"The Tunisian Regency is now de jure and de facto an integral part of the Ottoman empire;" and nearly all the Powers of Europe appear to have entertained the same opinion. England, Austria, and Russia officially congratulated the Bey on the reception of the firman, and have, as well as other Powers, acted upon it ever since. The Liberal Cabinet of England took a prominent part in the negotiations which led to the action of the Porte in 1871; and the activity of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville in assisting the Bey to obtain the firman when France was weak in 1871, forms a striking contrast to the apathy with which they have witnessed its destruction in 1881 when France is strong, powerful, and therefore to be dreaded. In 1878 the Bey sent both money and supplies to Constantinople, and Russia withdrew her Consul from Tunis on the outbreak of hostilities. The German Emperor in 1872 refused to receive a Tunisian envoy unless presented by the Turkish ambassador, and England has invariably assumed a similar position.

With these unavoidable references to the history of Tunis in the past, I now propose to sketch the events which led to and attended the recent French invasion of the country, and culminated in the signing of the Treaty of KasrEssaid on the 12th May 1881. In 1876 Monsieur Theodore Roustan arrived at Tunis as French Chargé d'Affaires. Restless, ambitious, and energetic, he soon evinced a disposition to advance French interests in the country with a high hand. Two years later Signor Licurgo Macciò, an old rival of M. Roustan's in Egypt, succeeded to the post of Italian Consul-General in Tunis, and seemed determined to contest his French colleague's endeavours to assert for France

an exclusive prépondérance at the Tunisian Court. About this time the capabilities of Tunis as a field for enterprise and speculation attracted the attention of the capitalists of Paris and Marseilles, and the Société des Comptoirs Maritimes, the Société Marseillaise, and the Société des Batignolles hastened to establish branches in the Regency. In M. Roustan they found an able and devoted ally. The Bey was induced to grant to the last-named Company a concession to construct a railway across his territory towards the Tunisian frontier, and a year later he unwillingly permitted the constructors to effect a junction with the Algerian lines. Five years ago a very similar grant was made to an Englishman; but as the pecuniary success of the undertaking was more than problematical, the project wholly failed to find favour in the English market. M. Roustan, however, induced the Government of the Republic to guarantee a satisfactory interest on the necessary capital; and it was then he must have unfolded his plans, which, three years later, resulted in the events which Europe has witnessed during the past three months. Not content with the success achieved by the Société des Batignolles, M. Roustan embarked on other similar adventures in aid of "French interests." Seven years before, the Bey of Tunis had granted to M. de Sancy a vast domain, to be held under certain specific conditions, called Sidi Tabet. The grant was purely personal, and amongst other things M. de Sancy engaged to maintain on the estate such an establishment as would conduce to the improvement of the native breed of horses. According to the terms of his agreement with the Tunisian Government, M. de Sancy's rights were forfeited, and an attempt was made by the Bey

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(who even then appears to have become alarmed at M. Roustan's progress) to recover possession of the property in the manner prescribed by the original deed of gift. M. Roustan, however, promptly intervened; the Tunisian Minister was obliged to publicly demand pardon for invading a French possession, and M. de Sancy's grant was renewed, but with powers of cession. The domain of Sidi Tabet has now passed into the hands of the Société Marseillaise. Shortly afterwards a M. Oscar Gay arrived at Tunis. brought with him a project, which appears to have been of too advanced a nature even for M. Roustan, although he very strongly supported it. M. Gay desired to rebuild the city, and reconstruct the ports, of Carthage. The Bey refused to accept his proposals, and he was obliged to rest contented with a considerable indemnity for lost time, and the Grand Cordon of the Tunisian Order. During 1880 M. Roustan pressed the granting of several other concessions on the Bey, but in the summer of that year he received a temporary check which has never been forgotten or forgiven. The English railway between Tunis and the Goletta came into the market, and after a spirited competition it was purchased by the Italian Rubattino Company. M. Roustan at once obtained grants for lines to the coast and to Bizerta, and a general undertaking from the Tunisian Governments to refrain refrain from allowing the construction of any other railways in the country without first offering them to French capitalists. M. Macciò now deavoured to obtain permission to connect the Regency with the telegraphic lines of Italy by a submarine cable; but M. Roustan induced the Bey to refuse his consent, although the French pretensions to

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monopolise telegraphic communication could on no ground be defended. Shortly afterwards a concession was granted for the construction of a port at Tunis, which would render the Rubattino line

practically useless. During the summer of 1880 M. Roustan first intimated to the Bey his plans for the establishment over the Regency of a French Protectorate; and as time went on, he pressed the matter with increasing energy on Muhamedes-Sadik, but without any favourable result. The Bey informed the Sultan of these proposals, and seemed inclined to court the aid of

Italy. Matters were in this position at the beginning of the present year, when the dispute commonly known as the Enfida case attracted public attention in England to Tunis, and more particularly to M. Roustan's proceedings. The ex

