wrong and dangerous one and that it has been adopted without due reflection upon its antirepublican nature and tendencies and its possible, nay probable, consequences to the liberties of the country, unless speedily arrested in its prog

ress.

The doctrine that clergymen must not enjoy all and singular the rights and immunities of other citizens is at war with the genius of our government and institutions, and opposed to every correct principle of civil as well as religious liberty, and we are amazed that it should ever have found its way into the constitution of a republican state, especially under the broad light of the declaration of American independence and of the federal constitution, and we can only account for this manifest retrogression from the great principles laid down in those charts of human liberty by attributing it to a most unreasonable prejudice against the ministers of religion.

Our government is founded upon the broad principle that all men are born free, and, in respect to their civil and political rights, on a perfect equality. Why, then, deprive clergymen of any one of those rights which we recognize and respect in other men? Says our federal constitution, "No religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office of public trust under the United States." Why then institute such a test in respect to office under a state government? We may be told that it is not a religious test. If it is not a religious test we beg to know what kind of a test it is. If it is answered that it is a mere test of occupation, we would ask with all seriousness whether it would not be well for the American people to pause and consider before they engraft any such principle into their republican system? Is it best to adopt the doctrine that a man's occupation or calling, whatever it may be, if it is an honest one, shall work a forfeiture of any of his rights as a citizen? Shall we promulgate the doctrine that men have no natural and inalienable rights-that our most sacred and heaven-derived rights are entirely at the discretion of a chance majority, and that

the doctrine of self-government is a humbug—an illusion? If we can properly exclude a particular class on account of their occupation, we may, by the same rule, and must, if we honestly adhere to it, exclude them from the right of suffrage and make them the mere passive subjects of a government in the powers of which they do not at all participate.

If the rule will apply to one calling, it will equally to another (in a civil point of view) and to another and still another, until, peradventure, there is but one class or profession left which is entitled to any voice whatever in the direction of public affairs. The adoption of this negative rule in respect to one class is but the first step in a roundabout way of setting up the exclusive right of some other class to rule the nation. We do not say nor believe that this is the object of those who advocate the principle; but we do say that this is the legitimate tendency of the principle and precisely where it would end, if faithfully carried out, unless the last class should be swept away by the same rule and society become reduced to anarchy.

If the clerical profession should by constitutional provisions be excluded from office, why not the legal profession also? But what would be thought of us if we should gravely talk of adopting a clause in our constitution that no lawyer should be eligible to a seat in our legislature? Yet this would be just as consistent and, we believe, quite as important to the safety of the state as to exclude clergymen; for lawyers are notorious monopolists of the honors and emoluments of office, and do not always forget to legislate for themselves; while clergymen, considering their education, talents, and the influence they exert in society, are quite modest in their political aspirations. But we would not subject even lawyers to such a degrading restriction. We might frequently wish to vote for one, as we frequently have done, and others might wish to do the same. We would sooner adopt the good old rule and have the offices accessible to every class of citizens, and trust to the good sense of the

people to fill them with faithful and responsible men, without respect to classes, occupations, or professions. But if the work of decapitation is to be commenced we would say by all means begin with the lawyers and end where you please. But the question is a grave one and merits a serious consideration and we cannot think of disposing of it in one short article. We shall, therefore, consider the subject further as we may have opportunity, and in the meantime we would like to hear from the press or from correspondents whatever may be said in favor of the restriction.

STATE GOVERNMENT-No. 3

[December 30, 1845]

On the subject of forming a state government, pardon me for differing with you on these two important points, viz: First, as to the time when a state government ought to be formed; and second, as to the power of "the people" to form a state government without applying to or obtaining an act from Congress to enable them to form a state government. I believe I am not mistaken when I affirm it as a fact that the democracy of Milwaukee are almost to a man in favor of our admission into the Union at as early a day as practicable, and that a law ought to be passed by our legislature, this winter, submitting the question to the people and providing for taking the census of the territory. And I hope you will see the propriety of using your influence with the legislature to carry these measures. As to the second point, you must be well acquainted with my views from our conversation on the subject while you were last in Milwaukee. These views I believe democratic, and I have not yet seen any cause to change them. I am well acquainted with the views of Senators Ewing of Ohio and Clayton of Delaware, as well as those of Clay of Kentucky, on this point; but are their views and votes to be quoted by a Democrat as authority,

in the face of the solemn adjudication of the Senate in the case of Michigan and in preference to the views of such men as Benton, Buchanan, Wright, and, in short, every Democrat in the United States Senate in 1836? I am and have been quite surprised that you should through your paper promulgate on this point the opinions of such bitter Whigs and party men as Clayton and Ewing as authority for Democrats, and omit entirely the opposite opinions on the same point of Benton, Buchanan, Wright, Morris, Niles, certainly not the least distinguished Democrats in the United States Senate in 1836. These two classes of men thought and voted differently as to the power of Michigan to form a state government without a preliminary act from Congress. And so long as I am a member of the Democratic party I certainly shall follow and adhere to the dictates of Benton, Wright, etc., in preference to the dictates of Ewing, Clayton, etc. So, I am satisfied, you will. I will therefore now, in affirmation of what I have written on this point, make a few brief quotations from the speeches of some of the Democrats in the Senate in 1836 on the admission of Michigan.

TERRITORIAL RIGHTS

[December 30, 1845]

We publish today an article upon this subject from a respected and intelligent correspondent. It affords us pleasure to give an opportunity to those who differ somewhat from us upon matters connected with state government to express their sentiments through our columns. Probably there is not so much difference between us and our correspondent as he supposes.

We have no disposition to discourage immediate action in regard to state government, nor do we like to press the subject beyond the spontaneous wishes of the people.

The right of the people to hold a convention, form and adopt a constitution, and submit it to Congress for approval, considered simply as a proposition and going no further, we have never doubted. But that the constitution can be of any binding force, or that the state government can be legally organized and put in operation without a previous act of Congress, we do deny. We presume it will not be questioned that an act of Congress is necessary to admit a state into the Union. A state cannot admit itself into the Union. The constitution says that "new states may be admitted by the Congress into the Union," but it does not say they shall be admitted. If a state cannot get into the Union without an act of Congress, then one of two things will be necessary to establish the absolute legal right of a territory to state sovereignty-either Congress can be compelled to pass the act, or a territory can become an independent sovereignty out of the Union. Are there any means whereby Congress can be compelled to pass an act of any kind?

If so, we would like to know where the authority is to be found and in whom it is vested. Can a territory become a state out of the Union? If a territory can form a state government and put it in operation for one purpose, before entering the Union, it can for every purpose-if it can for one day, it can for a thousand years-if it can at all, it can dismember the Union, and if one territory can dismember the Union, so can another, and so can a state, and our boasted Union, so far as the authority of the federal government is concerned, is all afloat. We are a friend to popular freedom, but we do not think it is to be secured and perpetuated by promulgating the doctrine that any state or territory may set up for herself whenever Congress refuses to legislate to suit her.

As to the application of the numerical condition contained in the ordinance to the two additional states which Congress might or might not form, according to their discretion, we must differ from our correspondent and from all his authorities.