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secure substantially the right. The qualification is easily obtained, and it being required by the best authority which the nature of the case admits of, its attainment is indispensable.

Careful attention to this matter is of the highest importance, not only as respects the simple privilege of voting for delegates to form a constitution, but this privilege affords a lever of power by which this inestimable right to choose their own rulers and share in the blessings of self-government may be secured to them and those who may follow them to this "land of the free," for all time to come. Upon the election of a strongly Democratic convention will depend the liberal extension of the right of suffrage under the state constitution. The Democratic party has always taken the lead in contending for this right. It is, indeed, the fundamental principle of democracy that every man has a natural right to participate in the powers of the government.

But it is not upon mere party grounds that we urge this class of persons to prepare themselves to exercise this important right. We are in favor of the utmost freedom upon this point, and wish to see it secured by our constitution because it is right both in theory and [in] practice; for if we predicate the right of any man to participate in the political power upon anything but the fact that he is a man, there is no rational limit to restriction until it terminates in absolute monarchy. It is very probable that a majority of our adopted countrymen will attach themselves to the Democratic party; but we cannot prevent that, and to be frank about it we do not wish to. It is very natural that those who have come to this country for liberty's sake should attach themselves to that party which is most ready to welcome them to all the rights and privileges of freemen.

It is, moreover, a fact quite perceptible to foreigners that the policy of the Whig party is, in many important respects, identical with that which they have seen in the land of their

nativity, carried out to its ultimate results-the prostration and ruin of the mass of the people. They are, therefore, the natural allies of the Democratic party in its opposition to every species of monopoly.

BIENNIAL SESSIONS

[April 28, 1846]

A late number of the Iowa Capital Reporter contains an able article from a correspondent, showing the impolicy and bad economy of biennial sessions of the state legislature. It seems that the rejected constitution of Iowa contained this objectionable provision, and whether that was one of the grounds of the rejection or not there appears now to be a strong disposition to discard the principle and provide for annual sessions in the new constitution about to be formed in that territory.

We have always believed this to be a penny-wise and pound-foolish policy, and have intended to take up and investigate this principle in the course of our articles upon the constitution to be formed for Wisconsin. Although not prepared at present to bestow that attention to it which we had intended, we cannot refrain from alluding to it at this time and presenting the views of the writer alluded to. He has glanced at some of the most substantial reasons which should operate against biennial and in favor of annual sessions.

It will not be denied that there has been a strong disposition manifested and a growing tendency in our country since the adoption of our federal constitution, under one specious pretext or another, to transfer the political power from the many, and to consolidate it in the hands of the few. The new doctrine of biennial sessions, under the plausible garb of economy and a check upon excessive legislation, if not directly intended to aid in this transfer of power is preëmi

nently favorable to such a result. It is, to say the very least, an encroachment upon the most popular-perhaps it should be termed by way of preeminence--the popular branch of our republican form of government. With the executive and judicial powers constantly armed and in the field of action, is not two years entirely too long a period for a free people to withdraw their immediate agency from their own government? We are fully persuaded that it is.

As respects the economy of the measure, the history of Illinois speaks volumes. Our mouth is full of arguments and we could write columns upon this topic; but we must forbear for the present and be content with presenting some of the views of the Reporter's correspondent, which we here subjoin:

One of the features to which I have alluded, as being radically wrong, is that fixing the intervals for the assembling of the state legislature, wherein I am convinced that the convention committed a great error. This provision more immediately affects the citizens of the entire state than any other, and involves considerations of the weightiest import. From some cause or another-perhaps owing to impressions left upon [the] community by the sessions of our territorial legislature all parties seem to have regarded the frequent recurrence of legislative sessions as the greatest evil with which the people could be cursed; whereas it is, in fact, the main bulwark of their liberties. This view of the subject is so apparent to my mind that I cannot but regard with surprise the fact that it was overlooked by the Democratic portion of the former convention.

