All property both real and personal, of the wife, owned and claimed by her before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, devise, or descent, shall be her separate property; and laws shall be passed more clearly defining the rights of the wife in relation as well to her separate property as that held in common with her husband. Laws shall also be passed providing for the registration of the wife's separate property.

The legislature shall have power to protect by law from forced sale a certain portion of the property of all heads of families. The homestead of a family, not to exceed two hundred acres of land (not included in a town or city) or any town or city lot or lots in value not to exceed two thousand dollars, shall not be subject to forced sale for any debt hereafter contracted; nor shall the owner, if a married man, be at liberty to alienate the same, unless by the consent of the wife in such manner as the legislature may hereafter point out.

It may be that the number of acres exempted is too large, but we go the principle most decidedly, and hope within a year to find ourselves living under some such provision.

LETTERS OF "JEFFERSON"-No. 1

[ May 30, 1846]

MR. EDITOR: A subscriber ventures to send you a short communication, and as a progressive Democrat he feels he has the right to ask its insertion in a paper which by its course proves that its aim is to recommend and support such new measures as it conceives will be for the best interest of the people of the state, without regard to antiquated theories or old-fashioned practices. Among the many new improvements which I hope to see in our new constitution, there will be none more satisfactory, to myself at least, than a provision that the judges shall be elected by the people; and where is the Democrat that can truly say that the people are incapable of making the selection. What sophistry, indeed, is it to admit that the people have sufficient of discrimination and judgment to select members of the legislature, who make the law, but not the judge who is to explain it. These purely

disinterested gentlemen tell us that we may elect a governor and a legislature, but not a judge, who is, after all, but a creature made by the governor or the legislature. I contend that the people are just as capable of selecting good judges by voting directly for them, as by delegating that power to others to do it for them. If the declaration that all power is in the people is true, then why not leave that power where it naturally belongs? Why remove it from them, and impliedly say they distrust this first great cause of power in this country. It is flat nonsense, and is but a relict of old English prejudice. A few years since our justices were appointed, and I appeal to every man in the territory to say if we were better, if as well, served then, as now that they are elective. This innovation certainly has done no injury.

When we reflect upon the logrolling by which judges are elected by the legislature, we feel confident that there would be less of intrigue and corruption in going directly before the people than in submitting the appointment to a political caucus. The true Jeffersonian test of "is he honest, is he capable" can then be made to bear directly upon a candidate. With the people, honesty of purpose and the weight of moral character will have an influence that is never properly considered by a legislative body.

The old standing argument in favor of the appointment of judges is that they should be removed as far as possible from the people, and not [be] dependent on the popular will. What I contend for is, that they should be dependent, and know, as all other officers do, that they are but servants of the people. The governor who administers the law has to acknowledge his obligation to popular sovereignty, and we cannot conceive why there should be any reservations made in favor of the judiciary—and if the constitution should require that they should be elected every three or four years by the people, its present opponents will soon begin to acknowledge its force and correctness.

Another point made by the friends of gubernatorial appointment or legislative election is that judges should not

interfere with or become political candidates of party. In what, we would seriously ask, consists the difference between the candidate for the bench electioneering through his friends or by himself with the people, or the representatives of the people? None whatever if the legislature truly represent the wishes of their constituents. But the opponents of the proposed amendment know that it is much easier for an improper man to succeed with a small body that may misrepresent the people, than with the people themselves who are not so ambitious as their representatives, nor as easily cajoled or intimidated into a wrongful act. Upon serious reflection, I cannot conceive any good reason why the governor that swears to execute the law should be elected by the people that does not apply with equal force to the case of judges, who, if they are honest, will faithfully interpret the law without regard to the popularity of the cause-and if they would not do justice for fear of that influence, I do humbly conceive that they would not be rendered any more just by being appointed. The people will soon learn a man, and if they know him to be honest, and he proves by his conduct that he is not pandering for a reëlection, he will of all others be the one most likely to be resupported by the independent freemen of his circuit.

LETTERS OF "JEFFERSON"--No. 2

[June 6, 1846]

JEFFERSON.

MR. EDITOR: I had not expected, when I penned a few thoughts for your last number upon the subject of the election of judges, that so reasonable a proposition would have been opposed by any professedly Democratic paper, but as the Argus promises hereafter that it will oppose the suggestion, when it shall have heard all that has been said in favor of popular elections, I will assign, with your permission, a few propositions which its editor may perhaps notice when he has determined what reply he should make thereto.

First. Does the Argus recognize the "vox populi," the will of the majority of the people, as the great governing voice of the state under all circumstances whatever; and, being of right supreme, have they the power to direct the mode in which all officers shall be chosen?

Second. If they possess that supreme political power, should they be restricted in any way whatever from a full and free exercise of that right?

Third. Should the people be governed by old precedents when they conflict with the progressive spirit of the age, and the doctrine of submission to the popular will, or popular sovereignty?

Fourth. Ought not the people to have the power of voting directly for every officer under a state government, when they by their taxes contribute to the support of such officer?

Fifth. What good reason exists for electing a governor who executes the law that does not apply with equal force to those who administer the same?

Sixth. As a principle ought the people to have the right of electing justices of the peace, who have jurisdiction up to fifty dollars, and if so what good reason exists to exempt from popular election the judge who can decide a controversy involving a greater sum?

Seventh. Are the people less competent to select judges, than justices of the peace, and if less qualified, why? JEFFERSON.

LETTERS OF "JEFFERSON"-No. 3

[ June 27, 1846 ]

MR. BROWN: In a late number of your paper I propounded a few queries to those opposed to an elective judiciary, asking whether in principle, at least, the friends of popular election were not correct; but as the Argus, as the organ of the Old Hunker system in opposing the election of the judges of the people, prudently avoids noticing any of the propositions

made, I will, with your permission, offer some further suggestions in favor of the popular mode.

The organ of an irresponsible judiciary naturally falls back upon the old cry that such was the mode prescribed some sixty years ago, and instances the Supreme Court of the United States as not inferior to any tribunal of the world, and asks whether that court has not been, "in point of ability and integrity, all that it could have been, and much more than it might have been under a different mode of selection.' The friends of that federal feature of our government have always contended that its character was owing to the fact of their being life officers, and if they are right the mode of selection certainly has nothing to do with it. We do not believe that the Argus would venture in this day to recommend the formation of the United States Supreme Court as a model for us-it is life tenure and only removable by impeachment. The people in this day are so generally opposed to all life offices that it seems almost surplusage for anyone to combat it, even as an imaginary evil, so far as our state is concerned; but I will notice this feature of life tenancy in connection with the question of election, as that is far more reprehensible than even the doctrine of appointment by the governor, or election by the legislature, which to do, Thomas Jefferson says, "is a violation of the principle of the separation of powers." In every new state they have carefully avoided this most antirepublican organization, but I copy a paragraph from the June number of the Democratic Review upon this subject: "The abbreviation of the judicial term of office seems to commend itself so universally to the statesmen who have been recently called to consider the subject, that it is a matter of surprise that the system of appointing judges for life or till its decline approaches, should have been perpetuated so long"; and shows that in the new constitutions of New Jersey, Louisiana, Texas, and Missouri, that the judges are now chosen for a short term of years. Thomas Jefferson, in speaking of this very identical Supreme Court of the United States,