BIENNIAL SESSIONS

[June 30, 1846]

We observe that this measure is attracting considerable attention throughout those states which are about to revise their constitutions. In New York there is a strong party in favor of holding sessions of the legislature every other year only, and if with the great business of that state such an interim between legislative sessions could be allowed surely it might be done in those states that have not so much general business, and no heavy system of internal improvements to fill the legislative halls with petitions and politics.

We should certainly prefer biennial sessions and we believe that almost all would also prefer them could they be convinced that the country would not suffer for want of legislative action; and of that we think there can be no danger if we discard from our legislative halls those abuses that have been creeping in year after year, from the increasing disposition of legislatures to interfere with all private contracts and to give to certain individuals and certain corporations privileges that may be denied to others. In the very act of incorporation of a city or village there is constant lobbying, constant additive powers given, and almost always powers are vested in these bodies that are at variance with the feelings of the people, and often with the pure principles of justice. Property is taken from individuals in a most summary method, and they are almost as often assessed as heavily for an injury inflicted as for a benefit conferred. This is wrong, and we do not think there is any good reason why such corporations should not all be embodied in a general law so that, under certain restrictions, these communities that chose might enjoy them, and all might be upon an equal footing. Property should never be taken unless for the general good, and then of course it could not be enjoyed by one more than another and all would feel the necessity

and submit willingly to a deprivation for which they would be fairly compensated.

The business of legislation can be made infinitely less than it has been for years past and then biennial sessions will be preferable to annual ones, but in order that this shall be done it must be made of no pecuniary advantage to legislators to protract their sessions. A suggestion in the Democratic Review that legislators shall be paid a certain salary quarterly during the term for which they are elected, without reference to the time of service, not to be diminished either in illness or on account of resignation, strikes us as the best proposition we have seen. This would induce men to labor during the session that it might prove a short one, to discountenance party resolutions that always consume time and engender bitterness of feeling, to pass laws that should be invariably general, and would prevent a multiplication of useless statutes-in short, to do their work as if they were sent there by the people and not merely to gain a little ephemeral distinction for themselves.

Another suggestion from the same periodical seems to us all important. It is that no law shall be passed remunerating an individual for accidents or misfortunes that have happened to him while fulfilling a contract for the state. Individuals do not do so in their private transactions and the agents of the state ought to be quite as particular. This might in some cases prove a hardship but when the practice is indulged in, as it has been among all the old states, it proves constantly a hardship to the whole people and opens a door for the most extensive corruption and favoritism. Nor are the hardships of these cases done away with for although many may be saved from loss yet there are many more, and generally the most meritorious, who, after dancing attendance upon the legislature for years, not only find their first loss confirmed but have added to it a loss as serious of time and of temper, and have also become disgusted with the government under which they live.

Throughout the United States there is at the present moment a strong disposition to reduce all legislative proceedings to a greater simplicity than has obtained for many years past. Men have seen the internal improvements of states almost destroying their energies and their integrity, and they are beginning to think that the best plan is never to force upon a country those improvements that must come of themselves when they are wanted. Where capital can be profitably employed there it will come, and although the action of the legislature may hasten the advent of some extensive system of improvements, it can very rarely do any good, and must almost always lead to the ruinous consequences we have seen in Michigan, in Illinois, and elsewhere.

Wisconsin must ever be an agricultural state, with the addition of a strong mining interest. It wants no state protection for any of its interests. It wants no laws to build up vast bodies corporate, whose interests shall be diametrically opposed to the body of the people in their employ. It wants few laws, but wants those to be readily understood and rigidly enforced. It wants but few state officers, and those elected by the people. It wants no central appointing power to rule by corruption that will gradually creep in. It wants no useless offices, no idle officers, and above all none of those situations that call forth crowds of office-seekers, who wish only to secure to themselves either large salaries or opportunities to enrich themselves by means inconsistent with the welfare of the state and often with common honesty.

With a strictly defined constitution, and one that shall prevent the passage of useless laws and the creation at the pleasure of the legislature of useless offices, biennial sessions would be sufficient for all our purposes, and they would also be short. The people would be spared the constant search after good men to represent them, and the constant mortification of finding the men they had chosen were more bent on personal aggrandizement than on the performance of their duties. Without such restrictions it would be useless trying to avoid the annual long sessions of other states, and use

less to hope to exclude that mere partisanship that has so long mingled with state elections everywhere.

We do not wish to see politics excluded from our state for we feel certain that the checks of parties on each other are highly beneficial, but we wish to see acerbity of feeling lessened, and argument resorted to by men, rather than irritation. All know that it is upon trifles most generally that the quarrels are most bitter, and that the usual weapons of partisan politicians are recrimination and abuse. There is too much done nowadays by legislators, and each act calls out the bitterness of party feeling. Let sessions be short, let them be held every other year, and men will argue more coolly, will avoid excitement, and will settle more generally upon those things they wish done.

Of course the governor should have power to call an extra session when he chooses, but as this would not produce extra pay or hold out inducements to do more than was necessary it would be called as seldom as possible, never without a strong necessity, and would end with the consideration of the special measure for which it was called.

AN ELECTIVE JUDICIARY

[ July 14, 1846 ]

We copy from the Wisconsin Argus a long article on the subject of the Judiciary,11 in which the elective mode is condemned as insufficient and dangerous. We do not agree with the writer in his positions, but many of our friends do, and we therefore think it right to lay the subject fairly before our readers for consideration.

We always approach this subject with a feeling of hesitation, for it is one of the most important for a new state, it is one we should much fear to see abused, and while the truly

11

"See post, 473 article on "The Mode of Selecting Judges," from the Madison Wisconsin Argus, July 7, 1846.

thinking men of all parties and all professions disagree so entirely on the subject it would seem to us that every man ought to hold his own opinion with some grain of doubt, while he should consider the opinions of others entitled to much respect.

The Argus states truly that our system of government, except only at primary meetings and in the election of very few officers, is not democratic but representative. We do not have a direct voice in the choice of our legislators because they must be nominated in some manner by agents and must be supported as party men. Yet we do not see that this is more an objection to the election of judges than of many other officers.

To our minds the great desideratum is to get judges who will hold themselves above politics, whether they be appointed or selected, and if anyone will show us how that object can be secured we will give up all our own favorite ideas and adopt his. We want to see the best men among us on the bench, and we want to see those men so well paid that they may feel willing to remain there.

There is one thing, however, that seems certain to us, and that is, our convention will be much governed in this matter by the state of New York. If the men in that convention think they dare run the risk of the election of judges by the people we do not doubt that it will increase the feeling on the subject here, for most of us feel satisfied that in an agricultural state, where cities are few and large villages rare, people will always elect better men, whether for the bench or the legislative halls. If, on the contrary, New York, after cool deliberation, shall decline making the change, many among our people, who have been long doubtful, would be decided against the measure as one that had been condemned by men of ability.

If it were only among lawyers, even eminent lawyers, that an opinion adverse to an elective judiciary was held, we might set it down as professional prejudice, but this is not so. Lawyers do not stand alone. There are many of our