared before the court and rendered services in the case in court, or, at least, who has been authorized by a claimant to appear as his counsel or attorney on the records of the court." All of which is respectfully submitted.

JOHN DAVIS, Clerk, &c.

Under the act of Congress creating this tribunal, it can entertain jurisdiction of claims for the loss of property only. It has no jurisdiction to hear, determine, and allow claims for damages caused by injury to the person.

The facts and proceedings appear in the opinion of the court.
Mr. B. S. Roberts for the complainant Williams.

Mr. J. Daniels for the complainant Whiting.

Messrs. Paine & Grafton for the complainant Brown.

Mr. J. A. J. Creswell for the respondents.

BALDWIN, J., delivered the opinion of the court:

In case No. 87 the petitioner represents that she sailed from the port of Foo-Chow, China, on the 7th of November, 1862, on board of the American ship Jacob Bell; that the said ship was on the 12th of February, 1863, captured by the confederate steamer Florida and burned, and that she lost thereby valuable goods, wares, merchandise, and other personal property. And in a separate and distinct count she asks and prays for judgment for direct damages because of permanent loss of health from exposure, prostration of nervous system, of suffering of mind and body, by reason of the capture on the high seas by pirates, and asks judgment therefor.

In case No. 160 the petitioner represents that he shipped on board of the Levi Starbuck, in the month of October, 1862, for a whaling-voyage of three years, and after crossing the Gulf stream said vessel was captured by the rebel steamer Alabama; that the Starbuck was immedi ately burned by the Alabama; that the officers and crew of the Starbuck, including himself, were placed in irons and kept in close confinement on board of the Alabama for sixteen days; that during the nighttime, for the whole of that period, he was kept in irons—confined in the hold of the vessel, in a small, filthy place, &c. After sixteen days of confinement he was set at liberty in an exhausted and enfeebled condition. And, notwithstanding he has employed the best medical aid within his reach, he has continued and still is in a condition little better than entire helplessness; that is to say, he is crippled in hands and feet for life, as he verily believes. He further states that when he was captured by the Alabama he was in good health, strong and robust; that he is advised that his sickness and present physical condition are the result of and directly chargeable to the treatment he received on board of the Alabama, as aforesaid. And for these injuries he asks judgment.

In case No. 286 the claimant represents that about the 26th of December, 1863, the ship Sonora was boarded in the Straits of Malacca by a boat's crew from the Alabama, who seized and burned the vessel, and cast the petitioner, who was the captain of the ship, and the other officers and crew of the Sonora, adrift at sea, in open boats, without provisions, water, charts, compass, or sails; that the petitioner made. for the port of Penang, which he reached on the 30th of December, having suffered great dangers and privations while at sea in the open boat. For this injury he claims compensation.

To each of these petitions a demurrer has been filed by the counsel for the United States, and the objections raised by the demurrer are: First, that the damages claimed do not directly result from acts of the socalled insurgent cruisers Alabama, Florida, and the Shenandoah, or their tenders; and, second, that this court has no jurisdiction to hear, determine, and allow claims or damages for injuries to persons; that it has jurisdiction to allow damages for injury to property only. Holding as we do upon the second question presented by the demurrer, it becomes unimportant for us to consider whether the damages claimed are too indirect or remote to entitle these petitioners to recover. The most important question raised by the demurrer in these cases is whether this court has jurisdiction, under the act of Congress creating it, to hear, determine, and allow claims for personal injuries of the character named in these petitions; that is, for injuries to the health and bodies of the claimants, caused, as it is alleged, by the acts of the officers and crews of the so-called rebel cruisers. Section 11 of the act referred to confers jurisdiction upon this court to hear and determine all claims admissible under the said act. And in section 12 it has defined the claims not admissible in this court. These two sections confer and limit the jurisdiction of this court. Section 11 provides that it shall be the duty of this court to receive and examine all claims admissible under this act that may be presented to it, directly resulting from damages caused by the so-called insurgent steamers Alabama, Florida, and their tenders, and the Shenandoah, after a certain date. The act itself nowhere defines the class of cases that are admissible. The question then arises as to what is the proper consideration to be given to the words "receive and examine all claims admissible directly resulting from damages caused," &c. Could it have been the

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intention of Congress, in the language here used, for this court to take jurisdiction of and hear and determine all claims growing out of the acts of the said cruisers, whether claims for which Great Britain might have been held liable or not? or for claims that had never been presented or considered by either government, or at the tribunal of Geneva? Or was it intended to include only such claims or classes of claims that had been presented and considered, or had some known character or classification? In order to determine the legislative intent in the language used, we adopt the usual rule in the construction of statutes, and seek to ascertain, if possible, such intent from the subject-matter to which the act relates. What was the subject-matter of this legislation? The creation of a court for the adjudication and disbursement of certain moneys received into the Treasury of the United States under an award made by the Tribunal of Arbitration, constituted by the first article of the Treaty of Washington, &c. To this tribunal were referred certain claims growing out of acts committed by certain vessels, and known as the "Alabama Claims." In pursuance of the award of this tribunal these moneys were paid into the Treasury of the United States. Now, what was the nature and classification of these claims as presented by the counsel for the Government of the United States? In note D, p. 249, vol. III, Papers Releating to the Treaty of Washington, we find the following divisions and classifications of these claims as presented to that tribunal by such counsel. They say:

