in view of the extreme urgency of the case, we implore the British Government, as well as the Governments of the other great Powers, to take such measures as may at least induce the Government of the French Republic to declare its intentions in respect to our Regency, and make known the complaints which it may consider itself justified to prefer against us.MUHAMED-ES-SADIK."

The next morning the interpreter of M. Roustan brought a letter to the Bey, in which he stated that the French Government had appointed General Bréart to tender a treaty for his acceptance, and that he requested the Bey to grant him an interview in the afternoon. He also asked the Bey's permission for the general to bring with him a detachment of troops from Djedeida. The Bey answered that although he should be happy to receive General Bréart, he strongly deprecated any approach of the French troops to wards Tunis. This letter had barely been forwarded to Tunis, when the advance-guard of General Bréart's troops was observed crossing the low hills in the direction of Djedeida. Before noon 4000 men had encamped in the gardens of Manozzba, barely two miles from the palace. Two batteries of artillery were ostentatiously displayed, and the outposts were pushed to the immediate vicinity of the Bey's residence at Kasr-es-Said. It is difficult to describe the terror excited amongst its inmates, who viewed the approach of the French from the upper windows. The effect of the demonstration was remarkable, and the Bey's advisers seemed at once to lose all hope. The attendants conversed in whispers, and at four o'clock M. Roustan arrived. He was soon followed by General Bréart, who was accompanied by twenty officers of his staff fully armed, and a numerous

escort.

On entering the Bey's room

he at once presented him with a draft treaty, which he said the French Government desired the Bey to sign that night before eight o'clock. The Bey asked for time, but General Bréart would only grant the extension of a single hour. The draft was then read over to the Bey, and for some time he declined even to consider it. He requested the general to inform him of the consequences of a refusal, whereupon M. Roustan answered that they would be of a very serious character. A friend of M. Roustan whispered them to the Bey. The penalty of non-compliance was to be the deposition of Muhamed-esSadik in favour of his younger brother Sidi Taib, and the condign punishment of the Prime Minister, Mustapha ben Ismail. Sidi Taib had lent a ready ear to the French proposals, and was at that moment waiting at the Marsa for the escort of French troops which was to convey him to the Bardo. The Bey then resolved to lay the matter before his Council. Ten of the councillors were in in the palace; and while nine of them advised the Bey to yield, the tenth declared death was preferable to such disgrace. Even then the Bey hesitated. He asked for an Arabic translation of the treaty, and to be allowed to sign under protest. Both requests were refused him. The ladies of the palace, terrified by the presence of the French soldiers, sent frequent messages imploring him to sign. The Beys of Tunis invariably affix their signet to documents of this kind, but in the present instance time would not allow of the seal being sent for. At seven o'clock he signed the French treaty and became a vassal of France, under terms even more onerous than those which Charles V. had imposed on his predecessor Mouley Hassan three

centuries and a half ago. While General Bréart was negotiating at the Bardo, M. St. Hilaire was even at the eleventh hour making the most pacific disclaimers in the French Chambers. On the 9th May he had, however, issued a remarkable circular which admitted to a certain extent the real objects of the Tunisian expedition, and in which, for the first time, he abandoned the plea of Hamír punishment. It will be curious to observe how he can reconcile these declarations with M. Ferry's statements in the Chamber exactly one month before. In this circular M. St. Hilaire sets forth the various reasons which have induced France to have recourse to other means as regards Tunis than "la discussion loyale et la persuasion." He then proceeds to enumerate the dispute as to the Tunis and Goletta railway, the Italian attempt to establish a submarine cable between Tunis and Italy, the opposition to the French railway to Susa, and lastly, "la question du domaine de l'Enfida qu'on essaye de ravir par des moyens illégaux à une compagnie Marseillaise aussi honnête que laborieuse." The Hamír raids are barely mentioned, but the real object of the French expedition is clearly revealed.

The treaty of Kasr-Essaid contains ten articles. The French Republic agrees to protect the Bey against all foreign Powers, and the Bey consents that his interests in Europe shall be exclusively represented by French diplomatists. The Bey yields to France the surveillance of the frontier and the coast, which may be carried out by the occupation of all places deemed necessary, until both Governments can agree as to the Bey being in a position to maintain tranquillity unaided. The Bey agrees to enter into no engagement of an interna

tional character without the consent of France, and renders himself responsible for the payment of a war indemnity by the offending tribes. The Bey consents that France shall remodel the system under which the finances of the country are at present administered. By this treaty the suzerainty of the Sultan is set aside, and that of France substituted in its stead; the right to an occupation of any part of the country by France is secured; the interests and treaty-rights of all other Powers are wholly disregarded, and the finances of the country handed over to those very speculators who have provoked the aggression. All this has been achieved by a war carried on in defiance of every rule of the law of nations, but against which no European Government has cared to raise its voice. It is in vain for the Bey to any longer protest. His old suzerain the Sultan considers him as a traitor, while his old allies the European Powers regard him as a French vassal. It is true that Lord Granville has written to M. St. Hilaire a remonstrance which would have considerable effect under ordinary circumstances. Such, however, has been the duplicity displayed by French statesmen in the Tunis question, that it will probably be received by them as the necessary and expected consequence of their own conduct. The Porte forwarded a solemn protest to his European allies, but neither Lord Granville's letter nor the appeals of the Sultan have had the smallest effect. On the 8th June, the Bey was forced by M. Roustan to issue a decree nominating the French Minister Resident as the sole intermediary for communication between the representatives of the Powers and the Tunisian Government; and within two hours M. Roustan promulgates this decree in an arrogant