Prime Minister of Tunis, Kheir-edDin Pacha, possessed an enormous domain in the neighbourhood of the city of Cairwán called the "Enfida." An English subject, Mr. Levy, was the proprietor of a neighbouring estate, known as the

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Suyah." Mr. Levy was in treaty for the purchase of the Enfida, when the Société Marseillaise intervened and induced the Pacha to sell it to them. According to the local law of Tunis, adjoining proprietors have the right of exercising preemption, and obtaining possession of the property sold, on repaying the purchase-money, with certain formalities, to the original vendee. This right was exercised by Mr. Levy, and the local courts put him in possession of the Enfida. M. Roustan forcibly ejected Mr. Levy's agents from a house on the estate, but failed to deprive him of the bulk of the property. The matter was referred to England: two ships of war were sent to counteract M. Roustan's attempt

to overawe the Tunisian authorities, and to this day Mr. Levy remains the occupant of the Enfida. The action of the Government in this matter, rightly or wrongly, impressed the Bey with a conviction that England was not prepared to surrender her interests in Tunis, and that Mr. Gladstone would adopt a policy in conformity with his views of 1871. M. Roustan next demanded, on behalf of a M. Renault, the authorisation of the Bey for the formation of an Agricultural Bank, with peculiar and exclusive privileges; and his request was refused. During the months of January and February in the present year, the Havas Telegraphic Agency and the French press entered on an active campaign against Tunis, taking the Enfida case and the Agricultural Bank as their text; and the assertion of French prépondérance, the establishment of the Protectorate, or even the total annexation of the Regency, were openly discussed. A French writer in a very remarkable pamphlet, Les Français en Tunisie,' alludes in the following terms to the means used to justify the approaching campaign in the eyes of France:

"C'est en cela," writes Videns, "consiste l'art moderne des gouvernants. Ils ont pour instruments choisis, dans l'exercise de cet art, les Agences télégraphiques, qui sont à leurs ordres: pour instruments volontaires les journaux juifs, ou financiers, c'est la même chose, et il y en a beaucoup: pour instruments aveugles ou inconscients, les malheureux journaux, même honnêtes, contraints par la nécessité de fournir des nouvelles à leurs abonnés, de reproduire les dépêches et les correspondences toutes faites des Agences, dont il leur est matériellement impossible de se passer."

The Italian and English press, however, strongly advocated the maintenance of the status quo in Tunis; and it soon became evident

that some better excuse for proceeding to extremities than the Enfida case must be put forward. The action of M. Roustan in that matter had wellnigh involved France in a very disagreeable complication. During the early days. of March, M. St. Hilaire thought it prudent to distinctly deny any desire on the part of France to obtain a protectorate over Tunis.

The activity of M. Roustan enabled him in a short time to furnish his Government with a fresh pretext for hostile action towards the Tunisian Government, and with one which entailed no undesirable entanglement with a European Power. He fell back on the time-honoured casus belli of a frontier raid. Between Tunis and Algeria is a spur of the Atlas range, stretching from a point some sixty miles inland to the shores of the Mediterranean near Tabarca. One slope is inhabited by the Tunisian tribe of Hamirs (any other rendering of the name is absolutely incorrect), while the other is peopled by the Algerian tribe of Nehed. The Hamirs are sturdy, warlike, and quarrelsome agriculturists, never too loyal subjects of the Bey, but by no means the brigands they have been described to be. In the last days of March a dispute arose between some of the Hamirs and their neighbours the Neheds, and in an affray a Hamir was killed and some Nehed tents burned. A company of French soldiers interfered; the Hamirs were attacked on Tunisian territory, and five French soldiers and several Hamirs lost their lives in the mêlée. This occurred on the 31st March; and within six weeks from that time, Tunis, as an independent country, ceased to exist, and the Sultan was deprived of one of his richest and most important dependencies.

The important rôle of the Havas Telegraphic Agency now began. The Hamir raids were exaggerated; and as the massacre of Colonel Flatters' expedition happened to occur at the same time, care was taken to confuse as much as possible the two events. Battles between the Algerians and the Hamirs were described one day and contradicted the next, and public excitement in France soon reached a pitch which permitted of no delay on the part of the Government. It was decided to punish the Hamirs. Preparations were commenced in Algeria and in France, and M. St. Hilaire distinctly assured both Signor Cairoli and Lord Granville that France had no other ulterior views beyond the vindication of her honour and the prevention of further disorders on the frontiers. These declarations were explicit, clear, and unmistakable. On the 11th April 1881, M. Jules Ferry denied that France had any idea of conquest, and assured the French Chamber of Deputies (with reference to an insinuation to the contrary) that "entre cette opération militaire et l'affaire d'Enfida il n'y a aucune relation, directe ou indirecte." With these assurances England and Italy had no other alternative but to remain content. On the 7th April M. Roustan announced to the Tunisian Government that the French Republic "a décidé d'infliger un châtiment à quelques-unes des tribus Tunisiennes." The Bey immediately answered that he was able and willing to inflict himself any punishment France desired on the frontier tribes, and respectfully protested in his own name and that of his suzerain against the violation of his territory, and the consequences which might ensue therefrom. As M. St. Hilaire refused to alter his purpose, the Bey addressed a second letter to

M. Roustan, as well as a circular to the foreign representatives, in which he set forth the difficulties of his position, and renewed his protests against the invasion of the Regency.

