novel, and less tested by experience. We notice, also, that our friend attempts no reply to our objection to his plan, that it would operate only to transfer a power usually entrusted to the executive and senate or to the legislature, to irresponsible caucuses, and party conventions-which is the precise avenue through which we think incompetent partisans will be most likely to reach judicial station, and party corruption to attain the administration of justice.

EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE

[July 25, 1846]

While we have advocated the policy of the appointment of judicial officers by the governor with the confirmation by the senate, as a preferable method to nomination by caucus with confirmation by the people, we have done so with the firm conviction that our constitution will be so framed as to limit the patronage of the executive of the state, in the matter of appointments, entirely or nearly so, to the officers of the judiciary. If the appointment of these officers is to form a part of an extended system of patronage entrusted to the executive, we have no hope, with all the temptations which such a system presents for distributing its favors to reward unscrupulous partisans or personal adherents, that this department of the government will thus be preserved from corruption. We should much prefer that the people do not delegate this trust, than that with it they confer upon the executive administration the power to strengthen itself against a withdrawal of their favor by the purchase of a numerous and widely distributed horde of mercenary apologists and defenders, through the conferring of official patronage.

By a report prepared by the secretary of state of the state of New York, at the requisition of the constitutional convention now in session, it appears that there have arisen, under the present constitution, 289 civil officers whose appointments emanate directly and solely from the governor, and

2,238 who are appointed by the governor with the consent of the senate. The compensation of that portion of these officers whose salaries are fixed by law amounts to no mean part of the public expenditures; but by far the larger proportion of the incumbents are paid by certain fees and perquisites pertaining to their respective offices, and their compensation cannot be ascertained short of requiring a return, from each, of the fees and emoluments he receives from his office. What a host of retainers, all looking to the same source for their appointments, and all bound by the strong tie of interest to perpetuate the same men in power as a means of retaining the favors they enjoy! What a fearful, though -unknown, amount of money placed, mediately under the control of a few official dignitaries, and more directly in the hands of one man, which may be used as a fund for purchasing defenders and apologists for any infraction of the constitution or neglect of duty, or for the corruption of the patriotism of the people.

It was, in a great measure, by a politic use of this immense power of patronage, through their own partisans in the executive chair, that the famous Albany Regency were enabled to control the politics of that state for so many years—making and unmaking governors, revolutionizing different sections, and building such stately fortunes for the few who had the distribution of favors and controlled the operations of the party. Twenty-five hundred office-holders scattered among the people and each surrounded by a circle of personal friends and dependents all interested to talk and write for the powers at Albany that controlled the party-and to these added greedy multitudes of expectants who well understood that they could only hope to attain the object of their desires by blindly adhering to, and actively furthering the objects of, those who had the dispensation of benefits-forms a political force all too effective for safety among a people devoted to the daily pursuits of industry and no further interested in political affairs than becomes their duty as citizens.

The state convention now in session in New York will, doubtless, break up this system of corruption, and revert to the people the choice of most of the officers now selected by appointment. This will work a great reform-removing the probability of any personal interest in the election of a particular candidate from the patronage his election may now place at his disposal, and leaving no motive of like character for undue subserviency to the incumbents of office. And we greatly mistake if a constitution for the state of Wisconsin, in order to be acceptable to the people, will not have to be modeled by a kindred spirit of enlightened democracy.

PARTYISM AND THE CONSTITUTION

[August 1, 1846]

A convention of Locofoco delegates met at Hall & Pratt's on Saturday last and put the following ticket in nomination for delegates to the convention to form a constitution for the state of Wisconsin, viz: F. S. Lovell and Elijah Steele, of Southport; M. M. Strong and Edward G. Ryan, of Racine; Daniel Harkins, of Pleasant Prairie; Haynes French, of Pike; Stephen O. Bennett, of Raymond; Thomas Stockwell, of Salem; James B. Carter, of Wheatland; Nathaniel Dickerson, of Burlington; Victor M. Willard, of Rochester; James H. Hall, of Paris; Chatfield S. Parsons, of Caledonia; and Chauncey Kellogg, of Mount Pleasant.

Of the individuals thus brought forward as candidates for election to assist in executing the most important trust that the people will, probably, be called to delegate for the next quarter of a century, we have nothing to say that will not occur to the mind of everyone who reads over the list. Some of them are capable and worthy men-others appear to have been nominated solely on the principle of throwing something, since the convention election gives the party an extra number of offices to dispose of to those who have by their continued importunities for office, heretofore, wearied the party

leaders. We are told that the nominees are, with one exception, democrats of the right stamp, by which are meant those that fear the party, reverence its nominations and love the two dollars a day (with most fervent wishes for more). But what their views are touching any principle to be established in the constitution, we can know nothing except by report. To carry out the "spoils" principle of choosing delegates, it became necessary to degrade the constitutional election, the most important one to the people that the citizens of this territory were ever called upon to decide, below the dignity of an ordinary election for county officers. A convention called to nominate candidates for the latter would have sent forth a declaration of principles, reasserted with pompous formality for the thousandth time; but, as on all matters that have anything to do with making a constitution, the party comprises almost every shade of difference in opinion, it, doubtless, appeared not advisable to look for accordant sentiments among the nominees, or to be in the least particular about what a candidate would go for in reference to the constitution.

We had hoped that men would be brought forward for delegates to the convention in such a manner that the question would not be whether the candidate was a free-trade man or a protectionist, "a bad Democrat, or a good Whig,' one who always votes a strict party ticket, or one independent of political associations-but is he sound on the principles on which the people wish to base their social compact? Is he such a man as we can trust with the difficult task of forming a constitution under which the present and perhaps succeeding generations are to live? In such a contest a discussion of principles, not of men or parties, would be evolved, by which the opinions of the people would become established and defined, and delegates would be chosen who could fully and faithfully represent the wishes of the people. The creation of a state government supposes society to be in its disorganized condition, and the work before them the formation of a new social compact. Each individual is a partner, con

tributing a certain portion of his natural liberty for the maintenance and improvement of civil liberty. The wishes of the people rather than the behests and interests of parties are the proper subjects of consideration.

These views we have held and advocated from the first, and, accordingly, we have urged the bringing forward of candidates by the people in their primary capacity without the intervention of caucuses, or party committees. Although the action of both the Loco and Liberty parties may seem now in a measure to compel the Whigs to make a party nomination, yet we think that their course should never drive our party from a right position.

Such are the views of the Whig county committee, and accordingly they have not called a Whig convention for the nomination of delegates to the convention (and will not do so unless the action of the committee is not approved of by the party generally) resting party efforts for organization upon the contest for county officers.

The call of the committee for a convention to present candidates for legislative and county officers will be found in another column-and we trust it will meet the prompt attention of every Whig in the county.

THE DELEGATE ELECTION

[August 15, 1846]

The Whig convention on Wednesday adjourned without taking any action in reference to a nomination for delegates to form a state constitution. This, we presume, is decisive of the fact that the Whigs, as a party, will not present a ticket for that object at the election-and, in default of any nomination of their own, members of the party will be left to select between candidates already before the people or hereafter to be brought forward. If the Whigs have refrained from making a nomination from conviction of the impropriety of party action in a matter of common and vital