The claims now under discussion, excluding those for increased war-premiums, may be divided into two general classes: 1. Claims for the alleged value of property destroyed by the several cruisers. 2. Claims arising from damages in the destruction of property, but over and above its value. Under the first class should be included, (a) owners' claims for the value of goods destroyed; (b) merchants' claims for the value of goods destroyed; (c) whalers' and fishermen's claims for the value of oil or fish destroyed; (d) passengers', officers', and sailors' claims for the value of personal property destroyed; (e) the claims of insurance companies for the values of property destroyed for which they had paid the owners the insurance. Under the second class of claims would be included, (a) owners' claims for the loss of charter-parties, freights, &c.; (b) merchants' claims for the loss of expected profits on goods; (c) whalers' and fishermen's claims for the prospective catch of oil or fish; (d) passengers' claims for various injuries other than in the loss of baggage; (e) officers' and sailors' claims for wages and expenses until their arrival home.

Two of these claimants would fall within class (e,) officers or sailors. No claims were presented for this class excepting for the value of personal property destroyed and wages and expenses until they arrive home. The other claimant, being a passenger, would fall in class (d,) and the only claims presented for this class were for the value of personal property destroyed, and for various injuries other than the loss of baggage. In the argument that follows, in explanation of the character of claims falling in these several classifications, no claims for injuries are named other than those for personal property, and injuries to persons are not mentioned. And wherever these claims are referred to by counsel in the presentation of their case, and whenever they speak of claims of individuals for personal injuries, they appear to have had in mind and spoke of none other than for injury to property. For instance, by reference to that portion of the argument upon page 185, of vol. I, Papers Relating to the Treaty of Washington, we find the claims, as stated by the American agent, classified as follows:

1. The claim for direct losses growing out of the destruction of vessels and their cargoes by the insurgent cruisers.

2. The natural expenditures in the pursuit of those cruisers.

3. The loss in the transfer of the American commercial marine to the British flag. 4. The enhanced payments of insurance.

5. The prolongation of the war, and the addition of a large sum to the cost of the war and the suppression of the rebellion.

So far as these various losses and expenditures grew out of the acts committed by the several cruisers, the United States are entitled to ask compensation and remuneration there for before this trbunal.

The claims for direct losses growing out of the destruction of vessels and their cargoes may be further subdivided into, 1st. Claims for the destruction of vessels and property of the Government of the United States. 2d. Claims for the destruction of vessels and property under the flag of the United States. 3d. Claims for damages or injury to persons growing out of the destruction of each class of vessels.

He then proceeds to say that in the accompanying volume, 7, of the proceedings of the Geneva tribunal, will be found ample data for determining the amount of damages which should be awarded in consequence of the injuries inflicted by the destruction of vessels or property, whether of the Government or of private persons. Now, by reference to volume 7, we find the claims of private persons to be for losses of vessels, loss of cargo, loss of personal effects, loss of wages, of stores, of freight-money, of commissions, of trunks, wearing apparel, articles of trade, &c. Throughout the whole list thus referred to in volume 7, we find no claims whatever of private persons for injuries for anything else than for property.

Again, the counsel for the claimants refer to that portion of the argument in behalf of the United States (p. 215, 3d vol. Papers Relating to Treaty of Washington) wherein they say that the United States claim indemnity in like manner for vessels and other actual property of the United States destroyed, and for immediate personal injuries to the officers and crew. Now, by reference to the argument on the next page, we find the following language used: "The nature of these reclamations is explained in the American case and in the appendix thereto, especially in the seventh volume; and in supplementary documents there will be found detailed statements, made on oath, with valuations and other particulars for the information of the tribunal." We find nothing in the appendix or in volume 7 giving any information whatever in reference to this kind of claim. In our examination of all the correspondence upon the part of the representatives of our Government, as well as that of Great Britain, in relation to what is known as the "Alabama claims,” from their inception down to and during the treaty at Washington, and in the examination of all the papers and correspondence submitted by our Government at the time of the treaty and during the whole of the discussion before the Geneva tribunal, both in the case of the United States and in the counter-case, we have not been able to find any allusion, in any manner whatever, by either government, to claims of the character presented by these claimants. And claims for injuries to the persons of individuals were in no way presented or considered or discussed before or at the time of the final award by the Tribunal of Arbitration. It is conceded that these claims were not presented to or considered by that tribunal.

Now, if this is true that no such class of claims were ever considered or presented at the time of the treaty, or at the time when this final award was made, what, then, must have been the character of claims that Congress intended should be adjudicated by this court? When the proper disposition of this money was considered by Congress, the main controversy appeared to be in regard to the rights of insurance companies to participate in the benefits of this award, and the whole discussion before Congress seemed to turn upon this particular question alone. Neither in the Senate or House of Representatives was there any reference made to claims of the character presented by these complainants. From the language used in the various sections of the act, it appears