never

circular to his former colleagues. This, too, is accepted by the Government which ten years ago helped to obtain the firman of 1871, and still considers Tunis an integral part of the Ottoman empire. Although we have had a Political Agent "near" the Beys of Tunis since 1690, Sir Charles Dilke assures the House of Commons that "access" to the Bey was an essential part of his functions. England has accepted the position of her representative at Tunis being virtually accredited to the French Minister Resident, and her colonists being practically under French protection. Neither Lord Neither Lord Granville nor Sir Charles Dilke can prevent a widespread appreciation of the ignominy of the situation, or of the humiliation England has suffered by the latest phase of the Tunisian question. It is useless to endeavour to shift the blame for what has happened to the shoulders of Lord Salisbury. Nobody can believe that the recent action of the French in Tunis was contemplated, when Lord Salisbury spoke at Berlin of the "legitimate extension of French interests" in that country. As Lord Salisbury well observed in the House of Lords, on the 21st June, "the Tunisian question has entered on a new phase.' If Lord Salisbury had invited M. Waddington to "take Carthage," as France would have us believe, there would have now been no necessity for the miserable pretexts of Hamir raids or frontier aggressions, or for the constant exercise of a duplicity in negotiation certainly unparalleled in the annals of diplomacy.

vented for weeks the formation of a Ministry, a powerful party demanded war against France at any price, and Garibaldi sent forth impassioned appeals from Caprera, imploring Italy to insist on the restoration of Tunisian independence. These feelings have been greatly aggravated by the recent occurrences at Marseilles. Italy now seeks peace with all the world to punish France. England has, through the English press, unanimously condemned the French aggression. Her friendship for France has cooled, and she is watching for the sequel of the campaign with anxiety. M. Roustan has already demanded the arrest of the Sheikh-el-Islam, who is the chief civil judge at Tunis; while his subordinate at Susa has been loaded with chains for preaching the holy war, an accusation which has already served the new Minister Resident in good stead. This will within a few days lead to the forcible resumption of the Enfida, and will be in strict accordance

with M. St. Hilaire's programme. The loss of the Enfida to Mr. Levy, and the consequent violation of the rights of an individual, will be of little importance in comparison with other wrongs we may confidently expect. When the most powerful arsenal in the Mediterranean is established at Bizerta, when English manufactured goods are subject to a French tariff, and when Malta is debarred from receiving supplies from Tunis, we shall probably regret the disdainful silence with which we received the thrice-repeated appeals for mediation from Muhamed-esSadik Bey. The importance of Bizerta is regarded as a harmless chimera by those who seek to put off the evil day, when England must realise her loss of power in Europe. Admiral Spratt and Mr. Bosworth Smith, Lord de la Warr

and Mr. Guest, have placed on record their opinions on this subject; and Admiral Hobart Pasha states that the possession of Bizerta means the mastery of the Mediterranean. A short time will probably suffice to put their views to the test.

But these consequences are of comparatively little importance with the effect this aggression has had on the Moslem world. The tribes of the interior of Tunis are in open revolt; this excitement is extending itself to Tripoli and to Egypt, and we daily hear of massacre and insurrection in Algeria, where a total disarmament of the natives has been hastily resolved on. Patriotic Frenchmen do not hesitate to ascribe the rising of Bon Amena to the unprovoked attack on the Tunisian Regency. The Moslem realises the fact that the day is coming when he must make one final stand against Christian invasion, and this resistance will take the form of a war which will extend from the frontiers of India to the shores of the Atlantic. Tunis contains the venerated city of Cairwán, and around that city the warlike tribes of the Slasi, the Hamama, and the Ouled Drid are assembling

These men

The

to defy the invader. regard Sultan and Bey alike as traitors to their faith, and they will fight under the flag of the Prophet. Once let this spirit spread, and the consequences of the French Protectorate over Tunis may exceed in importance anything which we are now able to contemplate. strength of this feeling in the interior of Tunis we can personally attest. In a word, the recent policy of France has earned for her the enmity of Italy, the resentment of England, and the antagonism of the Moslem world. Nowhere has this attempt at cheap glory been more ably denounced than in the French Chamber on the 23d of May; and the congratulations of M. St. Hilaire on the ominous silence of Prince Bismarck are singularly inopportune, if not wholly premature. The

author well observes:

"L'Europe va entrer à toute vapeur dans une mer d'iniquité. Tout est disposé pour cette croisade à rebours de la civilisation corrompue au profit des juifs et des meneurs des peuples. Mais toutes les expéditions ne ressembleront pas à celle de Tunis, décrétée et accomplir en guise d'appât. Il y aura bien du sang versé pour de l'or."