views. I have never, myself, courted any such influences. I am willing to be judged by the truth, by all parties and by men from all countries. I have no prejudices or unkind feelings against foreigners. I do not wish to see them deprived of the smallest portion of their just rights and privileges. I consider the naturalization laws to be about as they should be, and that if they are wrong Congress is the only power that can, constitutionally, alter or amend them. When foreigners come into our political household by the right door, I am not in favor of making any distinction in relation to them, except such as I would make towards all mankindthat sort of distinction that virtue and intelligence may demand.

When the state government bill was before the House of Representatives last winter, Mr. Pole, of Iowa, offered an amendment to it, the object of which was to restrict the right of suffrage to citizens of the United States. I, with my colleagues from this county, voted for the amendment. I had consulted with Mr. Pole on the subject before the amendment was offered, and we came to the conclusion that he should offer it instead of myself, though, if remembered correctly, it was originally drawn by me. I also voted against the passage of the bill, principally on account of its provisions respecting the qualifications of voters, although the bill was to my mind highly objectionable in other particulars. In view of what has been my uniform course upon this subject, both in public and in private, I am at a loss to conceive who could have been so lost to all sense of truth and justice as to have fabricated so false a statement as that which has been put in circulation against me. I am unwilling to believe that it was anyone who possesses the smallest claim to respectability in any community. From the manner of putting forth the report, and the time selected for it, when I was absent from the county and not expected to return in time to obviate its effects before the election, it would be a violence to reason to imagine any honorable object designed to be effected by it.

From what I have observed for more than a year past, I

have no doubt that a strong effort will be made in the convention to incorporate the alien suffrage principle into the constitution. I believe this to be the ulterior object of the friends of the present law from the beginning, though there were but few who would avow it. They have since grown more confident, and some of the candidates for delegate to the convention in other parts of the territory have already given pledges in favor of the measure, and they confidently expect now to establish their principles permanently by the constitution. I think, then, that it is important that every man who seriously reflects upon the consequences of such a measure ought to consider well as to whom he will cast his vote [for] at the coming election.

I commenced writing this address a week since, but was prevented from completing it by a sudden attack of fever and have not been able to finish it before this time, and it may now be too late to have any effect. I do not expect to be able to see the people generally before the election, nor do I feel very much disposed to make stump speeches upon an occasion like the present. My name has been placed before the public as a candidate under the circumstances already stated. I did not seek to have myself placed in this position. I had no desire of my own to become a candidate. It is the right of the people to do just as they please in relation to the matter, and whatever their decision may be, it will be cheerfully submitted to by me. I trust, however, that the people of Grant will not give a response to falsehood and misrepresentation, directed against one who has endeavored to serve them faithfully, and, whatever may have been his errors, has tried in all things to act consistently and for the best. Should I be chosen among others to represent you in the convention I can only say that this renewed confidence shall be met with renewed exertions on my part to fulfill all just expectations.

Respectfully, your fellow citizen,

THOS. P. Burnett.

Grant County, August 25, 1846.

THE CONSTITUTION

[February 14, 21, 28, March 7, 14, 1846]

One of the most important objects to be secured by our new constitution will be the proper and safe distribution of power. We must clothe the state with ample power, and the question is, how can it be made at the same time most efficient and most secure from abuse.

DISTRIBUTION OF POWER

All experience of popular governments in America shows the necessity of dividing power into three distinct departments, composed of separate bodies, and each department confined strictly to its own sphere. Upon the nice and accurate adjustment of these checks and balances, greatly depends the well government of the state. These departments are: First, the legislative; second, the executive; third, the judicial.

OF THE LEGISLATURE

The legislature is the grand medium through which the popular will expresses its decrees and infuses vitality into the body politic. Even in our present embryo political condition, it is the umbilical cord of our territory. It enacts laws and provides the money and means necessary for the enforcement of its will. The legislature is the popular voice, speaking through the constitution and modified by the constitution alone. It is composed of two branches, a senate and house of representatives, both elected by the people and both representing precisely the same interests. The Senate in Rome, like the House of Lords in England, represented the landed and aristocratic interest. We have only one interest to be represented; still it is found to be a salutary check upon rash and inconsiderate legislation to be represented in two legislative branches, in each of which every bill must pass through all its stages in regular form before its final enactment, thus affording time for deliberation, and

instruction from primary meetings of the people. Members of the senate are usually elected for a longer term than members of the house of representatives. Two years, the present term of members of the council, is a term of very suitable duration-short enough certainly. As for the lower branch, the members ought to be elected annually. Much diversity of opinion exists as to whether the people should be very fully represented in the general assembly or not. The ratio of representation cannot be fixed to suit all. One will insist upon incorporating in the general assembly as many of the people as possible, while another will urge the difficulty of uniting a multitude of discordant minds in support of important measures often embracing a great variety of details upon which a fewer number of more intelligent minds would readily coincide. Again, the great expense of an overgrown assembly is an important item of consideration with the people. A large legislative body, embracing, as it generally does, a smaller proportion of men who do their own thinking, than a smaller and more select body, is more in danger of being led by a handful of artful demagogues.

OF THE EXECUTIVE

The office of governor is the highest and most responsible office in the state. The governor is not only the highest civil officer, but he is also the highest military officer in the state; and much depends upon his promptness and decision in emergencies threatening the peace of the state. There is but little danger of an abuse of authority by the governor of the state, and therefore he should be clothed with ample authority. Our first experiment in state government will probably be made under the administration of Governor Dodge upon whom all men of all parties will unite as the man to hold the helm when our new vessel of state shall be launched from the stocks. The governor ought to be elected for a term long enough to give effect to the measures of his administration. A term of four years is about right. The veto power has been conferred and after much experience found salutary in most of the state constitutions. In this as in

other matters we have little faith in innovations and experiments in government.

OF THE JUDICIARY-NO. 1

We next consider the third division of power, viz: the power conferred upon courts of law.

That the machinery of law is cumbrous and expensive, that it often fails of the due administration of justice, is true. The atmosphere of the common law is that in which we were born and which we breathe from the cradle to the coffin. Our habits, our modes of thought, our notions of right and wrong are shaped and perhaps sometimes distorted by it. It was fastened upon our infant republic like a coat of mail which then protected it, but has now become too tight, so that the iron enters into the soul. The natural tendency of multiplying judicial decisions for centuries is to multiply legal refinements, legal subtleties, and legal technicalities. The process of hairsplitting like a series of infinitesimals has no end. The people feel and know this fact, or rather the results of it; but neither the people nor the wisest of their legislators have been able to invent any better remedy than to try to avoid lawsuits. Those who think that lawyers endeavor to make law an intricate labyrinth do the profession gross injustice. The intricacy of law is mainly owing to the imperfection and ambiguity of human language, to the infinite diversity of interests and rights which law has to protect, and [to] the fallibility of evidence. That a more simple and economical system of jurisprudence may yet be invented, we are not prepared to deny; but we do deny that the man is now living who can overthrow the great framework of law now existing in England and America and build up another of new materials, which would not violate established rights and the principles of sound reason. It is sheer quackery to pretend it. We must either have judges who will be governed by law and the principles of justice as already known and established, or we must submit to the arbitrary rule of our judges, and have in fact nothing to shield us from their