concerned the choice is as complete as it ever can be. It then becomes a question of choice not between men but between principles-not who shall be the instruments of carrying out a certain course of public policy, but what that policy shall be. In our conventions our agents vote for men-the principles which are to govern them being understood; while at the polls we vote for principles-the men who are to carry them out having been previously selected by our agents. This is the exact philosophy of our system and of the motives which govern our elections, at least so far as respects the legislative and executive departments. The election of town and county officers upon party principles may seem to be an exception to the rule, but even here we vote for men on party grounds for the sake of party organization and discipline, with an ultimate view of securing more important ends through the legislative and executive departments of the state or of the general government.

We see, then, that so far as the choice of men is concerned, the people have no more voice in the selection of legislative and executive officers than they have in the selection of judges appointed by the executive or elected by the legislature. The selections in the one case are made by agents chosen more or less directly by the people, for that purpose mainly or exclusively, in the form of a political convention, and in the other by agents chosen by a little different process, for that and for other purposes, in the form of a legislature. The difference amounts to about this: In the one case a farmer sends a hireling to the woods to split rails and tells him to keep an eye out for a sled crook and cut one in the course of the day; and in the other he sends one man to split rails, and another to cut a sled crook.

The nominations for legislative and executive officers having been made by opposite parties through their agents, it becomes necessary to refer them again to the people, because they are to be invested with power to enact laws and originate public measures; and they come before the people

not upon their own personal merits but upon the merits of their principles and the measures of their respective parties. If this party is the strongest, A. is the man-if that party is the strongest, B. is the man. There is no chance at the polls for the selection of men, or at the utmost the choice is between two, and a man must vote with his party and abide the selection which has been made or he must throw away either his principles or his vote, or both.

The selection of a judge having been made, not by the people in their primary capacity, but by their authorized agents, is there any similar necessity for submitting this selection to a popular vote for confirmation? It appears to us that there cannot be, for the reasons before alluded to-that the courts have no power to enact laws or originate public measures, and that these are really the only questions at issue at the polls. A judge is selected, or should be, simply with reference to his personal fitness to perform certain duties in accordance with existing law.

When we vote for a legislative or executive officer we intend that our votes shall tell upon the official doings of that officer. Can we have any such motive in wishing to vote for a judge? Do we wish to have our votes influence the decisions of a court? If these questions are answered affirmatively, an important point is conceded to those opponents of the elective mode who object to it on this very ground, and which objection is generally admitted to be valid, if well founded. If we do not intend that our votes shall bear upon the official acts of the judge, we beg to know what effect we expect our votes [to] have? They have nothing to do with the selection of the man, for the selection must be made before we can have an opportunity to vote upon it at the ballot box. We may elect a party man, but this will not affect party measures because party measures are entirely out of the sphere of his official duties. If there is no question to be decided at the ballot box but the personal fitness of the candidate, and that question is and must be effectually set

tled before it can get there, we cannot see what use there can be in sending it there at all.

There is, therefore, no important difference in these modes of selection. The people never select their officers in person, except those of the very lowest grade. In either case and in all cases the higher officers must be selected by agents chosen more or less directly by the people, according to the nature of the offices and the area over which their jurisdiction extends. The only difference consists in the different modes by which the agents who make the selections are chosen, and the only remaining question (as appears to us) is, what system of agency is calculated to secure the best selection of judges.

"ROUGH HEWER'S" VIEWS

[July 21, 1846]

MR. SMITH: I perceive you have laid before the public the crude suggestions I threw together as some of the points that might come under discussion in the formation of the constitution and (as I expected) you have commenced demolishing some of the plans as relates to the bank project. I believe with you that it is decidedly advisable not to have any at all, provided the issues of the banks of other states can be kept out of circulation; and I did not consider the provision suggested as likely ever to be made available, as it would have to be ratified by the people (or a subsequent legislature, which is the same thing) who would thereby assume the responsibility of the creature, which I take it for granted they would never do, and if banks are entirely excluded I shall be quite content.

In reference to the exemption of a home for every householder, I do not think forty acres too much when used for cultivation. Proper guards should be thrown in to prevent an abuse of so humane and desirable a provision. I con

sider the constitution the proper place to provide for it in order to give it stability and permanence. Our public domain embraces many hundred million of acres of land, and I consider no injurious results will accrue from a salutary provision of something of the kind. I am not pertinacious as to how or what it should be, but if I were in the convention I should go for forty acres—anyhow.

With respect to the religious (or as you call it, irreligious) test for office, I will join issue with you on that subject, and would contend obstinately for the provision proposed. I respect true religion and revere the author of it, whose kingdom is not of this world, and with a view to protect and perpetuate its purity and give our state and nation and posterity the benefit of its salutary influences, as the safest guard and shield to our free institutions, I would not open the door to tempt those who are set apart to minister at the altar and break to the people the bread of life down into the muddy waters of political strife. Let them keep their place, and attend to their appropriate duties with all men (not as partisans). Let the fountain be kept pure and the stream will run clear and full and even. We want no political priests or ministers, and if any of them prefer to become such, and prefer to occupy the bench or the senate hall, or to deal in political patronage, make them lay off their robes and become laymen. We will have no religious dictation in the civil government; no alliance of church and state. Let each be a separate organization, as each is dependent upon the other for the permanency of their establishments. There is no intolerance in connection with the provisions as you speak of. This system has worked well in the New York constitution, and I hope to see it in ours. More anon, as you proceed to dissect the several items of my first communication.

Yours, etc.,

ROUGH HEWER.

ELECTIVE JUDICIARY

[July 21, 1846]

The Racine Advocate expresses a preference for an elective judiciary, but admits that it is a grave subject, upon which the wisest of men may differ, and should not be adopted without careful consideration. The Advocate says:

To our minds the great desideratum is to get judges who will hold themselves above politics, whether they be appointed or selected, and if anyone will show us how that object can be secured, we will give up all our own favorite ideas and adopt his. We want to see the best men among us on the bench, and we want to see those wen so well paid that they may feel willing to remain there.

This is the right spirit, and the one which we hope will generally prevail on both sides of the question. In what we have written upon this subject one important object we had in view was to counteract a false issue which seemed to be making up, to wit: Whether or no the people should be trusted to select their own rulers, by showing that the people have just as much to do with the choice of men under one of the proposed systems as another. We hear men talk about entrusting and not entrusting the people with power. We have had all the while a lurking surmise that such men did not know exactly what they were talking about.

Who are these men who, it is assumed, have all power buttoned up in their own breasts, and which they are to trust out to the people? We would like to see them and ask them where they got that same power. The truth is that under our federal and all of our state governments the people have now and always have had all power residing in themselves, and it is ridiculous enough for a politician to talk about the power which he proposes to confer upon the people, if they will only let him.