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In order to give France immediate proof of his ability to control the Hamírs, and afford any satisfaction which might be asked on account of the alleged raids, the Bey despatched his brother with a large force to the frontier; and within ten days he had received the submission, not only of the Hamirs, but of all the other mountain clans. The French preparations, however, increased in magnitude; the Bey in alarm appealed to the Sultan, and on the 18th April addressed fresh protests to M. Roustan. the 25th April, M. St. Hilaire saw Lord Lyons; and the French programme appears to have been considerably extended since M. Ferry's declaration of a fortnight previous. M. St. Hilaire then told Lord Lyons that "the objects of the French expedition were to chastise the lawless tribes, to insure the permanent establishment of order on the frontier, to settle outstanding claims, and to take effectual securities against Tunis being used by any foreign Power as a means of disturbing the French rule in Algeria." On the same day the invading force entered Tunisian territory. Five days before, M. Roustan had again demanded the Bey's permission for the French troops to land at Tabarca, and his Highness had refused to accede to the request. On the 26th April, Generals Forgemol and Vincendon entered the Hamír country and attacked the Hamirs at Ain Ismain. At the same time four French ironclads bombarded the ancient fortress of Tabarca. The Tunisian officer in charge of the fort declined to surrender it to the French of his own accord without the Bey's in

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structions, and while he was waiting for them he was unexpectedly attacked. About fifty Tunisian soldiers were killed, and the officer managed to escape wounded to the shore. The French flag was once hoisted on the Tabarca fort. Although the progress of Generals Forgemol and Vincendon in the forest-covered fastnesses of the Hamírs was necessarily slow, their delay was amply compensated for by great activity in other directions. On the 1st May the French occupied the port of Bizerta, which will in a few years, in all probability, become the most important harbour in the Mediterranean. Two days previously another force under General Logerot had taken Kef, and subsequently pushed on to Souk el - Arba, a station on the French railway. Meanwhile the alarm at the Bardo palace increased apace. The Bey telegraphed appeals to the Powers; these appeals were repeated even with greater force by the Sultan, and yet no sign was made.

M. St.

Hilaire repeated his pacific assurances. The European colonists, becoming more and more uneasy, addressed their respective Consuls as to the dangers of the situation. On the day the French troops entered Kef, M. Roustan writes as follows to his subordinates throughout the Regency: "There is no need for alarm; the French troops are only come to punish the Hamirs, and not to make war against the Bey of Tunis." The garrison of Bizerta was rapidly augmented, and in a a few days Generals Bréart and Maurand were in command of 12,000 men. The French flag was ostentatiously displayed on the citadel, the forts were furnished with French artillery, and the general in command styled himself officially "Governor of Bizerta." On the 5th May the

Bey communicated a further protest to the Powers by telegraph. The occupation of Bizerta had directed public attention in England and Italy still closer to the Tunisian question; Lord Granville and Signor Cairoli received fresh assurances that this step only formed part of the original plan of operations against the Hamírs, and appear to have been convinced by them. On the 9th May a column under General Bréart left Bizerta, and having crossed the Medjerda, took up a position near Saballa, barely ten miles from the capital. The following day, however, the French troops marched by way of the Sidi Tabet estate to Djedeida, a station on the French railway. The Bey's fears greatly increased, and on the 11th May he telegraphed by way of Italy the following last appeal to the Powers:

"To Earl GRANVILLE, London.The advance of the French troops in this Regency continues. Hitherto we have succeeded in reassuring our subjects by reiterated declarations that the French operations would be strictly confined to the punishment of the Kroumirs. We believed that the assurances given to the Powers and to our suzerain justified our so doing. Notwithstanding these protestations, the French camp is to-day within 17 miles of our capital, and during their march the French forces approached it even nearer. These undeniable facts tend materially to lessen the effect of the injunctions we have given our subjects, and have even led to our own conduct being very seriously animadverted on in our own dominions. We have redoubled our efforts to persuade our subjects to offer no resistance to this invasion, but our task becomes more difficult as a disregard of the assurances given becomes more apparent. Is it possible for us to tell how long we may be able to maintain order among the unoffending tribes, who see their dwellings, herds, and crops sacrificed by the march of the French troops? In these circumstances, and