The legislature is the immediate representative of the people, and is presumed to speak, more emphatically than any other branch of the government, their wishes and feelings. It is, as Blackstone would express it, "the supreme authority of the state," to which all other departments or coördinate branches are amenable, and is especially charged with keeping them within proper bounds, and, therefore, cannot but exert a healthful influence over all the various channels through which the government is administered. Is it not greatly to be feared that these channels would become polluted, in consequence of the absence of this essential influence, and the torpidity, for so long a period as two years, of this supreme power, emanating directly from the people? It is obvious that the danger would be imminent. Indeed, it is rather a novel spectacle in free gov

ernments to see the people jealous of a too frequent assembling of their immediate representatives, to watch over and guard their interests and to resist and repel the encroachments of the other departments of the government, over which, in fact, they have no immediate control, but through the legislature.

For one, I cannot but believe that, in this particular, the members of the former convention mistook the wishes of the people; for it is a libel upon their intelligence and patriotism to suppose that while they have abundantly manfested their willingness to supply the means, by a tax, for the support of a plain, simple, and economical government, yet they are entirely unwilling to extend that tax so far as to defray the expense of sending an agent from the several legislative districts to the seat of government, in the shape of a representative to the legislature, to investigate and report upon the manner in which the laws are administered, to point out abuses, provide remedies, and to enact new laws or amend old ones, so as to make them at all times subservient to the wants and interests of community. Were it not for intruding too much upon your room and the patience of your readers, I would proceed to show how ridiculous this policy is in point of economy, and that instead of economy it can only be characterized as the most ruinous parsimony. I will merely add that, supposing the legislature to sit fifty days in each year, to which period their two dollars per diem pay was limited, the expense over that of biennial sessions would be but about $4,000 per annum, or about two cents on each eighty acre lot or hundred dollars of the probable amount of taxable property at the time of our becoming a state.

I have yet to learn, sir, that true constitutional reform or progression in political economy extends to lengthening the intervals of the legislative sessions beyond the period of one year, to circumscribing the action and comparatively paralyzing this most essential arm of the government. Neither Missouri, Louisiana, Texas, nor Florida have adopted this policy in their new constitutions; and in Illinois, where their sessions are now biennial, I have no doubt they will repudiate it when her constitution is revised (which is to be done before long); for I am informed that, notwithstanding their constitutional provision on the subject, they generally hold either a called or adjourned session in each interim between the regular ones. I have also to learn of the explosion of that time-honored democratic principle by which delegated power is required to revert, at short intervals, to the hands of the people-for the policy under consideration doubles the term of office of their representatives. I am a progressive Democrat, but do not believe in retrograde progression.

I think, sir, it is the duty of the territorial press to take this subject in hand, and express their views freely upon it; and if any of them unfortunately (for myself, or for them, or for the community) should dissent from the views above expressed, they have my glove.

VOX POPULI.

INDIVIDUAL BANKING

[May 5, 1846]

The Racine Advocate (which, by the way, is ably conducted by its new proprietors) at the close of a well-written article in opposition to the present banking system makes an exception in favor of individual banking, which we were sorry to see. The paragraph reads thus:

The people have no longer any confidence in banks, and legislators know it. They still continue in most states to prescribe remedies for evils, while they see that not in any one case can they ever effect a cure. That they must all go down in the end we firmly believe, and if banking ever succeeds it must be individual banking, where the confidence placed is as much in the honesty of the individual banker as in his capital. We have seen all other modes prove failures, and while we would not encourage even this, we would not prohibit it.

With due deference to our esteemed cotemporary we must say that we would prohibit, absolutely, individual banking, and for precisely the same reasons that we would prohibit corporate banking. There is no more safety to the bill holder under this system than any other, or, at any rate, than under a corporate system with individual responsibility. We would as soon be shaved by a corporation as by an individual-on a bank note as on a shinplaster; we can see no difference.

The failure of the banker is but one in a thousand of the evils incident to the banking system in any form. Paper money, while it is almost utterly useless, is infinitely mischievous, even supposing there could be no such thing as a bank failure. Political economy and the experience of man

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