and to convince the honest legislator that he is rendered almost powerless by the vogue. It is true that important occasions will often arise where these managers, not having the talent to conceal their views, overshoot the mark, disgust those who have served them, and lose their power at once and forever; but new men arise after the ferment has subsided and the same round of chicanery is played again.

All must admit that the single-district system is more democratic. It brings the delegate and his constituents more closely together. They know him better and the nominations are made more at home. Besides, there is none of that logrolling in conventions where distant interests will join to foist nominees upon a county that would not be their first choice. In short, the single-district system brings the power closer to the people, and that is what we should all strive to do upon all occasions.

We are all well aware that there have been many objections raised to this plan, the most prominent of which has always been that in many of these districts there will be but little choice of men, or, in other words, that in many there are none but farmers, who have not that refinement of education or habit of public speaking that is so much more readily found when you have a county to ransack. To this we answer that these accomplishments are not necessary. There will always be speakers enough in the legislature, always be men enough of really superior minds, and if you fill up the remaining numbers with plain, sensible men you will have a legislature fit for all emergencies.

To the men who make this objection we would like to ask a question or two. How is it with the large-district system? Do you select men of great talent, of great oratory, great purity? No. You do not; and why? Because it cannot be done. The system is bad in itself and to get one good man in your delegation you are often forced to admit the remainder to be all indifferent. In large districts there are too many interests to allow of a choice of good men. They

are there, it is true, but you dare not choose them for fear of injuring yourselves with some of the petty but widely extended influences that always make themselves felt in large districts.

Another advantage of the district system is that it prevents what is called gerrymandering. Where this system prevails no cunning can make much difference in laying out contiguous districts, the more particularly in a state such as ours will be, where certain lines can be prescribed and the minority in politics must have as nearly as possible its proper number of delegates.

We trust that when Wisconsin becomes a state this will be taken care of and that we shall then have not only our lower house so elected, but our upper house as near as it may be. Indeed, we would prefer that it should be likewise arranged according to the single-district system alone, even if we only elected in three or four years. We, however, think four or even three too long, and believe a senate might well be renewed every two years if there are annual sessions, and four where the sessions are biennial.

Another advantage will be that where each portion of a county is sure of its representative there will not be such an anxiety to multiply counties for the sake of influence, and none will wish to go to the expense of new county buildings, etc., unless the increased convenience to a considerable portion of country will pay not only that expense, but the extra burden of another set of county officers.

It ought to be a sufficient inducement to us to try this system, the mere seeing how discontented with the old one all have become in other states. But in addition to everything, a new state requires it more than all others. Among us there will be constantly new men coming in, who may be well fitted for office, well known in their small districts, and perfectly trusted, while in the county abroad they are entirely unknown. In the old states men do not often come into a county unless it be to remain for many years, and never look

for office until the old stagers shall have lost popularity or have been promoted, and under the county system when one of them goes his place is supplied by another from the same clique.

Another advantage yet would be the breaking up of the influence of those little knots of politicians, who, lacking any other capabilities to gain power, gain it by industriously canvassing a county and then let themselves out for the hire of some little office as tools to some ambitious man who has rather more sense than they and guides their exertions.

We are inclined to the belief that the single-district system would be far the best for us and far the most popular among us; and we hope the convention will so arrange the matter that the election of members for both houses will be brought as near the people as possible, and the candidate for office chosen from such a small territory that he may be as well known as possible to those who send him on to do for them the duties that must be performed by delegate.

SELECTIONS FROM THE PLATTEVILLE INDEPENDENT AMERICAN

LETTERS OF “A FARMER OF GRANT”—No. 1

[December 31, 1845]

As we are shortly to be employed in forming a constitution for the government of the state of Wisconsin, it is right and proper that every paper should begin to discuss the subject; and indeed every citizen has a right, through the press, to give his views of what features in the fundamental law of the country would, or would not, be likely to promote justice and happiness.

We are here collected from all the states of the Union and other countries; therefore we ought to exchange ideas freely, with an honest intention of stifling prejudice and coming at truth, by inquiring of many people. It is not uncommon for men to believe that the things to which they have been habituated are preferable to all others. This disposition has shown itself in all the conventions, from that that formed the Constitution of the United States down to that of Texas. John Adams once said, at the table of Mr. Jefferson, "The British government is the best in the world, if it were trimmed of some of its little errors." Mr. Hamilton being present replied, "As it is, it is the best." Likely they were both right, but an original thinker, like Franklin or Jefferson, would have been likely to inquire whether it could be made better, or whether it fully answered the purpose for which governments were instituted among men, viz: to secure their rights, and to promote justice and happiness. This should be the polar star to guide the framers of all constitutions and laws, and perhaps the whole should be resolved into the word justice; for when a man has strict jus

tice done him in every respect, if he is not happy it is not the fault of the laws of his country. Nearly all robberies that have been committed by legislation have been carried through under the pretence of promoting happiness. All the bankrupt laws, the stay laws, the loan office laws, the lottery laws, the distribution laws, the state debt and internal improvement laws, the bank and tariff laws, with a thousand others of a similar cast for individual benefit, have been carried forward with the pretence of promoting happiness; but in my view he that is willing to sacrifice justice to promote general happiness is on the wrong track, and will not accomplish his object, and all such legislation should be prohibited by the constitution.

As the constitution of Texas is the latest improvement in that way, I will notice a few of its sections. Article I, section 11, says: Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishments inflicted. All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.

It can easily be seen that this section is the production of a lawyer. This remedy is just no remedy at all. To sue a man at law is about equal to challenging him to fight a duel, and as dueling is prohibited in another part of this constitution, it was perhaps thought right to let them fight their battles in court. When a man is about to challenge his adversary to fight a duel, he reasons thus: "The scoundrel has done me an injury; therefore I will take the risk of getting a shot in my body for the chance of putting one into his." So if he sues him at law: "The rascal has done me an injury, I will take the risk of a shot into my pocket for the chance of putting one into his"; but there is this difference-in the latter case both shots are sure to take effect, while in the former they may both miss: of the two evils the dueling is undoubtedly the least.

Article I, section 12. "No person for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall a per