And this is but one instance among a thousand equally as flagrant. A power liable to such abuse should, by the constitution, be taken from the legislature-how this may be effected must be left for the convention to decide. It might be done by causing a long public notice to be given of all acts intended to be passed, or by submitting them to a vote of the people generally, before they should become laws, or by letting them lie over from the session which should introduce them to the subsequent session, for final passage, during which time the people might become acquainted with their provisions, judge of their necessity and utility, and act accordingly. Something of the kind the people owe it to themselves to adopt, to save them from the consequences of excessive and hasty legislation.

K.

"CONCORDIA'S" VIEWS ON THE ELECTION OF JUDGES

[June 11, 1846]

OUR FUTURE JUDICIARY

As we are about to form a state constitution, a fundamental, ruling principle to guide our future legislators, many questions of grave importance arise, and among them, as not the least important, is the manner of choosing the judiciary. Apprehensions, at first view, may arise against their election; but if we keep steadily in view the true spirit and intent of our government, a self-government, vested in the people, and place confidence in them, then all fears vanish as to the inefficiency of this manner of choosing our judges. If we cannot put confidence in the people as to their capability of self-government, then we are to look to the one-man power, as our resort in this deplorable dilemma, by whom we are to be kept in obeisance. This, we think, is the fundamental difference between democracy and monarchy, the two great systems that sway the world. The former is a distri

bution of power among the people; the latter, its concentration in one man. The former treats all as equals; the latter establishes unnatural and unwarrantable distinctions and privileges. And, we think, the former would recognize the election of judges by the people; the latter would place the whole judiciary system in the power of one man, or nearly so. Who, then, is there but would choose the former method, actuated by the consciousness of his own individual privileges, and a proper degree of jealousy for his own rights? This is upon general principles.

But it is apprehended by some that there are collateral influences that will tend to lay aside this principle. But we contend that if the principle be right and expedient in one case or circumstance it is in another. If it be right in a calm, it will withstand the tempest of partisan feelings and actions. If it be expedient in a calm political atmosphere, it will be amid the lowerings of jarring elements, the very moment when the voice of the people should be supreme in the land. "Vox populi vox Dei" was the maxim of the ancient civilians, and it will equally apply to us.

But, in a communication in your last number the writer confessed that public opinion is in favor of election. This, then, is a powerful argument in favor of the election, for no law in a democratic government should be made in advance or opposition to that opinion; for then, it is not the law of the land, but the will of the few. When our legislators or representatives cease to enact the will of the people, they cease to be their representatives; the vox populi is disregarded, and dissatisfaction prevails.

Neither can it be thought ultra, unless ultra in simplicity, the best ultraism we can possibly adopt. The first system. of government, that we are aware of, established upon the earth was patriarchal; or where one family or number of families voluntarily and individually placed themselves under the direction of one patriarch. This was an union of individual will, happy in its results, democratic in its prin

ciples, a model for all. But the refined ingenuity of the nineteenth century would center too much power in one, thereby lessening the influence that each, individually, is entitled to. We do not say that this extensive territory, with so many inhabitants, can be swayed in that primeval manner of ruling neighborhoods; but we do say, the nearer we get to this principle, the better is our system of govern

ment.

It is true that we can frequently accomplish some specified object through the medium of an agent better than to do it ourselves. "Your child is sick, and you want an agent or physician to administer medicine," says the writer in your last. "You have a suit to manage, and you want a lawyer' or an agent. All this is acknowledged. But, you want to choose that physician according to your own views of medicinal skill, and the lawyer for his legal knowledge, and not trust to a third person's dictation. So it is with our judges or agents to administer justice; we, as people, rather elect our own agents than trust to a third person, or executive. For how is our executive, residing in one place, at a distance from most counties, to know whom to appoint? He surely cannot know individuals in every county; of their acquirements and capability to fill such an office faithfully. The answer, obviously, is that individuals will be recommended to the governor by their respective friends. And here, of course, will appear that partisan influence which some so much fear. And it is worse, for this interference of friends will work secretly and carry with it greater corruption, while an election is more open and better to be seen. This is the way they are appointed in many states, the deplorable consequences of which are already working a reformation. For if partisan action is to be the order of procedure it had far better rest in the great mass of the people than in the choice of one man. If judges are appointed with whom the executive is acquainted, they must necessarily reside without most of the counties when appointed, probably most of

them centered at the capital. These will be sent, strangers, into the different counties, bearing with them the impression that the county does not afford men capable of administering justice, and even if so, that the people are not capable of selecting them. But it is said that they ought to come strangers from other counties, that they may not be prejudiced in any trial, or actuated by any local considerations; and after coming, ought to reside there; and the term he affixes for their duration in office is seven years. Now in my humble opinion this would inevitably place us in the same dilemma, as the writer considers it, as we would be in if they were chosen from the county. For in seven years any man would acquire an interest in affairs where he resided, and acquire all the local prejudices that any other citizen would, for it is not expected that a judge must isolate himself from the world.

But it is to be hoped that these prejudices are not so alarming after all. For the people always choose to have their rulers from among themselves. This is something that is not only natural to man, but is complied with generally; it shows an equal respect to all locations, and equal representations from all parts. Although the original English colonies constituted a part of the British government, yet one great cause of disaffection was that the English government took it upon herself to appoint some officers which the people claimed they had a right to choose from among themselves.

The governor, it is gravely said, is more capable of selecting judges than the people; yet all will acknowledge that the people are competent to elect their own governor. He is the highest officer in the state. Then if we can elect the most responsible officer within the suffrages of the people it is difficult to ascertain upon what principle of logic why [sic] they may not choose inferior officers.

In relation to the salary, there will undoubtedly be as many aspirants seeking executive patronage for the emoluments of the office, as there will the patronage of the people-and

doubtless more because they can more easily impose upon an executive, whose only knowledge of their character is obtained through the mediation of partisan friends, than upon the people who are better acquainted with such individuals. A competent salary should be given, that responsible and capable men may be induced to accept the office; and it is sincerely hoped that no individual would be so rash, under any circumstances or prejudices, as to disgrace his own dignity and office, so much as to subject himself to impeachment by the all-seeing eye of the people; and it is further hoped that public opinion, if it be not already so, will soon become so reformed that any person will not dare to offer himself as a candidate for office unless he is qualified to perform its duties.

In the state of New York the judges are appointed by the executive, with the consent of the senate. But long experience has taught them the inefficiency of the method, and the dissatisfaction among the people; and consequently, upon the suggestion of the governor, who declares that too much power is invested in that department, a convention has been called and will meet during this month to revise the constitution; and one of the greatest objects of that convention, by the almost unanimous approval of the electors, is to take the power of appointment from the executive and vest it in the people. Let us, then, profit by the experience of older states, and avoid error by the constitutional support of an elective judiciary.

CONCORDIA

WHIG NOMINATIONS

[July 28, 1846]

In the Express of today will be found a list of the nominees to the constitutional convention, presented for the suffrages of the electors of Dane County. The candidates selected are all men of sound principles, practical intelligence,